AEDPA Deference and the Narrow Reach of Cronic:
Commentary on Kenard Singh v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

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I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Kenard Singh v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, No. 23‑11033 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), a federal habeas case arising from a felony murder prosecution in Florida. The case sits at the intersection of three important strands of criminal procedure:

• The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel;
• The distinction between the ordinary Strickland v. Washington standard and the rare presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic;
• The highly deferential review imposed on federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA) when reviewing state postconviction rulings.

After pleading guilty to reduced charges and receiving a 21‑year sentence based on a cooperation agreement, Kenard Singh allegedly violated his plea agreement by giving inconsistent testimony at his co‑defendant’s trial. The state moved to vacate his plea and/or sentence; at the motion hearing, Singh’s private lawyer, Jack Maro, insisted he no longer represented Singh, was unprepared, and then—when compelled to represent Singh anyway— largely conceded the state’s position while focusing on remedy. The state court vacated the plea and sentence. Singh later went to trial on the original first‑degree felony murder charge and received a mandatory life sentence.

In his state postconviction motion and in federal habeas proceedings, Singh argued that Maro’s performance at the plea‑vacatur hearing was so deficient that it amounted to “no assistance at all” under Cronic, thus entitling him to a presumption of prejudice, rather than to the more demanding proof of actual prejudice required by Strickland.

The Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, holding that the state court’s decision to apply Strickland rather than Cronic was not an “objectively unreasonable” application of clearly established Supreme Court law, given AEDPA’s stringent standard of review and the narrowness of Cronic’s exceptions.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion proceeds in three main steps:

1. Factual background and state proceedings.
   Singh was originally charged in Florida state court with first‑degree felony murder stemming from a home‑invasion robbery and the killing of Douglas Tripp. He gave a sworn proffer implicating himself and co‑defendant Brenton Crabtree, and then entered a plea to second‑degree murder with a 21‑year sentence, conditioned on his testifying truthfully “consistent with [his] sworn proffered testimony” in Brenton’s case.
   
   At Brenton’s trial, Singh’s testimony deviated from his proffer in two critical respects: he denied seeing Brenton load a gun with bullets in the car and denied seeing Brenton throw a rock at a car window (though he admitted hearing it). A recorded jail call after the trial showed Singh boasting that he denied seeing a gun and bullets and threatening to “not remember nothing” if asked to testify again.
   
   The state moved to vacate Singh’s plea and/or sentence for noncompliance with the cooperation agreement. At the hearing on that motion:
   • Maro was in the audience, having filed a “notice of nonrepresentation” after the time for direct appeal expired;
   • The trial judge compelled him to represent Singh at the hearing, dismissing the claimed fee “conflict” as irrelevant;
   • The judge expressed a “visceral reaction” to Singh’s testimony, called his noncompliance “fundamentally apparent,” and suggested the state might be “better off just rolling the dice” on a life sentence;
   • Maro admitted he had not watched the co‑defendant’s trial and “didn’t have a clue” about the details of the alleged breach; he largely conceded there was nothing meaningful he could say to contest the state’s allegations;
   • He focused primarily on the remedy, advocating—via Forsythe v. State—for vacating both the plea and sentence (rather than just resentencing on the existing conviction), so that Singh could potentially renegotiate.
   The trial court vacated Singh’s plea and sentence, castigated his conduct, and warned “It will never be 21 years again. Never.” A public defender was later appointed, but Singh rejected a 35‑year plea offer and went to trial, resulting in a life sentence. His direct appeal failed.
2. State postconviction and federal habeas proceedings.
   Singh filed a Florida Rule 3.850 motion arguing that Maro’s performance at the motion‑to‑vacate hearing was constitutionally ineffective under both Strickland and Cronic—specifically, that Maro had “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” invoking the second Cronic category.
   
   At the evidentiary hearing, Singh testified that Maro had ceased communication after the plea and did not prepare him for the co‑defendant’s trial; that they did not confer before or during the vacatur hearing. Maro testified he believed the case was essentially “finished” after sentencing; he thus did not attend Brenton’s trial, arrived at the vacatur hearing only to bear “witness” to the prior proceedings, and was unprepared when pressed into representation. Nonetheless, he testified that once it was clear the judge would find a breach, he viewed renegotiation (rather than immediate resentencing before a hostile judge) as the best available path.
   
