Adjudication Before Modification: In re P.K. and the Limits of “Material Change of Circumstances” in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Law

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in In re P.K., No. 23‑729 (Nov. 5, 2025), is a significant clarification of the procedural safeguards governing abuse and neglect proceedings—especially where the State seeks to alter an existing dispositional order or terminate the custodial rights of a non-parent caregiver such as a grandparent.

Justice Trump, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated an order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County that had terminated the paternal grandmother’s legal and physical custodial rights to the child, P.K., without first adjudicating newly alleged abuse and neglect. The Court held that:

• New, unadjudicated allegations of abuse or neglect cannot be treated as a “material change of circumstances” to justify modification of a prior dispositional order under Rule 46 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑606(a); and
• Such new allegations must instead be pled in a verified petition or amended petition and adjudicated under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601 before any dispositional remedy, including termination of custodial rights, may be imposed.

In doing so, the Court reinforces the two‑stage structure (adjudication followed by disposition) as a due process safeguard, clarifies the proper use of Rule 19(b) amended petitions after disposition, and warns circuit courts and the Department of Human Services (DHS) against “short‑cutting” the adjudicatory phase through modification motions.

A. Parties and Posture

• Petitioner: P.K.’s paternal grandmother (hereafter “Grandmother”), the child’s legal and physical custodian at the time of the challenged order.
• Respondent: West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS).
• Child: P.K., whose parents’ parental rights and whose aunt’s legal guardianship had already been terminated in earlier phases of the case.
• Other participants: Guardian ad litem (GAL) for the child; maternal grandfather as later placement for P.K. and her half-siblings.

The central question was procedural: could the circuit court terminate Grandmother’s custodial rights based solely on a “dispositional” hearing grounded in new allegations that had never been the subject of an adjudicatory ruling?

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Initial petition (November 2021)
   An abuse and neglect petition was filed naming several respondents: P.K.’s parents, her paternal aunt/guardian, Grandmother, and P.K.’s great‑grandmother. As to Grandmother, the State alleged:
   • “Deplorable” and unsafe living conditions (holes in porch, broken windows, garbage, lack of running water, inadequate food, refuse and human waste).
   • Unfitness of Grandmother’s and great‑grandmother’s homes as residences for P.K.
   P.K. was removed from Grandmother’s home and placed in DHS custody. Grandmother waived the preliminary hearing, later stipulated to abuse/neglect based on the deplorable conditions, and was granted a post‑adjudicatory improvement period.
2. Improvement and reunification (2022–January 2023)
   A family case plan was executed in April 2022. P.K. was physically placed with Grandmother, and a June 2022 order noted P.K. was “doing well” in that placement. The case later expanded to include P.K.’s two half‑siblings via amended petitions, but in January 2023 the GAL, MDT, CASA, and DHS reported that P.K. had been successfully reunified with Grandmother and that P.K. and Grandmother should be dismissed from the proceedings. The circuit court did so, effectively making Grandmother the child’s permanent legal and physical custodian. No written dismissal order appears in the record, but the oral ruling stands undisputed.
3. DHS motion to modify disposition (May 2023)
   After reunification and dismissal, DHS filed a Rule 46 motion to modify the January 2023 disposition, alleging post‑reunification issues:
   • Grandmother allowed contact between P.K. and her biological father (J.K.), whose parental rights had long been terminated.
   • J.K. and his girlfriend were allegedly living in Grandmother’s home and J.K. was dropping P.K. off at school.
   • A registered sex offender (J.T.M.) was present in the home, and the school bus was directed to pick up/drop off the child at the home of another registered sex offender (H.H.).
   • Grandmother failed to address P.K.’s serious vision problems (inability to see apps at school, headaches, apparent strabismus).
   DHS asked the court to find a “material change of circumstances” and modify placement.
4. Third amended petition (June 2023)
   When the circuit court did not promptly act on the modification motion, DHS filed a third amended petition that:
   • Re‑pleaded the same issues as in the Rule 46 motion in more detail; and
   • Added further allegations: frequent school absences; lack of reliable transportation; P.K. sleeping on a mattress in the kitchen; eviction and unstable housing; Grandmother not being paid at work; and an unexplained move to Ohio.
   DHS sought emergency removal, which the court granted on June 21, 2023, placing P.K. with her maternal grandfather. The record reflects no preliminary hearing following emergency custody, contrary to Rule 22’s mandate.
5. “Evidentiary dispositional hearing” and termination (September 2023)
   After procedural steps on visitation and review, the court held what it described as an “evidentiary dispositional hearing” on September 6, 2023. CPS worker Hillary Sowards and the GAL testified; Grandmother did not testify or present evidence.
   
