After Louisiana’s 2008 Tax Sale Revision, Pre‑Sale Notice Failures Do Not Create Absolute Nullities; Reconventional Nullity Claims in Quiet Title Actions Must Meet Dual Statutory Deadlines

Case: Belaire Development & Construction, LLC v. Succession of Theodore Shelton Sr., et al., Nos. 2025-C-00151 c/w 2025-C-00156 (La. Oct. 24, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

Author: Guidry, J.; Crain, J., concurring; McCallum, J., concurring in the result; Griffin, J., dissenting

Introduction

This decision squarely addresses two recurring issues in Louisiana tax sale litigation after the Legislature’s 2008 overhaul of Title 47, Subtitle III, Chapter 5:

Whether a failure to provide pre-tax sale notice still renders a post-2008 tax sale an absolute nullity; and
Which prescriptive period governs a tax sale nullity claim asserted as a reconventional demand in response to a purchaser’s petition to quiet title.

The case arises from a 2017 tax sale of immovable property in St. Martin Parish. Belaire Development & Construction, LLC (Belaire) acquired a 99% tax title; the City of Breaux Bridge briefly held the remaining 1% (later transferred to Belaire). After the redemptive period, Belaire sent a post-sale notice under La. R.S. 47:2157. In 2021, Belaire filed a petition to quiet title, and Dehlice Shelton, the independent executrix of the Succession of Theodore Shelton, Sr., responded in 2022 with a reconventional demand to annul the tax sale, alleging inadequate pre- and post-sale notice.

The trial court sustained prescription exceptions and dismissed the reconventional demand. The Third Circuit reversed, deeming the reconventional nullity timely under La. R.S. 47:2266 and characterizing the alleged defect (lack of pre-sale notice) as an absolute nullity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify both the nullity framework after the 2008 revision and the timing rules for reconventional nullity claims in quiet title actions.

Summary of the Opinion

Absolute vs. relative nullity: For tax sales occurring on or after January 1, 2009 (the effective date of the 2008 revision), the failure to provide pre-tax sale notice does not render the sale an absolute nullity. Under La. R.S. 47:2286, the only grounds to set aside a tax sale are a payment nullity, a redemption nullity, or a nullity under La. R.S. 47:2162, and all are relative nullities.
Reconciling timing statutes: A nullity action (here, a redemption nullity) brought as a reconventional demand in a quiet title action must be brought within the applicable prescriptive period in La. R.S. 47:2287 and, to avoid entry of judgment quieting title, also within the six-month window in La. R.S. 47:2266(A).
Application to this case: The Court held that Belaire’s 2020 notice under La. R.S. 47:2157 was deficient—it misstated the filing deadline (60 days instead of six months) and therefore did not “duly notify” Ms. Shelton for purposes of starting prescription. Service of the petition to quiet title in June 2022 did constitute “duly notified” under La. R.S. 47:2122(4). Ms. Shelton’s reconventional demand filed in November 2022 was therefore timely under both La. R.S. 47:2287(A)(1) and La. R.S. 47:2266(A).
Disposition: The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit insofar as it reversed the trial court’s prescription ruling, but reversed the Third Circuit’s conclusions that pre-sale notice defects support absolute nullity and that La. R.S. 47:2266 alone controlled timeliness. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Statutory Backdrop

Due process notice principles. The Court reiterated foundational due process doctrine:

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950): Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” to apprise interested parties and afford an opportunity to object.
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983): In tax sale contexts, when a party’s name and address are reasonably ascertainable, notice by mail or a similarly reliable means is a minimum constitutional requirement.

Louisiana constitutional and statutory framework. La. Const. art. VII, § 25(A) mandates notice “in the manner provided by law” to all record owners of any interest. Before 2008, missing pre-sale notice rendered a tax sale an absolute nullity. See Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, 05-1192 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So. 2d 1172.

The 2008 revision. Through 2008 La. Acts No. 819, the Legislature reorganized tax sale law with express aims of due process compliance, efficient collection, fair redemption, and returning property to commerce. See La. R.S. 47:2121(A). Key features:

La. R.S. 47:2286: “No tax sale shall be set aside except for” a payment nullity, redemption nullity, or a nullity under 47:2162 (sale to a prohibited buyer), “all of which are relative nullities.”
Commentary emphasizes that post-sale notice of the right to redeem is “the important notice,” and “minor procedural violations in noticing the tax sale and in the conduct of the tax sale” do not create nullities. La. R.S. 47:2286, Comments—2008 (b), (c).
“Duly notified” is defined in La. R.S. 47:2122(4) to include efforts meeting due process that provide notice meeting the requirements of a range of statutes (including 47:2156 and 47:2157), or service of the petition and citation under 47:2266—regardless of whether actual notice resulted.

