Ambiguous Leases, Missing Exhibits, and the “Fully Heard” Standard: Commentary on Howard Avenue Station, LLC v. The Dubliner, Inc.

I. Introduction

This unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision arises from a long‑running dispute over a narrow strip of courtyard space between two commercial buildings in Tampa, Florida. Despite its modest subject matter—a twelve-foot strip of outdoor area—the opinion in Howard Avenue Station, LLC v. The Dubliner, Inc., No. 24‑13428 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), offers important guidance on:

• How federal courts, applying Florida law, determine when a lease is ambiguous and may be illuminated by extrinsic evidence;
• The legal effect (or lack thereof) of using only street addresses to describe leased premises;
• How earlier state‑court litigation over the same property can be used as contextual evidence of contractual intent without triggering collateral estoppel;
• The interaction between de novo and clear‑error review in bankruptcy appeals involving contract interpretation; and
• The meaning of being “fully heard” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) in a bench trial.

The dispute is embedded in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Howard Avenue Station, LLC (“HAS”), managed by Thomas Ortiz, is the debtor. Frank Kane is the owner of two adjacent commercial parcels; The Dubliner, Inc. operates an Irish pub as Kane’s tenant. HAS claims that its 2009 lease with Kane includes the “Disputed Area”—a twelve-foot strip of courtyard between the pub building and HAS’s building. The Dubliner and Kane deny that claim.

The case comes to the Eleventh Circuit after:

• A 2007 state‑court declaratory judgment action over essentially the same physical space, resolved in The Dubliner’s favor;
• A 2012 Chapter 11 filing and adversary proceeding by HAS asserting that the Disputed Area is part of the bankruptcy estate by virtue of the 2009 HAS Lease;
• An initial bankruptcy‑court ruling based on collateral estoppel, reversed by the district court in 2022;
• A bench trial on remand, culminating in a Rule 52(c) judgment for Kane and The Dubliner; and
• A 2024 district‑court affirmance reviewing the bankruptcy court as an appellate tribunal.

HAS and Ortiz then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The panel (Judges Jill Pryor, Brasher, and Tjoflat) affirmed the district court, which had affirmed the bankruptcy court. Although the opinion is designated “Not for Publication,” its analysis is detailed and functionally precedential for practitioners looking for persuasive authority on several recurring issues in commercial real estate and bankruptcy litigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision can be summarized in four core holdings:

1. Standard of Review: The district court applied the correct standard of review to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Interpretation of the 2009 HAS Lease was reviewed de novo; the bankruptcy court’s underlying factual findings (particularly about the parties’ intent and historical use of the courtyard) were reviewed for clear error.
2. Lease Ambiguity and Interpretation: The 2009 HAS Lease was ambiguous because:
   • It referenced a missing “Section 2 Sketch” that was supposed to describe the demised premises “more particularly”; and
   • Its description of “buildings and exterior space” as a “fenced off area and storage unit in the rear” of the Howard Avenue building, illustrated by an attached photograph, did not include the Disputed Area and in fact suggested the opposite.
   Considering extrinsic evidence—including the photograph, historical usage, and landlord Kane’s testimony—the courts correctly concluded that the parties did not intend to include the Disputed Area in the 2009 HAS Lease.
3. Addresses vs. Other Evidence under Florida Law: HAS’s argument that listing street addresses (309, 311, 315, and 317 S. Howard Avenue) entitles it to the entire parcel associated with those addresses was rejected. The Eleventh Circuit clarified that, under Florida law, while a street address can satisfy a description requirement for conveying property, it does not automatically override more specific contractual language, attached exhibits, and extrinsic evidence about the scope of the leased premises.
4. Rule 52(c) and Being “Fully Heard”: The bankruptcy court did not violate Rule 52(c)’s “fully heard” requirement by granting judgment after both sides had presented their cases and by refusing HAS’s attempt to reopen its case to elicit additional testimony from Ortiz. Having already put on its case‑in‑chief and cross‑examined witnesses, HAS had a fair opportunity to be heard. Additional proposed testimony about why the Section 2 Sketch was omitted would, in the Eleventh Circuit’s view, have had “little or no probative value” and would not have changed the outcome.

