Aligning the CGL Employer’s Liability Exclusion with Alabama Workers’ Compensation Standards: Commentary on Amanali Babwari v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.

Aligning the CGL Employer’s Liability Exclusion with Alabama Workers’ Compensation Standards: Commentary on Amanali Babwari v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Amanali Babwari v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, No. 24‑11396 (11th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), addresses a recurring problem at the intersection of torts, workers’ compensation, and insurance law: whether a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy covers injuries to an employee who is assaulted on the employer’s premises immediately after work.

At the heart of the opinion is an “employer’s liability” exclusion that denies coverage for bodily injury “arising out of and in the course of” employment. The Eleventh Circuit holds that this exclusion must be interpreted using Alabama workers’ compensation jurisprudence construing the same phrase, and that, under that standard, the employee’s shooting in the employer’s parking lot does arise out of and occur in the course of employment. As a result, the CGL policy provides no coverage, and State Farm has no obligation to satisfy the consent judgment obtained by the injured employee against his employer.

Although “Not for Publication” and therefore non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion is likely to be persuasive authority for Alabama federal courts (and influential for Alabama courts) in future coverage disputes. It clarifies:

  • That the CGL employer’s liability exclusion is treated as a deliberate transplant of statutory workers’ compensation language;
  • That Alabama’s workers’ compensation concepts of “arising out of” and “in the course of” employment define the scope of that exclusion; and
  • That the exclusion can apply even where a workers’ compensation claim might fail for other, statutory reasons (e.g., “personal animus” assaults).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Shooting in the Employer’s Parking Lot

Amanali Babwari worked as a clerk at the Pit Stop Grocery, a Birmingham, Alabama convenience store. On the night of October 10, 2016, he worked the closing shift alone. Around 11:00 p.m., he closed the store, locked the front door, and at that point was “off the clock.”

Pit Stop required him to park in a particular location: an unlit corner of the store’s parking lot next to a dumpster. As he got into his car in that spot, an unknown assailant emerged from behind the dumpster, pointed a gun at him, and demanded, “give [him] all [he] got.” Babwari handed over a bag containing about $100 in small bills. The assailant then shot him several more times and fled. Babwari was struck by at least nine bullets but survived after emergency treatment and weeks of hospitalization.

B. Underlying State-Court Litigation and Consent Judgment

On April 28, 2017, Babwari sued Pit Stop in Alabama state court. He asserted:

  1. Negligence – alleging the store failed to take reasonable security measures;
  2. Wantonness – alleging a more aggravated form of misconduct under Alabama law; and
  3. An alternative claim under the Alabama Employer’s Liability Act, Ala. Code §§ 25‑6‑1 through 25‑6‑4.

State Farm, which had issued a general liability policy to Pit Stop, initially defended the employer under a reservation of rights, signaling that it disputed coverage but would provide a defense in the interim. It later concluded there was no coverage and withdrew from the defense.

Thereafter, Pit Stop and Babwari entered into a settlement and asked the state court to enter a consent judgment – a judgment agreed to by the parties. The court entered judgment against Pit Stop for $877,659.66. Crucially, the judgment did not state which of the three claims (negligence, wantonness, or Employer’s Liability Act) formed the basis of liability.

C. The Direct-Action Suit Against State Farm

After securing the consent judgment, Babwari invoked Alabama’s Direct‑Action Statute, Ala. Code § 27‑23‑2, which allows a prevailing plaintiff to sue a defendant’s insurer directly to “reach and apply” available insurance proceeds to satisfy a judgment. He filed such an action in Alabama state court against State Farm, seeking to recover the amount of the consent judgment plus interest.

State Farm removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Because the direct‑action statute only allows recovery if the insured (Pit Stop) had coverage for the loss, the central question became whether the State Farm policy covered Babwari’s injuries. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nowlin, 542 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1988).

D. The State Farm Policy and Its Exclusions

The CGL policy covered “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence,” defined as:

“An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”

The policy contained several relevant exclusions, including for bodily injury that:

  • “is expected or intended to cause harm as would be expected by a reasonable person”;
  • “is the result of willful and malicious, or criminal acts of the insured”;
  • “aris[es] out of and in the course of . . . [e]mployment by the insured; or [p]erforming duties related to the conduct of the insured’s business” (the employer’s liability exclusion); or
  • “aris[es] out of any . . . [e]mployment-related practices, policies, acts or omissions.”

The employer’s liability exclusion is central. It is intended to draw a boundary between risks covered by CGL and those meant to be addressed by workers’ compensation and employers’ liability policies.

E. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment in the District Court

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

State Farm argued:

  • There was no covered “occurrence,” as the injuries stemmed from an intentional criminal assault;
  • Even if there was an occurrence, one or more of the policy exclusions (intentional injury, criminal acts, employer’s liability, employment‑practices) barred coverage;
  • Babwari could not carry his burden to show that the consent judgment rested on a covered theory (negligence) rather than clearly uncovered ones (wantonness or the Employer’s Liability Act claim).

Babwari responded that his injuries were caused by a covered “occurrence” and that none of the exclusions applied. He also contended that the consent judgment must rest on negligence.

The district court agreed with Babwari. It:

  • Interpreted the policy to cover negligence but not wantonness;
  • Reviewed the record of the underlying state action and found “no evidence . . . that would support a finding” of wantonness; thus, by elimination, it reasoned that negligence must have been the basis for the consent judgment;
  • Did not analyze whether the Employer’s Liability Act claim might have been the basis for liability;
  • Held that the shooting was an “occurrence” and that no exclusion applied.

The district court therefore entered summary judgment for Babwari and ordered State Farm to pay the $877,659.66 judgment plus $262,035.51 in prejudgment interest.

F. Appeal to the Eleventh Circuit

State Farm appealed, raising three issues:

  1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that negligence necessarily provided the basis for the consent judgment;
  2. Whether the shooting was a covered “occurrence” under the policy;
  3. Whether the employer’s liability exclusion barred coverage.

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and resolved the appeal solely on the third issue, finding the employer’s liability exclusion dispositive. It therefore did not address the “occurrence” issue or the allocation of the consent judgment among covered and uncovered claims.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of State Farm.

The court held:

  • The policy’s employer’s liability exclusion bars coverage for injuries “arising out of and in the course of” employment or the performance of duties related to the insured’s business;
  • This language is a deliberate transplant from Alabama’s workers’ compensation statute, which covers injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment,” Ala. Code § 25‑5‑31;
  • Consequently, the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” in the policy should be construed using Alabama workers’ compensation case law;
  • Under that case law, both elements were satisfied: Babwari’s injuries both “arose out of” and were “in the course of” his employment:
    • “Arising out of”: There was a causal connection between his employment duties (required late‑night closing shift and mandated parking location) and the risk that materialized in the shooting;
    • “In the course of”: The injuries occurred immediately after work, on employer‑maintained premises (the parking lot), while he was leaving work—a classic application of the “parking lot” exception to the ordinary coming‑and‑going rule.

The panel rejected three counterarguments by Babwari:

  1. That workers’ compensation law is liberally construed in favor of coverage, while insurance exclusions are strictly construed against insurers, and thus workers’ compensation law is an improper interpretive guide;
  2. That his injuries would not be compensable under workers’ compensation because of Alabama’s “personal animus” limitation for third‑party assaults, see Ex parte N.J.J., 9 So. 3d 455 (Ala. 2008);
  3. That the court should instead use respondeat superior principles rather than workers’ compensation standards to interpret the exclusion.

In response, the court emphasized:

  • The interpretive presumptions (liberal construction for workers’ compensation, narrow construction of exclusions) only arise where ambiguity exists; here, the policy unambiguously incorporated the workers’ compensation phrase;
  • The “personal animus” limitation in N.J.J. arises from the statutory definition of “injury,” not from the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment,” so it need not be imported into the policy exclusion;
  • Respondeat superior offers no better framework given the near‑verbatim use of workers’ compensation language in the CGL policy.

Thus, because the employer’s liability exclusion validly applied, coverage was barred regardless of whether the shooting was an “occurrence” or which theory grounded the consent judgment.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Function of the Employer’s Liability Exclusion in CGL Policies

The court begins by emphasizing the structural role of the employer’s liability exclusion. It relies on leading insurance treatises:

  • Couch on Insurance: A general liability policy is designed to “provid[e] coverage for the employer’s liability to the general public” but not “for an employer’s liability for injuries to its employees.” Couch on Insurance § 129.11 (3d ed.).
  • New Appleman on Insurance: The exclusion prevents duplication of coverage that should instead be provided by workers’ compensation and employers’ liability insurance. See 3 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 18.03[5].

Doctrinally, this reflects a common insurance-law principle: CGL policies protect the insured against liabilities to third parties (customers, passersby, other businesses), while employees’ workplace injuries are channeled to the specialized workers’ compensation system (and, where applicable, employers’ liability coverage). The employer’s liability exclusion enforces that division of responsibility.