   In its September 19, 2023 order, the court:
   • Declared that at the time of both the initial petition and the third amended petition, P.K. was an abused and neglected child and Grandmother “an abusive and neglectful custodian” based on a host of conditions (failure to address medical needs, exposure to sex offenders and terminated parents, educational neglect, unstable housing, drug‑related environment, etc.).
   • Terminated Grandmother’s legal and physical custodial rights under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), and barred all contact and visitation.
   • Simultaneously invoked Rule 46 and § 49‑4‑606(a), finding by clear and convincing evidence both a “material change of circumstances” and that modification (i.e., termination) was in P.K.’s best interests.
   Later orders attempted to recast the September 6 hearing as a combined “adjudicatory and dispositional” proceeding.
6. Post‑judgment motion and appeal
   Grandmother moved for reconsideration, arguing that the September 6 hearing should have been a reopened adjudicatory hearing under Rule 19(b) based on the new allegations in the third amended petition, and that she had not consented to an accelerated combined adjudicatory/dispositional hearing under Rule 32. The circuit court denied reconsideration, and Grandmother appealed.

B. Holding and Disposition

The Supreme Court:

• Vacated the order terminating Grandmother’s legal and physical custodial rights.
• Remanded with directions to conduct proceedings consistent with the statutory and rule‑based procedures for abuse and neglect cases, including:
  • Proper adjudication of the allegations in the third amended petition; and
  • Compliance with requirements for preliminary hearings, case plans, and any accelerated disposition.

The key new rule is stated in Syllabus Point 3:

Allegations of abuse and neglect for which a respondent has not been previously adjudicated do not constitute a material change of circumstances for purposes of modification of a dispositional order under Rule 46 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(a). Such allegations must be pleaded in a verified petition or, pursuant to Rule 19 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, a verified amended petition, and adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601, et seq.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standard of review and deference to circuit courts

The Court reiterates the familiar mixed standard of review from In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), which itself quoted In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996):

• Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
• Findings of fact in bench‑tried abuse and neglect proceedings are reviewed for clear error and will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

However, the central errors here were procedural and legal rather than factual, so the Court’s review was largely de novo.

2. Adjudication as a prerequisite to disposition

Relying on Syllabus Point 1 of State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), the Court reiterates a bedrock rule:

In a child abuse and neglect hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives under W. Va. Code, 49‑6‑5 [now § 49‑4‑604], it must hold a hearing under W. Va. Code, 49‑6‑2 [now § 49‑4‑601], and determine “whether such child is abused or neglected.” Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case.

This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed:

• In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023) – without properly made findings of abuse/neglect at adjudication, a case cannot proceed to disposition.
• In re A.G., 247 W. Va. 249, 878 S.E.2d 744 (2022) – disposition and termination are unlawful absent a prior adjudicatory hearing.
• In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 827 S.E.2d 830 (2019) – the two‑stage process is essential to the due process protections of parents in permanent removal cases.

In re P.K. applies these principles to a scenario involving a non‑parent custodian and a post‑reunification petition, underscoring that any respondent facing termination of custodial rights is entitled to an adjudication on the specific allegations underpinning that termination.

3. Procedural integrity and the Edward B. doctrine

The Court again invokes Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001), which it quotes and re‑adopts in Syllabus Point 4 of In re P.K.:

Where it appears from the record that the process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the disposition of cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting order of disposition will be vacated and the case remanded for compliance with that process and entry of an appropriate dispositional order.