The court also rejected HAS’s contention that the district court “impermissibly relied on dicta” from an earlier district court opinion, clarifying that a later district judge may use another judge’s prior analysis as persuasive reasoning without giving it preclusive effect.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Properties and the Disputed Area

The case centers on two adjacent parcels at the corner of West Azeele Street and South Howard Avenue in Tampa:

• The Howard Avenue building (southeast corner), containing units with addresses 309, 311, 315, and 317 South Howard Avenue. These were leased to HAS under the 2009 HAS Lease.
• The Azeele Street building (2307 W. Azeele Street), whose first floor has been leased to The Dubliner, Inc. since 2002 under a lease that ultimately continued on a month‑to‑month basis.

Between the two buildings lies a courtyard. A wooden dividing wall, installed before either tenant took possession, runs north–south and splits the courtyard into eastern and western portions:

• The Dubliner’s portion: From the west wall of the Azeele Street building eastward to the west side of the wooden dividing wall. Shortly after moving in, The Dubliner constructed an elevated deck in this area (later removed), but it continued to use the entire space up to the fence.
• HAS’s portion: From South Howard Avenue up to the east side of the dividing wall.

The Disputed Area is a twelve‑foot strip on the eastern side of the courtyard, extending from the east side of the wooden wall toward HAS’s building. HAS contends that this area falls within its leasehold; Kane and The Dubliner contend that it is part of the Azeele parcel and always leased to The Dubliner.

B. The Earlier Contracts and State‑Court Litigation

Several contractual layers pre‑date the 2009 HAS Lease:

• 2002 Dubliner Lease: The Dubliner leased the first floor of the Azeele Street building from Kane. The lease (later renewed) was interpreted in 2008–2009 by a Florida state court to cover the Disputed Area.
• 2006 Master Commercial Lease to HAS: Ortiz and HAS entered into a “Master Commercial Lease” and an option agreement with Kane. The Master Lease’s legal description covered both parcels but stated that it was “subject to existing tenant leases,” including The Dubliner’s lease. It thus did not displace The Dubliner’s rights while that lease was effective.
• 2007 State‑Court Declaratory Judgment Action: In 2007, The Dubliner sued HAS, Ortiz, and Kane in Florida state court, seeking clarity about:
  • Whether The Dubliner had validly renewed its 2002 lease; and
  • Whether its leasehold included the Disputed Area.
  Kane, HAS, and Ortiz took the position that the Dubliner Lease was either invalidly renewed or did not include the Disputed Area, which they claimed was separately leased on a month‑to‑month oral basis to The Dubliner and thus terminable at will by Kane.
  The state court rejected those arguments. It held that:
  • The Dubliner’s renewal was valid; and
  • The Dubliner Lease covered the Disputed Area.
  Partial judgment issued in July 2008; final judgment entered May 24, 2009.

C. The 2009 HAS Lease

In July 2009, two months after the state‑court final judgment, Kane, Ortiz, and HAS terminated the Master Lease and entered into a new “2009 HAS Lease.” This lease differed significantly from the Master Lease:

• It no longer purported to lease both entire parcels to HAS; it covered only:
  • The downstairs space in the Howard Avenue building; and
  • The upstairs space in the Azeele Street building.
• It described premises by street addresses (309, 311, 315, and 317 South Howard Avenue) rather than by a parcel‑wide legal description.
• It was silent about:
  • Existing leases (including The Dubliner’s); and
  • The Disputed Area specifically.

Two provisions were central to the later litigation:

1. Section 1 (“Buildings and exterior space”): It defined the exterior space as:

   Buildings and exterior space: see Composite Exhibit “A” which includes a photograph of the fenced off area and storage unit in the rear of the Howard Avenue bldg. to be included as part of the Demised Premises.

   The photo in Composite Exhibit A (the “Section 1 Photograph”) did not depict the Disputed Area; it showed only a fenced area behind the Howard Avenue building, wholly on HAS’s side of the wooden wall.
2. Section 2 (Demised Premises and missing Sketch): It provided that Kane:

   [H]ereby leases, lets and demises to the Tenant … the Demised Premises, more particularly described in Composite Exhibit “A” (sketch).

   However, the referenced “Section 2 Sketch” was never attached to the executed lease. At trial, Kane testified that he did not know why it was missing, but that, if included, it would not have shown the Disputed Area as part of HAS’s premises.