B. Transplanted Language and the Use of Workers’ Compensation Case Law

The crucial move is the recognition that the policy’s phrase “arising out of and in the course of . . . employment” is the same phrase used in the Alabama workers’ compensation statute, Ala. Code § 25‑5‑31. The court invokes the interpretive canon articulated by Justice Frankfurter and championed in Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law:

“When a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.”

That is, where insurance drafters clearly borrow statutory language, courts should presume they intended to carry over the same settled meaning. The Eleventh Circuit uses this “transplant” principle to justify adopting the workers’ compensation understanding of the phrase.

1. Alabama’s Prior Endorsement: U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Byrd

The court notes that the Alabama Supreme Court has already taken this approach. In U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Byrd, 137 So. 2d 743, 745 (Ala. 1962), the court recognized that an employee‑injury exclusion was “obviously” intended to limit the insurer’s risk to injuries “not within the purview of the workmen’s compensation statutes.” This aligns with the Eleventh Circuit’s use of workers’ compensation law to interpret the exclusion.

2. Out-of-State Cases Supporting the Same Approach

The court also cites a line of cases from other jurisdictions that read nearly identical employee exclusions through the lens of workers’ compensation law:

  • Ottumwa Housing Authority v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Iowa 1993) – Held that “arising out of and in the course of employment” in an employee exclusion should carry the same meaning as in workers’ compensation.
  • Gear Automotive v. Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co., 709 F.3d 1259, 1264 (8th Cir. 2013) – Read the exclusion in light of Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Act because the language was borrowed from that statute.
  • Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Co., 350 P.3d 782, 788 (Alaska 2015) – Consulted workers’ compensation case law in construing the CGL exclusion for bodily injury “arising out of and in the course of employment.”
  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roe, 573 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) – Interpreted “arising out of his or her employment” in an exclusion consistently with the state workers’ compensation act.

These authorities reinforce that it is doctrinally sound and commercially expected to synchronize the meaning of this standard phrase across workers’ compensation and liability policies.

C. The Alabama Workers’ Compensation Standard

Under Alabama workers’ compensation law, the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” is a conjunctive double requirement: the injury must satisfy both components. See Ex parte Shelby County Health Care Authority, 850 So. 2d 332, 335–36 (Ala. 2002).

1. “Arising Out of” Employment

“Arising out of” connotes a causal connection between the employment and the injury. As the Eleventh Circuit quotes:

It “connotes a causal relationship between the claimant's performance of his or her duties as an employee and the complained‑of injury.”
(Shelby County, 850 So. 2d at 336 (citation omitted))

The task is to identify whether the employment exposed the worker to a danger or set of circumstances that materially contributed to the injury. It is not limited to the immediate physical act being performed as part of the job; it can extend to conditions of work (e.g., required shifts, locations, or routes).

The Eleventh Circuit finds a causal nexus here:

  • Babwari was in a dark, unlit corner of the employer’s parking lot, late at night, next to a dumpster that provided cover for an assailant;
  • He was there because his employer required him to park in that location and assigned him to the late‑night closing shift.

Those employment conditions created or enhanced the risk of a violent robbery in that location at that time. Thus, the shooting “arose out of” his employment within the Alabama workers’ compensation framework, and by extension, within the meaning of the policy exclusion.

2. “In the Course of” Employment

“In the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury:

It means “within the period of his employment, at a place where he may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incident to it.”
(Shelby County, 850 So. 2d at 336 (citation omitted))

Alabama courts have made clear that the “course of” employment:

  • Is not confined to moments when the employee is literally performing work duties or “on the clock”; and
  • Includes a “reasonable time, space, and opportunity before and after” work while the employee is at or near the place of employment. Hughes v. Decatur General Hospital, 514 So. 2d 935, 937 (Ala. 1987).

This leads directly to what is often called the parking‑lot rule:

  • Ordinarily, injuries sustained while commuting to and from work are not in the course of employment (the “coming‑and‑going” rule).
  • But Alabama recognizes an exception where the injury occurs in an employer‑owned and maintained parking lot shortly before or after work, or in certain immediately adjacent areas used for ingress and egress.

The Eleventh Circuit relies on several key Alabama cases:

  • Brunson v. Lucas, 5 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) – Acknowledged that injury in an employer‑maintained parking lot immediately before or after work can be in the course of employment.
  • Hughes v. Decatur General Hospital, 514 So. 2d 935, 937 (Ala. 1987) – Extended coverage to a public street between a hospital and its parking lot, recognizing that such areas may be within the “course of” employment when used for access.
  • Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 464 (1932) – Treated a sidewalk immediately outside the workplace as a covered location for purposes of workers’ compensation.

