Introduction

The case of Lisa M. Folajtar v. Attorney General of the United States addresses a pivotal issue concerning the intersection of criminal convictions and Second Amendment rights. Folajtar, convicted of federal tax fraud under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), challenged the application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits individuals convicted of felonies punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing firearms. This commentary delves into the complexities of the judgment rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, analyzing its implications on firearm regulations and constitutional protections.

Summary of the Judgment

In November 2020, the Third Circuit Court upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), rejecting Folajtar's as-applied Second Amendment challenge. The court reaffirmed the longstanding prohibition against firearm possession by individuals convicted of serious crimes, including non-violent felonies like tax fraud. The majority opinion, authored by Circuit Judge Ambro, emphasized legislative intent and historical precedent in maintaining the ban, while the dissenting opinion criticized the blanket approach, advocating for consideration of the nature of the felony beyond its classification.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court's decision heavily relied on established precedents that validate restrictions on firearm possession by felons:

• District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Affirmed an individual's right to possess firearms for self-defense but recognized that this right is not absolute.
• McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010): Extended Heller’s ruling to state and local governments, reinforcing the constitutionality of felon disarmament.
• Marzzarella v. United States (2010) and Binderup v. Attorney General (2016): Established frameworks for evaluating as-applied Second Amendment challenges, emphasizing the seriousness of the underlying offense.
• Vartelas v. Holder (2012): Supported the exclusion of felons from firearm possession based on the concept of unvirtuous citizens.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied a two-pronged approach to assess Folajtar's challenge:

1. Identification of Historical Justifications: The court examined whether individuals with Felony convictions fall within the historically recognized classes excluded from Second Amendment protections.
2. Legislative Deference: Emphasized deference to Congress’s designation of felonies as serious crimes warranting firearm possession restrictions.

The majority posited that felony convictions inherently signify a serious breach of societal norms, thereby justifying firearm restrictions. By affirming the legislative classification of tax fraud as a felony, the court concluded that Folajtar does not qualify for Second Amendment protections.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the precedent that felony convictions, regardless of their violent or non-violent nature, disqualify individuals from possessing firearms. It underscores the judiciary's deference to legislative determinations of criminal seriousness, potentially limiting the scope for as-applied Second Amendment challenges by felons. Future cases involving non-violent felonies may cite this decision to uphold firearm possession bans, thereby maintaining robust regulatory barriers against felon disarmament.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

The Third Circuit's affirmation in Folajtar v. Attorney General solidifies the judicial endorsement of firearm possession restrictions for felons, encompassing both violent and non-violent convictions. By upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the court emphasizes the enduring principle that severe criminal conduct, as determined by legislative bodies, justifies limitations on constitutional rights for the sake of public safety and societal order. This decision not only reaffirms existing legal frameworks but also sets a clear precedent that challenges to felon disarmament must overcome significant hurdles, thereby shaping the landscape of Second Amendment jurisprudence moving forward.