Adequate Findings Over Form: Vermont Supreme Court Affirms Termination Without a Standalone “Stagnation” Section and Confirms Waiver of Child-Testimony Claim

Introduction

This commentary examines the Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in In re A.M., Juvenile (H.B., Mother), Case No. 25-AP-132 (Sept. 5, 2025), affirming the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her ten-year-old child, A.M. The proceeding arose from a Child in Need of Care or Supervision (CHINS) case initiated in 2021 based on substance-use and mental-health concerns. Although the Court’s decision issued as a three-justice panel entry order and is therefore nonprecedential, it provides practical guidance on several recurring issues in termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) appeals:

How and where a trial court must make “stagnation” findings to establish a change of circumstances for post-disposition TPR.
The permissibility of considering events occurring after filing the TPR petition.
Preservation and waiver in challenges to a court’s refusal to allow a child to testify.
The primacy of the “resumption of parental duties within a reasonable time” factor when mental-health instability, refusal to share treatment information, and strained family dynamics impede reunification.

The Supreme Court affirmed the TPR, holding that the family court’s findings—though not organized under a separate heading labeled “stagnation”—adequately demonstrated changed circumstances, and that Mother waived any challenge to the refusal to have A.M. testify. The Court also upheld the trial court’s assessment that Mother could not resume parental duties within a reasonable time in light of unresolved mental-health concerns, relational instability, and the child’s need for permanency.

Summary of the Opinion

The case’s trajectory began with a 2021 CHINS petition based on Mother’s fentanyl use and declining mental health. Following a conditional-custody arrangement and case plan emphasizing substance-use treatment, mental-health engagement, and safe, non-aggressive behavior, a critical incident occurred in August 2022: A.M. ingested liquid methadone that Mother had improperly stored in an unlabeled bottle, requiring Narcan to revive him. Custody shifted to the Department for Children and Families (DCF).

Mother later made some progress, including periods of sobriety and participation in supervised and then unsupervised visits. However, in spring 2024 she sent over 100 accusatory communications alleging abuse by DCF and family members, made alarming claims (e.g., that A.M. and classmates were being “trafficked”), was involuntarily hospitalized for several days, and then refused to release records to DCF. Supervised visits resumed after a protective order, and Mother continued to display dysregulated behavior during some visits.

The family court found stagnation and concluded Mother could not resume parenting within a reasonable time, particularly given mental-health uncertainty, inability to manage stress, and a risk she would disrupt A.M.’s relationships and therapy. The Supreme Court affirmed:

Changed circumstances via stagnation: Although the trial court did not segregate a standalone section labeled “stagnation,” its findings—especially on the resumption-of-parental-duties factor—sufficiently established stagnation over the four-year life of the case.
Post-petition evidence: The trial court properly considered events after the TPR petition, consistent with Vermont law.
Child testimony issue waived: Mother failed to preserve (and effectively opposed) allowing A.M. to testify; she could not raise the issue on appeal.
Resumption within a reasonable time: The record supported the conclusion that Mother, despite strengths (housing, employment, medication management), could not safely resume full-time care within a reasonable time due to unresolved mental-health issues, refusal to share treatment information, and the child’s marked need for permanency.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287 (1994): Establishes the two-step framework for post-disposition TPR—first, whether there is a change in circumstances; second, whether termination serves the child’s best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). The Court applied this structure.
In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504 (1990): Defines “changed circumstances” as commonly demonstrated through parental stagnation or deterioration over time. The decision framed the trial court’s task here.
In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637 (1998) (mem.): Identifies the most important best-interests factor: whether the parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time. This emphasis drove the outcome, given A.M.’s need for stability and the four-year pendency.
In re N.L., 2019 VT 10, ¶ 9, 209 Vt. 450: Sets the standard of review—deferential to trial court factfinding; findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous; conclusions sustained if supported by those findings. The Supreme Court repeatedly anchored its affirmance in this deferential posture.
In re C.L., 151 Vt. 480 (1989): Holds that the absence of an explicit or separately captioned “changed circumstances” finding does not require reversal if the decision contains sufficient findings supporting the standard. This case directly supports the Court’s refusal to reverse on the mother’s formatting argument.
In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175 (1993): Clarifies that progress in some areas does not preclude a finding of changed circumstances. The Supreme Court relied on this to explain why Mother’s partial successes (sobriety periods, compliance in some respects) did not foreclose a stagnation finding.
In re T.M., 2016 VT 23, ¶ 14, 201 Vt. 358: Confirms trial courts may consider all evidence presented at the termination hearing, including post-petition developments. This defeated Mother’s suggestion that later events (notably those surrounding her 2024 hospitalization) were off-limits.
In re A.M., 2015 VT 109, ¶ 28, 200 Vt. 189: Reiterates preservation requirements—parties must present issues with specificity and clarity to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule. The Court used this to hold that Mother did not preserve her challenge regarding child testimony.
State v. Morse, 2019 VT 58, ¶ 7, 211 Vt. 130: Explains the invited-error doctrine—parties who invite a ruling cannot later challenge it on appeal. Mother’s litigation posture opposing A.M.’s testimony undercut her appellate claim.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three main parts.