D. Bankruptcy and the Adversary Proceeding

HAS filed a Chapter 11 petition on June 6, 2012. In August 2012, The Dubliner’s written lease expired, and it continued as a month‑to‑month tenant, still occupying the first floor of the Azeele building, the western portion of the courtyard, and the Disputed Area.

In October 2012, HAS commenced an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, seeking:

• A declaration that the 2009 HAS Lease gave it the right to occupy the Disputed Area; and
• Turnover of the Disputed Area as property of the bankruptcy estate.

Kane intervened and counterclaimed for a declaration that the 2009 HAS Lease did not grant HAS any right to the Disputed Area. Notably, in this new litigation, Kane took the exact opposite position from the 2007 state‑court case: now he argued that The Dubliner, not HAS, held the rights to the Disputed Area under his separate arrangement with the pub.

E. Prior Appeals and Remand

The bankruptcy court initially granted summary judgment for Kane on collateral estoppel grounds, holding that the 2007 state‑court ruling in favor of The Dubliner on the Disputed Area precluded HAS’s claim. HAS and Ortiz appealed.

In 2022, District Judge Honeywell reversed. She held that collateral estoppel did not apply because:

• The state case had interpreted the 2002 Dubliner Lease, determining whether that lease gave The Dubliner rights to the Disputed Area; whereas
• The adversary proceeding concerned the 2009 HAS Lease, a different contract not yet in existence when the state litigation occurred.

Nevertheless, Judge Honeywell noted that the state‑court judgment provided “persuasive—perhaps even dispositive—evidence” against HAS’s claim that the parties to the 2009 HAS Lease intended to include the Disputed Area. That observation was expressly framed as a matter of evidentiary weight, not preclusion.

The case returned to the bankruptcy court for a full trial on the meaning and scope of the 2009 HAS Lease.

F. Bench Trial, Rule 52(c) Motion, and District‑Court Affirmance

After HAS presented its case‑in‑chief, including testimony from Ortiz, Kane and The Dubliner moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) (made applicable by Bankruptcy Rule 7052) for judgment on partial findings, arguing:

• That the 2009 HAS Lease unambiguously excluded the Disputed Area; or
• Alternatively, that even if the lease was ambiguous, HAS had not carried its burden of showing that the Disputed Area was included.

The bankruptcy court reserved ruling, wanting to hear from Kane, particularly about the missing Section 2 Sketch. Kane testified that:

• He always treated the Disputed Area as part of the Azeele Street parcel; and
• He had always leased it that way—i.e., alongside The Dubliner’s use of the Azeele building, not as part of the Howard Avenue building premises.

After hearing all evidence, the bankruptcy court granted the Rule 52(c) motion, holding that the 2009 HAS Lease did not include the Disputed Area. It relied on:

• Kane’s testimony about his intent and historical usage;
• The content of the Section 1 Photograph and “fenced off area” language;
• The absence of the Section 2 Sketch; and
• The broader context, including the recent state‑court ruling against HAS on the same physical space under the prior lease regime.

HAS sought to recall Ortiz to testify that Kane had told him the addresses in the lease were sufficient and that the Section 2 Sketch was therefore unnecessary. The bankruptcy court denied that request, holding that:

• HAS had already had an opportunity to elicit such testimony in its case‑in‑chief; and
• Additional testimony would not resolve the ambiguity about what the lease actually covered.

HAS appealed again. In 2024, District Judge Barber, acting as an appellate court, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s findings and judgment.

IV. Analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

A. Standards of Review in Bankruptcy Appeals

The Eleventh Circuit began by restating a foundational principle of bankruptcy appellate practice: when a case travels from the bankruptcy court to the district court and then to the court of appeals, the court of appeals reviews the bankruptcy court’s decision directly, applying the same standards that the district court was required to use.

Citing In re Brown, 742 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014), the panel reaffirmed:

• Legal conclusions (including contract interpretation) are reviewed de novo.
• Factual findings (such as what the parties intended or how space has historically been used) are reviewed for clear error.

HAS argued that the district court had improperly reviewed the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the 2009 HAS Lease under the more deferential clear‑error standard rather than de novo. It pointed to a concluding sentence in Judge Barber’s opinion stating that the bankruptcy court’s conclusion was “not clearly erroneous.”

