Adoption of the "Substantial Factor" Standard in Washington State Anti-Discrimination Law

Introduction

The case of Gail L. Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., et al. (127 Wn. 2d 302) adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Washington on July 20, 1995, marks a significant development in the state's anti-discrimination jurisprudence. This case addresses the critical issue of causation standards in employment discrimination claims under Washington's Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 49.60.180(2). The primary parties involved are Gail L. Mackay, the appellant, and Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., along with its president, Robert Anderson, as the respondents.

Summary of the Judgment

Gail L. Mackay, a former salesperson for Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., alleged that her termination was due to gender discrimination, contrary to economic reasons initially stated by the company's president, Robert Anderson. Mackay claimed preferential treatment towards male employees and a hostile work environment based on gender. The trial court instructed the jury to determine if gender was a "determining factor" in her dismissal. The jury ruled in favor of Acorn, leading Mackay to seek a new trial on grounds of improper jury instructions. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the correct causation standard under RCW 49.60.180(2) is whether gender was a "substantial factor" in the termination decision, rather than a "determining factor," and remanded the case for a new trial under this standard.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively analyzes existing precedents to determine the appropriate causation standard:

GLASGOW v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC Corp. (103 Wn.2d 401, 693 P.2d 708): Established the "determining factor" standard for gender discrimination cases under RCW 49.60.180.
WILMOT v. KAISER ALUMINUM Chem. Corp. (118 Wn.2d 46, 821 P.2d 18): Applied the "substantial factor" standard in a retaliation context.
Allison v. Housing Auth. (118 Wn.2d 79, 821 P.2d 34): Rejected the "determining factor" standard in retaliation cases, advocating for "substantial factor."
Additional appellate cases such as Pannell v. Food Servs. of Am., BURNSIDE v. SIMPSON PAPER CO., and LORDS v. NORTHERN AUTOMOTIVE Corp., which varied in their application of "determining factor" and "substantial factor" standards.
Federal precedents including PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS (490 U.S. 228) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which influenced the court's reasoning towards adopting a "substantial factor" standard.

Legal Reasoning

The majority opinion, authored by Justice Dolliver, scrutinized the legislative intent and existing statutory language of RCW 49.60.180(2). The court emphasized that the phrase "because of" in the statute should be interpreted to require that discrimination be a "substantial factor" in employment decisions, aligning with modern understandings of causation in employment law. Justice Dolliver argued that adopting the "determining factor" standard would impose an excessively high burden of proof on plaintiffs, potentially undermining the statute's purpose to deter discrimination. Referencing prior cases, the court reasoned that "substantial factor" allows for a more flexible and fair assessment of discriminatory motives, especially in complex employment environments where multiple factors may influence decisions.

Impact

The adoption of the "substantial factor" standard fundamentally alters the landscape of employment discrimination litigation in Washington State. This shift lowers the threshold for plaintiffs to succeed in discrimination claims, enabling more robust enforcement of anti-discrimination protections. Employers must now be more vigilant in ensuring that their employment decisions are free from discriminatory influences, even if such influences are not the sole reason for the decision. The "substantial factor" standard aligns Washington's approach with evolving federal standards, particularly following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, fostering greater consistency between state and federal anti-discrimination laws.

Complex Concepts Simplified

            Determining Factor: A causation standard where the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory reason was the sole reason for the adverse employment decision. If there are other legitimate reasons, the plaintiff cannot prevail.
        

            Substantial Factor: A more flexible causation standard where the plaintiff needs to demonstrate that discrimination was a significant or meaningful aspect influencing the employment decision, even if other factors were also involved.
        

            RCW 49.60.180(2): A provision in Washington State law that makes it unlawful for employers to discharge or bar any person from employment based on specific protected characteristics, including sex, race, and others.
        

            Multiple Causation: Situations where more than one factor contributes to an outcome, making it challenging to isolate a single cause.
        

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Washington's decision in Gail L. Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc. underscores a pivotal shift from a stringent "determining factor" standard to a more accommodating "substantial factor" standard in employment discrimination cases under RCW 49.60.180(2). This transition not only enhances the protective framework for employees facing discrimination but also aligns state law with contemporary federal standards. The ruling obligates employers to maintain fair employment practices diligently and ensures that discriminatory motives can be effectively challenged even amidst multiple influencing factors. As a result, this judgment fortifies the state's commitment to eradicating discrimination in the workplace, fostering a more equitable and just employment environment.