Affirming Dismissal With Prejudice for Repeated Shotgun Pleadings After Explicit Repleading Instructions (Even for Pro Se Litigants)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose after pro se plaintiff Jibrail Malik Muhammad, Sr. filed multiple sprawling complaints against several defendants, including Dolgencorp, LLC (Dollar General). The district court ultimately dismissed Muhammad’s third amended complaint with prejudice, concluding it remained a shotgun pleading despite detailed prior instructions and multiple opportunities to replead. Muhammad also sought post-judgment relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which the district court denied.

On appeal, the key issues were (i) whether the district court abused its discretion by treating the third amended complaint as a shotgun pleading, (ii) whether dismissal with prejudice was disproportionate given Muhammad’s pro se status, and (iii) whether reconsideration was wrongly denied.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, it held:

• The third amended complaint still contained shotgun-pleading defects—especially failure to separate distinct theories into separate counts and the use of vague, disconnected allegations.
• Dismissal with prejudice was permissible because Muhammad had already been given multiple chances to replead, warned of consequences, and still failed to comply with explicit instructions.
• The Rule 59(e)/60(b) motion was properly denied because it largely reiterated prior arguments rather than identifying newly discovered evidence or manifest legal/factual error.

The panel also declined to consider a sanctions request raised only in the reply brief (not by separate motion), and denied an emergency motion for relief as beyond the scope of the appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018), supplied two central rules. First, it confirmed that dismissal of a complaint as a shotgun pleading is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Second, it set a procedural safeguard: before dismissing with prejudice on shotgun-pleading grounds, a court must explain the defects and give the plaintiff at least one chance to replead. The panel relied on this framework to conclude the district court acted within its discretion because Muhammad received multiple repleading opportunities and detailed instructions.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015), provided the taxonomy of four categories of shotgun pleadings. The opinion used this classification to identify Muhammad’s defects as primarily:

• Category three: failing to separate each cause of action into a different count; and
• Category two: “conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts” not clearly connected to a specific cause of action.

Procup v. Strickland

Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986), grounded the court’s discussion of a federal court’s inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect its jurisdiction from conduct that impairs Article III functions. The panel invoked Procup in two ways:

• To justify managerial tools (such as page limits) for repetitious or burdensome filings; and
• To reject Muhammad’s complaint that the magistrate judge lacked authority to impose a 35-page limit, particularly given the history of “hundreds of pages” prior complaints.

Cramer v. Florida and Tamiami Partners v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla.

These cases illustrated the category two concept:

• Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1997), was cited for pleadings being so disorganized and ambiguous that it becomes nearly impossible to discern the claims.
• Tamiami Partners v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1995), supported the point that “vague and cursory allegations” are a hallmark of shotgun pleading.

Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris Cnty.

Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris Cnty., 89 F.3d 1481 (11th Cir. 1996), reinforced the category three defect: a count improperly “present[s] more than one discrete claim for relief.” The panel applied this directly to Counts 10 and 11 (each alleged both disparate treatment and hostile work environment theories).

Moon v. Newsome

Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1989), supplied the sanction principle: although dismissal is “extraordinary,” dismissal for disregard of a court order—especially after forewarning—is generally not an abuse of discretion. This authority underwrote affirmance of dismissal with prejudice after repeated noncompliance.

Waldman v. Conway and Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC

The panel balanced solicitude for pro se litigants with limits on judicial assistance:

• Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2017), confirmed that pro se pleadings are liberally construed.
• Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2020), emphasized courts cannot serve as de facto counsel or rewrite deficient pleadings to sustain an action.

Together, these cases framed the court’s view that pro se status does not excuse repeated failure to present coherent, rule-compliant claims after guidance.

Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., Arthur v. King, and Terrell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs.

These precedents anchored the standards for reconsideration and the scope of appropriate post-judgment relief:

• Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707 (11th Cir. 2020), provided abuse-of-discretion review for Rule 59(e) denials.
• Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000), provided abuse-of-discretion review for Rule 60(b) denials.
• Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2007), stated Rule 59(e) grounds are limited to newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact and cannot relitigate old matters.
• Terrell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs., 98 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2024), reiterated that Rule 60(b) is not a vehicle to raise arguments or evidence that could have been presented earlier.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

(1) Identifying concrete shotgun-pleading defects

The court did not rely on abstract labels; it pointed to specific counts as examples of recurring defects.

