Before: FLAUM, EBEL and LEVAL, Circuit Judges. Honorable Joel M. Flaum, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Honorable David M. Ebel, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Honorable Pierre N. Leval, United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. OPINION OF THE COURT EBEL, Circuit Judge. This appeal stems from litigation challenging a short-lived Pennsylvania statute ("Act 44") that increased salaries for state legislators, executive officials and state judges. Plaintiffs are Pennsylvania citizens, a state representative and two organizations — Common Cause and the League of Women Voters. They sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its governor and treasurer, the General Assembly's leadership, and the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs allege that, for the past ten years, members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have traded judicial decisions favorable to the Pennsylvania General Assembly in return for the legislature's funding the state judiciary. According to Plaintiffs, this arrangement culminated in the General Assembly's enactment of Act 44 in a sleight-of-hand manner during the dead of night. In this litigation, Plaintiffs primarily challenge the manner in which Act 44 was enacted, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief. Because Plaintiffs allege only general grievances shared by all citizens of Pennsylvania, however, we conclude that they lack standing to pursue the claims they assert. Therefore, having jurisdiction to consider this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs' action in its entirety. I. BACKGROUND Because the district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), see Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 447 F.Supp.2d 415, 419 n. 1, 422 (M.D.Pa. 2006), we must accept as true all well-pled allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, see Lewis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 542 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Taliaferro v. Darby Tivp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (Rule 12(b)(1) and (6)). A. Factual allegations In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged the following: 1. Events leading up to the General Assembly's enactment of Act 44 The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that [t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system. Pa. Const., art. V, § 1. Based upon this constitutional provision, Allegheny County, in 1985, sued the Commonwealth, arguing that, contrary to the relevant Pennsylvania statutes enacted by the General Assembly, the Pennsylvania Constitution required the Commonwealth, rather than the County, to fund the County's Court of Common Pleas. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 517 Pa. 65, 534 A.2d 760, 761, 763 (1987). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, holding "that the statutory scheme for county funding of the judicial system is in conflict with the intent clearly expressed in the constitution that the judicial system be unified." Id. at 765. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided that, because this order entails that present statutory funding for the judicial system is now void as offending the constitutional mandate for a unified system, we stay our judgment to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to enact appropriate funding legislation consistent with this holding. Until this is done, the prior system of county funding shall remain in place. Id. (footnotes omitted). Notwithstanding this mandate from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, the General Assembly declined to act to fund the courts. See Pa. State Ass'n of County Comm'rs v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 324, 681 A.2d 699, 700-01 (1996). After nine years of inaction, the Pennsylvania Association of County Commissioners sought mandamus relief from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asking the Court to direct the General Assembly to fund the state's unified court system. See id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus: "Pursuant to this writ, jurisdiction is retained and by further order a master will be appointed to recommend to this court a schema which will form the basis for the specific implementation to be ordered." Id. at 703. At about this same time, the General Assembly, contrary to the Pennsylvania Constitution, was generally enacting legislation "in ways that precluded involvement in the legislative process by both the public and the vast majority of legislators." App. at 43. Common Cause, as well as other parties, sued Pennsylvania in state court, challenging the validity of these various legislative enactments. In 1998 and 1999, the General Assembly negotiated with the Pennsylvania courts over the Commonwealth's funding the court system. Those negotiations resulted in the General Assembly enacting legislation to fund the Commonwealth's unified judicial system in return for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's judicial decisions upholding the legislation being challenged in state court. 2. Enactment of Act 44 In 2005, the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "in secret," negotiated with state legislators for the enactment of a bill increasing the salaries of the Commonwealth's judges and justices. Eventually, this pay hike was included in legislation that also increased the salaries for legislators and high-level executive branch employees. House Bill 1521, the bill that would become Act 44, was initially "a 24-line bill" entitled "Relating to Compensation for Executive Branch Officials," which prohibited "any member of the executive branch or any board from receiving compensation greater than that paid to the Governor." App. at 49. The House passed House Bill 1521. The Senate then amended House Bill 1521, changing it "into a 27-line bill restricting its application to officials elected or appointed to an executive branch position after November 1, 2006." Id. at 50. The Senate passed the bill as amended. The House, however, rejected the revised bill and so House Bill 1521 was referred to a conference committee consisting of three House and three Senate members. The members of this conference committee, named as defendants in this litigation, included most of the General Assembly's leadership. "At approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 7, 2005," the conference committee amended House Bill 1521, changing it from a twenty-seven-line bill about compensation for executive officials into "a 22 page bill, providing for massive increases of up to 54% in the salary of every justice and judge of