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument as a misreading of the district‑court opinion:

• The passage HAS cited referred to the bankruptcy court’s weighing of evidence and the resulting factual finding about the parties’ intent—not to the pure legal question of whether the lease language was ambiguous.
• Elsewhere, the district court had expressly and at length analyzed the lease language, an exercise that embodies de novo review.

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit conducted its own de novo review of the lease and reached the same conclusion. This alone cures any alleged error in the district court’s articulation of the standard.

This portion of the opinion reinforces an important nuance: in contract disputes, especially over ambiguous instruments, courts often confront mixed questions:

• Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law.
• Determining what the parties intended once ambiguity is found is a question of fact, often turning on extrinsic evidence.

The Eleventh Circuit treats these components distinctly, as it should: legal conclusions de novo, factual conclusions for clear error.

B. Ambiguity of the 2009 HAS Lease and the Missing Sketch

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower courts that the 2009 HAS Lease was ambiguous. Two aspects drove this conclusion:

1. Confined description of exterior space in Section 1: Section 1 described the exterior space as a “fenced off area and storage unit in the rear of the Howard Avenue bldg,” with reference to an attached photograph. The photo showed only the fenced area behind the Howard Avenue building, not the Disputed Area (which lay beyond the wooden dividing wall).
   
   The Eleventh Circuit stressed that it is “simply not the case” that a lease term describing a “fenced off area” could unambiguously be read to include a portion of outdoor space outside the fenced area. Indeed, “if anything, the lease unambiguously does not include the Disputed Area.”
2. The missing Section 2 Sketch: Section 2 purported to describe the “Demised Premises” “more particularly” through a “Composite Exhibit ‘A’ (sketch).” That sketch was missing from the executed document.
   
   The absence of a referenced document that was intended to give a more precise delimitation of the premises is itself a strong source of ambiguity. The court called this the creation of “inherent ambiguity,” thereby justifying resort to extrinsic evidence.

Once ambiguity was found, the bankruptcy court was entitled—indeed obligated—under Florida law to consider extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties intended the lease to cover. The Eleventh Circuit endorsed the bankruptcy court’s reliance on:

• Historical use of the Disputed Area (which The Dubliner had occupied since 2002);
• Kane’s testimony that he had always treated the Disputed Area as part of the Azeele Street parcel rented with the pub, not as part of HAS’s Howard Avenue premises; and
• The context of the 2007 state‑court judgment, which had just confirmed The Dubliner’s rights to the Disputed Area under the prior lease structure.

Viewed against this backdrop, HAS’s insistence that the lease “unambiguously” included the Disputed Area was described by the panel as “border[ing] on frivolous.”

C. Street Addresses vs. the Scope of the Lease: Misreading Mendelson

A central plank of HAS’s theory was that, under Florida law, a lease that demises specific street addresses necessarily carries with it the entire tax parcel or legal lot associated with those addresses. HAS invoked Mendelson v. Great Western Bank, F.S.B., 712 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), as supposedly establishing this proposition.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument on two levels:

1. Mischaracterization of Mendelson: Mendelson stands for the unremarkable proposition that a street address can be a sufficient description to support the conveyance of real property. It does not say that whenever a lease identifies premises by address, the tenant automatically acquires every square foot of land corresponding to that address, regardless of other contractual language or attachments.
2. Addresses do not trump other indicia of intent: Even if an address is a valid descriptor, it is only one part of the interpretive picture. Here, other evidence pointed strongly the other way:
   • The focus on “fenced off” rear space in Section 1 and the supporting photograph;
   • The missing sketch, which was supposed to “more particularly” describe the demised premises; and
   • The longstanding, visible occupation of the Disputed Area by The Dubliner.
   Under Florida law, these elements may be used to define or limit what portion of a parcel the parties intended to lease, particularly where the instrument is ambiguous.

This portion of the opinion provides a useful clarification for Florida practitioners: a street address can satisfy the Statute of Frauds and support a conveyance, but it does not create a blunt rule that tenants “get everything” associated with that address. In mixed‑use or multi‑tenant settings, the actual extent of leased premises will depend on the totality of the contract language and context, not on automation by parcel boundaries.

