AEDPA Shields Partial Courtroom Closures Absent Objection: No Clearly Established Requirement to Apply Waller to Partial Closures or to Demand a Knowing Waiver for Non‑Objected Public‑Trial Claims

Introduction

In Grant Gambaiani v. Brittany Greene (7th Cir. May 13, 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging an Illinois conviction for sex offenses against a minor. The appeal presented two constitutional claims: (1) a Sixth Amendment public-trial claim stemming from a partial courtroom closure during the minor victim’s testimony, and (2) a Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claim alleging deficient plea advice that led to rejection of a favorable offer.

The core issues were not whether a public-trial violation or attorney error occurred in the abstract, but whether, under AEDPA’s exacting standards, the petitioner could show that the state courts’ decisions were contrary to or unreasonable applications of clearly established Supreme Court law, or rested on unreasonable determinations of fact. The panel (Judges Hamilton, Brennan, and Scudder, opinion by Judge Brennan) held he could not.

Summary of the Opinion

• Public-trial claim:
  • AEDPA deference foreclosed relief on two independent grounds. First, the Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to object to the closure waived the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law—because the Supreme Court has not squarely held that a public-trial right can be waived only by an on-the-record, knowing and voluntary waiver (as opposed to non-objection). The court also rejected any argument that the waiver finding rested on an unreasonable factual determination.
  • Second, on the merits, the state court’s approval of a partial closure under Illinois statute 725 ILCS 5/115-11—allowing the defendant’s father to remain and the press to attend if present, but excluding other spectators during the minor’s testimony—was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The Supreme Court’s Waller/Presley framework addresses total closures and closures over objection, not partial, unobjected closures; AEDPA does not permit habeas courts to extend those rules.
• Ineffective assistance during plea bargaining:
  • Under § 2254(d)(2), the state courts’ factual determinations—crediting counsel’s testimony that they advised Gambaiani of his sentencing exposure and finding that he rejected any plea involving prison time—were not unreasonable. Given these findings, he failed both Strickland prongs (no deficient performance, no prejudice).
• Result: Affirmance of the district court’s denial of habeas relief in full.

Analysis

AEDPA Framework and the Court’s Approach

The court meticulously recited AEDPA’s two gateways to relief: § 2254(d)(1) (contrary to/unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law) and § 2254(d)(2) (unreasonable determination of the facts). Emphasizing Harrington v. Richter and White v. Woodall, the opinion underscores that relief is available only where no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court; lower-court splits and the need to extend Supreme Court rationales generally doom habeas claims.

Public-Trial Claim

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Waller v. Georgia (1984): Established the four-factor test governing total closures of proceedings (overriding interest, narrow tailoring, consideration of reasonable alternatives, and on-the-record findings) for suppression hearings.
• Presley v. Georgia (2010): Applied Waller to jury selection, holding voir dire is included within the public-trial right and requiring consideration of alternatives before closing.
• Peretz v. United States (1991) and Levine v. United States (1960): Cited to show that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the possibility that failure to object can constitute waiver of public-trial rights, undermining any claim that a knowing, explicit waiver is clearly required.
• Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982): A First Amendment access case recognizing the compelling interest in protecting minor sex-crime victims, while striking down a mandatory closure rule; relevant to the legitimacy of limited closures.
• Seventh Circuit’s Walton v. Briley (2004): On direct appeal, this circuit demands knowing and voluntary waiver for public-trial rights. But the panel properly held that Walton cannot define “clearly established” law for AEDPA purposes.
• Other circuit decisions: United States v. Hitt (5th Cir. 2006) (failure to object can waive), United States v. Thompson (8th Cir. 2013), Judd v. Haley (11th Cir. 2001), and Zornes v. Bolin (8th Cir. 2022) (partial-closure doctrine)—all illustrating lower-court divisions and the distinct handling of partial vs. total closures.
• United States v. Anderson (7th Cir. 2018): Limited closures to late arrivals may not violate the public-trial right when the courtroom remains accessible to those present.

2) Legal Reasoning on Waiver

The Illinois Appellate Court deemed the claim waived because defense counsel did not object when the State invoked 725 ILCS 5/115-11 to exclude spectators during the minor’s testimony (while allowing the defendant’s father to remain). On habeas, Gambaiani argued this finding rested on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” and contradicted clearly established law.

The Seventh Circuit rejected both arguments. Factually, the record showed counsel did not object and sought only to ensure the father could stay—amounting to acquiescence. Legally, because the Supreme Court has not clearly held that public-trial rights require an on-the-record, knowing and voluntary waiver (akin to the waiver of counsel or a guilty plea), the state court’s waiver ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The presence of a lower-court split (e.g., between Walton and Hitt) confirmed that fairminded jurists could disagree, which is fatal to habeas relief.

3) Legal Reasoning on the Merits (Partial Closure)

The panel proceeded to the merits in the alternative. It held that the state court’s approval of a partial closure—excluding non-interested spectators during the minor’s testimony while allowing the father to remain and the press to attend if present—was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Waller and Presley address total closures and closures over objection; the Supreme Court has not extended those holdings to partial closures or required trial courts to conduct a Waller analysis sua sponte when no objection is lodged.

