Ambiguous Health-Related Remarks and Remote-Work Friction Are Not Enough: The Eleventh Circuit’s High Bar for Proving Disability Discrimination in Probationary Employment

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, non‑precedential decision in Emily Laughlin v. Miami‑Dade County, Florida, No. 24‑13284 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), offers a detailed application of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) to a probationary public employee with serious health issues who requested work‑from‑home and flexible scheduling accommodations.

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus non‑binding, the opinion reinforces several important themes in Eleventh Circuit disability‑discrimination jurisprudence:

• The exceptionally narrow category of what qualifies as “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent.
• The demanding nature of the pretext inquiry under the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework.
• The limited role of the “convincing mosaic” theory, which is different but “not more forgiving” than McDonnell Douglas.
• The court’s willingness to assume arguendo that the plaintiff is disabled and suffered an adverse employment action, yet still affirm summary judgment based solely on a failure to show discriminatory intent.

The case centers on whether a probationary animal services outreach specialist, whose health deteriorated due to a brain tumor, thyroid masses, and autoimmune disease, was terminated because of her disability or because of legitimate performance concerns during the probationary period. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the County, holding that the record—viewed in the plaintiff’s favor—did not present sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find intentional discrimination.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and Employment Setting

Plaintiff‑Appellant Emily Laughlin was hired in February 2022 as an outreach specialist with the Miami‑Dade County Animal Services Department (ASD). Her responsibilities included:

• Booking and hosting pet adoption events at the County’s animal shelter and in the community.
• Coordinating logistics for these events, including decorations, staffing, and equipment (e.g., mobile clinic vehicles, payment devices).

Like other new hires, Laughlin was subject to a 12‑month probationary period before she could attain civil service status. During probation:

• Employees are informally evaluated, primarily by supervisors.
• Failure to satisfactorily complete probation results in loss of the position.

Defendant‑Appellee is Miami‑Dade County, Florida, acting through the ASD and its supervisory and HR structure.

B. Medical Conditions and Accommodation

Several months into her probation, Laughlin developed significant health issues:

• Migraines, dizzy spells, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), lightheadedness.
• Difficulty swallowing and frequent vomiting—reportedly up to 20–30 times per day.
• Medical diagnoses: a brain tumor, thyroid masses, and an autoimmune disease.

She sought treatment from multiple specialists (neurosurgeon, neurologist, gastroenterologist) and informed her then‑supervisor, Gilda Nunez, and a human resources manager of her condition. In support, she submitted a nurse’s note indicating:

“multiple complex medical issues” and a requirement for “time off to work to complete required testing and follow up.”

In response, the ASD granted an accommodation:

• Some work‑from‑home days.
• Flexible hours, so long as she completed eight hours per day.

However, ASD Director Bronwyn Stanford was “not a fan of people working from home.” She questioned the accommodation and pressed Laughlin with comments such as:

“But how long do you think you're going to be working from home? Is that gonna stop soon? Can we stop that soon?”

C. Deterioration in Workplace Relationships and Performance

After Laughlin began working from home periodically, she testified that her relationships with coworkers deteriorated:

• Reduced responsiveness to her emails and calls.
• Less willingness to assist with events.
• One colleague allegedly said she would respond only if Laughlin was physically in the office.

During preparation for “MEGA,” the shelter’s largest annual adoption event:

• Coworkers allegedly gave her “the cold shoulder.”
• Adoption counselors refused to help decorate, forcing Laughlin to enlist her mother and mother‑in‑law to assist.
• Director Stanford nonetheless emailed a “SHOUT OUT” praising Laughlin for her decorations and initiative.

In November 2022, supervisory responsibility for Laughlin shifted to Shelter Program Manager Victoria Valledor. While maintaining Laughlin’s ability to work from home, Valledor:

• Scheduled in‑person meetings on days when Laughlin was not in the office.
• Formed an events committee but did not place Laughlin on it (which Laughlin viewed as a move “in preparation of getting rid of [her]”).
• Was overheard allegedly stating to a colleague, regarding Laughlin’s illness: “you know she's faking it, right? Being sick. There's no way she has a brain tumor.”

Complaints about Laughlin’s performance escalated:

• According to Valledor, staff at “almost every event” complained that Laughlin forgot tasks and shifted burdens to others.
• For one event, Valledor had to “scramble last minute” when Laughlin failed to secure a mobile animal clinic vehicle.