In re P.K. finds exactly such substantial deviation: no preliminary hearing following emergency removal, no reopened adjudicatory hearing on new allegations, no compliance with Rule 32 for an accelerated disposition, and apparent reliance on remote historical misconduct instead of conditions at the time of the new petition.

4. Rule 19(b) and amended petitions after disposition: In re M.E.

DHS argued that Rule 19(b) does not permit amended petitions after disposition and that a entirely new petition would be required. The Court rejected this narrow reading, relying on its prior interpretation in In re M.E., No. 16‑0006, 2016 WL 3463474 (W. Va. June 21, 2016) (memorandum decision).

In M.E., the original petition had been dismissed after the children returned to the petitioner’s home. New allegations later arose, and DHS filed an amended petition in the same action. This Court approved that approach, emphasizing “liberal amendment in the interest of the children’s best interest” and upholding the circuit court’s decision to reopen adjudication under Rule 19(b).

Here, the Court applies M.E. to hold that:

• Rule 19(b)’s language (“If new allegations arise after the final adjudicatory hearing…”) is not cut off by the entry of an earlier disposition; and
• Especially where a case is still active as to other children (such as P.K.’s half‑siblings), amended petitions are an appropriate vehicle for new allegations against previously dismissed respondents, with adjudicatory hearings reopened accordingly.

5. Accelerated disposition and Rule 32: In re Travis W. and In re J.M.

The circuit court and GAL suggested that the September 6 hearing effectively functioned as both adjudication and disposition. The Supreme Court examines this through the lens of Rule 32 and Syllabus Point 3 of In re Travis W., 206 W. Va. 478, 525 S.E.2d 669 (1999), which permits accelerated disposition immediately following adjudication only if:

1. All parties agree to the accelerated format;
2. An adequate case plan meeting statutory requirements is provided or expressly waived; and
3. Notice of the disposition hearing is given or waived.

The Court finds:

• No evidence that Grandmother agreed to a combined adjudicatory/dispositional hearing.
• No record of a completed case plan being submitted or waived.
• No notice that the hearing would serve as a termination‑level disposition.

As in In re J.M., No. 13‑0439, 2013 WL 5475864 (W. Va. Oct. 1, 2013) (memorandum decision)—where a combined hearing was vacated for failure to satisfy Rule 32—the Court vacates the termination in In re P.K. and remands for proper separate or properly‑agreed combined hearings.

6. Modification of disposition and “material change of circumstances”: D.G., E.S., A.M., H.P.

The heart of the new rule in Syllabus Point 3 is the Court’s careful distinction between:

• “Material change of circumstances” relevant to modification of a disposition order under Rule 46 and § 49‑4‑606(a); and
• Brand‑new allegations of abuse/neglect that have never been adjudicated.

To illustrate the proper scope of “material change,” the Court discusses four prior cases where modification and termination were upheld:

1. In re D.G., No. 22‑767, 2023 WL 6144639 (W. Va. Sept. 20, 2023)
   The mother had been adjudicated neglectful based on substance abuse, domestic violence, and volatile behavior. She retained parental rights but lost physical placement under § 49‑4‑604(c)(5). The dispositional order explicitly conditioned future modification on proof of treatment and long‑term sobriety.
   
