AEDPA Deference to State Chapman Harmlessness for Apprendi/Blakely Guideline-Departure Errors

I. Introduction

Dwayne E. Sheppard v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections is a federal habeas appeal arising from a Florida life sentence imposed after a jury conviction for sexual battery with a deadly weapon. The underlying crime occurred in 1985, but the case went to trial in 2008 after latent fingerprints from a removed window screen were matched in 2005. The sentencing court imposed a life sentence by departing upward from Florida’s 1983 sentencing guidelines based on judicial findings of heightened premeditation and victim vulnerability.

The central constitutional issue was whether the life sentence violated the Sixth Amendment jury-trial rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, because the departure facts were found by the judge rather than by a jury. The Eleventh Circuit (non-precedential, per curiam) affirmed denial of § 2254 relief, holding that—even assuming an Apprendi/Blakely violation—the state court reasonably found the error harmless, and that conclusion is insulated by AEDPA deference.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court made four key moves:

It accepted that, for Apprendi purposes, Florida’s 1983 guidelines “cap” (here, 12 years) was the relevant “statutory maximum,” even though the offense statute permitted life.
It concluded the sentencing court violated Apprendi/Blakely by imposing life based on judge-found facts (heightened premeditation and victim vulnerability).
It emphasized that such violations are subject to harmless-error review under Washington v. Recuenco.
It held that the state postconviction court’s determination—applying Chapman v. California—that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was not unreasonable under AEDPA, and therefore federal habeas relief was barred under Brown v. Davenport.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The Sixth Amendment sentencing rule

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): Established that any fact (other than a prior conviction) increasing the penalty beyond the “statutory maximum” must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel quotes the canonical formulation and treats the departure factors as Apprendi-relevant facts.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004): Defined “statutory maximum” as the maximum a judge may impose based solely on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. That definition supplies the bridge to guideline systems that constrain judicial sentencing absent extra factfinding.
Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2014): Used by the panel to support the proposition that Florida’s guideline ceiling functions as the Apprendi “statutory maximum” when exceeding it requires additional factual findings.

2. Harmless error and federal habeas “double deference”

Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006): Confirms Apprendi/Blakely errors are not structural; they can be harmless. This is crucial because it permits the state courts to salvage a Sixth Amendment sentencing error if the record leaves no reasonable doubt that a jury would have found the aggravating facts.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967): The state postconviction court applied the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, and the federal court’s task becomes assessing whether that state harmlessness determination was unreasonable under AEDPA.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993): Supplies the federal habeas prejudice test (“substantial and injurious effect”). The Eleventh Circuit frames the modern rule: a petitioner must satisfy both Brecht and AEDPA when the state court adjudicated harmlessness.
Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 (2022): The controlling doctrinal framework: when a state court finds an error harmless, a federal habeas court cannot grant relief unless the petitioner clears two hurdles—(1) Brecht prejudice and (2) AEDPA unreasonableness in the state harmlessness ruling. The panel relies on Brown to deny relief once it finds the AEDPA hurdle not met, without needing to resolve Brecht.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): Provides the high bar for AEDPA relief (“beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”). The panel uses this to underscore that it is not enough to think the state court was wrong; the decision must be unreasonably wrong.

3. Florida departure-factor law used to evaluate “rational jury” findings

Because harmlessness turned on whether “any rational jury” would have found the departure facts, the opinion anchors its analysis in Florida Supreme Court and District Court of Appeal decisions defining those departure factors:

State v. Obojes, 604 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 1992): Defines heightened premeditation as a “careful plan or prearranged design formulated with cold forethought,” distinguishing deliberate planning from mere opportunity.
Marcott v. State, 650 So. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 1995) and Audano v. State, 641 So. 2d 1356, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994): Provide contrasts where conduct did not satisfy the heightened premeditation standard—used to argue Sheppard’s conduct was more planned than opportunistic.
Hawkins v. State, 522 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988): Frames “victim vulnerability” as requiring a specific weakness making the victim particularly vulnerable and known to the offender.
Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 1986) and Grant v. State, 547 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989): Reject sleep or general helplessness as sufficient vulnerability.
Wemett v. State, 567 So. 2d 882, 887 (Fla. 1990) and Mathis v. State, 515 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1987): Reject departure rationales that are common to most instances of the crime (e.g., mere defenselessness, gender), reinforcing that “particular” vulnerability must be something more.