Applying these authorities, the court concludes that Babwari’s injuries occurred “in the course of” employment:

  • The assault happened immediately after he finished work, as he was leaving; and
  • He was still physically on employer‑maintained premises—the Pit Stop parking lot—in a location where he was required to park.

These facts fall squarely within the parking‑lot exception as articulated in Alabama workers’ compensation decisions.

D. Rejection of Plaintiff’s Three Counterarguments

1. Comp Liberal Construction vs. Narrow Construction of Exclusions

First, Babwari argued that:

  • Alabama courts broadly construe “employment” and related concepts to favor workers in workers’ compensation cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Weaver, 871 So. 2d 820, 824 (Ala. 2003).
  • By contrast, they narrowly construe insurance policy exclusions in favor of the insured and coverage. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 103 So. 3d 795, 805 (Ala. 2012).

He contended that this asymmetry makes workers’ compensation law an inappropriate interpretive template for a coverage‑limiting exclusion in an insurance policy.

The Eleventh Circuit responds that these interpretive presumptions only come into play when language is ambiguous. Citing Wakefield v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 572 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Ala. 1990), the court notes:

“Pit Stop’s insurance policy unambiguously transplants the meaning of ‘arising out of and in the course of . . . employment’ from the workers’ compensation statute. . . . Because the policy is ‘clear and unambiguous,’ it ‘must be enforced as written.’”

Thus, the court treats the presence of the precise statutory phrase as evidence that the parties intended to import its established meaning, defeating any claim of ambiguity and sidelining the interpretive presumption in favor of coverage.

2. The “Personal Animus” Limitation from Ex parte N.J.J.

Second, Babwari argued his injuries would not be compensable under Alabama’s workers’ compensation statute, invoking Ex parte N.J.J., 9 So. 3d 455, 457 (Ala. 2008). That case interpreted the statute’s definition of “injury,” Ala. Code § 25‑5‑1(9), which excludes certain harms:

“Injury” does not include “an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him or her and not directed against him or her as an employee or because of his or her employment.”

In other words, if a third party attacks an employee for purely personal reasons unrelated to the job, that harm is not a compensable “injury” under the statute, even if it occurs at work.

The Eleventh Circuit responds by sharply narrowing what is imported from workers’ compensation law:

  • The “personal animus” limitation is tied to the statutory definition of “injury,” not to the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” itself.
  • The policy’s exclusion uses only the latter phrase; it says nothing about restricting “injury” to the statutory definition in § 25‑5‑1(9).

Thus, even if a workers’ compensation claim might be denied on “personal animus” grounds, the employee’s injuries can still be said to “arise out of and in the course of employment” for purposes of the CGL employer’s liability exclusion. The exclusion is concerned solely with the employment nexus, not with whether the injury satisfies all the separate statutory conditions for workers’ compensation benefits.

This is an important point: the employer’s liability exclusion can be broader in scope than what workers’ compensation would cover, because the exclusion only borrows the employment-relationship test, not other statutory limitations on recoverable injuries. That creates potential coverage gaps where neither workers’ compensation nor the CGL policy responds.

3. Respondeat Superior as an Alternative Framework

Third, Babwari urged the court to interpret the exclusion through the lens of respondeat superior—a tort doctrine defining when an employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s acts—rather than workers’ compensation standards.

The Eleventh Circuit dismisses this suggestion briefly but decisively. Given that the policy mirrors the workers’ compensation statute’s language, workers’ compensation jurisprudence is the more natural reference point. Respondeat superior uses distinct concepts (“scope of employment,” “furthering the employer’s business,” etc.) that are not textually tied to the policy language at issue.

E. Issues the Court Declined to Resolve

Because it found the employer’s liability exclusion dispositive, the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to reach:

  1. Whether the shooting was an “occurrence” under the policy – i.e., whether an intentional assault by a third party against an insured’s employee is an “accident” from the standpoint of the insured. This is a recurring and nuanced issue in CGL litigation, but it remains unresolved in this case.
  2. Whether the consent judgment rested on a covered theory of liability – the district court had effectively “reverse‑engineered” the basis for the consent judgment by eliminating wantonness, but it did not address the Employer’s Liability Act claim, and the Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to sort this out.