   The subsequent modification was based on:
   • Leaving treatment early;
   • Incarceration; and
   • Threatening and yelling at the kinship relatives caring for the child; plus
   • Non‑participation in the case.
   The Court characterized these as a worsening of already adjudicated conditions—classic “material change” justifying modification and ultimate termination.
2. In re E.S., No. 16‑0821, 2017 WL 678881 (W. Va. Feb. 21, 2017)
   The noncustodial mother’s rights were initially left intact to allow services to address substance abuse, depression, and housing issues. She was warned that permanency needs could require a more drastic disposition later. When she failed to achieve mental health treatment and stable housing, the Court deemed that failure a material change that justified modification and termination in the child’s best interests.
3. In re A.M., No. 20‑0180, 2020 WL 5652426 (W. Va. Sept. 23, 2020)
   The mother killed the father in the child’s presence, and disposition under § 49‑4‑604(c)(5) kept her rights intact while the child lived elsewhere. Her subsequent 15‑year prison sentence, making reunification impossible before the child reached adulthood, and the child’s bond with the foster family, constituted a material change. The Court allowed modification and termination to permit adoption.
4. In re H.P., No. 18‑1117, 2019 WL 2452768 (W. Va. June 12, 2019)
   The mother had been adjudicated neglectful due to domestic violence and emotional abuse (screaming in the child’s face, name‑calling) with her boyfriend. Her disposition permitted gradual reunification but explicitly warned that continuing the relationship with the boyfriend—whose rights were later terminated—could endanger reunification.
   
   When DHS discovered that the boyfriend was still living in her home, the Court held that her continued relationship with him:
   • “Jeopardized the safety and security of the children,” and
   • Constituted a material change justifying modification and termination.

In each case:

• The underlying issues had already been adjudicated (substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal conduct, or dangerous partner); and
• The “change” was a deterioration, persistence, or practical escalation of those same issues after disposition.

By contrast, in In re P.K.:

• The initial adjudication concerned only deplorable home conditions at a specific point in time.
• The later allegations—failure to treat medical needs, exposing P.K. to registered sex offenders, renewed contact with terminated parents, educational neglect, post‑reunification instability—were never adjudicated as abuse/neglect as to Grandmother.

Thus, treating these new allegations as a “material change of circumstances” for modification under Rule 46 and § 49‑4‑606(a) would allow DHS and the circuit court to leapfrog the required adjudication stage and terminate custodial rights on untried allegations—precisely what the Court rejects.

On this basis, the Court formulates the new, general rule in Syllabus Point 3: unadjudicated abuse/neglect allegations cannot qualify as a “material change” for modification; they must be formally pled and adjudicated under § 49‑4‑601 et seq.

7. Conditions at the time of the petition: In re C.S., In re I.J., In re K.S.

The Court notes an additional error: the circuit court’s apparent reliance on:

• Grandmother’s 2011 and 2017 drug‑related arrests and incarcerations (before P.K.’s birth and long before reunification in January 2023); and
• Failed drug and alcohol screens from 2022 prior to successful reunification and dismissal from the original proceeding.

Citing W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601(i) and Syllabus Point 8 of In re C.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022), the Court reiterates that a finding that a child is abused/neglected must be based on “conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and neglect petition.”

In addition, relying on In re I.J., No. 23‑353, 2024 WL 4789972 (W. Va. Nov. 14, 2024) (memorandum decision), and In re K.S., 246 W. Va. 517, 874 S.E.2d 319 (2022), the Court warns that remote evidence not “seasonable as remote in time” is not appropriate to support adjudication. On remand, the circuit court must focus on conditions around the third amended petition, not historical misconduct that had been addressed through prior proceedings and reunification.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Due process and the two‑stage structure

The Court’s reasoning is grounded in constitutional due process. Citing In re A.P.-1, the Court emphasizes that the bifurcated structure—adjudication followed by disposition—is not mere formality:

“[O]ur insistence on procedural integrity . . . is not hollow formality.”

By insisting on:

• A verified petition or amended petition; and
• A full adjudicatory hearing with notice and opportunity to be heard;

before any termination or substantial limitation of custodial rights, the Court protects:

• The respondent’s liberty interest in family integrity; and
• The child’s interest in a fair, accurate, and transparent process leading to a safe and permanent placement.

2. Proper reading of Rule 19(b): reopening adjudication for new allegations

Rule 19(b) states:

If new allegations arise after the final adjudicatory hearing, the allegations should be included in an amended petition rather than in a separate petition in a new civil action, and the final adjudicatory hearing shall be re‑opened for the purpose of hearing evidence on the new allegations in the amended petition.

