Admonitions Cure and Mistrial as an Extreme Remedy: Kentucky Supreme Court Reaffirms High Bar and Wide Latitude in Closing Argument in Stone v. Commonwealth (Unpublished)

Case: Lee Stone v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

Date: October 23, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed

Designation: Not to be published (RAP 40(D))

Introduction

This memorandum opinion arises from a Henderson County prosecution in which Lee Stone was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses stemming from a July 13, 2023 sequence of events involving the theft of a running vehicle with a dog inside, a subsequent crash injuring another motorist, the theft of a Good Samaritan’s car at the crash scene, flight, and the discovery of cannabis and paraphernalia. The jury convicted Stone of two counts of theft by unlawful taking (TBUT) over $1,000, one count of TBUT under $500, fourth-degree assault, leaving the scene of an accident, possession of cannabis and drug paraphernalia, and found him to be a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO-1). The circuit court imposed a twenty-year sentence.

On appeal as a matter of right, Stone challenged the trial court’s denial of multiple mistrial motions. The motions were based on two categories of alleged error: (1) “inflammatory” statements by eyewitness Kirstie Burden during her testimony; and (2) prosecutorial misconduct in the Commonwealth’s closing argument. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Though unpublished and nonbinding, the opinion is instructive on the continued vitality of several familiar Kentucky trial-management principles: mistrial as an “extreme remedy”; the strong presumption that prompt admonitions cure error; the need to request admonitions to preserve relief; and the “wide latitude” afforded counsel in closing arguments, including the use of reasonable inferences and rhetorical flourishes that are not “flagrant.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Stone’s mistrial motions.

Witness statements: One challenged remark (speculation that Stone might have had “a warrant, drugs, or something”) was immediately cured by a sua sponte admonition; the other (that Burden’s children “any other day” could have been in the car) was not objected to with a request for an admonition and was not deemed highly prejudicial. Under Kentucky law, such admonitions typically cure any prejudice, and the failure to request one weighs against mistrial.
Closing argument: Of four challenged statements, two drew immediate admonitions from the court (“absurd” description of defense arguments and reference to potential punishment), curing any error. The other two—an inference about Stone’s plan to ditch the Good Samaritan’s car and a “Grand Theft Auto” analogy—were within the “wide latitude” accorded counsel and not “flagrant” misconduct, especially in light of strong evidence of guilt.

Given the isolated nature of the remarks, the trial court’s curative admonitions where appropriate, the absence of requests for admonitions in other instances, and the strength of the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that no mistrial was required and affirmed the convictions and sentence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Commonwealth v. Padgett, 563 S.W.3d 639 (Ky. 2018): Reiterates that mistrial is an “extreme remedy” reserved for “fundamental defects” causing prejudice so acute that a fair trial cannot continue; admonitions are meant to cure prejudice rather than punish counsel, and can obviate mistrial.
Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2016): Admonitions are deemed to cure error; contemporaneous objection is required for reversal based on misconduct; mistrial may be appropriate only if an admonition likely cannot be followed and the evidence is devastating, or if an inflammatory/hyper-prejudicial question lacks factual basis.
Price v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2001): An admonition to disregard improper comments generally cures error.
Graves v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. 2000): Where an admonition could easily cure any prejudice, failure to request an admonition undermines claims of error and the need for mistrial.
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2017): Defines prosecutorial misconduct as attempts to persuade a jury to wrongly convict or impose unjustified punishment; nevertheless, Kentucky affords counsel wide latitude in closing argument.
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2006): Confirms wide latitude in closing arguments to draw inferences from the evidence and to argue forcefully.
Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509 (Ky. 2010), superseded in part by KRS 503.055, 503.050(4): Establishes the two-step misconduct analysis: determine whether misconduct occurred and, if so, whether it was “flagrant” under four factors (likelihood to mislead/prejudice, isolated vs. extensive, deliberate vs. accidental, strength of evidence). If not flagrant, reversal requires three conjunctive conditions: proof not overwhelming, contemporaneous objection made, and insufficient curative admonition. Although Hannah is superseded on self-defense burdens, its misconduct framework remains used.
Wallace v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.3d 291 (Ky. 2015): Confirms preservation through timely objections/motions (including motions for mistrial).
Maupin v. Commonwealth, 101 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1937): Addresses the court’s discretion whether to admonish the jury; failure to admonish is ordinarily not reversible absent a request.
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987): Prosecutorial remarks that do not affect the outcome do not warrant reversal.

Legal Reasoning

Standard of review. Denial of a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A mistrial is not a disciplinary device; its function is to cure irremediable prejudice. The question is whether there was a “fundamental defect” such that the trial could not continue fairly or be cured by less drastic means, chiefly an admonition.

Witness Burden’s statements.

“Warrant, drugs, or something” speculation: The trial court sustained Stone’s objection, denied mistrial, and sua sponte admonished the jury to disregard the comment. Under Padgett, Dickerson, and Price, such an admonition is presumed to cure prejudice. Nothing suggested the jury could not or did not follow it. No abuse of discretion.
“Any other day my kids would have been in the back seat” remark: The court overruled the objection, denied mistrial, and issued no admonition. Stone never requested an admonition. The Court held the remark was not inflammatory or highly prejudicial; it reflected the witness’s routine and concern. Under Graves and Maupin, the absence of a requested admonition—and the availability of an admonition to cure any slight prejudice—undercut the mistrial claim. No abuse of discretion.

