Affirmation of Police Pursuit Immunity under Section 6-5-338

Introduction

In Ex parte City of Montgomery and Shelton Davis (2025), the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed whether a municipal police officer—and, derivatively, his employer—enjoys statutory immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338 when engaged in a high-speed vehicular pursuit that resulted in a collision with a third party. Petitioner Madilyn Shuford sued Officer Shelton Davis and the City of Montgomery for damages, alleging negligent and wanton conduct during a December 2021 chase. The defendants sought summary judgment on immunity grounds. After the trial court denied their motion without explanation, the City and Officer Davis petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the entry of judgment in their favor.

This commentary examines the background facts, the Court’s findings, the legal framework for peace-officer immunity, the precedents that shaped the decision, and its likely impact on future tort claims arising from police pursuits.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment for the City and Officer Davis. The Court held that:

Under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a), a peace officer is immune from tort liability for discretionary acts within the line and scope of law-enforcement duties.
Officer Davis was indisputably a peace officer performing his law-enforcement duties (pursuing a suspect with lights and siren activated).
He exercised judgment and discretion in deciding to continue the chase and to traverse a red light after slowing for safety.
Petitioner Shuford failed to produce substantial evidence of an exception to immunity (e.g., willful or reckless misconduct or a statutory violation in failing to use audible/visual signals).
Because the officer is immune, the City is likewise immune under § 6-5-338(b).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Ex parte Cranman (2000): Established the two-part test for State-agent immunity and defined the discretionary-function rule.
Ex parte Rizk (2000) and Ex parte Butts (2000): Adopted Cranman’s immunity restatement for state agents.
Hollis v. City of Brighton (2006): Incorporated § 6-5-338(a) into the Cranman framework and clarified the test for peace-officer immunity.
Ex parte City of Montgomery (2018): Detailed the three-factor test for § 6-5-338(a) immunity (peace officer status, law-enforcement function, discretion).
Ex parte Kennedy (2008): Placed the initial burden on the officer to show entitlement to immunity, then shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate an exception.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps:

Establishing entitlement to immunity: Officer Davis submitted uncontroverted evidence—his affidavit, patrol-car video, departmental pursuit guidelines, and the accident report—showing he was on duty, in a felony pursuit, using lights and siren, slowing for a red light, and exercising discretion throughout.
Shifting the burden: Having met their burden, the defendants shifted the burden to Shuford to identify a genuine factual dispute or an exception. She alleged improper use of signals and excessive speed under § 32-5A-7 but provided no admissible evidence; her self-serving hearsay affidavit was omitted, and her interrogatory responses merely expressed that she “did not see” lights or hear sirens.
No exception shown: The Court found no evidence of willful misconduct, statutory violation, or reckless disregard beyond discretionary judgment. Accordingly, immunity applied fully, and the City, as officer’s employer, shared in that immunity.

Impact

This decision reinforces the strong protection accorded to peace officers under § 6-5-338, particularly in high-speed pursuits. Key effects include:

Trial courts will scrutinize pursuit-policy compliance and use of signals in summary-judgment proofs; officers should document siren and light activation meticulously.
Plaintiffs challenging police-pursuit collisions must produce admissible evidence of a statute violation or willful misconduct to overcome immunity.
This ruling may reduce litigation risk for municipalities and officers acting consistently with established pursuit guidelines and statutory requirements.
It underscores the bifurcated burden: officers first demonstrate entitlement; plaintiffs then prove an exception.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment: A court decision without a full trial when there is no real dispute over important facts.
Writ of Mandamus: An extraordinary order by a higher court directing a lower court or government official to perform a duty correctly.
Discretionary Function: Actions requiring judgment or choice, as opposed to ministerial acts carried out per fixed rules.
Peace-Officer Immunity (§ 6-5-338): Statutory shield protecting officers (and their agencies) from lawsuits for discretionary law-enforcement acts, unless an exception (e.g., willful misconduct) applies.
Cranman Test: A two-step analysis—first, does the agent act in a protected capacity? If so, has the plaintiff shown an exception to immunity?

Conclusion

Ex parte City of Montgomery and Shelton Davis cements the rule that peace officers engaged in discretionary law-enforcement activities—such as high-speed pursuits with proper lights and siren—are entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338. Plaintiffs must come forward with concrete evidence of statutory violation or willful misconduct to defeat that immunity. The decision promotes clarity in handling pursuit-related tort claims and underscores the importance of rigorous documentation by law-enforcement agencies.