Affirming NFA Registration Requirements: Upholding Miller in the Post‐Bruen Era: 7th Cir.

Introduction

In the case United States of America v. Jamond M. Rush, the Seventh Circuit was tasked with addressing a key constitutional challenge to Section 5861(d) of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The case involves a defendant, Jamond M. Rush, who was charged with possessing an unregistered, short-barreled rifle – an Anderson Manufacturing AR-15 with a 7.5-inch barrel, a firearm falling under the NFA’s regulation. Rush’s primary argument was that the registration and taxation regime imposed by the NFA – and now embodied in §5861(d) – burdens conduct that is otherwise protected by the Second Amendment. The United States, as the plaintiff-appellee, countered that both historical precedent, such as the landmark UNITED STATES v. MILLER decision, and the recent Supreme Court decision in Bruen, support the continued constitutional validity of the NFA’s requirements. This commentary examines the judicial decision, its interpretation of Second Amendment jurisprudence, and the new precedent established by upholding Miller post-Bruen.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision by rejecting defendant Rush's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Specifically, the court concluded that Section 5861(d) of the NFA – which requires the registration of certain unregistered firearms and imposes a tax mechanism – does not violate the Second Amendment even when evaluated in the context of the recent Supreme Court decision in Bruen.

The court’s opinion emphasized two main issues. First, it reaffirmed that UNITED STATES v. MILLER, a foundational Second Amendment case that upheld federal regulation of short-barreled firearms, remains controlling precedent. Secondly, applying the two-step test from Bruen, the court found that the regulation in question does not infringe upon the protection of the right to keep and bear arms because the regulated firearms fall outside the class of arms “in common use” for lawful self-defense. The court’s analysis detailed how historical practices, dating back to colonial-era and early Republic laws, support the constitutionality of registration and taxation regimes similar in purpose to §5861(d).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment robustly cites several key precedents:

UNITED STATES v. MILLER (1939): This decision played a central role in the court’s analysis by establishing that the Second Amendment does not extend to items not in common use for lawful purposes. Miller has historically upheld regulation over unregistered, short-barreled firearms and was determined to control the current challenge despite claims to the contrary.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Although Rush argued that Bruen’s framework undermined the NFA’s provisions, the Court clarified that Bruen does not redefine or overrule Miller. Instead, Bruen contributes a two-step analysis: first determining whether the firearm in question falls within the constitutional protection of the Second Amendment and secondly whether the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition.
Bevis v. City of Naperville and Friedman v. City of Highland Park: These cases are used to explain that even if a weapon is common, its use must serve a recognized lawful purpose (e.g., self-defense) to receive Second Amendment protection. The court noted that popularity alone does not shield a firearm from regulation.
Additional Historical Analogues: Citing colonial and post-colonial laws (from 1631, 1649 Massachusetts law, and 18th-century regulations), the judgment demonstrated that the tradition of enforcing registration and imposing taxes or fines as a form of public safety is deeply rooted in American legal history.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s legal reasoning revolves around the interplay of historical context and constitutional text:

Application of the Bruen Two-Step Test: The Court first examined whether the Second Amendment covers the possession of an unregistered, short-barreled rifle. Finding that the firearm in question was not protected, because it is not “an arm in common use” for lawful self-defense, the court proceeded to the second step.
Historical Consistency: In step two, the judgment compared the modern regulatory scheme of §5861(d) with historical firearm regulations. The Court emphasized that registration and taxation measures have longstanding historical antecedents, reinforcing that the modern statute is “relevantly similar” to regulations dating back to the colonial period.
Reliance on Precedent: The court reiterated the binding nature of Supreme Court precedent (notably Miller), arguing that when a precedent is directly controlling, it must be followed even if later decisions (e.g., Bruen) elaborate upon its principles. This reasoning was buttressed by detailed discussions on the permissible scope of governmental regulation of arms.
Distinction between Licensing and Banning: The judgment also distinguishes the registration and taxation requirements from outright bans. The government’s position that the regime simply imposes a condition on lawful possession—rather than infringing on Second Amendment rights outright—was upheld as consistent with established regulatory traditions.

Impact

This decision is expected to have significant implications for Second Amendment jurisprudence and the regulation of firearms:

It reinforces the continuing validity of UNITED STATES v. MILLER in limiting Second Amendment protection to arms commonly used for lawful self-defense.
It clarifies that registration and taxation requirements, as applied under the NFA, can constitute valid regulatory measures even under the heightened scrutiny of the post-Bruen era.
Future challenges to federal firearms regulations that incorporate historical analogues are likely to cite this decision as authority on how historical tradition and contemporary regulation interact.
The opinion may influence circuit courts and lower courts by establishing that a strict numerical argument (based solely on prevalence or “common use”) does not override the requirement for a demonstrated lawful purpose.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The judgment involves several technical legal concepts which can be better understood as follows:

Facial Challenge: This is a constitutional challenge asserting that a law is invalid in all its applications. Rush had to prove that there is no conceivable circumstance under which the statute might be valid—a challenging standard that the court found unfulfilled.
Bruen Two-Step Framework: First, determine if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct in question; second, assess whether the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition. The court’s discussion addresses both steps, emphasizing the improper expansion of Second Amendment protections.
Historical Analogue: Rather than expecting modern law to mirror old statutes exactly, the Court seeks “relevantly similar” historical practices. It explains that while conditions change, the underlying principle of regulating dangerous or unusual arms has deep roots.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States of America v. Jamond M. Rush firmly upholds the constitutionality of Section 5861(d) of the NFA. Central to the reasoning is the affirmation that UNITED STATES v. MILLER remains controlling, and that the registration and taxation scheme does not impose an impermissible burden on the Second Amendment. The court’s detailed analysis under the Bruen framework shows that short-barreled rifles, by virtue of not being considered arms in common use for lawful self-defense, fall outside the ambit of heightened protection. Moreover, the rich historical tradition of regulating firearms—through measures ranging from colonial statutes to modern tax and registration regimes—provides ample support for the NFA’s approach.

In summary, the judgment underscores that contemporary regulatory measures, when appropriately justified by historical precedent, remain constitutional. This decision not only reaffirms Miller but also clarifies the boundaries of Second Amendment challenges in a post-Bruen context, setting a significant precedent for future firearms regulation litigation.

Affirming NFA Registration Requirements: Upholding Miller in the Post‐Bruen Era