Prosecutorial misconduct allegations during closing argument.

Calling defense arguments “the most absurd thing you have ever heard”: The court sustained the objection, denied mistrial, and sua sponte admonished the jury to disregard the remark. The isolated comment was cured by the admonition; it was not shown to be flagrant or outcome-determinative.
Reference to possible punishment for fourth-degree assault (“as little as a fine”): The court admonished the jury to disregard discussion of punishment during the guilt phase and the prosecutor immediately rephrased to address the elements rather than penalty. The admonition cured the error. The Court again emphasized that isolated lapses promptly corrected do not justify mistrial.
Inference that Stone planned to ditch Burden’s car: The court overruled the objection, finding the comment a direct and reasonable inference from evidence that Stone took Burden’s car, abandoned it quickly, and fled on foot. No admonition was requested. Kentucky allows reasonable inferences in closing; this was neither unsupported by the record nor highly prejudicial.
“Grand Theft Auto” analogy: The court overruled the objection that it was a “send a message” argument. The Supreme Court characterized the analogy as hyperbole aimed at countering the defense theme that Stone “simply made poor choices,” and found no flagrant misconduct. The statement did not exhort the jury to convict to send a broader societal message; it dramatized the sequence of theft, crash, and flight in a pop-culture shorthand. No admonition was requested.

Flagrancy and overall fairness. Applying Hannah’s flagrancy factors, the Court found no flagrant misconduct. The challenged remarks were isolated, not extensive; two were promptly cured by admonitions; there was no showing of deliberateness to mislead; and the evidence of guilt was strong (surveillance video of the initial theft, eyewitness testimony to the crash and theft of the Good Samaritan’s car, immediate flight and apprehension, and physical evidence). The jury’s choice of fourth-degree rather than second-degree assault further undercut any claim of undue prejudice in the guilt phase. In the totality, the trial was fair; mistrial was unwarranted.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although designated “Not to be Published,” the opinion offers clear, practical guidance that fits comfortably within Kentucky’s established mistrial and prosecutorial-misconduct jurisprudence:

Admonitions remain the default cure. Kentucky courts continue to presume juries heed admonitions; prompt curative instructions will normally obviate mistrial, even when a comment strays into improper territory (e.g., punishment during the guilt phase or ad hominem characterizations of defense argument).
Preservation matters. Defense counsel must not only object but also request an admonition when one could cure the harm. Absent such a request, claims on appeal face steep odds unless the error is truly “flagrant.”
Closing argument latitude is wide. Prosecutors and defense counsel may use reasonable inferences and rhetorical devices—including pop-culture analogies—so long as they remain tethered to the evidence, do not misstate the law, and do not cross into “send a message” exhortations or other forbidden appeals. Hyperbole, without more, is not necessarily misconduct.
Mistrial remains an “extreme remedy.” Trial judges should reserve it for situations where prejudice is so severe that an admonition cannot realistically cure it. This opinion reinforces trial-court discretion in choosing admonitions over mistrial.
Strength of the evidence influences the analysis. Where the record strongly supports guilt, isolated and cured improprieties are unlikely to warrant reversal, especially where the jury’s verdict shows measured consideration (here, conviction of the lesser assault degree).
Persuasive, not binding. Under RAP 40(D), the opinion cannot be cited as binding precedent, but parties may cite it for consideration where no published opinion adequately addresses the issue, provided they append the full decision. It therefore contributes persuasive weight to the “admonitions cure” and “wide latitude” lines of cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mistrial: Stopping the trial midstream due to an error so serious that the jury cannot fairly continue. It is a last resort.
Abuse of discretion: A standard of appellate review asking whether the trial court’s decision was unreasonable or based on wrong legal principles. It is highly deferential to the trial judge.
Admonition: A judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard a particular statement or piece of evidence. Kentucky law presumes juries follow these instructions, which usually cures harm.
Prosecutorial misconduct: Behavior by a prosecutor aimed at obtaining a wrongful conviction or unjust punishment. Not every misstep is misconduct; context and effect matter.
Flagrant misconduct: Particularly serious misconduct judged under four factors (potential to mislead or prejudice, scope, deliberateness, and strength of the evidence). If not flagrant, reversal requires additional showings (weak evidence, objection, and insufficient admonition).
TBUT: Theft by unlawful taking—stealing property without permission. The value distinguishes the grading of the offense.
PFO-1: Persistent Felony Offender in the first degree—an enhancement based on prior felonies that can increase the penalty for a new conviction.
“Not to be published” (RAP 40(D)): The decision is not binding precedent and ordinarily should not be cited, except in limited circumstances when no published case adequately addresses the issue and the citing party provides the full opinion to the court and all parties.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Lee Stone’s convictions and twenty-year sentence, holding that the Henderson Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying mistrial. The opinion crystallizes four durable points of Kentucky law and practice: mistrial is an extreme remedy; prompt admonitions generally cure error; counsel must preserve claims by requesting admonitions where they can cure; and closing argument enjoys wide latitude for reasonable inferences and nonflagrant rhetoric. Even though unpublished, Stone reinforces the practical playbook for Kentucky trial courts and litigants: object promptly, request curative admonitions, and reserve mistrial for the truly incurable trial defect.