A separate incident occurred after a December 2022 event:

• Laughlin had checked out a portable credit card machine for use at an event she did not personally attend.
• An adoption counselor returned the machine but placed event receipts on Laughlin’s desk instead of delivering them to Finance.
• Laughlin asserted she was unaware that the receipts had been left there.
• Twelve days later, Finance staff discovered the receipts on her desk and complained of being “extremely tardy in completing the reconciliation process and submitting documentation.”
• Laughlin admitted the receipts were overdue but emphasized it was her first time handling that responsibility and claimed counselors historically submitted receipts directly to Finance.

Following the receipts incident, an informal performance discussion was held. Present were Supervisor Valledor and the HR manager. They raised multiple concerns:

• Complaints from staff about Laughlin’s alleged unprofessional conduct and disruptions.
• Concerns about her work output, especially while working from home, including a documented day in which she reported four hours of work but produced minimal output.
• The late submission of receipts to Finance.

Valledor later memorialized these concerns in an email, noting both the professionalism complaints and the Finance department’s criticism regarding the receipts.

D. Failure of Probation and End of Employment

In January 2023, approximately 11 months into Laughlin’s 12‑month probationary period:

• Supervisor Valledor informed HR of her intent to conclude that Laughlin failed probation.
• HR drafted a “failure‑of‑probation” letter, which Director Stanford ultimately signed.

Stanford’s precise role in the termination decision was somewhat murky:

• She testified in deposition that she needed to sign such letters and customarily asked questions about performance before doing so.
• She did not recall signing Laughlin’s letter, but conceded the signature was hers and recalled being told Laughlin was “not following through working from home, not responding.”
• She initially indicated she was not “involved in the decision” but later signed a declaration stating that she “authorized” the failure of probation after asking questions about performance.

At the termination meeting, present were:

• Supervisor Victoria Valledor.
• Assistant Director Annette Jose (who oversaw HR).
• A human resources manager.

Jose told Laughlin that she had failed probation. Her remarks included:

“unfortunately at this time you're not able to dedicate all of your time to the work”
“you're not able to give 100% right now”
“it has nothing to do with your – your health issues . . . it has to do with the performance that we need from this position and your inability right now to perform at that level”
“I believe it would be better for you to focus on yourself and your health this new year.”

The County characterized the outcome as a voluntary resignation; Laughlin maintained she was terminated. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit assumed for purposes of analysis that she was in fact terminated.

E. Litigation History

Laughlin sued Miami‑Dade County in the Southern District of Florida, asserting:

• Disability discrimination under:
  • The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
  • The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA).
  • The Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).
• Additional claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (later disposed of on summary judgment and not challenged on appeal).

She alleged that:

• Her serious medical conditions rendered her an individual with a disability within the meaning of these statutes.
• Miami‑Dade County terminated her employment because of her disability (or at least, because of her need for accommodation).

The County moved for summary judgment, arguing:

• A reasonable jury could not find that Laughlin was disabled under the statutory definitions.
• Even assuming she was disabled, no reasonable jury could find that she was terminated because of her disability rather than her performance during the probationary period.

The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding:

• Laughlin had not shown that she qualified as disabled.
• Even if she were disabled, she failed to establish intentional discrimination (directly or circumstantially), particularly because she could not show pretext as to the County’s stated performance‑based reasons.

Laughlin appealed, challenging the dismissal of her ADA, RA, and FCRA disability‑discrimination claims.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit (Judges Jill Pryor, Lagoa, and Wilson) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in a per curiam opinion, conducting a de novo review of the record in the light most favorable to Laughlin.

A. Legal Framework

The court first recited the basic statutory framework:

• ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12132): Prohibits a public entity from subjecting a qualified individual with a disability to discrimination “by reason of such disability.”
• Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)): Prohibits disability discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
• FCRA (Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)): Prohibits discrimination “because of such individual’s ... handicap.”

The panel emphasized that, in employment discrimination cases, ADA, RA, and FCRA claims are analyzed under the same substantive standards, drawing on:

• Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2022).
• Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007).

To establish unlawful discrimination, a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination, which may be proved by:

1. Direct evidence of discriminatory intent.
2. Circumstantial evidence, under:
   • the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework; or
   • the “convincing mosaic” approach articulated in Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019).

Crucially, the panel expressly declined to decide two threshold issues:

• Whether Laughlin was in fact an “individual with a disability.”
• Whether she suffered an adverse employment action (termination versus purported resignation).

Instead, the court assumed arguendo that Laughlin met those elements and resolved the appeal solely on the absence of evidence of discriminatory intent.

