Aggravated Stalking Is Not a “Violent Felony” for No-Bail Purposes:
A Commentary on State v. Nicolae Beldiman (Vt. 2025)

Introduction

On 16 July 2025 a specially-assigned Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court delivered an Entry Order in State v. Nicolae Beldiman. The decision squarely addressed whether the felony of aggravated stalking, 13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(1), qualifies as “a felony, an element of which involves an act of violence against another person” under Vermont Constitution ch. II, § 40(2) and its statutory analogue, 13 V.S.A. § 7553a. The classification is critical because only those felonies may support a pre-trial hold-without-bail order.

This case reached the Supreme Court after the trial court continued a no-bail hold; Mr. Beldiman pursued the constitutionally guaranteed de novo review before a single Justice. The Court ultimately reversed, holding that aggravated stalking does not contain an element that constitutes an act of violence. In so doing, the Court refused to treat the Legislature’s characterization in § 1063(c) (“shall be considered a violent act for the purposes of determining bail”) as dispositive, re-affirming judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.

Summary of the Judgment

• Issue: Whether aggravated stalking is a qualifying “violent felony” such that a defendant may be held without bail under § 7553a.
• Holding: No. The elements of aggravated stalking do not require proof of an act of violence, therefore the offense does not satisfy the first prong of the constitutional and statutory no-bail framework.
• Result: The no-bail order was vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to impose standard conditions under § 7554.
• Key Rationale: (1) Only statutory elements, not factual allegations, determine whether an offense “involves an act of violence.”
  (2) The Legislature may not redefine constitutional terminology by fiat; § 1063(c) is a nullity for purposes of § 7553a.
  (3) Aggravated stalking can be proved without any threat or use of physical force, and therefore lacks the requisite element of violence.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. State v. Filippo, 172 Vt. 551 (2001) (mem.)
   Established that “element” refers strictly to the statutory building blocks of an offense, not the evidence or surrounding facts.
   Influence: Anchored the Court’s refusal to examine the factual allegations in the information.
2. State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 390 (1995)
   Adopted an “expansive” dictionary sense of violence, yet still tied it to conduct that creates fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
   Influence: Demonstrated that even broad definitions require a nexus to bodily harm or force, which aggravated stalking lacks.
3. State v. Perron, No. 24-AP-163, 2024 WL 3416096 (Vt. Jul. 12, 2024) (unpub.)
   Found aggravated assault with a deadly weapon to be violent because it pairs an intent to threaten with the means (weapon).
   Influence: Provided a contrast: aggravated stalking does not require matching intent and capacity.
4. State v. Combs, No. 23-AP-185, 2023 WL 4348874 (Vt. Jul. 3, 2023) (unpub.)
   Focused inquiry on whether an element “relates closely to an injurious or destructive act toward another.”
   Influence: Helped frame the Court’s conclusion that stalking can be completed without such an injurious act.
5. State v. Madigan, No. 2011-103, 2011 WL 4974812 (Vt. Mar. 25, 2011) (unpub.)
   Highlighted legislative silence as a factor but ultimately centered analysis on statutory elements.
   Influence: Reinforced that a mere label added by the Legislature is not controlling.

B. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Three-Pronged Test under § 7553a / § 40(2).
   The Court revisited the constitutional/statu­tory structure: (1) violent-felony element; (2) weight of the evidence; (3) danger analysis & adequacy of conditions. Because the first prong failed, the remaining prongs were moot.
2. Element-Focused Inquiry.
   Following Filippo, the Justice parsed the text of § 1063: none of its five statutory elements require either force or threats of bodily harm. Fear or emotional distress can suffice.
3. Separation of Powers and Legislative “Labeling.”
   Although § 1063(c) calls stalking a “violent act,” the Court declared that language a nullity for § 7553a purposes because the Vermont Constitution gives the judiciary—not the Legislature—the final word on constitutional terms that curtail liberty.
4. Comparison with True “Violent” Elements.
   By contrasting aggravated assault (§ 1024) and other recognized violent crimes, the Court found aggravated stalking materially different: it can be committed merely by property interference, surveillance, or conduct causing emotional distress.
5. Constitutional Avoidance of Over-Breadth.
   Echoing the presumption that “most prisoners are bailable,” the decision avoids an interpretation that would dramatically expand no-bail exceptions.

C. Potential Impact

• Immediate Bail Practice: Trial courts can no longer use aggravated stalking alone to justify no-bail holds; prosecutors must charge an additional qualifying violent felony, or proceed under § 7554 with stringent conditions.
• Legislative Drafting: The decision signals that merely inserting “is a violent act” into a statute does not overcome constitutional limitations. Future bills will need to embed actual violence elements if the Legislature wishes to expand § 7553a coverage.
• Separation of Powers Doctrine: Re-affirms the judiciary’s role as gatekeeper when statutory language intersects with constitutional rights. May influence future challenges where statutory classifications impinge on bail, firearms dispossession, or habitual-offender enhancements.
• Domestic and Victim-Safety Concerns: Although stalking victims may face genuine risk, the ruling underscores that risk must be handled through conditions of release—electronic monitoring, no-contact orders, etc.—rather than categorical denial of bail.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Element of an Offense

The specific factual proposition the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., “the defendant threatened another with a deadly weapon”). If it is not listed in the statute’s wording, it is not an element.

Act of Violence

For § 7553a, conduct that by its nature involves physical force or threats sufficient to create fear of serious bodily injury. Emotional distress alone is insufficient.

Hold Without Bail

A pre-trial detention order denying any possibility of release. Vermont allows it only in narrow circumstances set out in the Constitution.

De Novo Review

Latin for “from the beginning.” The reviewing Justice makes an entirely independent decision, owing no deference to the trial court’s findings.

Legislative “Labeling” vs. Constitutional Interpretation

While the Legislature may describe conduct as “violent,” that label cannot expand constitutional categories that limit liberty. The judiciary has the final say on what counts as “violent” within § 40(2).

Conclusion

State v. Nicolae Beldiman represents a significant clarification of Vermont bail jurisprudence. By holding that aggravated stalking is not inherently violent, the Supreme Court reinforced two enduring principles: (1) only the statutory elements, not factual allegations or legislative labels, determine whether a crime is “violent” for no-bail purposes, and (2) constitutional safeguards against pre-trial detention cannot be eroded by legislative re-definition. Practitioners must now assess stalking charges through the ordinary bail-conditions framework, while lawmakers are reminded that genuine violence must be built into the elements of an offense, not merely pronounced in ancillary subsections. The decision strengthens the presumption of bail, re-asserts judicial independence, and provides a robust template for analyzing future challenges under § 7553a and ch. II, § 40(2).