D. Extrinsic Evidence and the Role of Prior Litigation

The Eleventh Circuit also endorsed the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s reliance on the 2007 state‑court litigation as contextual evidence of what the parties intended in 2009, while maintaining the earlier holding that the state judgment did not collaterally estop HAS from litigating the meaning of a different lease.

The analytical steps are:

• The 2007 case decided an issue of possession of the Disputed Area under the 2002 Dubliner Lease.
• The present case concerns the scope of a later, distinct contract—the 2009 HAS Lease—which did not exist at the time of the state proceedings.
• Because the “issue” in the collateral estoppel sense is not identical (different contract, different parties’ rights), preclusion does not apply. This was Judge Honeywell’s 2022 holding.
• However, the fact that:
  • The Dubliner’s rights to the Disputed Area had just been upheld in court; and
  • HAS and Kane had been adverse to The Dubliner over that same space;
  is highly probative of what they intended two months later when they redrafted and narrowed HAS’s lease rights in 2009.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed that these surrounding circumstances could be taken into account when interpreting the ambiguous 2009 lease. Viewed in that light, it is “difficult to believe” that the parties, having just lost a lawsuit about the Disputed Area, nevertheless intended silently to shift that area into HAS’s leasehold without express language.

This analysis illustrates a critical distinction in contract and preclusion law:

• Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars relitigation of an identical legal or factual issue actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior case.
• Contextual use of prior litigation focuses on how the prior ruling shaped the parties’ expectations and conduct in subsequent negotiations.

The former is a rule of preclusion; the latter is a permissible use of history as evidence of intent, especially under Florida’s approach to ambiguous instruments.

E. Alleged Improper Reliance on “Dicta”

HAS argued that the district court on the second appeal improperly relied on “dicta” from Judge Honeywell’s earlier opinion. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this argument as “completely without merit.”

Judge Honeywell had remarked in 2022 that the state‑court decision was “persuasive—perhaps even dispositive—evidence” against HAS’s interpretation of the 2009 HAS Lease. HAS characterized this as nearly preclusive treatment of the state case. But as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out:

• Judge Honeywell explicitly rejected collateral estoppel and treated the prior litigation only as factual context.
• No authority bars a later district judge from citing an earlier judge’s non‑binding but reasoned analysis (even if characterized as dicta) as persuasive support.

The Eleventh Circuit’s approval of this practice underscores that:

• District courts may rely on each other’s reasoning as persuasive, not binding, authority; and
• Criticizing such cross‑reference as “impermissible reliance on dicta” is not a viable appellate strategy in the absence of true preclusion concerns.

F. Rule 52(c) and the Meaning of Being “Fully Heard”

One of HAS’s more substantial procedural arguments was that the bankruptcy court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) by granting judgment on partial findings without giving HAS a full opportunity to present its case—specifically, without allowing Ortiz to reopen testimony in rebuttal after Kane testified about the missing Section 2 Sketch.

Rule 52(c) allows a judge in a bench trial to enter judgment against a party on an issue once the party has been “fully heard” on that issue and cannot prevail. Bankruptcy Rule 7052 makes Rule 52(c) applicable in adversary proceedings.

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the view, previously articulated by other circuits (citing EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2010), and First Va. Banks, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 206 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2000)), that:

The right to be “fully heard” does not “amount to a right to introduce every shred of evidence that a party wishes, without regard to the probative value of that evidence.”

Applied to HAS, the court noted:

• HAS had already presented its case‑in‑chief, including Ortiz’s testimony.
• HAS had the opportunity to question both Ortiz and Kane about the contents and significance of the missing Section 2 Sketch but chose not to do so in its initial presentation.
• Ortiz’s proposed “rebuttal” testimony—that the parties agreed the addresses alone were sufficient and that the sketch was unnecessary—would not have altered the legal conclusion:
  • The absence of the sketch created ambiguity, which had already been resolved against HAS through other extrinsic evidence.

Because the incremental probative value of the proposed testimony was negligible, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen the case and granting the Rule 52(c) motion.

This is an important procedural teaching:

• Rule 52(c) does not require that parties be allowed to present every conceivable piece of evidence.
• Once a party has had a fair chance to present its theory and evidence in its case‑in‑chief, and once the judge reasonably concludes that additional evidence would not change the outcome (because it is cumulative, marginal, or legally irrelevant), the “fully heard” requirement is satisfied.
• Parties cannot withhold “key” testimony for rebuttal and then complain under Rule 52(c) when the court declines to reopen the record.