B. No Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent

The court held that none of the statements cited by Laughlin—including those by Assistant Director Jose at the termination meeting—qualified as “direct evidence” of disability discrimination:

• Direct evidence, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, is limited to the most blatant remarks where discriminatory intent is explicit and requires no inference (e.g., “Fire him—he is too old.”).
• Jose’s statements about Laughlin not being able to “give 100%” and that it might be “better” to focus on her health were ambiguous.
• As in Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2001), such remarks “merely suggest,” but do not prove, discriminatory motive.

C. No Circumstantial Evidence of Discriminatory Intent Under McDonnell Douglas

Assuming Laughlin could make a prima facie case, the court focused on pretext:

• The County articulated legitimate, non‑discriminatory reasons: repeated complaints about Laughlin’s performance and professionalism and the late submission of Finance receipts.
• Under Akridge v. Alfa Insurance Cos., 93 F.4th 1181 (11th Cir. 2024), pretext requires showing that the stated reason is:
  • False; and
  • A cover for discrimination.
• The inquiry centers on the employer’s (even mistaken) beliefs, not the employee’s view of her own performance or objective “reality.”

The panel concluded that Laughlin failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext because:

• She did not dispute that Finance complained about the receipts and that the receipts were in fact submitted late; she admitted as much in a sworn declaration.
• She produced no evidence that the various staff complaints about her communication or event preparation did not occur or were fabricated.
• Her argument that the cited performance issues were “minor” or unfair was legally insufficient, because employers may terminate employees for “a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all,” so long as it is not discriminatory.

D. No Convincing Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence

Finally, the court considered whether Laughlin’s evidence—taken as a whole—could form a “convincing mosaic” from which a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory intent. Laughlin pointed to:

• Jose’s remarks at the termination meeting.
• Stanford’s questioning of her work‑from‑home arrangement.
• Negative or dismissive comments by coworkers and supervisors (e.g., insinuations she was “faking” illness).
• Coworkers' refusal to assist her with events and reduced cooperation once she began working from home.

The court held that, even collectively, this evidence showed only that coworkers:

• Were unhappy with her remote‑work status.
• Believed she was performing poorly, especially while working from home.
• Raised complaints that her supervisors acted upon.

In the panel’s view, this was not sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the genuine reason for terminating her probation was disability‑based animus rather than perceived performance shortcomings. The decision emphasized that the “convincing mosaic” approach is an alternative analytical structure but not a more lenient one; both it and McDonnell Douglas ultimately ask the same question: whether there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find unlawful discrimination.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. ADA, RA, and FCRA Alignment

The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that:

• Employment discrimination claims under the ADA and RA are analyzed under the same substantive standards (Owens, 52 F.4th at 1333–34).
• Disability‑discrimination claims under the FCRA are analyzed using the same framework as ADA claims (Holly, 492 F.3d at 1255).

This alignment simplifies litigation in cases involving public employers like Miami‑Dade County, which may be subject to all three statutes simultaneously. The plaintiff still must establish:

1. That she is a qualifying “individual with a disability” (or “handicap” under Florida law).
2. That she is a “qualified individual” (able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation).
3. That she was discriminated against “because of” or “by reason of” her disability.

In this case, the panel bypassed the first two elements and went straight to the third—intentional discrimination—assuming arguendo that Laughlin satisfied them.

2. Methods of Proving Intentional Discrimination

The court’s structure mirrors its broader employment‑discrimination jurisprudence, particularly:

• Todd v. Fayette County School District, 998 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2021).
• Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019).

A plaintiff has three main avenues:

a. Direct Evidence

Direct evidence is limited to statements that, if believed, prove discriminatory intent without inference or presumption. Examples from Eleventh Circuit case law:

• “Fire Earley—he is too old” (Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990)).
• A statement that a decisionmaker “wanted a Korean in that position” (Jefferson v. Sewon America, Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018)).

The court again labeled this standard as “rigorous” (Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999)), noting the Eleventh Circuit has set “severe limits” on what qualifies as direct evidence (Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.11 (11th Cir. 1998)).

b. McDonnell Douglas Burden‑Shifting

Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as applied in Todd:

1. Prima facie case: Plaintiff must show:
   • Disability (or perceived disability).
   • Qualification for the job.
   • Adverse employment action “because of” disability.
2. Employer’s burden: Articulate a legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason for the action.
3. Pretext: Plaintiff must demonstrate the stated reason is pretext for discrimination—i.e., not honestly believed and masking discriminatory intent.