   The state postconviction court applied Strickland, not Cronic, and found neither deficient performance nor prejudice, expressly crediting Maro’s tactical focus on vacating the plea and sentence as reasonable, given the risk of an immediate life sentence before a “clearly displeased judge.” The intermediate appellate court affirmed in a per curiam summary disposition.
   
   In federal habeas proceedings under § 2254, the district court held that the Supreme Court had not “squarely addressed” whether Cronic should supplant Strickland in these circumstances, and thus the state court’s application of Strickland was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law.
3. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding.
   The Eleventh Circuit:
   • Reviewed the federal district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo, but applied § 2254(d)’s deferential standard to the state postconviction decision;
   • Recognized that Strickland is the default rule, and that Cronic’s presumption of prejudice applies only in three narrow categories, including when counsel “entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”;
   • Noted that, under Bell v. Cone and Florida v. Nixon, the “failure must be complete” and strategic concessions, or tactical decisions to avoid a “useless charade,” do not necessarily trigger Cronic;
   • Conceded it was a “close call” whether Maro’s representation, as a matter of first principles, might fit within Cronic’s second exception;
   • Nevertheless concluded that, at the very least, there was room for “fairminded disagreement” as to whether Cronic rather than Strickland should apply in this “novel factual context”; and since the Supreme Court has not clearly established that Cronic governs such hearings, AEDPA deference required upholding the state court’s application of Strickland.
   The court therefore affirmed the federal district court’s denial of Singh’s § 2254 petition.

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III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. The core ineffective assistance precedents: Strickland and Cronic

The Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance framework is anchored in two Supreme Court decisions:

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
  Strickland sets out the two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance:
  1. Deficient performance – counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and
  2. Prejudice – a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
  Both prongs must be proven. The Eleventh Circuit reiterates this (“must affirmatively prove both deficient performance and actual prejudice”) and notes that this is the “ordinary” standard for ineffective assistance claims.
• United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
  Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, recognizes narrow situations where the adversarial process has so completely broken down that prejudice can be presumed; litigating actual prejudice would be unjustified. The Eleventh Circuit, echoing Cronic and its own precedents, lists three such situations:
  1. Complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of trial;
  2. Counsel’s entire failure to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing;
  3. Circumstances in which no lawyer, however competent, could provide effective assistance, making the proceeding inherently unfair.
  Singh’s argument falls under the second category: that Maro “entirely failed” to test the state’s plea‑breach case at the hearing. The court emphasizes that Cronic applies to “a very narrow spectrum of cases” and that the burden to invoke it is “very heavy.”

2. Narrowing Cronic’s second category: Bell v. Cone and Florida v. Nixon

• Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
  In Bell, defense counsel in a capital sentencing phase failed to present mitigating evidence and waived closing argument, leading to a death sentence. The Supreme Court held these failures did not trigger Cronic’s presumption of prejudice because counsel had otherwise performed as an advocate—he gave an opening statement seeking a life sentence and presented a theory of mental disturbance and remorse.
  
  Bell crystallizes an important refinement: Cronic’s second category covers only cases in which the attorney’s failure to contest the prosecution’s case is complete, not merely deficient at “specific points.” The Eleventh Circuit relies heavily on this. It reasons that because Maro:
  • Did some legal research or at least cited Forsythe v. State to argue about the appropriate remedy; and
  • Advocated for vacating both the plea and sentence to avoid immediate resentencing before a hostile judge,
  his assistance, however poor, was not a total abdication “throughout the proceeding as a whole.” Thus, under Bell, Cronic’s second exception is arguably not met.
• Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
  In Nixon, counsel in a capital case conceded the defendant’s guilt in order to focus on avoiding a death sentence, even though the defendant never expressly consented. The Supreme Court held that this did not automatically trigger a presumption of prejudice under Cronic; instead, it remained subject to Strickland’s performance and prejudice analysis.
  
  Critical to the Eleventh Circuit’s use of Nixon is the idea that:

  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for his unwillingness to engage in “a useless charade.”

