Admissibility of Contemporaneous Carjacking Evidence to Prove Specific Intent Under Rule 404(b): United States v. Glenn Miller

Introduction

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Glenn Miller (No. 24-5586, Mar. 19, 2025) addressed when evidence of a separate carjacking and shooting—occurring minutes and blocks away—may be admitted at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove the specific-intent element of a prior carjacking charge. The defendant, Glenn Miller, was convicted of (1) carjacking a Chevrolet HHR under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) and (2) using a firearm in relation to that carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Miller contended that the district court erred by admitting evidence of a subsequent Hyundai Sonata carjacking and shooting (the “Maplewood Carjacking”) in violation of Rule 404(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, clarifying the careful balancing required when admitting contemporaneous “other‐acts” evidence to prove intent.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit held:

The district court properly applied the three-step test for Rule 404(b): (1) presence of sufficient evidence that the other act occurred (Miller’s guilty plea to the Maplewood Carjacking); (2) proof that the act was offered for an admissible purpose—here, to establish Miller’s specific intent to commit violence in the HHR carjacking; and (3) balancing probative value against unfair prejudice, aided by a limiting instruction and sanitized testimony.
Evidence that Miller brandished loaded firearms and shot a victim in the subsequent carjacking was highly probative of his intent to kill or seriously harm Becton during the charged HHR carjacking.
Limiting instructions and controlled presentation of Phillips’s testimony sufficiently mitigated any risk of the jury drawing improper character inferences.
The convictions for Counts 1 and 2 were therefore affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Rule 404(b): The bedrock principle that “other-acts” evidence is inadmissible to prove character but may be admitted for purposes such as intent, motive, or knowledge.
United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2008): Establishes that § 2119’s “specific intent” element can be proven by brandishing-plus evidence—either direct proof that a firearm was loaded or circumstantial evidence showing a willingness to kill or harm if the victim resisted.
United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013): Clarifies that brandishing alone is insufficient; there must be “brandishing-plus.”
United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 962 (6th Cir. 2013): Illustrates how circumstantial evidence of intent (a loaded weapon, threats, physical touching) satisfies § 2119’s intent element.
United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2012): Warns against admitting temporal-and-factual-distant bad-acts evidence when it risks proving propensity rather than intent.
United States v. Carter, 779 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2015): Discusses the standard of review for Rule 404(b) rulings without fully resolving an intra-circuit split.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit applied the three-step Rule 404(b) framework:

Occurrence of the Other Act. Miller’s guilty plea to the Maplewood Carjacking satisfied the requirement that there be sufficient evidence the act actually occurred—no clear-error challenge was raised.
Proper Purpose & Materiality. The government offered the Maplewood Carjacking evidence to prove Miller’s specific intent to cause death or serious bodily harm when he carjacked Becton. § 2119 requires proof beyond an “empty threat,” and precedent allows intent to be shown by evidence a brandished gun was loaded or that the defendant used it against another victim contemporaneously.
Probative Value vs. Unfair Prejudice. The circuit found the evidence highly probative—photographs of shell casings, recovered guns, and Phillips’s eyewitness testimony strongly suggested the weapons were loaded during the HHR carjacking. Any risk of unfair prejudice was minimized by (a) a limiting instruction restricting the jury’s use of the evidence to intent, and (b) sanitizing the shooting victim’s testimony to avoid inflammatory detail.

The court distinguished Clay—where the prior bad act occurred years earlier and was of a different nature—emphasizing the close temporal and geographic nexus here, which made the Maplewood Carjacking especially relevant to intent. The panel concluded that admission was proper and within the district court’s broad discretion.

Impact

This decision sharpens guidance on admitting contemporaneous “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b) in federal carjacking cases. Key takeaways for practitioners:

Evidence of a near-in-time, similar offense involving loaded firearms can be a powerful, admissible means of satisfying the specific-intent element of § 2119.
Defense counsel should emphasize temporal, factual, and logical distance when challenging admission of other-acts evidence.
District courts must carefully craft limiting instructions and sanitize testimony to guard against impermissible character inference or jury passion.
Appellate courts will defer to such rulings unless the trial record establishes clear error in fact finding, application of the law, or balancing prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 404(b). Generally bars other-acts evidence to prove character, but allows it for specific purposes like intent or knowledge.
Specific Intent in Carjacking (§ 2119). The government must show the defendant intended to kill or cause serious harm if the victim resisted. Mere brandishing isn’t enough; the firearm must have been loaded or there must be other strong clues to deadly intent.
Brandishing-Plus. Circumstantial or direct evidence—e.g., threats, loaded weapon, shooting another victim—that closes the gap between a mere threat and real intent to harm.
Probative vs. Prejudicial. Probative value measures how strongly evidence tends to prove something important; unfair prejudice measures the risk the jury will decide based on emotion or character judgment rather than the charged facts. Limiting instructions can reduce that risk.

Conclusion

United States v. Glenn Miller reaffirms that closely timed, factually similar prior acts involving loaded firearms may be admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove the specific intent element of federal carjacking. The Sixth Circuit’s careful endorsement of limiting instructions and sanitized testimony underscores the judiciary’s commitment to fair trials: admitting only genuinely probative evidence while minimizing the risk of jury passion or improper character inference. This decision will guide federal courts and litigants in balancing probative value against unfair prejudice whenever evidence of contemporaneous misconduct is offered to establish intent in violent‐crime prosecutions.