Ambiguity in Pro Se Filing Timing and Accrual of False Imprisonment Precludes 12(b)(6) Time-Bar Dismissal

Introduction

In a nonprecedential but instructive summary order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the Southern District of New York’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of several claims brought by pro se plaintiff Royce Corley as time-barred. The panel emphasized two practical but consequential points at the pleading stage:

• A statute-of-limitations defense may not be resolved on a motion to dismiss where key dates are ambiguous on the face of the complaint or require extrinsic proof.
• For pro se filings, an action is timely if the complaint was received by the clerk’s office before the limitations period expired; uncertainty about the time of receipt (here, an automated email near midnight) must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor at the pleading stage.

The case arises from a January 2021 event in which Corley’s then-wife miscarried after consuming an alcoholic beverage allegedly sold by Rantab Enterprises, Inc. (“Rantab”). Corley alleges that when the couple sought care at Mount Sinai Morningside (formerly St. Luke’s–Roosevelt) and declined certain treatment on religious grounds, hospital staff and NYPD officers detained them against their will. He sued:

• Mount Sinai Morningside and three medical personnel (the “Mount Sinai Defendants”),
• The City of New York and two unnamed police officers (the “City Defendants”), and
• Rantab Enterprises, Inc.

Corley asserted: (1) § 1983 claims for unlawful imprisonment and infringement of religious rights against the Mount Sinai and City Defendants; (2) a New York product liability claim against Rantab; and (3) a New York negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against all defendants. The district court dismissed the § 1983 and NIED claims as time-barred, declined supplemental jurisdiction over the product claim, and denied Corley’s request to represent the estate of his deceased unborn child and his request for pro bono counsel.

On appeal, the Second Circuit (Raggi, Lohier, and Park, JJ.) affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The order clarifies when a statute-of-limitations defense is “apparent on the face of the complaint,” how courts should treat ambiguous filing timestamps for pro se litigants, and reiterates existing rules on false imprisonment accrual and pro se representation of estates. While this is a “Summary Order” without precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1, it carries persuasive weight and practical guidance for district courts and practitioners alike.

Summary of the Opinion

• Time-bar dismissal vacated: The court vacated the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Corley’s § 1983 unlawful imprisonment and religious infringement claims, and his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. It held that the limitations defense did not appear on the face of the complaint and could not be resolved at the pleading stage because:
  • The accrual date for false imprisonment runs from the end of the detention, which was ambiguous on the pleadings (possibly crossing into January 24, 2021).
  • The filing date was also ambiguous. Although the docket reflected January 24, 2024, Corley produced an automated email from the SDNY pro se office at 11:50 p.m. on January 23, 2024. Under Second Circuit precedent, timeliness turns on when the complaint was received by the clerk, not when it appeared on the docket, and ambiguity must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor at this stage.
• § 1986 claim time-bar affirmed: To the extent the complaint contained any 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim, the panel affirmed dismissal as time-barred because § 1986 carries a one-year statute of limitations.
• Product liability claim reinstated: Because the panel vacated the dismissal of the federal claims, it also vacated the district court’s decision declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law product claim against Rantab and remanded. The panel noted that Corley pleaded complete diversity and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, indicating a potential independent basis for jurisdiction.
• Pro se representation of estate affirmed: The panel affirmed that Corley cannot represent the estate of his unborn child pro se because he has not shown he is the sole beneficiary.
• Denial of pro bono counsel affirmed: The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint pro bono counsel.
• Reassignment request denied: At oral argument, Corley’s request to reassign the case to a different district judge on remand was denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. BioHealth Lab’ys, Inc., 988 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2021)
  — Reiterated the de novo standard for reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, accepting well-pleaded facts and drawing reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.
• Rosa v. Doe, 86 F.4th 1001, 1007 (2d Cir. 2023)
  — Emphasized “special solicitude” for pro se litigants, including liberal construction and leniency with procedural rules—grounding the panel’s willingness to credit Corley’s allegations about the filing time and to resolve ambiguity in his favor at the pleading stage.
• Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Brothers, 774 F.3d 791, 798 n.12 (2d Cir. 2014)
  — Confirmed that a statute-of-limitations defense may be decided on a motion to dismiss only if it “appears on the face of the complaint.” If not, dismissal is improper at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
• Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. RADesign, Inc., 112 F.4th 144, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2024)
  — Held that where resolution of a limitations defense requires “consideration of facts outside of the complaint,” it is “inappropriate to resolve” on a motion to dismiss. The panel relied on this to reject the district court’s reliance on extrinsic materials (hospital discharge records) to fix an accrual date and to resolve the filing timestamp dispute.
• Watson v. United States, 865 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2017)
  — Clarified that false imprisonment claims accrue when the detention ends, not when it begins. This made the precise hour of release materially significant; if the detention ended on January 24, 2021, a January 24, 2024 filing would still be timely.
• Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007)
  — Reminded that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “not an occasion” for fact-finding. The lower court erred by effectively finding facts (e.g., the exact discharge date) using material outside the complaint.
• Toliver v. Sullivan Cnty., 841 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)
  — Established that an action is timely if the complaint was received by the clerk before the limitations period expired, regardless of when it was docketed. This principle directly supported Corley’s argument that he transmitted his complaint before midnight on January 23, 2024.
• Ortiz v. Cornetta, 867 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1989)
  — Directed courts to draw inferences in the plaintiff’s favor where there is “some doubt” about when a complaint was received by the clerk. The 11:50 p.m. automated email made the filing time sufficiently ambiguous to preclude dismissal.
• Paige v. Police Dep’t of City of Schenectady, 264 F.3d 197, 199 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001)
  — Confirmed that § 1986 claims carry a one-year statute of limitations; the panel affirmed dismissal of any § 1986 claim on that basis.
• Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., 122 F.4th 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2024); Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2010)
  — Held that a nonlawyer may represent an estate pro se only if he is the sole beneficiary and there are no creditors. The panel affirmed that Corley did not meet this standard, referencing New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law § 4-1.1(a)(4) on intestate succession.
• Leftridge v. Conn. State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2011); Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1989)
  — Set the standards for appointing pro bono counsel and confirmed the district court’s broad discretion to deny appointment, which the panel found was properly exercised here.

