Alternative Sentence + Substantive Reasonableness = Harmless Guideline Error: Eleventh Circuit affirms despite career-offender dispute and recognizes Conage/Rowe superseding Shannon

Introduction

In United States v. Alphonso Coleman, Jr. (No. 24-12346, Nov. 5, 2025), a non-argument calendar, unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 160-month sentence for cocaine and fentanyl distribution over the defendant’s objection to career-offender status. The panel did not need to resolve definitively whether a Florida cocaine-trafficking conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b) is a “controlled substance offense” for career-offender purposes because any error in applying the enhancement was harmless under the circuit’s two-part test: the district court announced an identical alternative sentence and that sentence was substantively reasonable. In a footnote, however, the panel also signaled that, in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Conage v. United States and the Eleventh Circuit’s own intervening decision in United States v. Rowe, there likely was no error at all—Conage abrogated United States v. Shannon, and Florida’s trafficking statute now qualifies as a predicate controlled-substance offense for career-offender purposes.

This commentary unpacks the factual background, the panel’s reasoning, the significant precedents cited, and the decision’s practical effects on federal sentencing—especially for defendants with Florida drug-trafficking priors and for appellate harmless-error review of Guidelines disputes.

Background and Key Issues

Coleman pleaded guilty to one count of cocaine distribution and two counts of fentanyl distribution. The presentence report placed his non-career-offender advisory range at 46–57 months, but a statutory mandatory minimum elevated the operative guideline term to 60 months (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)). The government objected, arguing Coleman qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because his prior Florida convictions—trafficking in cocaine (§ 893.135(1)(b)) and sale of cocaine (§ 893.13)—were “controlled substance offenses.”

Relying on United States v. Shannon, 631 F.3d 1187 (11th Cir. 2011), Coleman argued that Florida’s trafficking statute swept more broadly than the Guidelines definition because “purchase” of cocaine can be accomplished without possession; thus, categorically, the statute encompassed conduct that is not a controlled substance offense. The district court rejected Shannon’s premise in light of Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2022), which clarified that “purchase” under Florida law entails possession. It applied the career-offender enhancement, yielding a Guidelines range of 188–237 months, and varied downward to 160 months. Importantly, the court expressly stated it would impose the same 160-month sentence even if Coleman were not a career offender, based on its assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

On appeal, Coleman pressed the Shannon argument. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding any error was harmless because the district court pronounced an alternative sentence and that sentence was substantively reasonable. In a footnote, the panel further stated it “also” believed there was no error, citing United States v. Rowe, 143 F.4th 1318, 1329–31 (11th Cir. 2025) (holding that Conage overruled Shannon and that Florida’s cocaine-trafficking offense is a controlled substance offense under § 4B1.1).

Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed under the Eleventh Circuit’s harmless-error framework for Guidelines disputes:

First, the district court unambiguously stated it would impose the same sentence regardless of the career-offender enhancement.
Second, the 160-month sentence was substantively reasonable under § 3553(a), considering the seriousness of fentanyl distribution, Coleman’s escalating criminal pattern, the need for deterrence and public protection, and the sentence’s position well below the 40-year statutory maximum (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)).

The panel emphasized deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors and concluded that the 160-month term fell within the range of reasonable sentences on this record. In a footnote, it added that, given Rowe’s holding that Conage abrogated Shannon, there likely was no Guidelines error to begin with.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion relies on a suite of Eleventh Circuit and Florida decisions that collectively drive the outcome:

United States v. Shannon, 631 F.3d 1187 (11th Cir. 2011): Held that Florida cocaine trafficking did not categorically qualify as a controlled substance offense because “purchase” could be completed without possession, placing the statute outside the Guidelines definition when using the categorical approach. Coleman invoked Shannon to argue his trafficking conviction could not count as a predicate.
Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2022): Florida’s highest court clarified that “purchase” under § 893.135 entails acquiring possession (actual or constructive). This state-law clarification undercuts Shannon’s premise that one can “purchase” without possession, which had driven the overbreadth conclusion in Shannon’s categorical analysis.
United States v. Rowe, 143 F.4th 1318, 1329–31 (11th Cir. 2025): Binding Eleventh Circuit precedent (post-Conage) expressly holding that Conage overruled Shannon and that Florida’s cocaine-trafficking offense qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the career-offender guideline. The panel’s footnote cites Rowe to explain that, in any event, Coleman’s trafficking conviction counts.
United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2020): Provides the two-part harmless-error test in the sentencing context: an error is harmless if the district court states it would impose the same sentence absent the error and the sentence is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 19 (11th Cir. 2022): Reiterates that substantive reasonableness is assessed under the totality of the circumstances and in light of § 3553(a).
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirms the district court has broad discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Articulates the deferential “definite and firm conviction” standard for finding a clear error of judgment in the § 3553(a) weighing.
United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014): Notes that a sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness.
United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1069 (11th Cir. 2021): Lists the § 3553(a) factors and reinforces the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to reasonableness review.

Together, these precedents serve two distinct functions in the opinion: Goldman, Grushko, Butler, Cordero, Irey, and Stanley frame the harmless-error and substantive-reasonableness analysis; Shannon, Conage, and Rowe resolve (or, given Rowe, moot) the underlying career-offender predicate question.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds on two tracks.