G. Litigation and Drafting Lessons

The case also illustrates several practical lessons:

1. Attach the Exhibits You Reference: The missing Section 2 Sketch was a central source of ambiguity. From a transactional perspective, the lesson is straightforward: if a lease refers to a sketch or site plan as “more particularly” describing the demised premises, that exhibit must be finalized and physically attached. Otherwise, disputes over scope are almost inevitable—and may be resolved against the drafter or the tenant relying on broad, unbounded language.
2. Do Not Overclaim “Unambiguous” When the Document is Incomplete: The Eleventh Circuit’s statement that HAS’s position “borders on frivolous” should be read as a caution against aggressive over‑statement. Where the instrument itself points to missing components and contradictory spatial descriptions, insisting on “unambiguity” undermines credibility and invites judicial frustration.
3. Cross‑Examination Must Be Used Strategically: HAS had its main witness (Ortiz) on the stand and full opportunity to question Kane. If the contents and role of the missing sketch were so crucial, counsel needed to develop that evidence proactively in the case‑in‑chief. Tactical decisions to “wait and see” can foreclose opportunities under Rule 52(c).
4. Appellate Arguments Must Fairly Characterize Lower‑Court Decisions: The Eleventh Circuit was notably critical of HAS’s argument about the district court’s standard of review and the alleged “improper reliance on dicta.” Mischaracterizing the lower court’s analysis, especially where the appellate court can read the opinion directly, is not helpful advocacy.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Bankruptcy Appeals: “Second Court of Review”

In bankruptcy cases, appeals often follow this path:

1. Initial trial and judgment in the bankruptcy court (a unit of the district court).
2. Appeal to the district court, which acts as an appellate court reviewing the bankruptcy court.
3. Further appeal to the court of appeals (here, the Eleventh Circuit).

When the case reaches the court of appeals, that court does not defer to the district court’s intermediate conclusions. Instead, it reviews the bankruptcy court’s decision directly, applying:

• De novo review to legal questions; and
• Clear‑error review to factual findings.

B. Collateral Estoppel vs. Persuasive Evidence

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) prevents a party from re‑litigating an identical issue that:

• Was actually litigated and decided in a prior case;
• Was necessary to that judgment; and
• Involved the same parties (or their privies).

Here, the 2007 state‑court case decided whether the 2002 Dubliner Lease gave The Dubliner rights to the Disputed Area. The current case asked whether the 2009 HAS Lease gave HAS rights to that same space. Different contract, different legal issue; thus, no preclusion.

However, the fact that:

• The parties had litigated the same physical location;
• The court had just ruled against HAS and Kane; and
• They then rewrote their lease relationship shortly after;

is highly relevant background. Courts are allowed to consider such context as persuasive evidence about what the parties likely intended in the new contract.

C. Ambiguous vs. Unambiguous Contracts

A contract is:

• Unambiguous if its language has a single, clear meaning; courts enforce that meaning without looking at external evidence.
• Ambiguous if reasonable persons could understand it in more than one way, or if key referenced materials are missing or inconsistent (as with the absent Section 2 Sketch and the “fenced off area” language here).

Under Florida law, when a contract is ambiguous:

• Courts may consider extrinsic evidence such as:
  • Course of dealing;
  • Course of performance;
  • Surrounding circumstances at the time of contracting; and
  • Parties’ testimony about their intent.

D. “Month‑to‑Month” Leases and Holdover Tenants

When a fixed‑term lease expires but the tenant continues in possession with the landlord’s consent and rent payments continue, the tenancy often becomes:

• A month‑to‑month tenancy, terminable by either party with appropriate notice.

In this case, after the Dubliner Lease expired in August 2012, The Dubliner continued to occupy the premises on a month‑to‑month basis. However, its use of the Disputed Area did not shift to HAS merely because the written lease expired; the arrangement with Kane continued orally on the same spatial terms unless and until Kane reallocated that area. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion assumes, consistent with the record, that Kane did not do so.