  Given the trial judge’s “visceral” reaction and express belief that Singh had plainly lied at trial, the panel suggests that Maro might reasonably have concluded that directly contesting the judge’s assessment of Singh’s testimony was futile—a “useless charade.” Instead, the “strategy” was to concede the breach and argue about the remedy (vacate plea + sentence) to preserve some bargaining room with the prosecution.
  
  Under Nixon, such a choice—even if aggressive or unorthodox—does not automatically become a Cronic case. It remains within Strickland territory.

3. AEDPA and deference to state-court adjudications

The governing federal habeas framework comes from 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), elaborated by multiple Supreme Court cases:

• Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
  Defines when a state court decision is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court:
  • “Contrary to” – if the state court reaches a legal conclusion opposite to the Supreme Court on the same question, or confronts materially indistinguishable facts and reaches a different result;
  • “Unreasonable application” – if the state correctly identifies the governing legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts.
• Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
  Clarifies that an “unreasonable application” is not merely incorrect; it must be “objectively unreasonable.” The Eleventh Circuit quotes this, underscoring that—even if the panel might have decided the Sixth Amendment question differently de novo— AEDPA prevents relief unless the state court’s decision is beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement.
• Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011).
  Intensifies the deference: relief is available only where the ruling is “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” The Eleventh Circuit explicitly applies this standard and emphasizes that, because the Cronic-versus-Strickland question here is at least “a close call,” AEDPA requires deference. Close calls, by definition, fall within the range of fairminded disagreement.
• Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008).
  Addresses AEDPA’s “clearly established” requirement: when the Supreme Court has not “squarely addressed” a particular factual context, or clearly established a rule in that context, a state court cannot be faulted as “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law for choosing one plausible extension over another.
  
  The Eleventh Circuit invokes Wright to note that the Supreme Court has not clearly instructed when, if ever, Cronic is required at a plea‑vacatur or plea‑breach hearing like Singh’s. Therefore, the Florida postconviction court’s adherence to Strickland in this “novel factual context” cannot be branded “contrary to clearly established federal law.”

4. Eleventh Circuit and Florida precedents

• Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
  Cited chiefly for characterizing AEDPA review as “highly deferential.” It frames the lens through which the Eleventh Circuit reviews the state court’s handling of Singh’s ineffective assistance claim.
• Castillo v. Florida, Secretary of Department of Corrections, 722 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2013).
  Used to restate the three Cronic categories and to emphasize that where “an attorney is present and contests the prosecution’s case,” any errors are typically analyzed under Strickland, requiring a showing of actual prejudice.
• Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
  Quoted to stress the exceptional nature of Cronic claims and the “very heavy” burden they impose on petitioners.
• Florida state cases: Metellus v. State and Forsythe v. State.
  While not central to the federal constitutional holding, these Florida decisions shape the remedial options at the vacatur hearing:
  • Metellus v. State, 900 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 2005).
    The opinion describes Metellus as establishing that, upon a defendant’s breach of a plea agreement, a court may vacate only the sentence and resentence the defendant up to the statutory maximum on the existing conviction. The state invoked Metellus to argue that the court could vacate Singh’s 21‑year sentence and resentence him to up to life for second‑degree murder, or alternatively vacate both plea and sentence and try him for first‑degree felony murder, but preferred the resentencing option.
  • Forsythe v. State, 840 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
    Maro cited Forsythe, which he described as having a “different spin”: there, the state retained “the option of withdrawing from the agreement, and either going to trial or seeking a new agreement.” The state postconviction court later viewed Maro’s invocation of Forsythe as a sound strategy: by pushing for vacatur of both plea and sentence, rather than a resentencing in front of an angry judge, Singh at least preserved some room for renegotiation—indeed, the state later offered a 35‑year deal.
  The Eleventh Circuit relies on this remedial framing to support the notion that Maro was not doing nothing; he was advocating on the dimension that still seemed meaningfully contestable—the remedy—under Florida law.

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B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framing the federal question under AEDPA

The panel is careful to emphasize that it is not analyzing Singh’s Sixth Amendment claim de novo. The precise question under § 2254(d) is narrower:

Did the state postconviction court’s decision to analyze counsel’s performance under Strickland rather than Cronic result in a decision that was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts?

In other words, the federal court’s task is not to decide for itself whether Cronic should have applied, but whether Supreme Court law clearly required the state court to apply Cronic in circumstances like these.