1) Changed Circumstances via Stagnation:

The family court expressly found “changed circumstances” in the form of stagnation—i.e., over four years Mother did not demonstrate the ability to safely and consistently parent A.M.
Although the trial court embedded much of its stagnation analysis within the “resumption-of-parental-duties” factor rather than under a discrete heading, In re C.L. allows a functional, record-based approach: so long as specific findings support the conclusion, reversal is unwarranted.
Key factual anchors included:
- The 2022 methadone ingestion incident, resulting from improper storage of take-home methadone and initial misstatements to first responders.
- Subsequent progress to unsupervised visitation followed by significant regression in 2024, culminating in involuntary hospitalization and renewed supervised contact.
- Persistent refusal to release hospitalization records, impeding DCF’s ability to assess treatment recommendations and future risk.
- Two separate DCF substantiations for risk of harm.
The Court emphasized that Mother’s progress in some domains (sobriety, housing, employment) did not erase these risks or the prolonged inability to maintain unsupervised contact, consistent with In re A.F.

2) Evidentiary Scope—Post-Petition Events:

To the extent Mother implied the court relied impermissibly on events occurring after DCF filed the TPR petition, the Court reaffirmed that the trial court evaluates “the totality of the facts presented at the termination hearing,” citing In re T.M.
This authorized the family court’s reliance on Mother’s 2024 conduct, hospitalization, and subsequent visitation dynamics.

3) Child’s Testimony—Preservation and Waiver:

The record showed Mother at one point opposed allowing A.M. to testify and did not renew the request once the trial court denied the motion (with leave to revisit if necessity arose).
Under In re A.M. (2015) and State v. Morse, Mother both failed to preserve and invited any alleged error, precluding appellate review.
The family court also reasonably found the child’s position could be established via other evidence and that testifying could be detrimental.

4) Resumption Within a Reasonable Time (Best-Interests):

Applying In re J.B., the Court focused on whether Mother could safely resume parenting within a reasonable time, given A.M.’s age (10) and the case’s four-year duration.
Findings supporting non-resumption included:
- Continuing uncertainty around Mother’s mental-health status and treatment plan, compounded by her refusal to share hospitalization records with DCF.
- Evidence of dysregulated interactions during visitation (pressuring the child to adopt her views, denigrating paternal relatives), causing distress and undermining the child’s stability.
- A.M.’s explicit preference not to increase contact and to be adopted by his paternal aunt, consistent with his observed need for permanency and stability.
Given the deferential standard of review (In re N.L.), these findings adequately supported the conclusion that termination was in A.M.’s best interests.