E. “Scrivener’s Error” and Lease Reformation

The 2009 HAS Lease originally mis‑typed one of the street addresses as “313” instead of “315” South Howard Avenue. This was later corrected as a “scrivener’s error”—a clerical mistake in the written instrument, not reflective of the parties’ actual agreement.

Courts commonly permit correction (reformation) of such errors when the evidence shows a mutual understanding inconsistent with the literal text. That correction did not alter the substantive issue here: whether the lease included the Disputed Area.

F. “Not for Publication” and Precedential Value

The Eleventh Circuit marked this opinion “NOT FOR PUBLICATION.” Under the court’s rules, unpublished opinions:

• Are not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit; but
• May still be cited as persuasive authority.

In practical terms, that means lawyers can rely on the reasoning in Howard Avenue Station to support arguments in similar cases, but the opinion does not formally bind later panels in the same way as a published decision.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Drafting and Interpretation of Commercial Leases

For landlords, tenants, and transactional lawyers, the case illustrates:

• The importance of precise, complete descriptions of leased premises, including exterior spaces, patios, courtyards, and common areas.
• The risks of:
  • Relying solely on street addresses in multi‑tenant or mixed‑use contexts; and
  • Leaving referenced exhibits (sketches, site plans) out of the executed document.
• The value of explicitly addressing known disputes in new leases. If parties intend to shift control of an area previously contested in court, they should say so clearly, rather than hoping that general address language will suffice.

B. Bankruptcy Litigation and Property of the Estate

In the bankruptcy setting, this decision underscores that:

• Disputes about what is “property of the estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 541 often turn on state‑law property and contract principles.
• Debtors seeking to enlarge the estate by claiming rights in marginal or ancillary spaces must be prepared to confront both the written instruments and the history of use and litigation around the property.
• Bankruptcy courts, acting as courts of equity but constrained by state law, will not expand a debtor’s leasehold beyond what the contracts and credible evidence support.

C. Rule 52(c) Practice in Bench Trials

For trial lawyers, the court’s reading of Rule 52(c) has concrete consequences:

• Front‑load critical evidence: Do not assume you will always have a chance to “fix” gaps with rebuttal testimony. When the key issue is the interpretation of a written contract, present your best evidence—testimony, documents, and cross‑examination—during your case‑in‑chief.
• Be realistic about probative value: The court’s acceptance of the Third and Fourth Circuits’ “probative value” standard means that speculative or marginally relevant testimony will not bar a Rule 52(c) judgment once a party has otherwise been fairly heard.
• Expect robust use of Rule 52(c): Particularly in bench trials, judges may increasingly use Rule 52(c) to resolve cases efficiently once they are satisfied that additional evidence would not materially affect the outcome.

D. Appellate Strategy and Argumentation

The opinion also provides soft guidance on appellate advocacy:

• Arguments that hinge on strained readings of lower‑court language or misapplications of precedents (like HAS’s reliance on Mendelson) are unlikely to succeed and may draw sharp language from the panel.
• Challenging a district court’s reliance on another district judge’s non‑binding analysis as “impermissible dicta” is not a fruitful line absent actual preclusion or law‑of‑the‑case issues.

VII. Conclusion

Howard Avenue Station, LLC v. The Dubliner, Inc. is, on its face, a fact‑bound dispute over a small slice of courtyard. Yet it yields several important points of law and practice:

• It clarifies how courts in the Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law, treat ambiguous leases, missing exhibits, and the role of extrinsic evidence.
• It rejects an overbroad reading of Florida law under which a lease of a street address automatically conveys every part of the associated parcel, regardless of conflicting language or attachments.
• It draws a clear line between collateral estoppel and the permissible use of prior litigation as context for interpreting later agreements.
• It adopts the view that Rule 52(c)’s “fully heard” requirement does not guarantee a right to present every item of desired evidence, particularly where proposed testimony is of marginal probative value.

For commercial landlords, tenants, and bankruptcy practitioners in Florida and throughout the Eleventh Circuit, the case stands as a detailed, persuasive guide on how courts will analyze disputed exterior spaces in commercial leases, weigh evidence of contractual intent, and manage bench trials under Rule 52(c). Even as an unpublished opinion, its structured reasoning and integration of precedent make it a valuable resource for future litigation involving ambiguous lease provisions and contested property rights in bankruptcy estates.