4. The case’s own procedural predecessors

Sheppard v. State, 31 So. 3d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010): Direct appeal affirmance.
Sheppard v. State, 96 So. 3d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012): Postconviction review of Rule 3.850 denial.
Sheppard v. State, 190 So. 3d 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016): Rule 3.800(a) decision where the state postconviction court expressly found any Apprendi/Blakely-type error harmless. This harmlessness adjudication is the focal point of AEDPA review in federal court.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning is best understood as a two-level inquiry shaped by Brown v. Davenport:

Identify the Sixth Amendment error: Although the offense statute allowed life, Florida’s 1983 guidelines limited the sentence to 12 years absent additional factual findings. Under Blakely, that 12-year cap is treated as the “statutory maximum” because it is the most the judge could impose based solely on the jury’s verdict. Thus, a life sentence based on judge-found “departure reasons” violates the jury-trial rule.
Assess harmlessness through AEDPA’s lens: The state court applied Chapman and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found both departure facts. Federal habeas relief requires showing that harmlessness determination was unreasonable under § 2254(d) (and also satisfying Brecht), but failing AEDPA is dispositive.

On the heightened premeditation factor, the panel emphasizes evidence of planning and “cold forethought”: the intruder’s stated financial motive (“$500”), choosing the middle of the night, entering through a removed screen, arming himself, being naked to minimize trace evidence, and directing the victim to shower to destroy evidence. By contrasting Obojes with Marcott and Audano, the court treats the record as comfortably on the “planned” side of the line Florida law draws.

On victim vulnerability, the panel acknowledges Florida law’s caution against overbreadth—sleep, gender, and general defenselessness are not enough. The distinguishing feature, in the panel’s view, is the situational vulnerability created by the victim being confronted while lying beside her five-year-old daughter and the offender’s exploitation of the mother’s fear of harm to the child to compel compliance. That circumstance is framed as a specific, offender-recognized weakness satisfying Hawkins v. State and avoiding the “common to nearly any” problem flagged in Wemett v. State and Mathis v. State.

Finally, the panel’s bottom line is methodological: even if a federal judge might debate the departure factors, § 2254(d) demands more than disagreement. Because the state court’s Chapman harmlessness ruling is at least reasonable, AEDPA forecloses relief—and under Brown v. Davenport, that ends the case.

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision illustrates three practical consequences for future litigants and courts:

Guideline ceilings can function as Apprendi maxima: Even where the offense statute authorizes life, a guideline system that requires extra findings to exceed a range can create a lower Blakely “statutory maximum,” making judicial departure findings constitutionally sensitive.
Harmlessness is a powerful backstop for sentencing-factor jury errors: By relying on Washington v. Recuenco, the court treats the remedy as contingent: if the record makes the aggravating facts effectively inevitable for a rational jury, the Sixth Amendment error will not produce habeas relief.
Brown v. Davenport tightens habeas review of harmlessness: Petitioners must win twice—show Brecht prejudice and show the state harmlessness determination was unreasonable under AEDPA. The opinion exemplifies how a federal court can deny relief solely on AEDPA reasonableness, without reaching the full Brecht analysis.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Statutory maximum” (in Apprendi/Blakely terms): Not necessarily the maximum punishment written in the criminal statute. It is the most the judge may impose based only on the jury’s verdict (and admissions), without finding extra facts.
Upward departure: A sentence above the guideline range, permitted only if certain legally recognized “departure reasons” exist. If those reasons require factfinding, they can implicate the jury-trial right.
Harmless error: A constitutional mistake that does not justify relief because it did not affect the outcome under the applicable standard. States often use Chapman (“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).
Federal habeas review (AEDPA, § 2254(d)): Federal courts do not freely re-decide constitutional questions after state adjudication. Relief is limited to decisions that are contrary to, or unreasonably apply, clearly established Supreme Court law, or rest on unreasonable fact determinations.
Brecht vs. AEDPA after Brown v. Davenport: On habeas, the petitioner must show both (1) actual harmfulness under Brecht and (2) that the state court’s harmlessness decision was unreasonable under AEDPA. Failing either one defeats the petition.
“Heightened premeditation” and “victim vulnerability” (Florida departure factors): Under Florida law as cited, heightened premeditation requires “cold forethought,” not mere opportunity; victim vulnerability requires a particular weakness beyond what is common to the crime, known to and exploited by the offender.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision reinforces that an Apprendi/Blakely sentencing error in a guideline-departure regime does not automatically warrant federal habeas relief. Even where a life sentence rests on judge-found aggravating facts, relief is foreclosed if the state court reasonably concludes—under Chapman v. California—that a rational jury would have found the same facts, because AEDPA deference (as operationalized by Brown v. Davenport and Harrington v. Richter) makes federal reconsideration exceptionally limited.