For future litigants, that means:

  • The opinion offers no new guidance on what constitutes an “occurrence” in the context of third‑party criminal assaults; and
  • It leaves open doctrinal questions about proof burdens and allocation when a consent judgment is silent as to the specific theory of liability and some theories are clearly uncovered.

The case therefore stands as a strong authority on the scope of the employer’s liability exclusion rather than on the outer boundaries of “occurrence” or consent‑judgment allocation.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Several legal doctrines and terms in the opinion benefit from plain‑language explanation:

1. Commercial General Liability (CGL) vs. Workers’ Compensation

  • CGL policy: Protects a business against claims by members of the public (customers, visitors, neighboring property owners) who are injured due to the business’s operations, premises, or products. It is not primarily designed to protect employees.
  • Workers’ compensation: A statutory system providing no‑fault benefits to employees injured on the job (medical costs, a portion of wages, disability benefits). In return, employees usually cannot sue the employer in tort for workplace injuries.

The employer’s liability exclusion ensures that employees’ workplace injuries are channeled (if at all) into the workers’ compensation system and associated coverages, not into the CGL policy.

2. Employer’s Liability Exclusion

This is a clause in many CGL policies that excludes coverage for bodily injury to:

  • An employee of the insured; that
  • “arises out of and in the course of” employment or duties related to the business.

In essence: if the injury is work‑related, it is not covered by the CGL policy. The question becomes whether the injury is sufficiently tied to the job (time, place, circumstances, and causal connection) to be considered work‑related.

3. “Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment”

Under Alabama workers’ compensation law (imported into this case):

  • “Arising out of” means there is a causal link between what the employee is doing as part of the job (or the conditions of the job) and the injury. The job must contribute to the risk that caused the injury.
  • “In the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances: the injury occurs during a reasonable period around working hours, at a place the employee is reasonably expected to be, while doing work or something reasonably incidental to work (like entering or leaving the premises).

Both elements must be satisfied for workers’ compensation coverage—and, per this opinion, for the employer’s liability exclusion to apply.

4. The Parking-Lot Exception to the Coming-and-Going Rule

Generally, injuries commuting to and from work are not considered “in the course of employment.” But Alabama recognizes a “parking‑lot exception”:

  • If the employer owns or maintains a parking lot for employees and an employee is injured in that lot immediately before or after work, the injury can be “in the course of employment.”
  • This can extend to adjacent sidewalks and streets necessary for entry and exit, depending on the circumstances.

In Babwari, this exception is pivotal: although he had clocked out, he was still on the employer’s premises, in a required parking spot, leaving work at the end of the shift.

5. Consent Judgment

A consent judgment is a court judgment reflecting an agreement between the parties. Rather than the judge or jury determining liability and damages after a trial, the parties stipulate to a particular outcome, and the court enters it as judgment.

Importantly for insurance disputes:

  • A consent judgment does not automatically bind an insurer that disputes coverage, especially where the insurer defended under a reservation of rights or withdrew based on a coverage denial.
  • The plaintiff still must prove that the judgment corresponds to a covered claim under the policy.

6. Direct-Action Statute

Alabama’s Direct‑Action Statute, Ala. Code § 27‑23‑2, allows a judgment creditor (here, Babwari) to sue the defendant’s insurer (State Farm) directly to satisfy a judgment. However:

  • The insurer may assert all coverage defenses it would have had if sued directly by the insured; and
  • The plaintiff must establish that the loss falls within the policy’s coverage and is not barred by any exclusion.

7. Reservation of Rights

When an insurer defends under a reservation of rights, it means:

  • The insurer is providing a defense for the insured in the underlying lawsuit, but it does not concede that the claim is covered;
  • The insurer reserves the right to later deny coverage or seek a declaration of no coverage.

This allows the insurer to protect the insured from immediate litigation exposure while preserving its ability to contest coverage. When the insurer later withdraws the defense (as State Farm did), disputes about coverage are often litigated in a separate action.

8. Summary Judgment and De Novo Review

  • Summary judgment is a procedural device for resolving cases without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • On appeal, summary judgment decisions are reviewed de novo, meaning the appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions, but instead independently applies the law to the undisputed facts.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Doctrinal Consolidation: CGL Exclusions and Workers’ Compensation Standards

Even as an unpublished decision, Babwari is likely to shape coverage litigation in Alabama federal courts and may persuade Alabama state courts. It cements the principle that:

  • When a CGL policy uses the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment,” courts should interpret that phrase using Alabama workers’ compensation case law; and
  • The coverage inquiry for the employer’s liability exclusion largely mirrors the employment nexus inquiry in workers’ compensation (time, place, circumstances, and causation).

