Affirmation of Summary Judgment Standards and Limits on New Evidence in Sterling v. Deutsche Bank

Introduction

Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. is a pro se appeal decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 8, 2025. Plaintiff‐appellant Everton Sterling acquired title to property in the Bronx after the original mortgagor defaulted. Sterling then challenged the validity of the mortgages, alleging fraud and civil RICO violations against a host of defendants—including Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, its servicer, individual foreclosure counsel, and related entities. The central issues on appeal were:

Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when Sterling’s allegations were largely conclusory and unsupported by admissible evidence;
Whether Sterling’s “land records,” offered for the first time on appeal, could be considered absent “extraordinary circumstances”;
Whether the absence of affidavits from the defendants’ witnesses or alleged attorney “manipulation” violated due process; and
Whether Sterling’s motion to “claim and exercise constitutionally secured rights” was properly denied for noncompliance with local rules.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, sitting by summary order, affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing Sterling’s claims and denying his motions for reconsideration. Key holdings include:

The summary judgment standard under Rule 56(a) requires the nonmovant to show a genuine issue of material fact with admissible evidence; conclusory assertions and speculation will not suffice (Jeffreys v. City of New York).
Evidence not part of the district‐court record—such as the “land records” introduced for the first time on appeal—may only be considered in extraordinary circumstances, which were not shown here (Amara v. Cigna Corp.).
There is no Rule 56 requirement that a summary‐judgment movant support its motion with sworn affidavits; other admissible materials are adequate (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett).
No due‐process violation arose from counsel’s conduct, since Sterling received notice and multiple extensions to respond, and identified no actual procedural defect.
A motion asking a court simply to uphold constitutional rights is redundant and, here, properly denied for failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1 and as legally baseless.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): Reaffirmed that summary judgment is reviewed de novo and reiterated the standard of no genuine factual dispute.
Hayes v. Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2020): Quoted Rule 56(a), emphasizing the movant’s burden to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005): Held that nonmoving parties cannot defeat summary judgment with mere metaphysical doubt or conclusory allegations.
Amara v. Cigna Corp., 53 F.4th 241 (2d Cir. 2022): Explained the “extraordinary circumstances” exception for admitting evidence not in the district‐court record.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): Clarified that Rule 56 contains no express requirement that a moving party must negate the opponent’s claims via affidavits; any admissible evidence may support the motion.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in logical steps:

Summary Judgment Standard: Under Rule 56(a), a court must grant judgment if the movant demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact. Here, Sterling’s allegations of fraud and RICO violations were unaccompanied by admissible proof, thus failing to raise a triable issue.
Conclusive vs. Factual Allegations: Relying on Jeffreys, the court found Sterling’s pro se pleadings insufficient because they were conclusory and unsubstantiated by affidavits, documents, or testimony.
Extra-Record Evidence: Sterling’s attempt to introduce land‐registry documents on appeal ran afoul of Amara’s ordinary‐record rule. Absent extraordinary circumstances—here lacking—the court did not consider new evidence.
Affidavit Requirement: Celotex dispelled the notion that a summary‐judgment movant must submit affidavits. The defendants’ documentary submissions and Rule 56(c)(1) materials were adequate.
Procedural Due Process: No record evidence suggested that counsel’s conduct deprived Sterling of notice or an opportunity to be heard. The docket established multiple extensions and full access to filings.
Local‐Rule Compliance: Sterling’s motion to assert constitutional rights lacked any substantive claim and failed to comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1’s requirements for motion practice, justifying denial.

Impact

Although summary orders do not carry binding precedential effect in the Second Circuit, Sterling v. Deutsche Bank reinforces critical lessons for litigants—especially pro se parties:

Pro se litigants must present admissible evidence below to survive summary judgment and cannot rely on unfiled documents to salvage their case on appeal.
Counsel’s prestige or influence allegations cannot substitute for hard proof of procedural unfairness.
Rule 56’s flexibility means that multiple forms of evidence—not just affidavits—can support a summary‐judgment motion, but all must be in the district‐court record.
The “extraordinary circumstances” test remains a high bar for admitting new evidence on appeal.

Future district courts and litigants will look to this decision for guidance on the interplay between pro se practice, summary-judgment proof requirements, and appellate‐evidence rules.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A procedural device allowing a court to decide a case when there is no real dispute about important facts. If one side fails to show evidence that would let a reasonable jury rule in its favor, the judge can decide the case without a trial.
Conclusive Allegations: Statements in a pleading that assert legal conclusions or beliefs without factual support. Courts disregard these when deciding summary judgment.
Extraordinary Circumstances Exception: A narrow rule that permits an appellate court to consider evidence not presented below only when truly exceptional—e.g., fraud discovered after the record is closed.
Pro Se Litigant: A person who represents themselves in court without a lawyer. Pro se filings are held to a less strict standard, but still must comply with procedural rules and provide admissible evidence.
Local Civil Rule 7.1: A rule governing motion practice in the Southern District of New York, requiring parties to submit statements of fact and meet-and-confer certificates before filing certain motions.

Conclusion

Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. underscores the Second Circuit’s steadfast application of summary‐judgment standards and appellate‐evidence rules. Pro se litigants must marshal admissible evidence in the trial court to avoid summary dismissal, cannot introduce new proof on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances, and must comply with local procedural rules. While this summary order lacks binding precedential weight, its clear exposition of Rule 56 practice and the “extraordinary circumstances” doctrine offers valuable guidance for future cases—ensuring that merit, not mere allegations or unattached documents, governs the outcome.