Affirmation of the Co-Conspirator Hearsay Exception and Venue Principles in Continuing Racketeering Offenses

Introduction

In United States v. Garcia (2d Cir. May 23, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed two separate appeals arising from convictions and sentencing in the Southern District of New York. The first appeal, by defendant-appellant Jonathan Garcia, challenged his racketeering conspiracy conviction—specifically the admission of hearsay, sufficiency of evidence for murder in aid of racketeering, and venue. The second appeal, by Christopher Nelson, contested his supervised-release revocation sentence, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and procedural error in weighing the seriousness of his post-release offenses.

Summary of the Judgment

The court affirmed both district court judgments in full:

Garcia’s appeal: The hearsay statements were properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as co-conspirator statements. The evidence—including eyewitness testimony, recorded admissions, and social media posts—was sufficient to support a conviction for murder in aid of racketeering. Venue was proper in the Southern District of New York as a continuing RICO offense.
Nelson’s appeal: His Sixth Amendment claim failed because counsel’s comments at revocation did not amount to structural error. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in sentencing: it principally sanctioned the breach of trust while permissibly considering the seriousness of the underlying offense.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999): Established the two-part test for co-conspirator hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994): Clarified “in furtherance” requirement for co-conspirator statements.
United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2000): Held that RICO’s racketeering element makes violent acts continuing offenses for venue purposes.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Set forth the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.
United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020): Emphasized that supervised-release revocation should primarily sanction breach of trust.

Legal Reasoning

1. Co-Conspirator Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E))
The court applied the Gigante test: (a) a RICO conspiracy existed including the declarants and Garcia, and (b) their statements were made during and in furtherance of that conspiracy. Even if some statements had been improperly admitted, the authenticated testimony and physical evidence were so overwhelming that any error could not have affected the verdict under plain-error review.

2. Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder in Aid of Racketeering
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could find Garcia acted with intent—or at least depraved indifference—and that his motive was to maintain or elevate his position within the Latin Kings enterprise. Key facts: he armed himself, purchased gloves to avoid detection, chased the victim, and fired at a fleeing target.

3. Venue in a Continuing RICO Offense
Because murder in aid of racketeering is a continuing offense, venue lies both where the killing occurred and where racketeering acts took place. The Latin Kings’ meetings and criminal activities in Manhattan and the Bronx sufficed for venue in the Southern District, even though the shooting itself happened in the Eastern District.

4. Ineffective Assistance at Supervised-Release Revocation
The court declined to find structural error in Nelson’s counsel expressing personal disappointment. Under Strickland, strategic advocacy that acknowledges a client’s misconduct can fall within the wide range of professionally reasonable assistance.

5. Procedural Reasonableness of Revocation Sentence
Although § 3583(e) directs courts to focus on breach of trust, they may also “to a limited degree” consider the seriousness of the underlying offense. The revocation sentence—five years’ imprisonment consecutive to any state time—balanced Nelson’s reckless post-release drug dealing with the court’s need for deterrence and public protection.

Impact

This summary order, though non-precedential, reinforces key principles in RICO prosecutions and supervised-release revocations:

Hearsay Exception: Courts may admit a wide range of out-of-court declarations by co-conspirators so long as they further collective criminal objectives.
Venue in RICO Murders: Prosecutors can prosecute violent acts in districts where the enterprise is active, even if the violent act occurred elsewhere.
Revocation Sentencing: Judges retain discretion to consider both breach of trust and the gravity of new criminal conduct at supervised-release revocation hearings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Normally barred unless an exception applies.
Co-Conspirator Exception (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)): Allows admissions made by one conspirator, during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, against another conspirator.
Continuing Offense: A crime that spans time and location, permitting venue wherever any essential conduct element occurs.
Plain-Error Review: A deferential standard applying when a party fails to object at trial; appellant must show a clear error affecting substantial rights.
Supervised-Release Revocation: A post-sentencing proceeding where a court may revoke release and impose additional prison time for violations.

Conclusion

United States v. Garcia reaffirms vital evidentiary and venue doctrines in the RICO context and clarifies the scope of judicial discretion in supervised-release revocation proceedings. By upholding broad application of the co-conspirator hearsay exception, endorsing venue in continuing racketeering offenses, and confirming that revocation sentences may include consideration of underlying offense severity, the Second Circuit has solidified the toolkit available to prosecutors and sentencing courts in complex federal prosecutions.