Affirming §922(g)(1) and Clarifying Plain-Error Limits on Coerced Evidentiary Stipulations in United States v. Mayfield

Introduction

United States v. Mayfield (10th Cir. 2025) addresses two interrelated questions: (1) whether a district court’s strong encouragement—arguably verging on coercion—to have a criminal defendant stipulate to the authenticity and admissibility of government exhibits violated the Sixth Amendment’s fair-trial guarantee or the Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process clause, and (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing ammunition, is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in the wake of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022).

Dedric Mayfield, a Colorado felon with five prior convictions, was charged with possession of ammunition after a HALO (High Activity Location Observation) camera recorded him firing a .40-caliber handgun. At a pretrial conference, the district court admonished defense counsel to stipulate “to the maximum extent possible” to all government exhibits’ authenticity and admissibility, warning that withholding stipulations without a good-faith basis would put the defense on a “very bad footing.” Mayfield partly complied but did not object to all exhibits. A jury convicted him under § 922(g)(1) and he received a 120-month sentence. On appeal, Mayfield challenged (a) the trial court’s coercive stipulation instruction under plain-error review, and (b) the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) post-Bruen.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit rejected both of Mayfield’s arguments. It first held that his failure to object below meant the stipulation-instruction claim is subject to plain-error review. The court refused to apply a broad “futility exception” because Mayfield never presented his Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment concerns to the district court. Assuming without deciding that the instruction was erroneous, the panel concluded that Mayfield cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome (the third prong of plain-error review) because: (i) he had already stipulated to the HALO footage’s authenticity and admissibility before the disputed instruction; (ii) he admitted he was the person firing the handgun; and (iii) the government independently proved interstate commerce via an expert on ammunition manufacture. Thus no substantial rights were affected, and the claimed error was not “structural.”

Second, the panel reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) survives Bruen under binding precedent—United States v. McCane (10th Cir. 2009), Vincent v. Garland (10th Cir. 2023), and its post-Rahimi reaffirmance in Vincent v. Bondi (10th Cir. 2025)—which hold that felon-dispossession statutes fall outside the core Second Amendment right. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Davis v. Ayala (2015) and Chapman v. California (1967): Harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for preserved constitutional errors.
Olano (1993): Framework for plain-error review under Rule 52(b).
Uscanga-Mora (2009), Algarate-Valencia (2008), and Abuan (2003): The “futility exception” to waiver and its narrow application requiring that the court have “considered and rejected” an objection.
Greer v. United States (2021) and Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017): Supreme Court’s skepticism of a broad futility exception and criteria for structural error.
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991): Definition of structural error as one “affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds.”
Molina-Martinez (2016), Wolfname (2016), and Rosales-Miranda (2014): “Reasonable probability” standard to show an impact on substantial rights in plain-error review.
Taylor v. United States (1997) and Capps (1996): Elements of a § 922(g)(1) offense (prior felony, knowing possession, interstate commerce).
United States v. McCane (2009), Vincent v. Garland (2023), United States v. Rahimi (2024), and Vincent v. Bondi (2025): Post-Bruen analysis upholding § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment challenges.

Legal Reasoning

1. Preservation and the Futility Exception
Mayfield never objected to the stipulation instruction on Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Under Olano, unpreserved objections invoke plain-error review, not harmless-error review. Mayfield argued for a broad futility exception—that the district court’s “bad footing” comment closed the door to objection—but the Tenth Circuit held that the exception applies only when “the district court considered and rejected” an objection. Because Mayfield never raised his constitutional arguments below, the court refused to invoke futility.

2. Plain-Error Analysis
Assuming error, the panel applied the four-prong test of Olano:

Error: Possibly, in urging stipulation “to the maximum extent possible.”
Plain: Clear under existing precedent.
Substantial Rights: Not affected. Mayfield had already stipulated to the HALO footage before the instruction; he agreed he was the shooter; and an expert independently proved interstate commerce in ammunition.
Serious Effect on Fairness: No structural error—effects were measurable (admission of specific exhibits) and not pervasive or unquantifiable.

Because Mayfield could not show a reasonable probability of a different verdict without the instruction, the conviction stands.

3. Second Amendment Challenge
Under Bruen, the government must justify firearm restrictions consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that binding Tenth Circuit precedent (McCane, Vincent, Bondi) remains good law post-Rahimi and that § 922(g)(1) survives because felon-dispossession is deeply rooted in American legal tradition.

Impact

United States v. Mayfield clarifies several key points for future criminal cases:

District courts retain broad authority to streamline trials by encouraging stipulations, but defendants must timely object to preserve constitutional challenges.
The futility exception to waiver is narrowly circumscribed: a party must pursue an objection and have it explicitly considered and rejected by the trial court.
Plain-error review requires showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome; once core evidentiary stipulations and independent proof of statutory elements are in place, a stipulation-instruction error is unlikely to satisfy this prong.
Structural error doctrine remains confined to truly foundational defects—instructions on evidentiary stipulation do not automatically qualify.
The decision reaffirms that § 922(g)(1) stands post-Bruen, insulating it from facial Second Amendment attacks in the Tenth Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Waiver vs. Forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right (no objection at all). Forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right (failure to object). Both trigger plain-error review if not corrected at trial.

Plain-Error Review (Rule 52(b)): A four-part test requiring (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights (i.e., a reasonable probability of a different result), and (4) that seriously affects fairness or integrity.

Structural Error: A defect in the trial framework (e.g., total denial of counsel) that requires automatic reversal. Errors in evidentiary procedures or jury instructions—even if constitutionally flawed—are typically not structural because their effects can be measured against the trial record.

Second Amendment Post-Bruen: Courts use a two-step test: (1) Is the regulated activity protected by the Second Amendment’s text? (2) If so, can the government justify the restriction through historical analogues of firearm regulation? § 922(g)(1) survives because it falls outside the “plain text” protection for law-abiding citizens and aligns with historical traditions disarming dangerous individuals.

Conclusion

United States v. Mayfield stands for three principal propositions. First, defendants must timely articulate constitutional objections to evidentiary rulings; the futility exception will not rescue an unraised Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Second, plain-error relief demands a showing that an error undermined confidence in the verdict—stipulation-related errors will rarely pass that threshold once the record shows independent proof of every statutory element. Third, the felon-in-possession/ammunition-possession ban of § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Second Amendment in the Tenth Circuit. Together, these holdings reinforce procedural vigilance at trial and reaffirm Congress’s authority to disarm convicted felons.