Post-2008 appellate decisions. The Supreme Court surveyed appellate interpretations aligning with the 2008 framework:

Adair Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Turney, 50,574 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/4/16), 195 So. 3d 501: Post-sale notice is now the pivotal due process notice; adequate post-sale notification can cure pre-sale deficiencies.
Alpha Capital US Bank v. White, 18-0827 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/18), 268 So. 3d 1124: Failure of pre-sale notice does not render sale absolutely null; post-sale redemption notice under 47:2156/2157 can cure.
Stow-Serge v. Side by Side Redevelopment, Inc., 20-0015 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/20), 302 So. 3d 71: Similar recognition of the post-2008 regime.
Central Properties v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 16-1855 (La. 6/27/17), 225 So. 3d 441: Post-sale notice by the purchaser can satisfy statutory post-sale notice requirements and due process, even if the tax collector fails to provide post-sale notice. While not deciding the pre-sale notice question, the Court endorsed the post-2008 framework.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Plain text and comments of 47:2286 control for post-2008 sales. Applying standard canons (La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4), the Court gave effect to the unambiguous command of 47:2286: the only nullities are payment, redemption, or sale to a prohibited buyer—each relative and therefore curable. Official Revision Comments, though not law, confirm legislative intent to prioritize post-sale redemption notice and prohibit setting aside sales for pre-sale notice deficiencies alone.

2012 amendment to 47:2153 did not revive absolute nullity. The Court rejected the argument that 2012 La. Acts No. 836 (amending 47:2153) “restored” constitutional pre-sale notice protection by allowing an absolute nullity. The statute provides that, absent actual notice or reasonable efforts, the tax collector must cancel the sale and refund the purchase price. It does not create a private right to absolute nullity. Nor did the Legislature signal any departure from 47:2286’s exclusive list of relative nullities. The Court noted the canon that the Legislature is presumed to legislate with awareness of extant law. See M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So. 2d 16.

Constitutional questions reserved. The Court emphasized that any constitutional challenge to the 2008 revision (e.g., under La. Const. art. VII, § 25(A) or federal due process) was not properly before it: the constitutionality was not specifically pleaded below nor was the attorney general served. See Huber v. Midkiff, 02-0664 (La. 2/7/03), 838 So. 2d 771; Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm’n v. Office of Motor Vehicles, 97-2233 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So. 2d 776.

“Duly notified” and the content of notice. For redemption nullity prescription, 47:2287(A)(1) requires filing within six months of being “duly notified.” “Duly notified” (47:2122(4)) includes a notice that meets 47:2157. The Court found Belaire’s August 11, 2020 letter failed due process and statutory requirements because it misstated the available challenge window as 60 days when, under 47:2157(A)(1), the correct period was six months (less than five years since the tax sale certificate’s recordation). A notice that misstates an essential deadline does not afford a meaningful opportunity to object and thus is not “reasonably calculated” to apprise the party—violating due process and failing 47:2157.

Harmonizing 47:2287 and 47:2266: dual timing constraints. The Court read the statutes together: a party asserting a nullity must comply with both the prescriptive window in 47:2287 and the six-month bar to entry of a quiet title judgment in 47:2266(A)(1)–(2). The 2008 Comment (d) to 47:2287 supports that reconventional nullities must also be asserted within the time prescribed for the action or proceeding in which they’re brought. Thus:

47:2287 sets when the claim prescribes (e.g., six months after a person is “duly notified” for redemption nullities under A(1); 60 days if the “duly notified” event occurs more than five years after recordation under A(2)).
47:2266 sets a procedural six-month window after service of a quiet title petition, after which the court “shall” quiet title if no nullity proceeding is filed.

These operate cumulatively: to preserve the nullity and avert quieting the purchaser’s title, a party must (i) file before the 47:2287 prescriptive period runs and (ii) file within six months of service under 47:2266.

Application. Because the 2020 letter was not “duly notifying,” the first valid “duly notified” event was service of the quiet title petition on June 6, 2022 (which qualifies under 47:2122(4) as “service of a petition and citation in accordance with 47:2266”). The reconventional demand filed on November 29, 2022 was within six months of that service, satisfying both 47:2287(A)(1)’s prescriptive period and 47:2266(A)’s six-month window. The prescription exceptions were therefore improvidently granted.

3) The Dissent’s View (Griffin, J.)

