Affirming Felon-In-Possession Convictions: Probationary Disarmament and the Historical Tradition in § 922(g)(1)

Introduction

This commentary reviews the recent opinion in United States of America v. Kristian Darnell Moore, decided on March 5, 2025, by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The case centers on Moore’s appeal against his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) – the felon-in-possession statute – arguing that the statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. This case is particularly instructive as it explores the intricate issues surrounding the constitutional challenges raised by defendants who claim that firearm possession restrictions during probationary periods or supervised release lack a sufficient historical analogue.

The background involves two distinct incidents: Moore’s initial state-level felony conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and a subsequent violation of state probation conditions by obtaining firearms and engaging in cyberstalking and terroristic threat conduct. The Government relies on a substantial body of precedent, including recent Supreme Court and appellate panel decisions, to justify both the facial constitutionality of the statute and its application to Moore’s conduct.

Summary of the Judgment

In the opinion delivered per curiam, the Fifth Circuit Court affirmed Moore’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The decision was based on two major points:

The facial challenge to the statute is precluded by the precedent in United States v. Diaz, where similar Second Amendment challenges were rejected.
The as-applied challenge, which argued that Moore’s non-violent felony and his personal need for firearm possession for protection should exempt him, was rejected as the facts unequivocally demonstrated that Moore was subject to explicit probation conditions that bar firearm possession, further bolstered by parallels in recent opinions such as United States v. Contreras and United States v. Giglio.

Ultimately, the court determined that the historical tradition supporting temporary disarmament of convicted felons—whether on probation, parole, or supervised release—supports the operation of § 922(g)(1) in the present case, leading to an affirmation of the conviction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment relies heavily on several key precedents that clarify the application of the Second Amendment in the context of felony firearm bans. The decision emphasizes:

United States v. Diaz: This case provided a crucial framework by analyzing and rejecting both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the felon-in-possession statute by highlighting its alignment with the historical practices of firearm regulation and disarmament. The court in Diaz underscored that permanent disarmament had long been a penal measure, establishing that the statute fits within that historical continuum.
United States v. Contreras: Contreras is particularly relevant due to its discussion on the regulatory power to disarm individuals on supervised release or probation. Contreras confirmed that, given the historical tradition of temporary disarmament as part of a sentence, disarming individuals on probation aligns with the longstanding legal practice.
United States v. Giglio: This decision further consolidated the rationale for disarming individuals still serving portions of their sentence by rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenges. Giglio affirmed that even where supervised release is in force, continuing to enforce firearm bans remains constitutional.
Supreme Court Decisions (Bruen and Rahimi): While Moore's facial argument referenced the Supreme Court’s analysis in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and the more recent United States v. Rahimi, these decisions, in tandem with the Diaz opinion, effectively limited the scope of challenges to § 922(g)(1).

The interplay among these precedents forms the backbone of the appellate court’s reasoning, signaling that the disarmament of felons—even those on probation—fits squarely within America’s historical legal tradition regarding firearm regulation.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s legal reasoning is methodically structured. Initially, it dismisses the facial challenge by relying on prior decisions that have established a consistent interpretation of the Second Amendment in the context of firearm restrictions for persons with felony convictions. Specifically, the court notes how the reasoning in Diaz renders Moore’s facial attack moot, as the statute has already been validated under analogous circumstances.

The analysis then shifts to the as-applied challenge. Despite Moore’s argument that his prior felony did not involve violence and that his possession of firearms was meant solely for personal protection, the court finds this argument unavailing. A critical point in the reasoning is that Moore was under a probation order that expressly forbade firearm possession. The court scrutinizes his actions—acquiring multiple firearms and using them in the context of cyberstalking and terroristic threats—which further undermines his claim of being a ‘non-violent’ offender deserving of an exception.

The court also emphasizes that, for predicate offenses to be considered in a § 922(g)(1) analysis, they must arise from convictions that are separate from the ongoing charge, thereby disqualifying any post-arrest conduct not resulting in a prior felony conviction. Additionally, the reasoning is bolstered by analogies drawn in Contreras and Giglio, where historical practices of disarmament during periods of probation or supervised release are declared constitutionally sound. The decision reinforces that the historical tradition of firearm forfeiture supports the statutory limitations on individuals who are still serving sentences related to their felony convictions.

Impact

This judgment has several significant implications:

It reinforces the judicial acceptance of firearm possession restrictions on individuals who have committed felonies, even in contexts where the individual claims a non-violent history or a personal need for protection.
The decision strengthens precedent by affirming that both facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) must contend with a robust historical framework, thereby narrowing the scope for future successful challenges by similar defendants.
The reliance on cases such as Contreras and Giglio signals to lower courts that the enforcement of probation conditions regarding the possession of firearms is constitutionally permissible, potentially affecting a broad range of future cases involving disarmament during probation or supervised release.

In effect, the decision is likely to deter future constitutional challenges to analogous firearm regulations under the Second Amendment where the historical tradition supports the penal measures adopted by modern statutes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several key legal concepts within the judgment may seem complex at first glance. Here are simplified explanations to aid understanding:

Felon-in-Possession Statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)): This federal law prohibits individuals convicted of felonies (those punishable by more than one year in prison) from possessing or transporting firearms. It operates on the principle that individuals with certain criminal backgrounds pose too great a risk to be allowed to possess firearms.
Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges: A facial challenge argues that a law is unconstitutional in every application, whereas an as-applied challenge contends that, in a particular case, the law has been applied in a manner that violates the defendant’s rights. The court in Moore’s case rejected both types of challenges.
Historical Tradition Test: This legal principle assesses whether modern firearm regulations have historical analogues that justify disarming individuals based on past practices. In Moore’s case, the court drew upon historical forfeiture laws that temporarily disarmed convicts during their punishment or rehabilitation periods.
Probation and Supervised Release: While these terms refer to mechanisms of criminal sentencing that allow defendants to serve parts of their sentence outside prison, they are also considered periods during which certain restrictions—such as firearm bans—remain in force.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Moore provides a rigorous affirmation of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as applied to individuals on probation. By distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges and emphasizing historical practices of disarmament for convicted felons, the court has set clear parameters for future challenges targeting similar firearm possession restrictions.

The ruling underscores that the balance between Second Amendment rights and public safety measures is maintained when current statutes reflect long-standing legal traditions. Future litigants challenging § 922(g)(1) will have to contend with both the persuasive precedents of Diaz, Contreras, and Giglio, and the robust historical rationale that supports temporary firearm restrictions on individuals still serving the sentence of a felony.

This decision is significant not only for its immediate impact on Moore’s case but also for its broader legal implications regarding firearm regulation and the enduring influence of historical practices on modern jurisprudence.