• Category three (multiple discrete theories in a single count): Counts 10 and 11 each combined (i) disparate-treatment allegations (e.g., failure to hire, wage disparity) with (ii) a hostile work environment theory linked to an assistant manager playing music. This violated the magistrate judge’s explicit instruction to separate causes of action “based on separate transactions or occurrences” into separate counts.
• Category two (vague, muddled, disconnected allegations): The court highlighted Counts 3, 7, 10, and 16 as containing vague references, confusing shifts in theory, and allegations untethered to elements of the asserted claim (e.g., a “Double Jeopardy Clause” count tied to wage garnishment plus opaque references to other proceedings; ADA allegations commingled with hostile-environment rhetoric; a due-process allegation against a private company without coherent linkage to state action).

(2) Justifying dismissal with prejudice after repeated opportunities

The Eleventh Circuit treated the with-prejudice dismissal as a function of process and persistence: the plaintiff had already filed multiple defective complaints, received detailed explanations of deficiencies, was afforded additional chances to replead, and was warned there would be no further opportunities. Under Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets and Moon v. Newsome, continued failure to comply after forewarning supported dismissal with prejudice.

(3) Rejecting reconsideration as improper relitigation

The panel applied Rule 59(e)/60(b) limits: a motion cannot be used to reargue adequacy of pleadings absent newly discovered evidence or a manifest error of law/fact. Because Muhammad’s motion largely repeated prior arguments, denial was affirmed under Arthur v. King and Terrell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs..

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear application of entrenched Eleventh Circuit doctrine with practical signals for litigants and courts:

• Pro se litigants: Liberal construction has limits; after explicit instructions, courts will not “rewrite” pleadings and may dismiss with prejudice for repeated shotgun defects.
• District courts: The opinion affirms active case-management tools (including page limits under Procup v. Strickland) and underscores that dismissal with prejudice is sustainable when the record shows: notice of defects, an opportunity to replead, and continued noncompliance.
• Employment and civil-rights pleadings: Mixing disparate treatment, hostile work environment, ADA accommodation, and constitutional theories in undifferentiated counts invites dismissal; each theory must be pleaded with clear factual linkage and separated counts where appropriate.
• Post-judgment motion practice: Parties should treat Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) as narrow remedies, not a “second round” of briefing on arguments already considered.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Shotgun pleading”

A shotgun pleading is a complaint written in a way that makes it difficult for the defendant (and the court) to tell: (1) exactly what legal claims are being asserted, (2) what facts support each claim, and (3) which defendant did what. The Eleventh Circuit disfavors these pleadings because they obscure the issues, increase costs, and impede efficient adjudication.

Category two vs. category three defects (from Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off.)

• Category two: The complaint contains vague, conclusory, or irrelevant facts—so the legal theory and its factual basis are unclear.
• Category three: The complaint does not separate different causes of action into separate counts—multiple distinct claims are merged together.

“Dismissal with prejudice”

A dismissal with prejudice ends the case and prevents refiling of the same claims. It is more likely to be upheld when the plaintiff has been told what is wrong, given a fair chance to fix it, and still fails to do so—especially after a warning.

Rule 59(e) vs. Rule 60(b)

• Rule 59(e): A timely request to alter or amend the judgment, generally limited to newly discovered evidence or manifest errors.
• Rule 60(b): A limited “escape valve” from a final judgment for specified reasons (e.g., newly discovered evidence, fraud, extraordinary circumstances), not a chance to reargue.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision reinforces a practical rule of federal pleading and case management: when a plaintiff—pro se or represented—repeatedly files a shotgun complaint after detailed guidance and warnings, dismissal with prejudice is within the district court’s discretion. The opinion also reiterates the narrow function of Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b): they cannot be used to relitigate issues already decided. In the broader context, the case exemplifies the court’s ongoing effort—rooted in Weiland, Vibe Micro, and Procup—to protect judicial resources and ensure defendants receive fair notice of the claims against them.