Affirming Investigatory Stops and Limited Frisks under the Fourth Amendment: A Tenth Circuit Analysis

Introduction

The judgment in United States of America v. Adam Douglas Sherwood, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on March 10, 2025, underscores a reaffirmation of the principles governing investigatory stops and limited frisks under the Fourth Amendment. In this case, following a series of corroborated emergency calls alleging gunfire, Tulsa Police Officer Andrew DeGeorge initiated a traffic stop on a white Chevrolet Silverado, culminating in a series of searches that uncovered contraband, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. The defendant, Adam Douglas Sherwood, contended that the officers exceeded their boundaries under TERRY v. OHIO and that the searches violated his constitutional rights. The court’s analysis centered on whether the specific and articulable facts supporting the initial stop and subsequent searches satisfied the reasonable suspicion and probable cause standards mandated by the Fourth Amendment.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying the defendant’s motions to suppress evidence. The judgment held that Officer DeGeorge acted reasonably, citing that:

The initiation of the traffic stop was justified by the corroborated emergency calls and observable details, such as the improperly illuminated license plate.
The subsequent search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause, derived from multiple corroborating facts and prior convictions of the occupants.
The investigatory detention and the limited frisk—which eventually led to the seizure of a small bag of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia—fell within the permissible scope of Terry’s doctrine.
The search warrant obtained for the defendant’s phone was also upheld, with the court rejecting arguments regarding jurisdictional issues raised in light of McGirt v. Oklahoma.

In essence, the appellate court’s decision reaffirmed the parameters of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as applied to investigatory stops, vehicle searches, and limited frisks, making clear that the totality of the circumstances permits the use of such investigative techniques when specific, articulable facts are present.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment relies heavily on a well-established body of precedent:

TERRY v. OHIO (392 U.S. 1, 1968): This cornerstone case establishes that reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop also permits a limited frisk when there is concern for officer safety.
United States v. Madrid (713 F.3d 1251, 2013): The court reiterated the two-part test—“justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope”—for determining the reasonableness of a stop under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Daniels (101 F.4th 770, 2024) and United States v. Chavez (660 F.3d 1215, 2011): These cases provide the framework for assessing the reliability of emergency calls using a five-factor test.
Other supporting cases such as United States v. Saulsberry, United States v. Bradford, and United States v. King further underline the judicial consensus regarding probable cause and the acceptable scope of Terry frisk procedures.

By citing these precedents, the court reinforced that the officer’s actions were well within the scope of established Fourth Amendment doctrine, especially when balanced against the need for officer safety and reliability of evidence.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning pivots on several crucial principles:

Reasonable Suspicion and the Totality of the Circumstances: The judgment emphasized that reasonable suspicion does not require the same weight of proof as probable cause. The multiple corroborated emergency calls, the vehicle’s identifiable characteristics, and the erratic behavior of the occupants collectively satisfied the standard of “particularized and objective” facts that justify an investigatory stop.
Probable Cause for Vehicle Searches: The analysis used precedents clarifying that once reasonable suspicion leads to a stop, any subsequent evidence—such as admissions of prior felonies and observed gun holsters—can establish probable cause to search the vehicle comprehensively.
Scope of the Terry Frisk: Recognizing that officer safety underpins the Terry doctrine, the court held that a frisk extending into a suspect’s pocket was justified, particularly once the suspect voluntarily revealed the presence of a potential weapon (in this case, a pocketknife) that could conceal a more dangerous contraband.
Jurisdictional Considerations Post-McGirt: The court addressed the defendant’s challenge regarding the location of the stop being within Indian country, referring to United States v. Pemberton. It validated that, given the officers’ objective good-faith belief regarding the legitimacy of their actions, the evidence could not be excluded on jurisdictional grounds.

Impact

The judgment carries several significant implications for future case law and law enforcement practices:

Enhanced Clarity on Investigatory Stops: The decision reinforces that even in scenarios with inherent ambiguities—such as reliance on emergency calls—the totality of circumstances can establish the legal basis for a stop. This clarifies the threshold required for law enforcement officers to initiate contact.
Affirmation of Limited Frisks Under Terry: By validating the limited search of a suspect’s pocket upon an acknowledged statement about possessing a weapon, the judgment further defines the boundaries of a Terry frisk.
Jurisdictional Precedents: The decision’s treatment of the post-McGirt jurisdictional issue provides a useful roadmap for handling evidence obtained in locations affected by tribal sovereignty cases, provided the officers act in good faith.
Sentencing Enhancements: The application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) is bolstered by the recognition of physical proximity and constructive possession—a standard that may influence future sentencing decisions in drug-related cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

This judgment involves several complex legal ideas which can be clarified as follows:

Reasonable Suspicion: This is a lower threshold than probable cause. It requires that the officer have specific facts or observations that point to criminal activity—even if these facts do not warrant a full-blown arrest.
Terry Stop: Originating from TERRY v. OHIO, this concept allows police to briefly detain individuals and conduct a limited frisk if there is a concern for officer safety, even if there isn’t enough evidence for an arrest.
Probable Cause: This legal standard is met when the facts and circumstances create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found. Probable cause is needed to justify searches that go beyond a mere pat-down.
Constructive Possession: In sentencing, even if an accused is not seen directly with a weapon, being in close proximity to it or having access to it can satisfy the standard for possession.
Jurisdictional Good Faith: Evidence obtained under an officer’s reasonable belief that their actions are lawful will generally not be suppressed, even if technical jurisdictional issues (like those raised by McGirt) are later contested.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in this case reaffirms the legitimacy of investigatory stops and limited frisks under the Fourth Amendment when supported by specific, articulable facts. By upholding the officer’s actions—from the initial stop spurred by credible emergency calls to the subsequent searches—the judgment not only validates established precedents such as TERRY v. OHIO but also delineates clear parameters regarding probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and the appropriate scope of search procedures. Moreover, the handling of jurisdictional challenges in a post-McGirt context and the application of sentencing enhancements further contribute to a robust legal framework that balances public safety concerns with the constitutional rights of individuals. This ruling is poised to serve as persuasive authority in future cases, offering a comprehensive guide to the interplay between investigative practices and Fourth Amendment protections.

Ultimately, the judgment underscores that the legitimacy of police procedure in investigatory stops and limited frisks is firmly rooted in the careful evaluation of the totality of the circumstances—a principle that will continue to shape law enforcement practices and judicial reviews in similar contexts.