2. Identifying the governing Supreme Court law

The panel accepts that Strickland and Cronic together form the clearly established framework for ineffective assistance claims:

• Strickland is the default rule, requiring proof of both deficient performance and prejudice.
• Cronic recognizes narrow circumstances where prejudice will be presumed, including a complete failure of counsel to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.

The court further relies on Bell and Nixon to define the outer limits of Cronic’s second category and to reinforce that the failure must be “complete” across the proceeding as a whole, not just at discrete moments.

3. Applying Cronic’s second exception to the facts

Singh invokes the second Cronic exception: that Maro “entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” The panel’s analysis of this claim is two‑sided and explicitly acknowledges the difficulty.

a. Facts supporting Cronic’s application

The opinion candidly recognizes several facts that arguably support a Cronic‑type finding:

• Maro had filed a notice of nonrepresentation, believed his obligations ended at sentencing, and did not attend Singh’s testimony at Brenton’s trial, leaving him “without a clue” about the details of the alleged breach;
• He sat in the audience, rather than at counsel table, at the vacatur hearing, expecting only to “bear witness” to prior events;
• He had not consulted with Singh or prepared any defense regarding compliance with the plea agreement;
• Once pressed into service, he did not contest the factual basis of the state’s claim that Singh had materially contradicted his proffer and undermined the state’s case. Instead, he:
  • Characterized the breach question as a “factual determination” for the judge and said, “there’s not much else I can say to you as far as that’s concerned”; and
  • Focused almost exclusively on the options and remedy (vacating only the sentence versus vacating plea and sentence).

On this view, Maro “piggy-backed” on the state’s presentation, offered virtually no factual advocacy regarding compliance, and entered the hearing unprepared and unwilling to champion Singh’s cause on the central issue—whether Singh had truly breached.

b. Facts supporting Strickland’s application

However, the panel ultimately treats Maro’s performance as not satisfying the stringent “complete failure” standard required by Cronic, for at least two reasons:

1. Partial adversarial engagement.
   Even though Maro did not seriously oppose the factual showing of breach, the court notes that he did:
   • Engage on the legal question of remedy by citing Forsythe to distinguish Metellus and argue that the state could effectively withdraw from the agreement and renegotiate;
   • Press for the vacatur of both plea and sentence—contrary to the state’s preferred remedy of vacating only the sentence— in order to avoid an immediate resentencing to life by a judge who was “clearly displeased” with Singh’s conduct;
   • Request appointment of a public defender, recognizing that further representation would be needed.
   Under Bell, because Maro did something in opposition to the state’s preferred outcome, his performance cannot be characterized as a “complete” failure to function as an advocate “throughout the proceeding as a whole.” Any failures are therefore, in the panel’s view, errors occurring at “specific points,” placing the case under Strickland rather than Cronic.
2. Strategic futility and the “useless charade” doctrine.
   The trial judge had, even before hearing detailed argument, announced a strong belief that Singh’s testimony at Brenton’s trial was blatantly inconsistent with the proffer and that Singh had “fundamentally” failed to comply with the plea agreement. He described his “visceral reaction” to the testimony and repeatedly labeled Singh’s conduct as “absolutely absurd,” “beyond belief,” and deserving of harsher punishment.
   
   In this climate, the panel reasons, it was at least plausible—under Nixon—for Maro to treat a direct factual contest over whether Singh breached as unwinnable and instead devote limited time to the remedial question, which remained fluid under Florida cases like Metellus and Forsythe. The Supreme Court has stated that counsel cannot be faulted for declining to engage in a “useless charade” of formal opposition when guilt (or, by analogy, breach) appears conceded and obvious in the eyes of the factfinder.
   
   The state postconviction court adopted a similar view, praising Maro’s focus on avoiding immediate resentencing before a hostile judge and attempting to secure a posture in which renegotiation was still possible. The later 35‑year plea offer exemplified the payoff of that strategy, even though Singh ultimately rejected that offer and went to trial.

Given these two strands, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that—even if one might, on de novo review, consider this a borderline or even persuasive Cronic case—the state court was not “objectively unreasonable” in refusing to apply Cronic.