The Eleventh Circuit, citing Akridge, stressed that to prove pretext, it is not enough to show that the employer’s decision was:

• Harsh.
• Unwise.
• Factually mistaken.

Instead, the plaintiff must show:

“both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” (Akridge, 93 F.4th at 1196)

c. “Convincing Mosaic” Theory

Under Lewis, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence, which may include:

• Suspicious timing and ambiguous statements.
• Systematically better treatment of similarly situated comparators.
• Evidence undermining the employer’s stated justification (pretext).

The court, citing McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024), stressed that this is not a more forgiving standard than McDonnell Douglas; it simply offers a more flexible analytical structure focused on whether a reasonable jury could infer discrimination.

B. The Direct‑Evidence Analysis in Laughlin

Laughlin relied primarily on Assistant Director Jose’s statements in the termination meeting, emphasizing:

• Comments that Laughlin was unable to give “100%” to the job at that time.
• Statements that it would be “better” for her to focus on her health in the new year.

The panel analogized this to Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2001), where a supervisor told the plaintiff—who needed time off for a sick child—“I don't want you here . . . And if you need an excuse, you can use what's going on at home.” That was held not to be direct evidence.

Here, the court reasoned:

• Jose’s remarks were susceptible to multiple interpretations:
  • They might reflect concern for Laughlin’s well‑being.
  • They might reflect a performance‑based judgment that she could not keep up with the job’s demands while also attending to serious health issues.
• Crucially, Jose explicitly disclaimed that the decision was based on health, framing it in terms of performance needs.
• Thus, any inference that disability was the real reason requires an additional step of interpretation, disqualifying the remarks as direct evidence.

The court did not reach an additional issue noted by the district court: whether Jose actually was the relevant final decisionmaker for direct‑evidence purposes. It assumed arguendo that even if she were, her statements were too ambiguous to qualify.

C. The McDonnell Douglas/Pretext Analysis

The core of the court’s reasoning rests on pretext. The County offered two categories of non‑discriminatory reasons:

1. General performance and professionalism issues:
   • Frequent staff complaints at “almost every event.”
   • Allegations that she forgot tasks and shifted burdens.
   • Concerns about productivity while working from home, including a specific low‑output day despite recorded hours.
   • Complaints of unprofessional or distracting conduct around other staff.
2. The concrete receipts incident:
   • Late discovery of receipts from the December event on her desk.
   • Finance’s complaint about being “extremely tardy” in reconciliation.

In rebuttal, Laughlin advanced three main lines of argument:

• Her coworkers historically submitted receipts directly to Finance, and this was the first time she bore responsibility for them.
• She did not know the receipts had been left on her desk.
• The performance criticisms were exaggerated or minor and not severe enough to justify a termination.

The panel rejected these arguments as insufficient to establish pretext under Akridge:

• No showing of falsity: Laughlin did not produce evidence that the staff complaints were fabricated or that the receipts were not, in fact, late. She admitted the latter point in writing.
• No evidence of discriminatory motive: Even if the County overreacted to relatively minor errors, that is not actionable unless tied to disability‑related animus.
• Employer’s business judgment controls (within limits): Under Eleventh Circuit law, the court does not “sit as a super‑personnel department” and does not second‑guess business decisions as long as they are not driven by unlawful motives.

In short, the court found that Laughlin’s arguments attacked the fairness or proportionality of the decision but did not cast doubt on whether the County honestly believed its own stated reasons or whether disability actually motivated the action.

D. The Convincing‑Mosaic Analysis

Laughlin tried to assemble a “mosaic” from disparate pieces of evidence:

• Stanford’s evident dislike of remote work and her questions seeking an end to Laughlin’s work‑from‑home arrangement.
• Jose’s suggestion that Laughlin could not give “100%” and might be better off focusing on her health.
• Coworker hostility and withdrawal of assistance after she began working from home.
• Valledor’s alleged comment that Laughlin was “faking” her illness and skepticism that she had a brain tumor.
• Exclusion from the events committee created by Valledor.

The panel acknowledged these as “ambiguous statements and other bits and pieces,” but concluded they did not rise to the level required for a convincing mosaic:

• Hostility to remote work ≠ disability bias: Dislike of work‑from‑home arrangements, even if unfair, is not the same as animus toward a disability unless linked to the disability itself rather than to a preference for in‑person work.
• Coworker frustration ≠ unlawful motive: Evidence that staff were unhappy with Laughlin, believed she underperformed, or felt burdened by her mistakes does not by itself prove that the employer decided to end her probation because of a protected trait.
• No comparator or pattern evidence: Laughlin did not show that similarly situated non‑disabled probationary employees were treated better under comparable performance circumstances.
• No substantial pretext evidence: As the pretext analysis already concluded, she did not meaningfully undermine the County’s stated reasons.