Justice Griffin would treat the absence of pre-sale notice as an absolute nullity as a matter of federal due process, relying on Mennonite and Louisiana cases applying it, such as Quantum Resources Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 12-1472 (La. 3/19/13), 112 So. 3d 209; and Hamilton v. Royal Int’l Petroleum Corp., 05-846 (La. 2/22/06), 934 So. 2d 25. The dissent argues a state statute cannot dilute federal constitutional notice requirements and warns that allowing post-sale notice to “cure” a complete absence of pre-sale notice invites governmental neglect of pre-sale notice duties altogether. Citing out-of-state authority, the dissent contends post-sale redemption notices do not remedy pre-sale due process defects.

On prescription, the dissent reads 47:2287(C)’s language for reconventional demands as an alternative, not an additional, timing rule, arguing that making it cumulative with 47:2287(A) creates superfluity and practical impossibilities. The dissent also flags unresolved constitutional questions about whether due process claims may prescribe.

4) Impact and Practical Implications

Clarified nullity landscape for post-2008 tax sales. This decision cements that, for tax sales after January 1, 2009, defects in pre-sale notice do not produce absolute nullity. Challenges must fit within the three exclusive, relative nullity categories in 47:2286:

Payment nullity (taxes were actually paid or other statutory payment defects), 47:2287(B);
Redemption nullity (failure to duly notify at least six months before the end of the redemptive period), 47:2122(10), 47:2287(A); or
Nullity under 47:2162 (sale to a statutorily prohibited buyer).

Notice content matters. While the mode of sending post-sale notice under 47:2157 is flexible (ordinary mail suffices), the content is critical. An incorrect deadline undermines due process and the statute, meaning the “duly notified” clock never starts. Purchasers should ensure their 47:2157 letters:

Accurately state whether the recipient has 6 months (if under five years from recordation) or 60 days (if more than five years) to file suit;
Identify the property and the recipient’s potential interest; and
Are sent to reasonably ascertainable addresses, using redundant methods where appropriate.

Dual-deadline regime for reconventional nullities. The Court’s harmonization of 47:2287 and 47:2266 imposes two concurrent requirements for owners/heirs who respond to a quiet title action:

File the nullity within the prescriptive period triggered by the first qualifying “duly notified” event (which may be a correct 47:2157 notice or service of the quiet title petition under 47:2266); and
File within six months of service of the quiet title petition to avoid an automatic judgment quieting title.

Practice note: If more than five years have elapsed since recordation, 47:2287(A)(2) gives only 60 days after “duly notified” to sue on a redemption nullity—even though 47:2266 postpones entry of a quiet title judgment for six months after service. Litigants must heed the shorter prescriptive window: a suit filed after 60 days would be prescribed even if filed before the six-month 47:2266 mark.

Constitutional fault lines remain. The Court expressly declined to adjudicate constitutional challenges to the 2008 regime, leaving open whether, in a properly pleaded case, Louisiana’s prioritization of post-sale notice can coexist with Mennonite as interpreted in some jurisdictions and by the dissent. Future litigants intent on testing the constitutionality must plead it specifically and serve the attorney general.

Effect of later legislative action. The opinion notes a 2026 amendment: 2025 La. Acts No. 411 (effective Jan. 1, 2026) rewrites 47:2153 and adds 47:2153(D): “The failure of the tax collector to properly advertise the tax lien auction … shall not be a basis to annul the tax lien auction under La. R.S. 47:2286.” This further signals legislative reinforcement of the limited nullity regime.

Pre-2009 sales are different. The Court carefully cabined its holding to tax sales occurring after the 2008 revision’s effective date. For earlier sales, pre-sale notice failures may still support absolute nullity under pre-revision jurisprudence.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