Legal Reasoning

1) The statute-of-limitations defense did not “appear on the face of the complaint.”

The district court treated January 23, 2021 as the unambiguous date on which “the relevant harm occurred,” starting the three-year limitations clock for the § 1983 claims and the NIED claim. The panel explained that this framing was too rigid, especially for the false imprisonment claim, which accrues “when the alleged false imprisonment ends,” not begins. Corley alleged a six-to-eight-hour detention beginning the afternoon of January 23, 2021. Liberally construed (as required for pro se pleadings), this plausibly extends into the early hours of January 24, 2021. That possibility alone defeats a Rule 12(b)(6) limitations dismissal because timeliness then turns on facts not apparent from the complaint’s face.

The panel underscored that the district court’s reliance on extrinsic proof (hospital discharge documentation submitted by defendants) to resolve this ambiguity was improper at the pleading stage. Rule 12(b)(6) is not a vehicle for factual determinations; if outside materials are necessary, the court must convert to summary judgment or proceed to discovery.

2) Ambiguity surrounding the filing date must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor at the 12(b)(6) stage.

The docket reflected a filing date of January 24, 2024. But under Toliver, timeliness hinges on the date the clerk’s office receives the complaint, not the docket entry date. Corley alleged he emailed the SDNY pro se office before midnight on January 23, 2024 and then promptly submitted an amended complaint after midnight to correct an error. An automated reply from the pro se office at 11:50 p.m. on January 23 provided some support for his account. While not conclusive, this evidence created genuine doubt as to the receipt time. Under Ortiz, such doubt compels courts to draw inferences in favor of the pro se plaintiff and precludes dismissal at the pleading stage.

This reasoning operated in tandem with the false imprisonment accrual point: if the detention ended on January 24, 2021, then a filing on January 24, 2024 would also be timely regardless. Either way, ambiguity on these threshold facts foreclosed a Rule 12(b)(6) time-bar ruling.

3) Treatment of the non-federal product liability claim.

The district court had dismissed the product claim after dismissing the federal claims, invoking the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Because the panel reinstated the federal claims, it vacated the dismissal of the product claim as well. The panel further noted that Corley pleaded complete diversity and more than $75,000 in damages, potentially supporting 28 U.S.C. § 1332 jurisdiction irrespective of the fate of the federal claims, an issue for the district court to consider on remand.

4) § 1986 claims and the one-year limitations period.

The panel affirmed the district court insofar as any § 1986 claim was asserted because § 1986 carries a one-year limitations period—a bright-line rule that, unlike the § 1983 and NIED claims here, left no room for ambiguity-based rescue.

5) Pro se representation of an estate and appointment of counsel.

The panel affirmed that Corley may not represent the unborn child’s estate pro se because he is not shown to be the sole beneficiary under New York law. It also affirmed the denial of pro bono counsel, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the governing standards.

