Affirmation of Felon Firearm Transfer Ban and Recognition of Firearm Acquisition as a Second Amendment Corollary

Introduction

United States v. Freddie Knipp, Jr. is a Sixth Circuit decision addressing three key issues:

The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) under the Second Amendment;
The admissibility of a cooperating witness’s testimony regarding uncharged drug transactions;
The proper calculation of drug quantities for sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Freddie Knipp, Jr. was convicted in the Eastern District of Kentucky for two counts of distributing methamphetamine and one count of knowingly selling a firearm to a convicted felon, Larry Eldridge. Knipp challenged his conviction and 138-month sentence, raising constitutional, evidentiary, and sentencing objections. The Sixth Circuit heard argument on March 20, 2025, and issued its published opinion on May 19, 2025, affirming the district court in all respects.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Larsen, unanimously affirmed:

Facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(d)(1) were rejected under the Bruen framework. The court held that the Second Amendment’s text covers the acquisition of firearms as a “necessary corollary” to keeping and bearing arms, but that Congress’s long tradition of disarming dangerous persons, including felons, provides historical analogues sufficient to uphold the ban on transferring firearms to known felons.
Evidentiary challenges under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to pre-charged drug-sale testimony were deemed at most harmless error. The jury had overwhelming independent evidence—Facebook messages, audio/video surveillance, and controlled purchases—proving the charged acts.
The district court’s inclusion of pre-indictment drug-quantity admissions in Eldridge’s plea agreement and testimony for sentencing calculation was not clearly erroneous. The court credited Eldridge’s testimony and plea stipulation, which fell within the Sentencing Guidelines’ “relevant conduct” definition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570, 2008) – Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1, 2022) – Established the two-step historical-analysis framework for Second Amendment challenges.
United States v. Rahimi (602 U.S. 680, 2024) – Clarified the “relevantly similar” historical-analogue test under Bruen.
United States v. Williams (113 F.4th 637, 6th Cir. 2024) – Upheld § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) as constitutional under Bruen’s historical test.
United States v. Gore (118 F.4th 808, 6th Cir. 2024) – Held that receipt of a firearm is protected as a “logical antecedent” to keeping arms.
Collateral evidence cases on Rule 404(b) and res gestae: United States v. Brown, United States v. Johnson, United States v. Hardy.
Sentencing Guidelines interpretation: U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Gall v. United States (552 U.S. 38, 2007), United States v. McReynolds (964 F.3d 555, 6th Cir. 2020).

Legal Reasoning

Applying Bruen’s two-step framework, the court first determined that the Second Amendment’s text—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—covers the acquisition of firearms as a necessary precursor to keeping and bearing them. It relied on decisions such as Gore, Reese (5th Cir.) and Teixeira (9th Cir.) recognizing acquisition as a “necessary corollary.”

At Bruen’s second step, the government must demonstrate a historical tradition that permits analogous regulation. Drawing on Williams and a wealth of historical evidence, the court confirmed that disarming classes of dangerous persons—including felons—has deep roots in American law, dating to colonial statutes, the Civil War era, and post-Reconstruction gun-control measures. That tradition supports § 922(d)(1)’s ban on transferring firearms to known felons.

On evidence, the court noted that uncharged conduct testimony may escape Rule 404(b) if it is “inextricably intertwined” or part of the same course of conduct. Even if admission were erroneous, the independent evidence of the controlled buys and social-media records made any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

For sentencing, the court held that the district judge acted within his discretion in crediting Eldridge’s plea-agreement stipulation and trial testimony regarding earlier meth sales as “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). Credibility findings on drug-quantity issues are reviewed deferentially and were not clearly erroneous here.

Impact on Future Cases

Reinforces the Bruen test’s extensibility to firearm-acquisition bans, not just possession and carriage restrictions.
Affirms the long-standing tradition of disarming felons as a valid historical analogue under Bruen.
Clarifies that derivative standing or “third-party” claims by firearm sellers can proceed when they are themselves convicted under the statute.
Provides guidance on the interplay between Rule 404(b) and res gestae/background evidence in drug cases.
Confirms district courts’ broad discretion in sentencing-quantity determinations when based on plea stipulations and credible witness testimony.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bruen’s Two-Step Test:
1. Textual inquiry—does the Second Amendment’s text cover the conduct?
2. Historical inquiry—does an analogous tradition of regulation exist?
Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges:
- Facial—statute invalid in all or most applications.
- As-applied—statute unconstitutional in specific circumstances.
Res Gestae (Background) Evidence: Evidence joined in time or context with the charged offense may be admitted as part of the story of the crime, even if it otherwise qualifies as “other-acts” under Rule 404(b).
Relevant Conduct for Sentencing: Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, all acts “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan” can be aggregated for drug-quantity calculations.
Standard of Review:
- Constitutional questions—reviewed de novo.
- Evidentiary rulings—abuse of discretion.
- Sentencing factual findings—clear error; legal interpretations—de novo.

Conclusion

United States v. Freddie Knipp, Jr. stands as a comprehensive affirmation of the federal government’s authority to deny firearms to felons under the Second Amendment, while recognizing that the right to keep and bear arms necessarily includes the right to acquire arms. The decision reaffirms Bruen’s historical analysis, clarifies evidentiary and sentencing practices in drug-and-gun prosecutions, and will guide both trial and appellate courts in future Second Amendment litigation.