Adverse Possession Under Color of Title Defeats Unprobated Remainder Interests; After-Acquired Title Extends Mortgage to Entire Premises

Introduction

In Walters v. O'Quinn, 2025 NY Slip Op 05988 (App Div, 2d Dept, Oct. 29, 2025), the Second Department confronts a deceptively common real-property tangle: a decades-old, unprobated will that splinters title into life and remainder interests; a caregiver grantee who takes under a recorded deed, occupies and manages the premises as an owner for decades; and a lender that relies on the record and the occupant’s dominion to extend mortgage credit. The dispute culminates in a quiet title action under RPAPL article 15 pitting the estate of the long-term occupant and the mortgagee (Emigrant Bank) against heirs of a prior remainder beneficiary (the Balcarran defendants).

The court’s opinion synthesizes three doctrinal strands: adverse possession under RPAPL 501–543 (with the heightened cotenancy presumption in RPAPL 541), color-of-title principles under RPAPL 511–512, and the common-law doctrine of after-acquired title. The result is a clear, practical rule: long-term exclusive possession undertaken under a recorded deed and in good faith can extinguish unperfected or unasserted remainder claims; and when the possessor has previously mortgaged the premises, the possessor’s subsequently ripened title feeds the mortgage, encumbering the entire property.

Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal from an intermediate order as subsumed by the final order and judgment (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248; CPLR 5501[a][1]) and affirmed the Supreme Court’s order and judgment.

The court held:

The plaintiff, as executor of Glovern Monica Blair’s estate, established entitlement to summary judgment quieting title by adverse possession, and is declared the sole owner of the property; the Balcarran defendants (heirs of a prior remainder beneficiary) are forever barred from asserting any estate or interest.
Emigrant Bank established entitlement to a judgment declaring that it holds a priority mortgage lien encumbering the entire property, under both the adverse-possession facts and the doctrine of after-acquired title.
The Balcarran defendants’ attacks on the 1991 deed and on Blair’s knowledge were unsupported and speculative, insufficient to raise triable issues (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557).

Case Background and Procedural Posture

Key facts (abridged):

1974: Title conveyed to Rebecca Hogarth alone.
1977: Rebecca’s will granted Robert (her spouse) a life estate and a one-third remainder; her daughter Dorothea received a two-thirds remainder; Robert named executor.
1978: Rebecca dies. Robert petitions for probate but never prosecutes; letters never issue; the estate remains unsettled. Dorothea later dies intestate in 1988.
1983: Glovern Monica Blair moves in as Robert’s home health aide.
January 23, 1991: Five days before his death, Robert deeds the property to himself and Blair as joint tenants with rights of survivorship (the 1991 deed). Blair believes this conveys fee title and is unaware of the unprobated will.
1991–2012: After Robert’s death, Blair occupies the property as her primary residence, pays all carrying costs and taxes, maintains and improves the premises, collects rents, and services a mortgage.
2004 and 2007: Blair executes and refinances a mortgage (ultimately with Emigrant Bank) encumbering the property.
2012: Emigrant commences foreclosure; Blair dies later that year.
2015: During an attempted sale by Blair’s estate, a title break is identified and Dorothea’s heirs are alerted to a potential two-thirds interest. The estate sues under RPAPL article 15 to quiet title by adverse possession; Emigrant cross-claims for a declaration of a mortgage lien on the entire property.
2018–2022: Supreme Court initially grants Emigrant’s cross-claim; after intervening reargument motions, the court ultimately grants the estate summary judgment on adverse possession and, upon reargument, adheres to granting Emigrant summary judgment on its cross-claim. The Second Department affirms.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Inform the Decision