The decision thus brings greater predictability: employers, insurers, and injured workers can look to existing workers’ compensation precedents—especially parking‑lot and ingress/egress cases—to predict whether the CGL employee exclusion will apply.

B. Potential Coverage Gaps for Employees

A significant practical implication is that the employer’s liability exclusion can apply even where a workers’ compensation claim might fail for reasons other than lack of employment nexus. In particular:

  • Under Ex parte N.J.J., assaults driven purely by the attacker’s personal animus toward the employee may not be compensable under workers’ compensation because they fall outside the statutory definition of “injury.”
  • Under Babwari, however, such an assault may still “arise out of and in the course of employment” for purposes of the CGL exclusion if the job placed the employee in the time and place of the assault.

This creates a potential gap in coverage:

  • No workers’ compensation, because the injury is excluded as a “personal animus” assault; and
  • No CGL coverage, because the same injury is excluded as arising out of and in the course of employment.

From the standpoint of employees and their counsel, this underscores the importance of:

  • Carefully evaluating whether a workers’ compensation theory can be sustained, including scrutinizing any “personal animus” characterization; and
  • Recognizing that direct‑action suits against CGL carriers may face a steep hurdle where the employment relationship is strong.

C. Employer Risk Management and Insurance Structuring

Employers should be aware that:

  • Injuries occurring on their premises, even just before or after work, are likely to be deemed employment‑related for purposes of the employer’s liability exclusion;
  • Requiring employees to park or work in high‑risk locations (dark corners, late‑night shifts) may increase exposure without corresponding CGL coverage.

This amplifies the importance of:

  • Maintaining adequate workers’ compensation and employers’ liability coverage;
  • Implementing reasonable security measures, especially for late‑night operations and isolated parking areas;
  • Understanding that CGL coverage will not function as a back‑up workers’ compensation policy.

D. Guidance for Insurers and Coverage Litigators

For insurers and their counsel, Babwari offers several strategic takeaways:

  • Policy drafting: The opinion validates the use of workers’ compensation language in exclusions and confirms that courts will often import the corresponding jurisprudence.
  • Coverage analysis: In employee‑injury claims, early analysis should:
    • Map the facts onto workers’ compensation standards for “arising out of and in the course of employment,” focusing on parking lot, ingress/egress, and off‑premises adjacency precedents;
    • Recognize that personal animus or other statutory limitations on benefits do not necessarily narrow the scope of the exclusion.
  • Litigation strategy: Where the exclusion is likely dispositive, it may be efficient to focus briefing on employment‑nexus issues rather than engaging in broader, and sometimes more fact-intensive, debates about “occurrence,” intentional injury, or criminal‑acts exclusions.

E. Limits of the Decision’s Reach

Finally, it is important to note the opinion’s limits:

  • It is unpublished and formally “not for publication,” meaning it is not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, though it may be cited as persuasive authority.
  • It does not address whether an intentional assault by a third party against an employee is an “occurrence” from the insured’s standpoint—a distinct and complex area of CGL law.
  • It does not clarify how to allocate or interpret consent judgments that do not specify which causes of action formed the basis for liability, when some causes are covered and others are plainly excluded.

Within its core domain—the scope of the employer’s liability exclusion—it is, however, clear and robust.

VII. Conclusion

Amanali Babwari v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. solidifies an important interpretive principle in Alabama-related insurance law: when a CGL policy excludes coverage for injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment,” courts should interpret that phrase using Alabama workers’ compensation standards for employment nexus. Applying that standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee’s shooting in an employer’s parking lot immediately after a mandated late‑night shift is a work‑related injury for purposes of the employer’s liability exclusion.

The decision underscores:

  • The strong parallelism between workers’ compensation and CGL exclusions;
  • The breadth of the “arising out of and in the course of employment” concept, especially under the parking‑lot and ingress/egress cases; and
  • The reality that employee injuries can fall into a coverage gap—outside workers’ compensation’s statutory definition of “injury” yet still excluded under the CGL employer’s liability clause.

For employers, the case is a reminder that CGL policies are not backstops for employee‑injury liability. For employees and their counsel, it highlights the importance of understanding both the workers’ compensation framework and the limitations of direct‑action suits against liability insurers. And for courts and practitioners, it offers a coherent, treatise-backed methodology for integrating statutory workers’ compensation concepts into the interpretation of CGL exclusions that explicitly borrow that language.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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