Thus, even aggregating all circumstantial evidence, the court held that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the County's reasons were a cover for disability‑based discrimination.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion weaves together a number of foundational Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court cases:

A. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review

• Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Establish that summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that a genuine dispute exists only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. The panel applies this de novo, drawing all justifiable inferences in Laughlin’s favor but refusing to stack unsupported inferences on each other.
• Copeland v. Dep’t of Corr., 97 F.4th 766 (11th Cir. 2024): Cited for the rule that, on summary judgment, facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

B. ADA, RA, FCRA Framework

• Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirms that RA employment claims are governed by the standards that apply under the ADA.
• Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007): Confirms that FCRA disability‑discrimination claims use the same analytical framework as ADA claims.

C. Methods of Proving Discrimination

• Todd v. Fayette County School District, 998 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2021): Sets out the direct and circumstantial paths to proving intentional discrimination, including the McDonnell Douglas framework and the availability of alternative methods (such as the convincing mosaic approach).
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Foundational Supreme Court case creating the burden‑shifting framework widely used in employment discrimination cases.
• Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019): Elaborates the “convincing mosaic” doctrine and the types of circumstantial evidence that can support an inference of discrimination.
• McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024): Clarifies that the convincing‑mosaic route is “different but not more forgiving” than McDonnell Douglas, highlighting the unity of the ultimate inquiry—whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination.

D. Direct Evidence and Ambiguous Remarks

• Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1990): Provides a classic example of direct evidence (“Fire Earley—he is too old”).
• Jefferson v. Sewon America, Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018): Another direct‑evidence example, where the decisionmaker allegedly stated a desire for a Korean candidate.
• Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) and Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998): Emphasize that direct evidence is limited to explicit, blatant statements; most remarks, even biased ones, remain circumstantial.
• Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2001): A key analogue; the supervisor’s reference to using “what’s going on at home” as an excuse for resignation was not direct evidence of disability discrimination. This precedent closely parallels the analysis of Jose’s comments.

E. Pretext and Employer’s Beliefs

• Akridge v. Alfa Insurance Cos., 93 F.4th 1181 (11th Cir. 2024): Central authority on the pretext standard:
  • Pretext requires proving both falsity and discriminatory motive.
  • The focus is on the decisionmaker’s belief, not the objective correctness of the decision.
  • Employers may terminate for non‑discriminatory reasons, even if those reasons are poor or mistaken.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a pre‑trial mechanism to resolve a case without a full jury trial when:

• No genuine dispute exists over any “material” fact (facts that could affect the outcome).
• The moving party (here, the County) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court assumes, for purposes of the motion, that the nonmoving party’s evidence (here, Laughlin’s) is true and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. But the court does not:

• Accept speculative inferences not grounded in evidence.
• Weigh credibility (that is the jury’s function).

B. Direct Evidence vs. Circumstantial Evidence

• Direct evidence directly proves discriminatory intent without needing inference. Example: “Don’t hire her because she’s disabled.”
• Circumstantial evidence requires the factfinder to reasonably infer discrimination from surrounding facts (e.g., suspicious timing, inconsistent explanations, different treatment of similarly situated employees).

Most employment discrimination cases rely on circumstantial evidence, and the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for direct evidence is exceptionally narrow.

C. McDonnell Douglas and Pretext

Under McDonnell Douglas, after the employer articulates a legitimate reason for its decision, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that:

• The stated reason is untrue or not honestly believed; and
• The real reason was discrimination.

This is where the concept of “pretext” comes in: the employee must show the explanation is a “pretext” or cover story for discrimination. Simply arguing that the employer’s decision was unfair, harsh, or unwise is insufficient.

D. Convincing Mosaic

The “convincing mosaic” concept allows courts to ask a simpler question: Looking at all the circumstantial evidence together, could a reasonable jury find that the employer was actually motivated by discrimination?

Evidence that might contribute to such a mosaic includes:

• Close temporal proximity between disability/complaints and an adverse action.
• Discriminatory comments by decisionmakers.
• Evidence that comparators (non‑disabled employees with similar performance records) were treated more leniently.
• Large inconsistencies or shifting explanations in the employer’s stated reasons.

In Laughlin, the court concluded that the evidence—hostility to remote work, performance complaints, and ambiguous references to health—did not coalesce into such a mosaic.

