After Goldey and Egbert: Third Circuit Reaffirms No Bivens for Federal Prison Conditions and Excessive Force, But Requires Leave to Amend for Rehabilitation Act and RFRA Claims

Introduction

In Thomas Petoff v. Delmonico, No. 24-2933 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (not precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed in large part the dismissal of a federal prisoner’s civil rights lawsuit, holding that his constitutional claims could not proceed under Bivens in light of the Supreme Court’s post-Egbert regime—now reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Goldey v. Fields foreclosing Bivens for Eighth Amendment excessive force. At the same time, the Court vacated in part and remanded because the district court dismissed the action with prejudice without addressing, and without offering leave to amend, the plaintiff’s statutory claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).

The appellant, Thomas Petoff, a wheelchair user incarcerated at FCI Allenwood at the relevant time, alleged that after he filed a medical grievance seeking a wheelchair cushion, he was retaliated against, placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU), had his wheelchair confiscated, suffered assaults and humiliating treatment, was denied food (including his “religious diet”), medical care, recreation, and law library access, and ultimately lost good-time credits and was fined. The district court construed the complaint as raising First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment Bivens claims and dismissed with prejudice as non-cognizable under Bivens and barred by Heck v. Humphrey to the extent the claims would undermine disciplinary sanctions. The Third Circuit largely agreed on the Bivens and Heck analyses, but held that pro se litigants must be given an opportunity to amend to pursue non-futile statutory theories—here, the Rehabilitation Act and RFRA.

Summary of the Opinion

• Bivens claims: The panel agreed that Petoff’s constitutional claims—retaliation (First Amendment), property deprivation (Fifth Amendment), and conditions/medical care and excessive force (Eighth Amendment)—are not cognizable under Bivens after Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), and under Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025), which expressly forecloses Bivens for Eighth Amendment excessive force claims.
• Favorable-termination rule: To the extent any claims would call into question the validity of disciplinary proceedings resulting in loss of good-time credits or a fine, they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The court noted that Petoff disclaimed such a challenge on appeal, but affirmed that any such challenge would be futile.
• Statutory claims preserved for amendment: The district court failed to address Petoff’s invocation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, and his later-clarified RFRA “religious diet” claim. Although insufficiently pled, the Third Circuit held that amendment is not necessarily futile on the Rehabilitation Act and RFRA theories and remanded to permit amendment.
• Other rulings: HIPAA provides no private right of action. Dismissal of John Doe defendants for failure of timely service under Rule 4(m) stands; any challenge to that dismissal was forfeited on appeal.
• Disposition: Affirmed in large part; vacated in part; remanded to allow amendment limited to Rehabilitation Act and RFRA theories consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022): Egbert sharply curtailed the expansion of Bivens beyond the three canonical contexts (Bivens, Davis, Carlson), instructing courts to decline implied damages remedies whenever a claim arises in a “new context” and there is any reason (including the availability of alternative remedial schemes) to hesitate. The Third Circuit relied on Egbert, via its own decision in Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024), to conclude that Petoff’s First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment theories are not cognizable under Bivens.
• Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024): The Third Circuit’s analysis in Fisher explains how Egbert effectively ends most expansions of Bivens, particularly in federal prison litigation involving conditions of confinement, medical care, retaliation, and access-to-courts theories. The panel here cited Fisher to affirm dismissal of the constitutional claims.
• Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025): Goldey confirms that Eighth Amendment excessive force claims arise in a “new context” and that special factors counsel against recognizing a Bivens remedy. The Third Circuit invoked Goldey to foreclose Petoff’s excessive force allegations under Bivens.
• Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): The “favorable termination” rule bars § 1983 and analogous damages actions that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or (as adapted in the prison disciplinary context) sanctions affecting the duration of confinement such as good-time credits. The panel affirmed that any attempt to challenge disciplinary sanctions would be Heck-barred.
• Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2007), and Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002): These decisions require district courts, particularly in pro se cases, to offer leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Applying those principles, the panel vacated the with-prejudice dismissal as to statutory theories (Rehabilitation Act and RFRA) and ordered that Petoff be given a chance to amend.
• Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam): Reinforces liberal construction of pro se pleadings. The panel noted it was construing Petoff’s filings liberally.
• Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2021): Cited for the proposition—embraced by every circuit to consider the issue—that HIPAA contains no private right of action. Thus, any HIPAA-based claim would be futile.
• Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1993): Parties must adequately raise and brief issues on appeal. The panel used Kost to find forfeiture of certain arguments, including a challenge to Rule 4(m) dismissals.
• Standards of review: St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2020); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014) (plenary review of dismissal/summary judgment); U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837 (3d Cir. 2014) (plenary review of futility determinations).