4. Novelty of the factual context and the “clearly established” requirement

A crucial component of the court’s reasoning is that the Supreme Court has not “squarely addressed” the specific factual scenario at issue: a plea‑breach or plea‑vacatur hearing in which a defendant’s cooperation testimony allegedly violated a plea agreement and the court is deciding whether to vacate the plea and/or sentence.

While Strickland, Cronic, Bell, and Nixon offer general principles, none of them deals specifically with counsel’s performance at such a hearing, much less with a lawyer compelled to re‑appear after purporting to withdraw, unpaid and unprepared, to defend a client against a breach finding.

Relying on Wright v. Van Patten, the panel underscores that AEDPA relief requires not merely a plausible extension of Supreme Court precedent, but truly “clearly established” law in the relevant context. Because:

• No Supreme Court case has held that Cronic applies to plea‑breach or plea‑vacatur hearings in circumstances like these; and
• The existing precedent (especially Bell and Nixon) cuts against broadening Cronic’s reach,

the state court’s choice to use Strickland instead of Cronic cannot be condemned as contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.

5. The “close call” and fairminded disagreement

One of the more notable features of the opinion is its explicit acknowledgement that the Cronic/Strickland choice is “a close call” on the facts presented. Ordinarily, appellate courts may be reluctant to label issues “close” because AEDPA, as explained in Harrington, suggests that any close legal question falls within the realm of “fairminded disagreement” and thus favors denying habeas relief.

Here, the panel uses that very logic: the fact that reasonable jurists might debate whether Cronic or Strickland is the better doctrinal fit demonstrates that the state court’s selection of Strickland cannot be “objectively unreasonable.” Thus, the Eleventh Circuit aligns tightly with AEDPA’s deferential design: once a constitutional question is recognizable as debatable among fairminded judges, the federal habeas claim fails.

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C. Impact and Significance

1. On the scope of Cronic’s presumed-prejudice rule

Substantively, the opinion reinforces and applies a restrictive reading of Cronic, especially its second category: that counsel’s “entire failure” to test the prosecution’s case is reserved for exceptionally stark breakdowns in representation. Several implications follow:

• Partial advocacy is enough to avoid Cronic.
  Even when counsel is unprepared, disinterested, or overtly resistant to representing the defendant—as Maro was here— the presence of any meaningful adversarial conduct on any material issue in the proceeding is sufficient, under Bell as interpreted here, to keep the case in Strickland territory. In Singh’s case, that “material issue” was the remedy (vacate sentence only vs. vacate both plea and sentence) rather than the underlying factual questions of breach.
• Strategic concessions limit Cronic’s reach.
  By analogizing to Nixon, the court signals that even drastic concessions—like effectively conceding breach— can be framed as tactical choices rather than total abdications. Lawyers who decide, in the face of a hostile or convinced judge, to stop contesting certain facts and to concentrate wholly on sentencing or remedial options may thereby insulate their performance from Cronic claims.
• Cronic remains practically aspirational in habeas cases.
  The opinion underscores that Cronic is “a very narrow spectrum of cases” and that the “burden of proof under Cronic is a very heavy one.” In practice, in the post‑AEDPA world, it will be exceedingly rare for a state prisoner to obtain federal habeas relief by invoking Cronic rather than Strickland, unless the facts present an almost total absence of advocacy at a clearly critical stage (e.g., no counsel present, or counsel asleep, or entirely silent).

2. On federal habeas review and “novel” ineffective assistance contexts

From a structural perspective, the case illustrates how AEDPA constrains the development of federal constitutional doctrine:

• State courts have leeway in new fact patterns.
  Where Supreme Court precedent has not directly confronted a specific context—such as counsel’s role at plea‑breach/vacatur hearings—state courts have significant latitude to choose how to apply existing frameworks (Strickland vs. Cronic) without risking federal reversal. Only truly egregious or clearly forbidden applications will be disturbed.
• “Fairminded disagreement” is dispositive in close cases.
  The panel’s explicit recognition that this is a “close call” but nonetheless upholding the state court under Harrington is a textbook example of AEDPA at work: even if a federal court might, on its own, have extended Cronic, the mere plausibility of the state court’s contrary approach defeats habeas relief.
• Development of Cronic doctrine moves slowly in habeas.
  Because AEDPA deference often precludes relief absent a directly on‑point Supreme Court decision, expansion or clarification of Cronic doctrine typically must occur either:
  • In direct review of federal criminal convictions (where AEDPA does not apply), or
  • In state courts as a matter of state constitutional law that parallels or exceeds federal guarantees.
  Federal habeas, as this case shows, is a poor vehicle for pressing nuanced extensions of Cronic.