E. Probationary Employment and Civil Service Status

Probationary periods are common in public employment systems:

• They allow an agency to assess whether a new hire is a good fit before conferring stronger job protections.
• A failure of probation can often be executed with relatively limited procedural hurdles.

However, even probationary employees are protected from discrimination on the basis of disability; what changes is the ease with which an employer can legitimately justify termination based on performance or “fit.”

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

Although Laughlin is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent, it is nonetheless a useful window into how the Eleventh Circuit is likely to view similar fact patterns.

A. For Plaintiffs and Employees

• Ambiguous health‑related comments are rarely enough: Statements about “not being able to give 100%,” or “needing to focus on your health,” especially when paired with performance criticisms, will generally be treated as ambiguous and insufficient as direct evidence of discrimination.
• Documentation of pretext is critical: Plaintiffs need concrete evidence that:
  • Performance complaints were fabricated or selectively enforced; or
  • Similarly situated non‑disabled colleagues were treated more favorably; or
  • The employer’s explanations shifted over time or conflict with contemporaneous documents.
• Coworker hostility ≠ employer liability, by itself: Evidence that coworkers disliked an employee’s accommodations or were unhelpful will not, by itself, establish that the employer terminated the employee because of disability.
• Admitting key performance issues undercuts pretext: Laughlin’s own concession that she submitted the receipts late, without coupling that with evidence of disparate treatment or lack of genuine concern by Finance, made it difficult to show the reason was false.

B. For Employers and HR Professionals

• Documented performance concerns are powerful: Written complaints, contemporaneous emails, and HR‑memorialized discussions about performance strongly support a legitimate, non‑discriminatory explanation at summary judgment.
• Separate health from performance in communications: Jose’s explicit statements that the decision was about performance, not health, aided the County. Employers should be clear, accurate, and consistent in explaining performance‑based decisions.
• Train managers about comments on health and accommodations: While the comments here did not cross the direct‑evidence line, skepticism about an employee’s illness (“she’s faking it”) and hostility to work‑from‑home arrangements can still form part of a circumstantial case if combined with other evidence. Employers should discourage such statements and ensure accommodation processes are handled neutrally.
• Probationary decisions still require care: Even where probationary employees have fewer procedural rights, adverse actions must not be based on disability or other protected characteristics. Honest, performance‑based rationales should be documented well before the end of the probationary period.

C. Remote Work and Disability Accommodations

The decision implicitly touches on a growing area of contention: remote work as a disability accommodation.

• Dislike of remote work ≠ per se unlawful: An employer’s general skepticism about remote work is not automatically discriminatory, even when an employee requests remote work for medical reasons.
• But consistency and fairness matter: If an employer tolerates remote work for non‑disabled employees or allows others to underperform without consequence, yet aggressively disciplines a disabled employee for similar issues, that can support a claim of pretext or a convincing mosaic of discrimination.

In Laughlin, the record did not show that non‑disabled employees with similar performance issues were treated better or that the County’s decisions were inconsistent or shifting. That absence was decisive.

D. For Appellate Strategy

The opinion also offers a lesson in appellate focus:

• The panel chose not to address whether Laughlin had a qualifying disability or whether her departure was a termination or resignation, instead resolving the case on the ground that she could not prove discriminatory intent.
• Litigants should recognize that appellate courts often gravitate toward the narrowest dispositive ground—here, lack of intent—especially at summary judgment.

VIII. Conclusion

Laughlin v. Miami‑Dade County stands as a clear reaffirmation of the Eleventh Circuit’s high bar for disability‑discrimination plaintiffs attempting to survive summary judgment based on ambiguous comments, coworker hostility, and contested performance issues.

Key takeaways include:

• “Direct evidence” is reserved for explicit discriminatory statements that require no inference; most health‑related or performance‑related comments will be treated as circumstantial at best.
• Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs must do more than challenge the fairness of the employer’s decision; they must present evidence that the stated reasons are both false and a cover for discrimination.
• The “convincing mosaic” approach is not a looser standard; it remains a rigorous inquiry into whether the totality of the evidence can support a reasonable inference of unlawful motive.
• Probationary status and documented performance complaints significantly strengthen an employer’s position, especially when the plaintiff cannot show disparate treatment or shifting explanations.

Although non‑precedential, the decision signals that in the Eleventh Circuit, disability‑discrimination claims premised on remote‑work disputes and perceived minor performance infractions must be supported by substantial, concrete evidence of pretext and discriminatory animus to reach a jury. Ambiguity, standing alone, will not suffice.