Affirmative Defenses Do Not Undermine Probable Cause in § 3503(b) Defiant Trespass Arrests

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Edwin Soto‐Santana v. Stephan Wengen, decided April 25, 2025. The case arose when two tenants, Edwin Soto‐Santana and Yanahira Soto, were arrested by Officer Stephan Wengen for defiant trespass after returning to an apartment the city had declared uninhabitable. Although their landlord purportedly gave them permission to remain while repairs were made, the district court dismissed their § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as their state‐law false imprisonment claims, on the ground that Officer Wengen had probable cause. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Key issues:

Whether an officer’s knowledge of an affirmative defense (landlord’s permission) defeats probable cause to arrest for defiant trespass under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(b).
Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity where the interaction between trespass elements and affirmative defenses was unsettled.
The proper federal and state law standards for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit held that:

Officer Wengen had probable cause to arrest Soto and Soto‐Santana for defiant trespass. An inspector had posted an uninhabitability notice on the property, neighbors reported continued occupancy, and the landlord was absent when the officer arrived.
Under Pennsylvania law (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(b)), posting notice and “remaining” on the property without license or privilege sufficed for probable cause, irrespective of any claimed affirmative defense.
The existence of an affirmative defense—here, a landlord’s permission—does not factor into the probable cause determination.
Even if probable cause were lacking, Officer Wengen would be entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law required inclusion of affirmative defenses in a probable cause analysis for defiant trespass.
The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 1995): Standard for false arrest under § 1983 requires a lack of probable cause.
Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994): Defines false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law, also hinging on the absence of probable cause.
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003): Elements of malicious prosecution under § 1983 include initiation of a proceeding without probable cause.
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1995): Definition of probable cause—facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief of an offense.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972): Probable cause need not establish every element as would be required for conviction.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): Probable cause analysis uses a totality‐of‐the‐circumstances approach.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192 (3d Cir. 1993): Courts may consider public records in a Rule 12(b)(6) review.
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1989): Assumed, without deciding, that an affirmative defense could bear on probable cause.
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007): Affirmative defense of statute of limitations is irrelevant to probable cause.
Holman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009): Affirmative defense of necessity should not factor into probable cause, as it would require an officer to parse numerous factual scenarios.
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005): Officers need not correctly resolve conflicting evidence to establish probable cause.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018): Elements of qualified immunity require violation of a clearly established right.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in two steps:

Probable cause exists under § 3503(b): The property had been officially posted as uninhabitable. A neighbor reported continuous occupancy. The landlord was not present when repairs were alleged to be in progress. Under Pennsylvania law, posting notice and “entering or remaining” without license satisfy the elements of defiant trespass. The officer’s knowledge of a landlord’s permission did not negate those facts.
Affirmative defenses are irrelevant to probable cause: Following Sands and Holman, the court held that police officers are not required to consider statutory or code‐based affirmative defenses—such as a reasonable belief in permission—when assessing probable cause at the time of arrest. To require such analysis would impose an unworkable burden, asking officers to resolve contested facts that belong in a judicial or prosecutorial forum, not on the street.

Finally, even assuming arguendo that probable cause were deficient, Officer Wengen would enjoy qualified immunity. No precedent clearly established that an officer must adjudicate affirmative defenses before effecting a defiant trespass arrest.

Impact

This decision clarifies and reinforces the principle that probable cause focuses on the offense’s statutory elements and readily ascertainable facts—not on complex affirmative defenses. Implications include:

Law enforcement can rely on official postings and credible witness reports when enforcing housing codes and trespass laws.
Defendants cannot thwart an arrest by promptly raising an affirmative defense; such defenses must be adjudicated in court.
Qualified immunity remains robust where officers face unsettled legal questions about the scope of probable cause.
The ruling may limit malicious prosecution claims in jurisdictions with similar statutory schemes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances, that a person has committed an offense. It does not demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt or resolution of every factual dispute.
Defiant Trespass (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(b)): Occurs when someone knowingly enters or remains on property after notice against trespass by posting or other means. “Defiant” means they ignore the valid notice.
Affirmative Defense: A defense that, if proven, defeats criminal liability even if the prosecution proves every element. Examples include permission by an owner or necessity. These are typically reserved for trial or pretrial motions, not arrest-level assessments.
§ 1983 Claims: Federal civil rights claims for actions under “color of law” violating constitutional rights—false arrest and malicious prosecution both require a lack of probable cause.
Qualified Immunity: Shields government officials from liability unless they violated a “clearly established” right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Soto‐Santana v. Wengen establishes a clear rule: officers need not assess or resolve statutory affirmative defenses when determining probable cause for defiant trespass under Pennsylvania law. This preserves a practical, fact‐based approach to arrests and reinforces the principle that fine‐grained defenses belong in the courtroom, not on the street. The ruling strengthens qualified immunity in contexts where the law is unsettled, guiding both officers and litigants on the contours of probable cause and post‐arrest remedies.