The Court reads this:

• As authorizing amended petitions for new allegations even after initial disposition, consistent with M.E.;
• As imposing a mandatory duty to reopen the adjudicatory hearing to consider such new allegations; and
• As foreclosing the use of a Rule 46 “modification” hearing as a substitute for adjudication on those new allegations.

3. Distinguishing modification from new adjudication

The Court’s conceptual distinction is crucial:

• Modification under Rule 46 / § 49‑4‑606(a) presumes a valid original adjudication and subsequent worsening or persistence of those adjudicated conditions (e.g., failure to complete treatment, new criminal activity, continuing an unsafe relationship, new barriers to reunification).
• New allegations of a different type of abuse or neglect (e.g., medical neglect, exposure to sex offenders, different environmental risks) require:
  • A fresh petition or amended petition; and
  • A full adjudicatory hearing focused on those specific allegations.

In In re P.K., DHS attempted to conflate these categories, arguing that the post‑reunification conduct was a “material change of circumstances” justifying modification and termination. The Court rejects that approach as incompatible with the statutory and rule‑based framework.

4. Procedural defects mandating vacatur

The Court identifies a cluster of procedural errors that, cumulatively, “substantially disregarded or frustrated” the mandated process:

• No preliminary hearing following emergency removal based on the third amended petition, contrary to Rule 22.
• No reopened adjudicatory hearing focused on the allegations newly pled in the third amended petition, contrary to Rule 19(b).
• Misuse of a dispositional hearing to make first‑instance adjudicatory findings and terminate rights, without observance of Rule 32’s requirements for accelerated proceedings.
• Apparent reliance on remote historical misconduct that did not reflect the conditions at the time of the third amended petition.

Under the Edward B. rule, such systemic deviations require vacating the resulting dispositional order and remanding for proceedings that fully comply with the Rules and statutes.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Child Welfare Practice

1. Clear boundary between modification and fresh adjudication

The new syllabus point establishes a bright‑line rule with significant practical implications:

• DHS and GALs cannot use “modification of disposition” as a shortcut to litigate new abuse or neglect allegations.
• Circuit courts may not terminate parental or custodial rights based on unadjudicated allegations by characterizing them as a “material change of circumstances.”
• Any such allegations must be brought in a verified (amended) petition and adjudicated with full procedural protections.

2. Reinforcement of procedural safeguards for non‑parent custodians

In re P.K. involves a grandparent custodian rather than a biological or adoptive parent, yet the Court applies the same rigorous procedural protections. This underscores that:

• Once a non‑parent has been established as a child’s legal and physical custodian, their custodial rights are entitled to substantial due process protections; and
• Termination of a grandparent custodian’s rights cannot be treated as less procedurally demanding than termination of parental rights.

3. Practice adjustments for DHS and GALs

The decision will likely require DHS and GALs to:

• More carefully distinguish between:
  • Deterioration or non‑improvement in already‑adjudicated issues (properly addressed via Rule 46 motions), and
  • New conduct that constitutes independent grounds of abuse or neglect (requiring an amended petition and adjudication).
• Ensure emergency removals are promptly followed by preliminary hearings as mandated by Rule 22.
• Prepare and file case plans when pursuing termination, and either avoid or meticulously comply with Rule 32’s requirements for accelerated combined hearings.

4. Guidance to circuit courts

For circuit judges, the opinion provides clear guidance:

• Labeling a hearing as “dispositional” does not permit the court to make first‑time adjudicatory findings within it, absent full Rule 32 compliance and explicit party consent.
• If new allegations arise about a child already in the system (even if the particular respondent has been dismissed), the appropriate sequence is:
  1. Amended petition (Rule 19(b));
  2. Preliminary hearing (if emergency custody invoked);
  3. Reopened adjudicatory hearing on the new allegations; and
  4. Dispositional hearing, potentially accelerated under Rule 32 if all conditions are satisfied.