3. On defense practice in cooperation/plea-breach situations

The practical lessons for defense practitioners are sobering:

• Representation should not “end” at sentencing when plea obligations continue.
  Maro’s assumption that his responsibilities ended once sentencing and the appeal period passed left Singh exposed in a critical, foreseeable proceeding: a hearing on whether he violated the plea agreement through his trial testimony. Although the Eleventh Circuit denies relief on AEDPA grounds, the factual narrative plainly highlights how counsel’s disengagement can lead to catastrophic consequences (here, an eventual life sentence instead of 21 years).
• Counsel must anticipate plea-violation litigation where cooperation is central.
  In cooperation‑based pleas—particularly those hinging on future truthful testimony—defense counsel should:
  • Clarify the scope and duration of representation in the plea agreement and on the record;
  • Monitor and advise the client closely regarding compliance with cooperation obligations;
  • Prepare for potential plea‑violation or plea‑breach hearings as critical stages where liberty stakes are high.
• Strategic concessions should be documented and client‑informed.
  While Nixon authorizes some unilateral strategic concessions by counsel, best practice is to ensure that the client is fully informed and, where possible, that agreements or understandings about strategy are memorialized. In Singh’s case, the record reflects virtually no consultation before the crucial hearing, which would very likely be problematic under a de novo Sixth Amendment analysis even if AEDPA precludes federal relief.

4. On Florida plea law and remedial choices

At a more localized level, the decision also has implications for Florida practice:

• Choice of remedy matters as much as (or more than) guilt or breach.
  Once the trial judge was convinced that Singh had lied and breached the plea, the realistic advocacy terrain shifted from:
  • “Did a breach occur?” to
  • “What remedy does Florida law permit and what is in the defendant’s best interest?”
  The contrast between Metellus and Forsythe illustrates the range of remedial options: resentencing on the existing conviction versus vacating the plea and re‑opening negotiations or trial on original charges.
• Postconviction courts may credit counsel’s focus on remedy as strategic.
  The state postconviction court and, indirectly, the Eleventh Circuit found it reasonable that Maro abandoned a hopeless contest over breach and instead maneuvered for a posture in which Singh could still negotiate. That tactic generated a 35‑year plea offer—far worse than 21 years, but materially better than the life sentence Singh ultimately received.

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IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Ineffective assistance: Strickland vs. Cronic in plain terms

Think of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in two broad categories:

• The normal case – Strickland.
  Most of the time, when a defendant claims their lawyer did a bad job, courts:
  1. Ask whether the lawyer’s work was objectively unreasonable (deficient performance); and
  2. Require proof that the bad lawyering probably changed the outcome (prejudice).
  This is a demanding test; it is not enough to show mistakes—those mistakes must have made a real difference.
• The extreme case – Cronic.
  In a very small set of cases, the problem is so extreme that the law presumes the defendant was harmed without requiring proof that the outcome would have changed. Examples:
  • The defendant had no lawyer at all during a crucial part of the case (like trial or sentencing);
  • The lawyer did literally nothing to oppose the prosecution’s case, not just at a few moments, but throughout a key proceeding;
  • The circumstances make effective representation impossible (e.g., a lawyer appointed moments before a complex trial with no time to prepare).
  In such situations, the system’s basic fairness is so compromised that courts do not demand a detailed showing of how, specifically, the outcome was affected.

Singh tried to argue that his case was in the second category—that his lawyer’s failure at the plea‑vacatur hearing was so complete that prejudice should be presumed under Cronic. The Eleventh Circuit held that this was at least a debatable extension of Cronic, and thus the state court was not unreasonable in treating it as a normal Strickland case.

2. “Critical stage” and “meaningful adversarial testing”

• Critical stage.
  A “critical stage” in criminal proceedings is any step where substantial rights of the accused may be affected and where the assistance of counsel is necessary to ensure a fair procedure—typically arraignment, plea, trial, sentencing, and some important pretrial hearings.
  