First, the harmless-error track. Applying Goldman’s two-part test, the panel concluded:

Same-sentence pronouncement: The district court unequivocally stated it would impose the same 160-month sentence even without the career-offender enhancement. This explicit alternative sentence satisfies Goldman’s first prong.
Substantive reasonableness: The panel affirmed the 160-month term as reasonable under § 3553(a), highlighting:
- The seriousness of fentanyl distribution and its lethality, driving a strong need for deterrence and public protection.
- The defendant’s escalating criminal trajectory—from use, to selling cocaine, to selling fentanyl—and his failure to be deterred by prior prison terms, underscoring recidivism risk and the need to promote respect for the law.
- The sentence’s posture relative to statutory maxima: 160 months is well below the 40-year maximum for the fentanyl counts, an “indicator of reasonableness.”
- The district court’s consideration of the unenhanced 60-month Guidelines floor and its reasoned explanation for varying upward based on § 3553(a) factors.

Given the deferential standard articulated in Irey, the panel was not left with the “definite and firm” conviction that the district court misweighed the § 3553(a) factors. Hence, even assuming a Guidelines error, the sentence stands as a matter of harmless error.

Second, the predicate-offense track (in footnote). The panel indicated that, in light of Rowe, there likely was no error at all in counting Florida trafficking as a controlled substance offense. Conage’s authoritative interpretation of Florida law (that “purchase” entails possession) undermined Shannon’s earlier conclusion that the statute swept beyond the Guidelines definition. Rowe, a published Eleventh Circuit decision, expressly recognizes this and holds that Florida trafficking qualifies under § 4B1.1. Thus, the panel’s primary holding (harmless error) is reinforced by a merits-ready alternative ground (no error).

Impact

The decision’s practical significance lies in two interrelated areas:

Harmless-error doctrine in sentencing:
- District courts in the Eleventh Circuit are strongly incentivized to articulate an alternative, independent § 3553(a) sentence when resolving disputed Guidelines issues. Doing so can insulate the sentence from reversal even if the Guidelines calculation is later deemed erroneous.
- For defendants, this underscores the strategic importance of building a robust § 3553(a) record. If the court announces an alternative sentence and thoroughly explains its § 3553(a) rationale, appellate relief becomes significantly harder under Goldman’s two-part standard.
Florida drug-trafficking priors as career-offender predicates:
- Post-Conage and Rowe, Florida § 893.135 cocaine-trafficking convictions count as controlled substance offenses for career-offender purposes in the Eleventh Circuit. Shannon no longer provides a viable shield in this context.
- Defendants with Florida trafficking priors will more often qualify as career offenders, elevating advisory ranges substantially. This case illustrates that—even when a court varies downward from career-offender ranges—lengthy sentences can be sustained as substantively reasonable, particularly in fentanyl cases.

Although the Coleman opinion is unpublished and therefore nonprecedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, it reflects and operationalizes two binding currents: the Goldman harmless-error framework and Rowe’s resolution of the Florida trafficking predicate question.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A defendant is a “career offender” if (1) they were at least 18 when they committed the instant offense, (2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) they have at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses. The status substantially increases the advisory Guidelines range.
Controlled substance offense (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)): Generally encompasses manufacturing, importing, exporting, distributing, or dispensing a controlled substance—or possessing it with intent to do so. Offenses that criminalize conduct outside this definition (e.g., simple possession) typically do not qualify.
Categorical approach: Courts compare the statutory elements of the prior conviction to the generic definition in the federal provision. If the state statute’s least culpable conduct still fits within the federal definition, the prior counts. If the statute criminalizes conduct beyond the federal definition, it does not. Conage matters because the categorical approach depends on the state statute’s elements as authoritatively interpreted by the state’s highest court.
Harmless error in sentencing (Goldman): If the district judge states it would impose the same sentence regardless of the disputed Guidelines issue, and that sentence is substantively reasonable under § 3553(a), any Guidelines error is deemed harmless and does not warrant reversal or remand.
Substantive reasonableness: Appellate courts assess whether the sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” in light of the § 3553(a) factors, using a deferential standard. A sentence well below the statutory maximum and grounded in a reasoned explanation tied to the record often passes this test.
Variance vs. departure: A “variance” is a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors. A “departure” is a Guidelines-authorized adjustment within the Guidelines framework. Here, the district court issued a downward variance from the career-offender range (188–237 months) to 160 months; alternatively, that same 160-month term functioned as a significant upward variance from the unenhanced 60-month range.

What the Court Did Not Decide

The panel did not need to conclusively resolve whether Coleman’s trafficking prior categorically qualifies as a career-offender predicate in this case, because the harmless-error analysis disposed of the appeal. The footnote indicates the panel’s view—aligned with Rowe—that there was no error, but the holding of affirmance rests on harmless error and substantive reasonableness.

Conclusion

United States v. Coleman reinforces a now-familiar sentencing lesson in the Eleventh Circuit: when a district court announces an alternative sentence and explains it under § 3553(a), many Guidelines disputes—career-offender status included—will be swept into harmless-error affirmances if the sentence is substantively reasonable. The panel’s footnote also places another marker on the doctrinal landscape: after Conage and Rowe, Florida’s cocaine-trafficking statute qualifies as a controlled substance offense for career-offender purposes, displacing Shannon’s earlier contrary view.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores two imperatives. For the government, requesting an explicit alternative sentence and a thorough § 3553(a) explanation can inoculate a sentence against Guidelines error on appeal. For the defense, the focus should include a detailed mitigation presentation under § 3553(a) and, where appropriate, challenges to the breadth and application of prior convictions—though, as to Florida trafficking priors, Conage and Rowe now sharply narrow the path. In the era of fentanyl prosecutions and heightened public-safety concerns, Coleman demonstrates the breadth of district court discretion that the Eleventh Circuit will sustain under deferential substantive-reasonableness review.