Impact

While nonprecedential, this entry order offers practical guidance to family courts and practitioners:

Form vs. Substance in Stagnation Findings: A TPR order need not house “stagnation” in a standalone section if the decision, read as a whole, sets out specific findings that substantiate changed circumstances. Trial courts should still strive for clarity, but appellate reversal will not hinge on headings when the factual analysis is sufficient.
Use of Post-Petition Evidence: The Court reiterates the permissibility—and utility—of considering the totality of circumstances at the final hearing, including post-petition conduct that illuminates current risk and future prognosis.
Preservation Discipline and Invited Error: Parties must clearly present and maintain positions below. Opposing a motion (here, to allow child testimony) and then complaining of its denial on appeal is foreclosed.
Substance Use vs. Mental Health: Sustained sobriety and stability in housing/employment are important but not dispositive. Unresolved mental-health issues, refusal to share treatment information, and poor co-parenting/communication can independently support stagnation and non-resumption findings.
Child-Centered Permanency: The child’s reactions to visitation, behavioral regressions, stated preferences, and the availability of a stable adoptive home (paternal aunt) weighed heavily in the best-interests analysis.

Practitioners should expect increased attention to parents’ cooperation with treatment information-sharing when case plans require releases. While confidentiality protections remain, a parent’s refusal to provide releases can limit the court’s ability to verify progress and may be weighed adversely in assessing risk and readiness to reunify.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision): A status triggered when a child’s welfare is at risk due to neglect, abuse, or other circumstances, prompting court oversight and services.
Conditional Custody Order (CCO): An order placing a child with specified custodians under conditions designed to mitigate risk (e.g., supervised contact, treatment requirements).
Stagnation: A parent’s lack of sufficient improvement over time in the ability to safely and consistently meet the child’s needs. It can coexist with progress in some areas if core safety/stability issues remain unresolved.
Change in Circumstances: The threshold showing required for post-disposition TPR; often established through stagnation or deterioration in parenting capacity since the last disposition order.
Best-Interests Factors (33 V.S.A. § 5114(a)): Statutory criteria guiding whether TPR serves the child’s welfare, including the child’s adjustment, relationships, and most importantly, whether the parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time.
“Reasonable Time”: Assessed in light of the child’s needs and timeline for permanency, not simply the parent’s intentions. Delays across a large portion of a child’s life weigh against reunification.
Preservation and Invited Error: To appeal an issue, a party must clearly raise it below. A party cannot induce (or agree with) a ruling and later challenge it on appeal.
Substantiation (DCF): An administrative finding that abuse or risk of harm occurred, which courts may consider as part of the risk assessment.
Supervised vs. Unsupervised Contact: Supervision is used to manage safety or relational concerns. Regression from unsupervised back to supervised visits typically signals unresolved risk factors.
Protective Orders and Treatment Releases: Courts can limit contact to protect a child. Treatment releases in case plans allow DCF to verify compliance and progress; refusal to provide releases can impede reunification.

Conclusion

In re A.M. affirms a pragmatic, substance-over-form approach in TPR appeals: appellate courts will sustain termination orders when the record contains detailed findings supporting stagnation and the best-interests conclusion, even if those findings are not compartmentalized under specific headings. The decision underscores three themes. First, courts may and should consider post-petition developments that illuminate current risk. Second, preservation matters—positions not clearly advanced below (and especially those effectively opposed by the appellant) cannot be retooled on appeal. Third, a parent’s progress in discrete areas (e.g., sobriety, employment) does not negate stagnation where mental-health instability, refusal to share critical treatment information, and relational volatility persist, particularly after several years in care.

Although nonprecedential, this entry order offers concrete guidance on how Vermont courts are likely to assess stagnation, weigh child welfare evidence holistically at termination, and treat preservation issues surrounding child testimony. Most importantly, it reaffirms that the child’s need for timely permanency remains the lodestar in the best-interests analysis.