Legal Reasoning

1. Bivens non-cognizability of constitutional claims:
   • The district court read the complaint to allege First Amendment retaliation, a Fifth Amendment property deprivation, and Eighth Amendment denials of food, medical care, recreation, and access to the law library. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court’s bottom line: under Egbert and the Third Circuit’s Fisher, these are “new context” claims for which no Bivens remedy should be recognized, given special factors (including alternative remedial structures and separation-of-powers concerns).
   • The panel also made explicit what the district court had not: excessive force claims by federal prisoners are now foreclosed under Bivens by Goldey v. Fields. Thus, even the subset of Eighth Amendment claims that historically might have sounded in Bivens under Carlson v. Green can no longer proceed when they present new contexts, and Goldey specifically shuts the door on excessive force.
2. Heck’s favorable termination rule:
   • Although Petoff insisted he was not challenging the disciplinary sanctions, the panel affirmed that any such challenge—e.g., to the loss of good-time credits or the fine—would be barred by Heck unless and until the sanctions are reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated through appropriate channels (for federal prisoners, typically habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for credit loss).
3. Required leave to amend for statutory claims:
   • The district court did not engage with Petoff’s references to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and his later-clarified RFRA claim (denial of “religious diet”). The panel held that while the original pleading was sparse, it was error to dismiss with prejudice without giving a pro se litigant the opportunity to amend where amendment would not be futile.
   • The court therefore vacated in part and remanded to allow Petoff to amend to pursue Rehabilitation Act and RFRA theories. It expressly declined to deem such amendment futile at this early stage.
4. Other issues:
   • HIPAA: No private right of action; amendment on HIPAA would be futile.
   • John Doe defendants: Dismissal under Rule 4(m) stands; any challenge was forfeited on appeal under Kost.

Impact and Implications

This not-precedential decision nonetheless illustrates the post-Egbert landscape for federal prisoner litigation in the Third Circuit:

• Bivens pathways are practically closed for federal prisoners challenging conditions of confinement, medical care, retaliation, access-to-courts, property deprivation, and excessive force. After Egbert and Goldey, courts will dismiss such constitutional damages claims at the threshold absent a very narrow match to the original Bivens contexts and without special factors.
• Statutory avenues matter. The opinion signals that viable claims often must be framed, if possible, under statutes that provide their own causes of action and remedial schemes, notably:
  • Rehabilitation Act § 504 (29 U.S.C. § 794): For disability-based discrimination and failures to accommodate in programs conducted by federal executive agencies, such as the Bureau of Prisons.
  • RFRA (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1): For substantial burdens on religious exercise, including denial of a religious diet.
• Pro se litigants retain a right to attempt to cure deficiencies. District courts must offer leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. This decision reinforces that principle where statutory claims were pled or reasonably inferable but not addressed.
• Heck still polices the line between conditions claims and de facto challenges to disciplinary outcomes. Damages claims that would undermine the validity of sanctions affecting sentence length (e.g., loss of good time) are barred unless the sanction is invalidated.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Bivens: A judge-made damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officers. The Supreme Court has recognized only three core contexts (unreasonable search and seizure; Fifth Amendment sex discrimination in federal employment; Eighth Amendment medical indifference in Carlson). Egbert instructs lower courts not to extend Bivens into new areas; Goldey specifically forecloses Bivens for Eighth Amendment excessive force.
• “New context” and “special factors”: A claim is a “new context” if it differs in a meaningful way from the historic Bivens cases. “Special factors” include separation-of-powers concerns, alternative remedial structures (grievance systems, FTCA, habeas, injunctive relief), and the institutional competence of Congress to design remedies. If either prong counsels hesitation, courts must decline to imply a Bivens remedy.
• Heck’s favorable termination rule: You cannot sue for damages on a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or disciplinary sanction affecting your sentence unless that conviction or sanction has been invalidated. For federal prisoners, loss of good-time credits triggers Heck; challenges must proceed via habeas and administrative processes first.
• Rehabilitation Act vs. ADA Title II:
  • ADA Title II applies to “public entities,” generally state and local governments and their instrumentalities; it does not ordinarily apply to the federal government or federal prisons.
  • The Rehabilitation Act § 504 covers “programs or activities conducted by any Executive agency,” which encompasses federal prisons. Thus, disability-based denial of access or failure to accommodate in a federal prison is typically analyzed under the Rehabilitation Act, not ADA Title II.
  • Remedies and defendants differ. The Rehabilitation Act typically allows suits against the responsible agency or official in an official capacity; individual-capacity damages are generally not available under the RA. Compensatory damages for RA require deliberate indifference to federally protected rights; injunctive relief is also available. PLRA exhaustion applies.
• RFRA:
  • RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening a person’s religious exercise unless it uses the least restrictive means to further a compelling interest.
  • The Supreme Court in Tanzin v. Tanvir held that RFRA’s “appropriate relief” includes money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity may still apply, and PLRA exhaustion is required in prison cases.
  • To plead a RFRA claim, a prisoner must allege a sincerely held religious belief, a substantial burden on religious exercise (e.g., denial of a required religious diet), and then the burden shifts to the government to justify the restriction under strict scrutiny.
• HIPAA: The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act does not provide a private right of action; individuals cannot sue directly for HIPAA violations. Enforcement is administrative.
• Rule 4(m): Plaintiffs must serve defendants within 90 days; failure to do so allows dismissal without prejudice unless good cause is shown. Appellate challenges can be forfeited if not properly briefed.
• PLRA exhaustion and damages: The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires full exhaustion of available administrative remedies before filing suit. It also limits recovery for purely mental or emotional injury absent physical injury; allegations of significant physical harm (e.g., wounds, hospitalization, weight loss) can satisfy that threshold.