Impact and Practical Implications

For district courts and litigants:

• Heightened caution on Rule 12(b)(6) time-bar dismissals. Where the accrual date or filing date turns on facts not clearly admitted in the complaint—or on reasonable inferences drawn in the pro se plaintiff’s favor—a limitations defense cannot be adjudicated at the pleading stage.
• Accrual for false imprisonment claims. District courts must anchor accrual at the moment the detention ends. If the end-time is debatable based on the pleadings, dismissal should be denied or deferred until factual development.
• Pro se filing logistics matter. The panel’s reliance on an automated email timestamp shows that courts will not reflexively equate docket date with receipt date. Clerks’ offices and pro se offices may wish to ensure systems retain reliable metadata or receipts reflecting when submissions are received, especially around midnight and limitations deadlines.
• Strategic preservation. Pro se litigants should retain auto-receipts or acknowledgments that indicate when the clerk’s office received submissions. Defense counsel should anticipate that ambiguous timestamps will be construed in favor of timeliness at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
• Supplemental versus diversity jurisdiction. Where federal claims are dismissed, plaintiffs and courts should independently assess diversity jurisdiction before dropping state-law claims. Here, the panel flagged that diversity might supply an alternative jurisdictional basis if the pleadings are borne out.
• Estate representation by nonlawyers. The order reiterates a firm rule: unless the pro se litigant is the estate’s sole beneficiary (and there are no creditors), the estate must be represented by counsel. Plaintiffs intending to assert claims on behalf of an estate should plan accordingly.
• § 1986 claims are unforgiving. With a one-year limitations period, § 1986 claims require swift filing. The court’s approach here underscores that § 1986’s timeline is not saved by the broader three-year period applicable to § 1983 claims in New York.

Substantive areas likely to arise on remand:

• Whether the hospital and its personnel acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes (a nuanced inquiry in cases involving private hospitals and alleged coordination with police).
• Whether qualified immunity shields the NYPD officers from the false imprisonment and religious infringement claims, depending on a fuller factual record.
• The sufficiency of the product liability claim against Rantab and whether diversity jurisdiction truly exists (considering citizenship and the amount in controversy).
• The viability of a New York negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against medical providers and a restaurant, including doctrinal limits on NIED in New York.

Finally, while this is a Summary Order without precedential force, it is citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, and will likely be invoked as persuasive authority to resist early time-bar dismissals where accrual and filing dates are contestable on a pro se record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 12(b)(6) vs. summary judgment: A motion to dismiss tests whether the complaint states a claim; courts accept alleged facts as true and do not resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. If deciding the issue requires facts outside the complaint (like hospital discharge records), dismissal is improper at this stage.
• Statute of limitations: A filing deadline for claims. In New York, § 1983 claims generally borrow a three-year period from state personal injury law; New York NIED claims also typically use a three-year period. Section 1986 claims have a one-year period. The clock starts when the claim “accrues.”
• Accrual (false imprisonment): The claim accrues when the detention ends. This matters because your filing window runs from the end of the restraint, not the start.
• Face of the complaint: A limitations defense is suitable for a motion to dismiss only if the complaint itself clearly shows untimeliness. If the complaint permits a timely reading or requires external evidence to prove otherwise, the defense cannot prevail at the pleading stage.
• Pro se filing “receipt” versus docket date: The action is timely if the clerk’s office received the complaint before the deadline, even if it appears on the docket later. An auto-reply email acknowledging receipt before midnight can tip the inference toward timeliness when the record is unclear.
• Supplemental jurisdiction versus diversity: Federal courts can hear state claims related to federal claims (supplemental jurisdiction). If federal claims fall out, courts may decline to keep the state claims. Separately, a federal court can hear state claims under diversity jurisdiction if the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
• Pro se representation of estates: A nonlawyer can represent only himself. An estate is a separate legal entity; a nonlawyer may represent it pro se only if he is the sole beneficiary (and there are no creditors). Otherwise, counsel is required.
• Appointment of pro bono counsel: Courts have discretion to request volunteer counsel for indigent litigants; it is not automatic. Factors include the merits, complexity, and the litigant’s ability to present the case.

Conclusion

Corley v. Rantab Enterprises, Inc. underscores a careful gatekeeping role for district courts faced with statute-of-limitations defenses on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, particularly in pro se cases. Two central guideposts emerge:

• When accrual turns on facts that are ambiguous on the face of the complaint—as with false imprisonment ending in the early hours of the next day—courts should not dismiss as time-barred at the pleading stage.
• When the filing date is uncertain, the question is when the clerk received the complaint; doubts grounded in record evidence (such as an automated acknowledgment email) must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor on a motion to dismiss.

The Second Circuit thus vacated dismissal of Corley’s § 1983 and NIED claims and reinstated his state-law product claim, while affirming that § 1986 claims are subject to a one-year limitations period and that a pro se litigant may not represent an estate unless he is the sole beneficiary. Although nonprecedential, the order provides practical and persuasive guidance on procedural fairness for pro se litigants, the proper limits of Rule 12(b)(6) factfinding, and the careful treatment of filing and accrual ambiguities that can make or break claims at the courthouse door.