Ortiz v Eldert 294, LLC, 223 AD3d 911; X & Y Dev. Group, LLC v Epic Tower, LLC, 196 AD3d 732: These decisions state the summary-judgment burden in RPAPL article 15 quiet-title actions: a movant must show title or that the adverse claim is meritless.
Estate of Becker v Murtagh, 19 NY3d 75: The Court of Appeals articulates the elements of adverse possession post-2008 amendments and clarifies “exclusivity” (acting as an owner: caring for, improving, paying for the property) and “hostility” (conduct adverse to the true owner’s rights).
Vassilakos v Vassilakos, 228 AD3d 701; Myers v Bartholomew, 91 NY2d 630; DeRosa v DeRosa, 58 AD3d 794: These cases apply RPAPL 541’s cotenancy presumption: possession by one cotenant is presumed for the benefit of all, and absent ouster, 20 years of exclusive possession is required before title may be acquired by adverse possession against a cotenant.
Salzberg v Sena, 204 AD3d 853: Reinforces that hostility is satisfied when the possessor asserts a right adverse to that of the true owner.
Ziegler v Serrano, 74 AD3d 1610, and RPAPL 511–512: Recognize adverse possession founded upon a written instrument (color of title), supporting the “claim of right” element.
After-acquired title authorities: Anderson v Pease, 284 AD2d 871, 874; Collins v Tashjian, 124 AD2d 629, 630–631; Village of Tarrytown v Woodland Lakes Estates, 97 AD2d 338; Fries v Clearview Gardens Sixth Corp., 285 App Div 568, 571; 43A NY Jur 2d, Deeds § 230: Stand for the proposition that when a grantor or mortgagor purports to convey or encumber more than they own, any subsequently acquired title automatically inures to the benefit of the grantee or mortgagee.
Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557: Sets the summary-judgment standard that speculative or conclusory assertions cannot defeat a prima facie showing.
Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248; CPLR 5501(a)(1): Establish that a direct appeal from an intermediate order terminates upon entry of final judgment, and the issues are reviewable on appeal from the final judgment.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in two linked steps: first, whether Blair (whose estate is the plaintiff) acquired title by adverse possession; second, whether Emigrant’s mortgage lien extends to the entire premises through after-acquired title once adverse possession ripened.

1) Adverse possession established under RPAPL and RPAPL 541

The elements of adverse possession are: (1) hostile and under a claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; and (5) continuous for at least 10 years (Estate of Becker, 19 NY3d at 81). Where the dispute involves co-ownership or cotenancy interests, RPAPL 541 applies a presumption that the possessor holds for the benefit of other cotenants, and—absent ouster—requires 20 years of continuous exclusive possession (Myers, 91 NY2d at 632).

The court held that Blair satisfied these requirements:

Claim of right and hostility: Blair took under the 1991 deed, a recorded written instrument, which supplied color of title and a reasonable basis to believe she owned the fee (RPAPL 501[3], 511–512; Ziegler). Her acts—mortgaging, paying all carrying costs, renting out space, and making repairs—manifested a claim adverse to any other owner (Salzberg).
Actual, open and notorious possession: Blair resided at the property as her primary residence for over two decades, openly exercising dominion (taxes, maintenance, rent collection) consistent with ownership (Estate of Becker).
Exclusivity: The record showed that Blair alone cared for and improved the property, paid property charges (including the Emigrant mortgage), and exercised owner-like control, satisfying the exclusivity standard (Estate of Becker, 19 NY3d at 83).
Continuity (20-year period under RPAPL 541): Because the heirs framed their interest as a two-thirds remainder (derivative of Rebecca’s will and Dorothea’s intestacy), the court applied RPAPL 541’s 20-year requirement in the cotenancy context. Blair’s unbroken, exclusive, owner-like possession extended well beyond 20 years. No ouster need be proven when the 20-year threshold is met; the extended continuity overcomes RPAPL 541’s presumption that a possessor holds for cotenants.

The court also emphasized Blair’s lack of knowledge about the unprobated will and alternate claims. While adverse possession is ultimately an objective inquiry, New York’s post-2008 definition of “claim of right” focuses on whether there was a reasonable basis for the belief of ownership (RPAPL 501[3]), and the 1991 deed furnished that basis.

2) The mortgage encumbers the whole property via after-acquired title

Having determined that Blair’s adverse possession ripened into fee ownership of the entire property, the court addressed whether Emigrant Bank’s mortgage—granted before title ripened—nevertheless encumbers the whole parcel. The court answered yes, invoking the doctrine of after-acquired title: when a mortgagor purports to encumber an interest she does not yet own, any subsequently acquired title automatically passes to and is bound by the prior encumbrance (Anderson; Collins; Village of Tarrytown; Fries; 43A NY Jur 2d, Deeds § 230).

The same facts that established adverse possession—Blair’s long, exclusive, owner-like dominion under color of title—coupled with after-acquired title, vested Emigrant’s lien as a priority mortgage lien encumbering the entire property. The heirs’ opposition, which consisted of speculative attacks on the 1991 deed and assertions that Blair knew of competing heirs, did not raise triable issues (Zuckerman).