  Although the Eleventh Circuit does not explicitly analyze whether the plea‑vacatur hearing was a “critical stage,” the stakes—a potential life sentence and the unraveling of a previously secured plea—strongly suggest that it was.
• Meaningful adversarial testing.
  This phrase from Cronic refers to whether the defense lawyer actually functions as an advocate who challenges the prosecution’s case. To count as “meaningful,” counsel must do more than simply be physically present or go through formalities; they must make some substantive effort to counter what the state is trying to do.
  
  In Singh’s case, the debate is whether Maro’s minimal focus on remedy (rather than on the breach itself) counts as “meaningful adversarial testing” of “the prosecution’s case” for Cronic purposes. The Eleventh Circuit essentially says: yes, minimally, it does—and that is enough to avoid Cronic.

3. AEDPA and federal habeas deference

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief faces a substantial hurdle. Federal courts may not simply decide whether they think the state court was wrong; they may grant relief only if:

• The state court’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law; or
• The decision rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Important simplifications:

• “Clearly established” means Supreme Court holdings, not lower court decisions or general legal trends.
• “Unreasonable application” does not mean “incorrect” or “disagreeable.” It must be so wrong that no fair‑minded judge could reach that result given existing Supreme Court law.
• “Fairminded disagreement” is the shield. If reasonable judges could disagree about which rule applies or how to apply it, AEDPA requires denying relief.

In Singh’s case, the Eleventh Circuit held:

• The Supreme Court has not clearly instructed that Cronic applies in circumstances like a plea‑breach vacatur hearing;
• Given Bell and Nixon, it is at least reasonable for a state court to treat this as a Strickland case instead; and
• Therefore, the state court’s decision was not “objectively unreasonable,” even if the issue is close.

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V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Singh v. Secretary, Department of Corrections offers several important lessons for practitioners, courts, and scholars:

1. Cronic’s presumption of prejudice remains exceptionally narrow.
   The panel underscores that unless counsel’s failure is truly “complete”—no substantive challenge to the prosecution’s position at any point in a critical proceeding—Cronic will not apply. Even quite poor or minimally engaged advocacy tends to be analyzed under Strickland, which requires proof of actual prejudice.
2. Counsel’s focus on remedy can constitute “meaningful adversarial testing.”
   Even if a lawyer concedes the core factual allegation (here, breach of a plea agreement), digging in on the remedy—especially in a complex interplay of state sentencing law and plea doctrine—can be enough to satisfy the requirement that counsel function as the client’s advocate during the proceeding.
3. AEDPA severely limits federal courts’ ability to extend Cronic into new contexts on habeas review.
   Because the Supreme Court has not “squarely addressed” counsel’s obligations at plea‑breach hearings, federal courts must defer to reasonable state‑court applications of Strickland, even when the issue is debatable. Any significant evolution of Cronic doctrine will likely occur outside of § 2254 proceedings.
4. Plea‑breach hearings are effectively critical stages demanding diligent representation.
   Although not explicitly labeled as such in the opinion, the practical reality is clear: the hearing where Singh lost his 21‑year deal and was placed on a path to a life sentence was a moment of immense consequence. Defense counsel who treat their role as completed at sentencing, despite ongoing cooperation obligations, do so at the client’s peril.
5. State courts retain flexibility in remedying plea breaches under their own law.
   The contrast between Metellus and Forsythe highlights that Florida courts can choose among several remedial paths when a defendant breaches a plea agreement—resentencing on the existing conviction, vacating the entire bargain and reinstating original charges, or permitting renegotiation. Strategic lawyering at this stage can dramatically affect sentencing exposure.

Ultimately, the opinion does not establish a new binding rule for the Eleventh Circuit about when Cronic must apply; as an unpublished decision, it is not precedential. Its enduring significance lies in its illustration of how rigorously AEDPA cabins federal habeas review and how difficult it is, in practice, for defendants to obtain the benefit of Cronic’s presumption of prejudice—even in cases of starkly inadequate representation at high‑stakes hearings that determine the fate of a plea bargain and the difference between a term of years and life imprisonment.