Tax sale certificate: The recorded instrument evidencing the tax purchaser’s title interest following a tax lien auction. It triggers the redemptive period.
Redemptive period: The time during which the owner or interested party can redeem the property by paying statutory amounts. In Louisiana, generally three years from recordation of the tax sale certificate (La. Const. art. VII, § 25(B)(1)), subject to specific statutory schemes.
Pre-sale notice: Notice of delinquency and impending tax sale, historically critical for due process; after 2008, defects in pre-sale notice do not, by themselves, create a nullity action for post-2008 sales under 47:2286.
Post-sale notice of the right to redeem (47:2156/47:2157): Notices sent after the redemptive period begins, informing interested parties of their right and time limits to challenge the sale or redeem. Post-2008 law emphasizes these notices.
“Duly notified” (47:2122(4)): A due process-compliant effort to identify and provide a notice that meets the requirements of specific tax-sale statutes, or service of a petition and citation under 47:2266—regardless of whether the effort achieves actual notice.
Payment nullity (47:2122 definition; 47:2286): A ground to annul when taxes were paid or other payment defects exist.
Redemption nullity (47:2122(10); 47:2286): A ground to annul when a person was not “duly notified” at least six months before termination of the redemptive period.
Quiet title action (47:2266): A lawsuit by the tax purchaser to confirm title and full ownership; if no nullity proceeding is filed within six months of service, the court must quiet and confirm title.
Reconventional demand: A defendant’s claim asserted back against the plaintiff in the same suit—here, an annulment asserted in response to a quiet title petition.
Prescription vs. peremption: Prescription bars enforcement of a right after a time period; peremption extinguishes the right altogether. The statutes at issue use prescriptive terminology.

Unresolved Questions and Future Litigation

Constitutional challenge: Whether the post-2008 statutory emphasis on post-sale notices can constitutionally supplant pre-sale notice requirements under Mennonite remains open in Louisiana. A properly pleaded, noticed challenge could prompt a definitive ruling.
Dual deadlines in practice: Tension can arise when 47:2287(A)(2) prescribes in 60 days after a “duly notified” event occurring more than five years after recordation, but 47:2266 affords a six-month window before quieting. This decision signals that the shorter prescriptive period controls the claim, while 47:2266 controls the timing of judgment entry.
Standards for “reasonable effort” and address ascertainability: The opinion did not elaborate on how rigorous the search must be beyond the succession address used here. Future cases may refine the due process baseline.
Remedies via 47:2153: The 2012 version requires the tax collector to cancel the sale and refund the purchase price if the statutory pre-sale notice standard was not met. The contours and enforcement of that administrative remedy—and its interaction with purchaser-driven quiet title strategies—may invite further litigation.

Practical Guidance

For tax sale purchasers:

Send post-sale notices that strictly comply with 47:2157—use the correct deadline (six months if inside five years from recordation; 60 days if outside), property description, and statutorily suggested language.
Consider redundant delivery methods (ordinary and certified mail; email where appropriate), though ordinary mail suffices under the statute if content is correct.
Calendar the five-year anniversary of recordation. If you serve a qualifying notice after five years, a redemption nullity claim prescribes 60 days after that notice; however, remember the court will not enter a quiet title judgment until six months after service of the quiet title petition.
When a prior notice is questionable, service of a properly drafted quiet title petition can operate as the “duly notified” event (47:2122(4)), starting a fresh prescriptive clock.

For owners, heirs, and successors:

Act promptly upon receiving any tax sale notice or a petition to quiet title. Under this decision, you may have as little as 60 days to file a nullity claim depending on timing.
Scrutinize notice content. If the stated timeframe is wrong (as in this case) or other essential elements are missing, it likely is not “duly notified,” and prescription may not have started.
If contesting a quiet title, file the reconventional demand within six months of service to avoid an automatic judgment—even if you believe the prescriptive period is longer.
For pre-2009 sales, different rules may apply; consult counsel about persisting absolute nullity doctrines rooted in earlier jurisprudence.

For tax collectors and municipalities:

Even though pre-sale notice defects no longer create nullities for post-2008 sales, maintaining robust pre-sale notice practices remains prudent risk management and may avoid administrative cancellation obligations under 47:2153.
Track and implement the 2026 amendments clarifying that advertising defects are not grounds to annul under 47:2286.

Conclusion

This opinion has two lasting holdings. First, in the post-2008 statutory regime, a failure of pre-tax sale notice does not yield an absolute nullity; the exclusive nullity grounds are payment, redemption, and sale to a prohibited buyer—and they are all relative nullities. Second, when a property owner raises a nullity as a reconventional demand to a quiet title action, the owner must meet two clocks: the prescriptive period set by 47:2287 and the six-month “no-judgment” interval under 47:2266(A). Applied here, the purchaser’s 2020 post-sale notice was defective, so prescription did not begin until service of the quiet title petition in 2022. The reconventional demand filed within six months was timely, and the prescription exceptions should not have been granted.

At the same time, the Court expressly left constitutional questions unresolved due to procedural posture, and a vigorous dissent emphasizes the enduring force of Mennonite and Louisiana’s own pre-2008 jurisprudence requiring pre-sale notice as a constitutional prerequisite. As such, while the decision offers vital clarity for day-to-day tax sale practice—especially around notice content and timing—further appellate development is possible if and when a properly presented constitutional challenge arrives.