5. Balancing child protection and due process

Some may worry that requiring adjudication on new allegations could slow the path to permanency in urgent cases. The Court implicitly responds in two ways:

• Emergency removal tools remain available and were used here; what is required is follow‑up process (preliminary hearing, adjudication), not abandonment of emergency protection.
• Ensuring that termination is based on fairly tried, well‑founded findings enhances the legitimacy and durability of permanency decisions, thereby reducing later challenges and instability for children.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Adjudication vs. Disposition

• Adjudication is the stage where the court decides whether the child is “abused” or “neglected” as defined by law, based on evidence and due process. It answers the question: Did abuse or neglect occur, and by whom?
• Disposition occurs only after adjudication. The court chooses what to do about the child’s placement and the respondent’s rights—ranging from returning the child home with services to terminating parental or custodial rights.

West Virginia law requires adjudication first, disposition second, unless all parties knowingly agree to combine them under strict procedural safeguards.

B. Improvement Period

An improvement period is a structured time in which a parent or custodian works, under a case plan, to correct the conditions that led to the abuse or neglect finding (e.g., substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, securing stable housing). Successful completion may lead to reunification or less restrictive dispositions.

C. Modification of Disposition and Material Change of Circumstances

• Modification under Rule 46 and § 49‑4‑606(a) allows the court to change a prior dispositional order (e.g., moving from foster care with retained parental rights to termination of rights) if:
  • There is a material change of circumstances since the original disposition; and
  • The modification is shown by clear and convincing evidence to be in the child’s best interests.
• A material change typically means that:
  • The parent/custodian’s situation has significantly improved or deteriorated relative to the same problems that were already adjudicated (e.g., failed treatment, new crimes, persistent relationship with an abusive partner); or
  • New facts make the previous dispositional goals (like reunification) unworkable.

In re P.K. clarifies that completely new allegations of abuse/neglect—never previously litigated—do not fit under this “material change” rubric; they require a new or amended petition and adjudication.

D. Rule 19(b) – Amended Petitions for New Allegations

Rule 19(b) specifically addresses new allegations arising after adjudication. It instructs that:

• They should be added to the existing case, via an amended petition, and not filed as a wholly separate case; and
• The adjudicatory hearing must be reopened to address those new allegations.

This mechanism ensures that all allegations affecting a family are considered in one coherent proceeding while still preserving the respondent’s right to a full adjudicatory process.

E. Rule 32 – Accelerated Disposition

Rule 32 allows the court to hold disposition immediately after adjudication (in a single hearing) only if:

1. All parties explicitly agree to this accelerated format;
2. A proper case plan is provided or its submission waived; and
3. Parties receive, or knowingly waive, notice that a dispositional decision (including possible termination) will occur at that hearing.

Without these safeguards, a court cannot compress adjudication and disposition into one hearing.

F. Preliminary Hearing in Emergency Custody

When a child is taken into emergency custody (as with P.K. after the third amended petition), Rule 22 and § 49‑4‑602 require a prompt preliminary hearing, usually within 10 days, to:

• Review the basis for emergency removal;
• Decide whether continued custody is necessary pending further hearings; and
• Afford the respondent an early opportunity to contest the emergency removal.

Skipping this step, as occurred here, deprives the respondent of an early check on the State’s allegations.

V. Conclusion

In re P.K. is a significant procedural decision, not because it resolves whether Grandmother is a fit caregiver—that remains to be determined on remand—but because it robustly enforces the rule that:

• No one’s custodial rights, whether parent or grandparent, can be terminated absent a prior, proper adjudication of the particular allegations on which termination is based.

The Court’s new rule in Syllabus Point 3 draws a clear line: unadjudicated allegations of abuse or neglect cannot be shoehorned into the “material change of circumstances” standard governing modification of existing dispositional orders. They must instead be pled via a verified petition or amended petition and adjudicated under W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601 et seq.

By vacating the termination of Grandmother’s custodial rights and remanding for full compliance with the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes, the Court underscores that adherence to procedure is not a technicality but a core component of justice in child welfare cases. This decision will guide DHS, GALs, and circuit courts in structuring future proceedings, ensuring that efforts to protect children’s safety proceed hand‑in‑hand with fidelity to due process and the statutory framework.