Aesthetic-Harm Standing for Cultural Monuments, but No Due Process Right to City-Owned Statues

Italian-American Defense League v. City of New Haven, No. 24-2877 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (summary order)

Introduction

This Second Circuit appeal arises from New Haven’s removal of a Christopher Columbus statue from the city’s historic Wooster Square Park—an area described as “Little Italy” and home to festivals celebrating Italian-American heritage. The plaintiffs, the Italian-American Defense League (IADL) and local resident Ralph Marcarelli, sued the City and Mayor Justin Elicker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of procedural due process when the statue was removed without public notice or a hearing. They claimed the removal diminished the neighborhood’s character and depressed nearby property values, and they sought damages and equitable relief, including an injunction restoring the statue.

The district court dismissed for lack of standing and, alternatively, for failure to state a due process claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit took a bifurcated path: it disagreed with the district court and recognized the IADL’s associational standing based on aesthetic harms suffered by its members, yet it affirmed dismissal because the plaintiffs failed to identify a protected property or liberty interest necessary to sustain a procedural due process claim. Although issued as a “summary order” (and therefore nonprecedential under the Second Circuit’s rules), the decision is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and offers a notable, persuasive clarification on two fronts: (1) aesthetic-harm standing can extend beyond environmental cases to disputes over cultural monuments; and (2) due process claims cannot proceed absent a qualifying property or liberty interest, even when a municipal decision alters a neighborhood’s cultural landscape.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standing: The court held that IADL adequately alleged associational standing. Members who live near and frequent Wooster Square plausibly suffered concrete, particularized aesthetic and recreational harms from the statue’s removal, akin to environmental plaintiffs whose enjoyment of a place is diminished by challenged actions. Causation and redressability were also plausibly alleged, particularly given the request for injunctive relief restoring the statue.
• Merits: Despite standing, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the Due Process Clause. They identified neither a property interest in the city-owned statue nor a liberty interest in maintaining the “quality” or character of the neighborhood. Without a protected interest, there is no entitlement to process, and the due process claim necessarily fails.
• Disposition: Judgment affirmed. The appellate court disagreed with the district court’s standing analysis but affirmed the dismissal on the merits for failure to state a due process claim.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Article III Standing Framework:
  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021): Reiterated the tri-partite standing requirements—injury in fact (concrete, particularized, actual or imminent), causation, and redressability. The Second Circuit applied this structure to evaluate IADL’s allegations.
  • Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000); and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): These cases recognize aesthetic and recreational harms as cognizable injuries when plaintiffs use and value the affected area. The panel analogized the loss of a culturally significant statue to the diminished enjoyment of an environmental area.
  • Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977): Sets out the test for associational standing. The court found all three Hunt prongs satisfied: (a) IADL members plausibly would have standing individually; (b) restoring the statue is germane to IADL’s purpose of preserving Italian-American heritage; and (c) prospective injunctive relief does not require individual member participation.
  • Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997): Emphasizes the “relatively modest” burden to plead causation and redressability at the motion-to-dismiss stage, which the plaintiffs met by seeking restoration of the statue as a remedy.
• Pleading Standards and Review:
  • Henry v. County of Nassau, 6 F.4th 324 (2d Cir. 2021); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Supply the de novo review standard and plausibility pleading thresholds.
  • Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District Commission, 768 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014): Cited for the standard of review on standing dismissals.
• Due Process Elements and Protected Interests:
  • Bellin v. Zucker, 6 F.4th 463 (2d Cir. 2021) and American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999): The first step in any due process claim is identifying a protected property or liberty interest. Without such an interest, no process is due.
  • BAM Historic District Association v. Koch, 723 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1983): Holds that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “liberty” does not encompass a right to maintain “transient levels of the quality of neighborhood life.” The panel applied BAM to conclude there is no liberty interest in preserving a neighborhood’s cultural or aesthetic status quo.

Legal Reasoning

Standing. The court accepted as true the complaint’s allegations that IADL has members living around Wooster Square who valued the cultural symbolism of the Columbus statue and derived aesthetic and recreational benefits from its continual presence. Drawing on Summers, Laidlaw, and Lujan, the panel treated the loss of those benefits as a cognizable Article III injury, specifically an aesthetic/recreational harm that is concrete and particularized to those who use and frequent the affected area. The complaint further plausibly alleged that the City’s removal caused the harm and that an injunction restoring the statue would redress it—satisfying causation and redressability under Bennett’s “relatively modest” pleading standard at this stage.

Associational standing. Under Hunt, (a) at least some IADL members would have individual standing; (b) the organization’s mission—preserving Italian-American heritage—was germane to the suit’s objective of returning the statue to “Little Italy”; and (c) the injunctive relief sought does not necessitate individualized member participation. Although the complaint also sought declaratory relief, punitive damages, and even a constructive trust with the statue as the corpus, the court emphasized that the prospective injunctive remedy alone sufficed for associational standing. Notably, the court cited the record and representations at oral argument to conclude there were members similarly situated to Marcarelli even after he moved to Florida, which preserved IADL’s standing.