Practical Guidance for Remand

• Rehabilitation Act pleading:
  • Identify the disability and specific programmatic barriers or failures to accommodate (e.g., SHU not wheelchair accessible; denial of needed cushion; confiscation of wheelchair preventing access to services).
  • Allege exclusion from, denial of benefits of, or discrimination in “programs or activities conducted by” the Bureau of Prisons “solely by reason of” disability, or failure to provide reasonable accommodations.
  • Name proper defendants (typically the agency or officials in their official capacities) and seek appropriate relief (injunctive and, if alleging deliberate indifference, compensatory damages).
• RFRA pleading:
  • Specify the religious belief, the religious diet required by that belief, the duration and nature of the denial, and how the denial substantially burdened religious exercise.
  • Name the officers personally involved for individual-capacity damages under Tanzin, anticipating qualified immunity defenses, and plead exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Stay clear of Heck-barred theories: Claims must not necessarily imply the invalidity of disciplinary sanctions that affect sentence length. If relief would imply such invalidity, pursue administrative and habeas remedies first.
• Anticipate defenses:
  • Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA.
  • Sovereign immunity and proper-party issues (particularly for ADA vs. RA).
  • Qualified immunity for RFRA damages claims.

Conclusion

Petoff v. Delmonico is a clear snapshot of the post-Egbert and post-Goldey terrain in federal prisoner litigation. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s Bivens claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fifth Amendment property deprivation, and Eighth Amendment conditions/medical care, and confirmed that Eighth Amendment excessive force is now off-limits under Bivens. It also reaffirmed that Heck bars damages claims that would undermine disciplinary sanctions.

Equally important, the panel vacated in part because the district court prematurely shut the door on statutory claims. Pro se litigants must be afforded an opportunity to amend where non-futile statutory avenues exist. Here, the Rehabilitation Act and RFRA provide potential pathways for relief that the district court did not address. On remand, the pleadings will determine whether Petoff can state viable claims under those statutes, mindful of PLRA exhaustion and the distinctions among proper defendants and remedies.

Key takeaways:

• In the Third Circuit, after Egbert and Goldey, federal prisoners will almost never be able to proceed on Bivens claims for conditions, medical care, retaliation, access-to-courts, property deprivation, or excessive force.
• Statutory claims—particularly under the Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination and RFRA for burdens on religious exercise—are critical alternatives and must be considered before dismissing pro se complaints with prejudice.
• Heck continues to bar damages claims that would imply the invalidity of disciplinary sanctions affecting sentence length.
• HIPAA affords no private cause of action; Rule 4(m) service rules remain strictly enforced and unchallenged dismissals are forfeited on appeal.

Although nonprecedential, the decision provides a practical roadmap: constitutional damages claims are foreclosed; viable relief, if any, will arise from carefully pleaded statutory rights coupled with proper defendants and full exhaustion.