Administrative License Suspension Hearings: Non-Jurisdictional Nature of Statutory Time Limits and Prejudice Requirement

Introduction

The case of Kyla Bernard-Nichols v. Director, New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles presents a challenge to the administrative suspension (ALS) process under New Hampshire’s DUI statutes. On January 1, 2023, Ms. Bernard-Nichols was arrested for driving under the influence. She refused to submit to a blood test and declined to sign the ALS form. Pursuant to RSA 265-A:30, her license was suspended effective January 31, 2023. She timely requested an ALS hearing, but the arresting officer’s report and the hearing itself were delayed beyond the statutory deadlines. The Superior Court upheld the DMV’s suspension, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed on April 16, 2025.

The key issues are:

Whether the 20-day statutory deadline to hold an ALS hearing is jurisdictional (i.e., mandatory) or directory.
Whether a failure to meet that deadline deprives the DMV of power to suspend a license.
Whether a showing of actual prejudice is required when statutory hearing deadlines are missed.

The plaintiff invokes due process under the New Hampshire Constitution, arguing that the missed deadlines deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to contest the suspension.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that:

The 20-day time limit to hold an ALS hearing under RSA 265-A:31, I(c) is directory, not jurisdictional, because it serves to expedite adjudication rather than to protect a fundamental liberty interest.
Driver’s license suspensions implicate a protected property interest, not a fundamental liberty interest.
In the absence of an express enforcement mechanism for the hearing deadline, a missed deadline does not void the DMV’s jurisdiction to suspend; relief is available only upon a showing of actual prejudice.
The plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice beyond the temporary loss of her license; she made no showing that delay undermined her ability to defend at the hearing.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision upholding the administrative suspension.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Kerouac v. Dir., N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles (158 N.H. 353 (2009)): Established that “shall” is generally mandatory, but in the absence of an enforcement mechanism and when deadlines serve administrative efficiency, deadlines may be treated as directory.
McCarthy v. Wheeler (152 N.H. 643 (2005)): Held that missed deadlines in domestic violence protective orders were jurisdictional because such orders restrain fundamental liberty interests.
State v. Fournier (158 N.H. 441 (2009)): Found that missed statutory time limits in involuntary commitment proceedings deprived the court of personal jurisdiction, protecting a significant liberty interest.
In re Russell C. (120 N.H. 260 (1980)): Deemed juvenile adjudication time limits jurisdictional as they codify speedy-trial and due process rights for minors, implicating liberty interests.
State v. Cassady (140 N.H. 46 (1995)): Described the ALS process’s primary goal—to remove dangerous drivers promptly—and its informality and due process function.
Daneault v. Clarke (113 N.H. 481 (1973)) and Mackey v. Montrym (443 U.S. 1 (1979)): Confirmed that post-suspension hearings satisfy due process for property interests in driver’s licenses.
Smith v. N.H. Bd. of Psychologists and In re N.T. (175 N.H. 300 (2022)): Supported requiring proof of prejudice when mandatory deadlines lack express enforcement provisions.

The Court contrasts these cases to distinguish between deadlines intended to protect fundamental liberty interests (treated as jurisdictional) and those designed to improve administrative efficiency (treated as directory with prejudice requirement).

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a three-step analysis:

Nature of the Interest: Suspension of a driver’s license is a deprivation of a property interest, not a fundamental liberty interest.
Legislative Purpose of the Time Limit: RSA 265-A:31’s 20-day hearing deadline aims to expedite dispositions (protect the public) rather than safeguard personal liberty.
Enforcement Mechanism and Prejudice Requirement: The statute contains no explicit remedy for missing the deadline. Under New Hampshire precedent, directory deadlines lacking enforcement provisions require a showing of actual prejudice.

Because the ALS hearing deadline is directory, the DMV did not lose jurisdiction by scheduling the hearing nine days late. The plaintiff’s only asserted prejudice was temporary license loss—a consequence inherent in the statutory framework and insufficient, absent any impairment of her defense.

3. Impact

This ruling clarifies administrative procedure in New Hampshire:

It endorses a functional approach to deadlines—distinguishing those designed to protect property interests from those mandated to protect liberty interests.
It confirms that missed statutory deadlines in administrative contexts do not automatically void proceedings; claimants must show actual prejudice unless the statute provides otherwise.
It reinforces that due process for driver’s license suspensions is satisfied by prompt post-suspension hearings when pre-deprivation hearings are impracticable.

Future litigants and agencies will look to this decision when deadlines are missed in other administrative or quasi-judicial processes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jurisdictional vs. Directory Deadlines: A jurisdictional deadline deprives a tribunal of authority if missed; a directory deadline breaches procedural rules but does not strip authority if no statutory remedy is provided.
Property vs. Liberty Interests: Property interests (e.g., driving privileges) entail fair process but allow post-deprivation hearings. Liberty interests (e.g., freedom from confinement) demand stricter, jurisdictional timing safeguards.
Prejudice Requirement: When a statute lacks an express penalty for missing a deadline, courts require a showing that the delay caused actual harm to the claimant’s ability to present their case.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire’s decision in Kyla Bernard-Nichols v. Director, DMV establishes that statutory time limits for administrative license suspension hearings are directory rather than jurisdictional when they serve to expedite adjudication of a property interest. In the absence of an express enforcement mechanism, an aggrieved party must demonstrate actual prejudice from a hearing delay. This framework balances administrative efficiency with fundamental fairness and clarifies due process expectations for license holders and regulatory agencies alike.