Merits—Due Process. The plaintiffs alleged that the City removed the statue “secretly,” without notice or hearing. But procedural due process protects only against deprivations of recognized property or liberty interests without appropriate procedures. Here, the plaintiffs conceded that the statue is City property under the New Haven Charter. Consequently, they had no property interest in the statue. As to liberty interests, BAM forecloses the argument that residents possess a constitutional liberty interest in maintaining the “quality” or character of their neighborhood. Because the plaintiffs could not identify a cognizable property or liberty interest, the due process claim failed at the threshold, making it unnecessary to analyze what process would have been due or whether the City’s procedures were adequate.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Associational standing for cultural-aesthetic harms: The order persuasively extends the familiar environmental-standing template to a cultural heritage context. Organizations whose members live in or regularly use neighborhoods with prominent cultural symbols may plausibly allege aesthetic injury when such symbols are removed or altered.
• Pleading nuance for organizations: The court’s acceptance of organizational representations (including those clarified at oral argument) signals flexibility at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs should nonetheless allege concrete facts about members’ proximity, use, and personal valuation of the affected area.
• Injunctive relief matters for Hunt’s third prong: Seeking prospective equitable relief (e.g., restoration) supports associational standing by minimizing the need for individual member participation. By contrast, damages claims typically require individualized proof and may undermine associational standing.
• Due process limits remain firm: Without a state-created property entitlement or recognized liberty interest, procedural due process does not compel notice and hearing before a municipality exercises control over its own property, including monuments. Residents’ interests in neighborhood character—however deeply felt—are not “liberty interests” under BAM.
• Strategic takeaways for future litigation: Plaintiffs challenging municipal decisions about monuments will need either (a) a concrete property interest (for example, a statutory entitlement, permit, or vested right) or (b) a different constitutional or statutory theory that fits the facts. The decision does not address (and thus does not advance) First Amendment or equal protection theories, nor does it interpret state historic-preservation regimes that may create specific procedural entitlements under state law.
• Nonprecedential but citable: As a summary order, this disposition has no precedential effect in the Second Circuit, though it is citable under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1. It may carry persuasive weight, particularly in district courts confronting similar aesthetic-harm standing questions in the cultural heritage setting.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III standing: To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) injury in fact (a real, personal harm), (2) causation (the defendant likely caused it), and (3) redressability (a court is likely able to fix it). Aesthetic harms can qualify if the plaintiff uses and values the affected place and the challenged action diminishes that experience.
• Associational standing: An organization can sue on behalf of its members if at least one member would have standing individually, the suit aligns with the group’s mission, and the relief sought does not require individualized member participation. Prospective injunctive relief (like restoring a statue) typically meets this last criterion.
• Procedural due process basics: The Constitution requires fair procedures only when the government deprives someone of a recognized property or liberty interest. The inquiry starts with: “Is there a protected interest?” If not, no “process” is constitutionally mandated, regardless of how government acted.
• Property interest: Usually arises from state law sources (statutes, regulations, contracts) that create a legitimate claim of entitlement. Owning or having a legally enforceable entitlement to a thing is critical; conceding the government owns it (as here, the statue) defeats a property-interest claim.
• Liberty interest: Encompasses fundamental personal interests, but not generalized expectations about neighborhood “quality” or cultural constancy. BAM makes clear there is no constitutional liberty to maintain the current character of a neighborhood.
• Redressability at the pleading stage: Plaintiffs do not need to prove their remedy will work with certainty; they need only plausibly allege that the requested relief would likely address the harm. An injunction restoring a removed object can be enough.
• Constructive trust (as pleaded): An equitable remedy where a court treats someone holding property as a trustee for another, to prevent unjust enrichment. Here, plaintiffs suggested placing the statue in a trust to protect it. While unusual in this setting, the court noted such relief could also address the alleged injury for standing purposes.

What This Decision Does Not Decide

• First Amendment and government speech: The court did not address whether the statue’s presence or removal implicates government-speech doctrine or free speech rights. The case was litigated solely as a due process claim.
• State-law preservation rights: The panel did not interpret Connecticut’s historic preservation laws or the City’s charter to identify any state-created entitlement that could constitute a property interest. The plaintiffs’ concessions about ownership were dispositive.
• Damages via associational standing: While the opinion observes that the injunctive relief sought supports associational standing, it does not endorse obtaining individualized damages through organizational litigation.

Conclusion

Italian-American Defense League v. City of New Haven offers a two-part lesson. First, it persuasively recognizes that aesthetic harms stemming from the removal of a culturally meaningful monument can satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement when alleged by nearby residents who value and use the affected space. Second, it reaffirms that procedural due process is not a free-standing guarantee of notice and hearing; it attaches only when a plaintiff is deprived of a recognized property or liberty interest. Because the statue was City-owned property and residents have no constitutional liberty in maintaining neighborhood “quality,” the due process claim fails at the threshold.

As a nonprecedential summary order, the decision does not bind future panels, but it supplies useful guidance. For organizations defending cultural heritage, it illuminates a pathway to standing based on aesthetic and recreational harms. For municipalities, it underscores a robust limit: absent a protected interest, local governments retain broad discretion over their own property decisions without triggering federal due process requirements. The court thus draws a clear line between who may enter federal court and what claims can succeed once there.