The opinion also emphasized the recognized governmental interest in protecting child sex-crime victims from trauma and embarrassment (Globe Newspaper), and noted that many circuits permit partial closures upon a “substantial reason” (a lower threshold than Waller’s “overriding interest” for complete closures). Against that backdrop, Illinois’s statute authorizing limited closures for minor testimony (725 ILCS 5/115-11) comfortably fits within the range of reasonable approaches.

Gambaiani’s counterarguments—that the closure was “total” because only an “interested party” remained, and that locking the door to latecomers rendered the closure unconstitutional—failed under AEDPA. The factual reality that the father remained made the closure partial; the absence of press on that day did not convert the closure into a total one. And even if door-control procedures were imperfect, the state court’s approval was not beyond the bounds of reasonable disagreement given Anderson and similar cases.

Ineffective Assistance During Plea Bargaining

1) Precedents and Standards

• Strickland v. Washington (1984): Two prongs—deficient performance and prejudice.
• Missouri v. Frye (2012): Strickland applies to plea negotiations; defendants must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, they would have accepted the offer and the plea would have been entered and honored.
• Wood v. Allen (2010), Brumfield v. Cain (2015): High deference to state factfinding; disagreement is not enough—decisions must be unreasonable “beyond debate.”
• Sanders v. Radtke (7th Cir. 2022), Dassey v. Dittmann (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc): Reinforce deference to state courts’ credibility determinations under § 2254(d)(2).

2) Legal Reasoning

After an evidentiary hearing, the Illinois courts credited testimony from trial counsel (Halverson and Samuels) that they explained the sentencing exposure—including consecutive terms on predatory criminal sexual assault counts—and concluded that Gambaiani rejected a 4–15 year offer because he was adamant about avoiding any imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit held those credibility-based findings were not unreasonable. The consistency between counsel’s testimony and Gambaiani’s later refusal of a 25-year offer after a 43-year sentence supported the state courts’ view that his decisions were driven by an insistence on avoiding incarceration, not by misadvice.

Given those facts, the state courts reasonably held there was no deficient performance, and no prejudice under Strickland/Frye. On habeas, federal courts cannot reweigh witness credibility or redo the evidentiary hearing; the AEDPA bar is not cleared merely by pointing to disagreements or alleged inconsistencies unless the state court’s determinations are outside the range of fairminded judgment.

Impact

• Preservation matters: Defense counsel who do not object to proposed courtroom closures risk waiver under state law—and under AEDPA, petitioners will rarely succeed in arguing that non-objection cannot amount to waiver absent a Supreme Court ruling to that effect.
• Partial closures are AEDPA-resilient: Where courts allow family or press to remain and limit closures to sensitive testimony (e.g., child sex victims), state decisions upholding such measures will likely withstand habeas challenges absent on-point Supreme Court authority.
• Waller/Presley limits: On habeas review, petitioners cannot demand extension of Waller’s total-closure framework to partial, unobjected closures, nor can they require trial courts to apply Waller sua sponte. This is especially so where statutes like 725 ILCS 5/115-11 inject a specific, child-protection rationale.
• Plea-bargaining claims face high fact-deference: Credibility findings that counsel advised properly, combined with evidence that a defendant refused any incarceration, generally defeat Strickland prejudice. Later rejection of more favorable offers can corroborate the defendant’s intent and undercut claims of misadvice.
• Seventh Circuit direct-appeal doctrine vs. habeas: Although Walton v. Briley imposes a high waiver standard on direct appeal for public-trial rights in this circuit, Walton does not supply the “clearly established” federal law needed for AEDPA relief. Petitioners must anchor arguments in Supreme Court holdings, not circuit law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• AEDPA deference: Federal habeas courts do not decide the “best” constitutional answer. They ask whether the state court’s answer contradicts or unreasonably applies Supreme Court holdings (not dicta), or rests on factfinding that is unreasonable beyond fair debate.
• Clearly established law: Only holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the state decision count. Circuit splits are a signal that the law is not clearly established.
• Public-trial right: Criminal trials are presumptively open. Courts may close proceedings in narrow circumstances, but total closures require a stringent Waller analysis. Whether and how that applies to partial closures is an area where the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively.
• Partial vs. total closure: A total closure excludes the general public entirely. A partial closure leaves some access—often allowing family, press, or other interested persons to remain.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture: “Waiver” is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; “forfeiture” is a failure to timely assert it. States may treat non-objection as waiver; on habeas, petitioners must show that doing so conflicts with clearly established Supreme Court law.
• Strickland and plea offers: To prove ineffective assistance about a plea, a defendant must show both substandard advice/performance and a reasonable probability he would have accepted the offer and obtained a less severe outcome.

Conclusion

Gambaiani v. Greene is a textbook application of AEDPA restraint. The Seventh Circuit held that, absent a Supreme Court directive, state courts do not unreasonably apply clearly established law by treating non-objection as waiver of the public-trial right or by approving a partial closure for a child victim’s testimony without a Waller analysis—especially when the press could attend and a family member remained. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the court reaffirmed that credibility determinations made after an evidentiary hearing are rarely disturbed on habeas absent blatant unreasonableness.

The decision’s practical message is clear: object contemporaneously to courtroom closures to preserve robust Sixth Amendment review, and recognize that habeas relief will not be available to extend Supreme Court doctrine into unsettled areas. For plea-related Strickland claims, a petitioner who repeatedly refuses offers involving custodial time faces steep odds in proving that counsel’s advice—not his own stance—caused the rejection and resulting harsher sentence.