Impact and Implications

This decision is noteworthy for how cleanly it harmonizes adverse possession, the cotenancy presumption, and after-acquired title to stabilize ownership and lending outcomes in the face of old, unperfected testamentary dispositions.

Heirs and unprobated estates: The case underscores the risk of letting testamentary dispositions lie dormant. Failure to probate a will or to assert remainder interests can, over decades, yield to adverse possession, particularly where a possessor openly and continuously behaves as the owner under a recorded instrument and pays all carrying costs.
Cotenancy and the 20-year rule: Where competing claimants are positioned as cotenants or remaindermen, counsel must apply RPAPL 541’s 20-year period (absent ouster), not the baseline 10-year adverse possession period. This longer horizon is dispositive here.
Lenders’ security and title cures: The opinion provides comfort to mortgage lenders: a mortgage granted by a long-term possessor under color of title will attach to the entire fee when the possessor’s adverse possession ripens, even if the chain of title was imperfect when the mortgage was made. This can be especially important in foreclosures where heirs surface late with remainder claims.
Transactions with long-term occupants: Buyers, lenders, and title insurers should evaluate not just the paper chain but also the possessor’s conduct—tax payments, maintenance, occupancy length, and a recorded color-of-title instrument can forecast a successful adverse possession claim and support curative strategies (quiet title actions, declaratory relief, lien confirmation).
Estate administration practice: The opinion is a cautionary tale: unsettled estates and unprobated wills can leave remainder interests vulnerable. Prompt probate, recording of fiduciary deeds, and active stewardship of real property interests are essential.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse possession: A means of becoming the legal owner of land by occupying it like an owner—openly, exclusively, continuously, and without the true owner’s permission—for a defined period. In New York, the baseline period is 10 years, but special rules apply to cotenants (see next bullet).
RPAPL 541 (cotenancy presumption): When people share ownership (tenants in common), a possessor is presumed to possess for everyone’s benefit. To overcome this presumption without a clear “ouster,” a would-be adverse possessor must show 20 years of exclusive possession to cut off a cotenant’s rights.
Ouster: Clear, unequivocal acts by one cotenant denying another cotenant’s rights (e.g., explicit repudiation of the other’s interest) that start the adverse possession clock on a shorter timetable. Absent ouster, the 20-year rule applies.
Claim of right: Under RPAPL 501(3), this means the possessor reasonably believes the property is theirs. A recorded deed, even if it does not convey full title, can supply “color of title” and a reasonable basis for that belief.
Color of title (RPAPL 511–512): Possession under a written instrument (deed, judgment) that purports to convey title. It can extend adverse possession claims beyond the exact area physically used to the boundaries described in the instrument, and it supports the claim-of-right element.
After-acquired title: If a person mortgages or conveys property they do not yet fully own, and later they do acquire it, the newly acquired title automatically passes to the prior mortgagee or grantee. Here, when Blair’s adverse possession ripened into fee ownership, Emigrant’s earlier mortgage became a lien on the entire property.
Quiet title (RPAPL article 15): A lawsuit used to settle who owns real property and to remove clouds or challenges to title.
Summary judgment standards: The moving party must first show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law; the opponent must then produce competent, non-speculative evidence raising a factual dispute warranting trial (Zuckerman).

Conclusion

Walters v. O’Quinn affirms a coherent, practice-oriented rule for long-lived title defects. Where a possessor has, for decades, lived as the owner under color of title—paying taxes and carrying costs, managing tenants, repairing and improving—the law will quiet title in that possessor, even against heirs of a remainder who failed to perfect or protect their claims. In the cotenancy and remainder context, RPAPL 541’s 20-year benchmark governs, and here that period was amply met.

Equally consequential is the court’s clear application of after-acquired title: a mortgage given by a possessor before her adverse possession ripens will encumber the entire property once title matures. For lenders, this decision strengthens confidence in mortgages secured by longstanding possessors under recorded instruments; for heirs and estate fiduciaries, it is a stark reminder to act promptly to probate wills, record interests, and defend remainders.

The Second Department’s opinion thus fortifies the stability of land titles by recognizing open, exclusive, long-term possession and by ensuring that subsequently perfected title carries forward earlier conveyances and encumbrances—grounding equitable outcomes in settled doctrines of adverse possession and after-acquired title.