the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System, every member of the General Assembly, and senior members of the executive branch including the Governor and members of his Cabinet." Id. at 51. The revised bill also mandated "that provisions of the Act are non-severable and if any provision of the Act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions or applications of the Act are void." Id. at 65. According to Plaintiff's, by including this non-severability provision, "the Commonwealth government intentionally created a financial conflict for state court judges to ensure they would not deviate from the negotiated goal of upholding salary increases for all three branches of state government." Id. at 66. This revised bill was presented to the Senate and House within "minutes" after being reported out of the conference committee "under a rule prohibiting any amendment." Id. at 52. Both chambers passed the bill. "A few hours later, the Governor signed" the bill "into law," and it immediately took effect. Id. at 53, 66, 317. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later held this legislative process did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 951, 59 (2006). 3. Reaction to Act 44 "There was a negative public response to [Act 44], focusing particularly upon its timing and method of passage. . . ." Stilp, 905 A.2d at 925. Several state-court actions challenged Act 44's validity. See id. at 926-28. Four months after its enactment, the Genera] Assembly, on November 16, 2005, repealed Act 44 "in its entirety" and reinstated the previous pay scheme ("Act 72"). App. at 53; see Stilp, 905 A.2d at 924-25 924 n. 3. Act 72 was intended to decrease all state officials' salaries to pre-Act 44 levels. Because Act 72 repealed Act 44, the district court in this litigation held that Plaintiffs' claims seeking a declaration that Act 44 was unconstitutional were now moot. See Common Cause, 447 F.Supp.2d at 424. After the district court dismissed Plaintiffs' case in its entirety, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Act 72 was itself unconstitutional insofar as it decreased judges' salaries. See Stilp, 905 A.2d at 939, 949. Specifically, the court held that Act 72 violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's provision stating that "Justices, judges and justices of the peace . . . shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth." Id. at 929-30 (citing Pa. Const., art. V, § 16(a)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to conclude, however, "our finding of this unconstitutional effect does not taint the remainder of Act 72. Thus, we find that the remainder of Act 72's repeal of Act 44 is valid." Id. at 949. Because part of Act 44, the portion increasing judges' salaries, thus remained in effect, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court went ahead and addressed the validity of that statute. The court held that the manner in which the General Assembly enacted Act 44 did not violate Pennsylvania's constitution. See id. at 949-59. But Act 44's provision of unvouchered expenses to state legislators — a thinly veiled attempt to permit current legislators to enjoy the Act's pay increase, contrary to state law — was invalid. See id. at 960-70. The state supreme court then held that, notwithstanding Act 44's express non-severability clause, the Act actually left it to "the Judiciary to make the ultimate determination of severability." Id. at 973. The court then severed the invalid provision of Act 44 — the provision of "unvouchered expense[s]" for legislators — from the "otherwise-constitutionally valid remainder of Act 44." Id. at 980-81. The ultimate result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis was "that Act 44's provisions . . . which relate solely to the formula to determine compensation paid to the Judiciary, remain[ed] in force." Id. at 981. The court further noted, this Court did not draft or play any role in the enactment of the legislation that became Act 44. That legislation, passed by the General Assembly and duly signed by the Governor, set the compensation judges were to receive, and in July of 2005 the Judiciary began receiving that compensation, only to have the compensation unconstitutionally reduced by Act 72. The Constitution of Pennsylvania mandates that the Judiciary shall be compensated as provided by law. To effectuate that constitutional command, we order that the Treasurer of the Commonwealth: (1) shall forthwith calculate judicial compensation in accordance with Act 44, as explained in this Opinion; and (2) shall, upon receipt of vouchers prepared by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, reimburse members of the Judiciary for the unconstitutional diminution in compensation effected by Act 72. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Stilp was entered September 14, 2006. See id. at 918. Ten months later, on July 13, 2007, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a third statute, Act 30, which replaced the reinstated portions of Act 44 regarding judges' salaries. Apparently in order to avoid the Pennsylvania constitution's prohibition against the legislature reducing the salaries of sitting judges, Act 30 gave the judges a one dollar raise from their salaries as they existed on that date, July 14, 2007, and enacted a new formula for calculating future cost-of-living raises for state court judges. The parties appear to agree that Act 30 repealed the remaining portion of Act 44 reinstated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, The net result appears to be that, despite the now complete repeal of Act 44, some Pennsylvania judges' salaries remain higher than they were prior to the General Assembly's enactment of Act 44. It is on this basis that Plaintiffs argue that, even though Act 44 has been repealed in its entirety, it made lasting effects on state judges' salaries such that Plaintiffs' claims are not moot. Because we decide this appeal on the basis of standing, we need not address whether Plaintiffs' claims are moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (addressing standing before mootness); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51-52, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (same); United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). See generally Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (noting that "[mjootness has been described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)") (quotations omitted). B. Procedural posture of this litigation Plaintiffs initiated this federal litigation on October 6, 2005, a month before the Pennsylvania legislature repealed Act 44. Plaintiffs amended their complaint once before that repeal, and a second time after the General Assembly repealed Act 44. In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged five federal and eight state-law claims, and sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In a very thorough decision, the district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' federal claims. See Common Cause, 447 F.Supp.2d at 419, 431 n. 14. In light of that determination, the court held that it did not need to consider Plaintiffs' pendent state-law claims and, therefore, dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint "in its entirety." Id. at 431 n. 14, 438. Plaintiffs appeal the district court's decision dismissing their federal claims. Before the district court, Plaintiffs conceded that the Commonwealth should be dismissed as a party. The district court also dismissed Defendant Treasurer Casey. Plaintiffs do not challenge either of these dismissals on appeal. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court held, among other things, that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the federal claims they are pursuing in this litigation. See id. at 424-30. "Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiffs claims, and they must be dismissed." Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188. This court reviews "dismissals for lack of standing de novo." Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 294 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1473, 170 L.Ed.2d 297 (2008); see also Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 539 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). In an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we review only whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. Facial attacks, like this one, contest the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the trial court must accept the complaint's allegations as true. Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188 (citations, quotations omitted). Further, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendants['] conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quotation, alterations omitted); see also Pa. Prison Soc'y v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking the federal courts' jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing their standing. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). III. STANDING A. General standing principles Standing implicates both constitutional requirements and prudential concerns. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004). In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. The standing requirement is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (quotations, citations omitted). A federal court "[a]lways . . . must balance the heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction against the deeply rooted commitment not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless adjudication of the constitutional issue is necessary." Id. (quotations, citations omitted). Thus, Article III's standing requirement "is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Invoking the power of the federal judiciary requires more than important issues and able litigants. See id. at 489-90, 102 S.Ct. 752. 1. Constitutional standing requirements "Article III, § 2, of the Constitution restricts the federal`judicial Power' to the resolution of`Cases' and`Controversies.' That case-or controversy requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing." Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471, 102 S.Ct. 752. [I]n order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an injury in fact (i.e., a "concrete and particularized" invasion of a "legally protected interest"); (2) causation (i.e., a "fairly traceable" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is "likely" and not "merely speculative" that the plaintiffs injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). Sprint Commc'ns Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2535 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130) (further quotation, alterations omitted); see also Cortes, 508 F.3d at 161. "In this manner does Art. III limit the federal judicial power`to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.'" Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). "Determining that a matter before the federal courts is a proper case or controversy under Article III therefore assumes particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society." DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (quotation omitted). "[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." Id. (quotations omitted). "If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it. . . ." Id. Of particular relevance to this case, a plaintiff must allege an actual, concrete injury. See Sprint Commc'ns Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2535; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. It is not enough to assert a generalized, abstract grievance shared by a large number of similarly situated people. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83, 102 S.Ct. 752 (citing cases). We go on to discuss prudential standing. 2. Prudential standing requirements In contrast to constitutional standing, prudential standing "embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quotation omitted). Although the Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, [the Court has] explained that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quotation omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752; Twp. of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2007). Without such limitations-closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quotation omitted). Of import in this case, then, "even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the [Supreme] Court has refrained from adjudicating `abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to `generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). 3. Generalized grievances "Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the [Supreme] Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance." Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (citing cases). Based upon this reasoning, the Supreme "Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law." Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quotation, alteration omitted; citing cases); see also Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516-17, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) ("We will not . . . entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's non-concrete interest in the proper administration of the laws."); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (per curiam