Affirmation of Per Se Breath Alcohol Standards in State v. McManus and Pangman

Affirmation of Per Se Breath Alcohol Standards in State of Wisconsin v. McManus and Pangman

Introduction

The case of State of Wisconsin v. Michael J. McManus and William A. Pangman ([152 Wis. 2d 113], [Case Nos. 87-1815-CR, 88-0951]) represents a pivotal moment in Wisconsin's legal framework concerning alcohol-impaired driving. Decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on November 15, 1989, this case addressed the constitutionality and interpretation of section 346.63(1)(b), Statutes, which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle with a breath alcohol concentration of 0.1 grams or more per 210 liters of breath.

Both defendants, McManus and Pangman, appealed their convictions under this statute, challenging its construction as a per se violation and its compliance with due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. This commentary delves into the background of the case, summarizes the court's judgment, analyzes the legal reasoning and precedents cited, explores the impact of the decision, simplifies complex legal concepts, and concludes with the broader significance of the judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

In both cases, McManus and Pangman were convicted for operating a motor vehicle with a breath alcohol concentration exceeding the statutory limit established by section 346.63(1)(b), Stats. The primary contention was whether the statute should be interpreted as a per se violation, thereby rendering evidence of individual partition ratios between breath and blood alcohol concentrations irrelevant.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the convictions in both cases. The court held that section 346.63(1)(b) unambiguously establishes a per se standard, making the partition ratio evidence inadmissible. Additionally, the court found no constitutional violations concerning due process, equal protection, legislative authority, or vagueness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court referenced several key precedents to support its decision:

  • STATE v. BRAYMAN, 110 Wn.2d 183, 751 P.2d 294 (1988): A Washington Supreme Court case that similarly upheld a per se breath alcohol violation, deeming partition ratio evidence irrelevant.
  • STATE v. WALSTAD, 119 Wis.2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984): Clarified that blood alcohol serves as an indicator of alcohol in the brain, not the direct cause of impairment.
  • STATE v. HINZ, 121 Wis.2d 282, 360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct.App. 1984): Established the standard for appellate review of evidentiary rulings, emphasizing the abuse of discretion test.
  • STATE v. MUEHLENBERG, 118 Wis.2d 502, 347 N.W.2d 914 (Ct.App. 1984): Reinforced the constitutionality of per se blood alcohol standards.
  • STATE v. VICK, 104 Wis.2d 678, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981): Allowed expert testimony on the absorption rate of alcohol into the bloodstream but distinguished it from partition ratio disputes.

These precedents collectively reinforced the court's stance on the reliability and constitutionality of per se breath alcohol standards.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning centered on a clear statutory interpretation. Section 346.63(1)(b) explicitly prohibits driving with a breath alcohol concentration of 0.1 grams or more per 210 liters of breath, establishing a per se violation. This interpretation was supported by legislative history indicating the legislature's intent to remove presumptions and enforce strict standards.

The court dismissed Pangman's argument that the statute was ambiguous or violated constitutional protections by emphasizing that the statute provided a clear, objective standard that did not rely on varying partition ratios. Moreover, the court noted that the breath test, as administered by the Intoxilyzer 5000, was a scientifically validated and reliable indicator of impairment, further justifying the per se standard.

On constitutional grounds, the court found that the statute served a legitimate government interest in public safety and that the classifications within the statute were rational and non-arbitrary, thus satisfying due process and equal protection requirements.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for DUI law in Wisconsin:

  • Reaffirmation of Per Se Standards: Establishes that a fixed breath alcohol concentration limit serves as sufficient evidence of impairment, simplifying prosecution and reducing reliance on variable partition ratios.
  • Limitations on Defense Strategies: Prevents defendants from introducing partition ratio evidence to argue that their actual blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit.
  • Legislative Clarity: Clarifies the legislative intent to enforce strict breath alcohol standards, reinforcing the role of standardized breath testing devices in DUI prosecutions.
  • Judicial Efficiency: Streamlines court proceedings by limiting the scope of admissible evidence, thereby reducing complexity in DUI cases.

Future cases will likely follow this precedent, solidifying the legal framework surrounding breath alcohol testing and per se violations in Wisconsin.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Per Se Breath Violation

A per se violation means that a person can be automatically deemed to have committed an offense without the need for additional evidence of wrongdoing. In the context of this judgment, it implies that if a driver's breath alcohol concentration meets or exceeds 0.1 grams per 210 liters, they are automatically guilty of the offense, regardless of any other factors.

Partition Ratio

The partition ratio refers to the relationship between the alcohol concentration in a person's breath and their blood alcohol concentration. Different individuals may have varying partition ratios, which can affect the accuracy of converting breath alcohol levels to blood alcohol levels.

Intoxilyzer 5000

The Intoxilyzer 5000 is a breath testing device approved by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation. It measures the alcohol concentration in a person's breath by analyzing a specific volume of deep lung air, aiming to provide an accurate representation of blood alcohol levels.

Due Process and Equal Protection

Due Process ensures that laws are applied fairly and that individuals have the opportunity to present their case. Equal Protection mandates that individuals in similar situations be treated equally by the law. In this case, the defendants argued that the statute infringed upon these constitutional protections, which the court ultimately rejected.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision in State of Wisconsin v. McManus and Pangman solidifies the state's stance on alcohol-impaired driving by upholding a per se breath alcohol concentration standard. By affirming the constitutionality and clarity of section 346.63(1)(b), the court ensures a consistent and streamlined approach to DUI prosecutions. This judgment not only reinforces legislative intent to prioritize public safety but also limits potential defense strategies that could undermine the effectiveness of breath alcohol testing. As a result, the ruling plays a crucial role in shaping the enforcement and interpretation of DUI laws in Wisconsin, promoting a safer driving environment.

Case Details

Year: 1989
Court: Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Attorney(S)

For the defendant-appellant Michael J. McManus there were briefs by Ralph A. Kalal, and Kalal and Habermehl, Madison, and oral argument by Ralph A. Kalal. For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Jerome S. Schmidt, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Donald J. Hanaway, attorney general. For the defendant-appellant William A. Pangman there were briefs (in court of appeals) by Richard L. Kaiser, Peter J. Heflin, and William A. Pangman Associates, Waukesha, and oral argument by Mr. Kaiser. For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief (in court of appeals) and oral argument by Christopher W. Stock, Ozaukee county assistant district attorney, serving as special prosecutor.

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