ADA/Rehabilitation Act Jail-Damages Require Sheriff’s Actual Knowledge (No Vicarious Liability); Post-Release Injunctive Claims Moot Absent Likely Reincarceration

Introduction

In Kevin Lewis v. Sheriff, Fulton County Georgia (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026), plaintiff Kevin Lewis—who is legally blind—challenged the treatment he received during short periods of pretrial detention at two Georgia county jails: less than 48 hours at the Chatham County jail and approximately 16 days at the Fulton County jail. Lewis alleged that jail staff failed to provide disability-related assistance (help reading documents, navigating the facilities, accessing phones/kiosks and grievance processes, and obtaining desired medications), and he sued the supervising sheriffs in their official capacities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.

The key issues on appeal were (1) whether Lewis had evidence sufficient to obtain monetary damages under Title II/§ 504 and (2) whether his request for prospective injunctive relief remained justiciable after his release.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the sheriffs. The court held:

Damages: Compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA and § 504 require proof of intentional discrimination, satisfied in this circuit by deliberate indifference—i.e., an official with authority must have actual knowledge of discrimination and fail to adequately respond. Lewis produced no evidence that either sheriff had such knowledge; vicarious liability is unavailable.
Injunctive relief: Lewis’s release from custody mooted his prospective claims. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception did not apply because there was no reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that Lewis would be incarcerated again.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Silberman v. Mia. Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019)
The court relied on Silberman for two core propositions: (1) Title II and § 504 claims are governed by the same standards and may be analyzed together, and (2) the basic three-part test for liability (qualified individual; exclusion/denial/discrimination; “by reason of” disability). The opinion also treated Silberman as foreclosing Lewis’s argument that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should not be analyzed together.
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002)
Cited to confirm that Title II and § 504 are enforceable through private causes of action, framing the remedial posture in which the damages and injunctive relief questions arise.
Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012)
Used for the circuit rule that a plaintiff seeking monetary damages under Title II/§ 504 must prove intentional discrimination—a heightened requirement beyond establishing exclusion or denial of benefits.
Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241 (11th Cir. 2022)
Central to the holding: Ingram supplies the definition of intentional discrimination as deliberate indifference requiring (a) an official with authority to correct the problem and (b) actual knowledge of discrimination plus an inadequate response. It also provides the rule that vicarious liability is unavailable under Title II and § 504—preventing a damages theory based solely on staff misconduct without the requisite official knowledge.
Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriﬀ's Dep't, 783 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2015)
Cited for the general mootness principle: a case becomes moot when there is no longer a live controversy for which meaningful relief can be granted.
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007)
Supplies the specific mootness rule for prisoners: release or transfer generally moots claims for prospective injunctive/declaratory relief because such remedies are forward-looking.
Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002)
Provides the two-prong “capable of repetition, yet evading review” test. The court applied it narrowly and rejected the exception because Lewis could not satisfy the first prong (reasonable expectation/probability of recurrence involving him).
Feliciano v. City of Mia. Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
These cases framed the summary-judgment posture: evidence viewed in the nonmovant’s favor; summary judgment appropriate absent a genuine dispute of material fact; and the “reasonable jury” standard.
Jones v. United Space All., L.L.C., 494 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007); FTC v. On Point Cap. Partners LLC, 17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021)
Cited for standards of review (de novo review of legal questions and mootness determinations).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis turned on remedies. Even assuming Lewis could satisfy the baseline elements of a Title II/§ 504 claim (disability; denial of benefits/services; causation “by reason of” disability), the court emphasized that damages impose an additional, stringent requirement: the defendant’s intentional discrimination.

Applying Liese and Ingram, the court treated “intentional discrimination” as requiring deliberate indifference, which in turn demands evidence that an official with corrective authority had actual knowledge of discrimination and failed to adequately respond. The record showed no grievances or communications reaching either sheriff and no evidence that either sheriff knew of Lewis’s alleged mistreatment. Because vicarious liability is unavailable under Title II/§ 504, Lewis could not bridge the gap by pointing to failures of subordinate staff alone.

For injunctive relief, the court applied the Eleventh Circuit’s general rule (from Smith v. Allen) that release moots forward-looking relief concerning detention conditions. It then rejected the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception under Soliman because the charges were dropped and there was no evidence of a reasonable expectation that Lewis would be detained again—making recurrence speculative rather than probable.

Impact

Heightened proof requirement for damages against jail leadership: The decision reinforces that, in this circuit, obtaining compensatory damages under Title II/§ 504 against sheriffs in their official capacities requires evidence tying the discrimination to an official’s actual knowledge and deliberately indifferent nonresponse—not merely proof of inaccessible systems or frontline staff failures.
Litigation strategy implications: Plaintiffs seeking damages will likely need discovery focused on notice pathways (grievances, requests, ADA coordinators, supervisory reports, policies showing who knew what and when) to satisfy the “actual knowledge” element described in Ingram v. Kubik.
Mootness constrains systemic jail-access claims by former detainees: Absent class certification or a concrete likelihood of re-detention, former detainees will face significant hurdles obtaining prospective injunctive relief once released—particularly where the “capable of repetition” prong cannot be shown with individualized probability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title II ADA and § 504 Rehabilitation Act: Federal disability-rights statutes that require covered public entities (and federally funded programs) to provide access to services/programs without disability-based discrimination, including via reasonable accommodations.
Intentional discrimination (for damages): Not necessarily animus; in this circuit it is met by deliberate indifference—knowing about discrimination and failing to act adequately.
Actual knowledge: Evidence that the relevant official was actually informed or otherwise aware of the alleged discriminatory barrier or denial (not merely that the problem existed).
No vicarious liability: The sheriff cannot be held liable for money damages under Title II/§ 504 solely because employees acted improperly; the plaintiff must meet the deliberate-indifference standard as to an official with authority.
Mootness: If the court can no longer provide meaningful forward-looking relief (e.g., the plaintiff is no longer jailed), the claim for injunctive relief generally ends.
Capable of repetition, yet evading review: A narrow exception requiring a demonstrated probability the same plaintiff will face the same issue again, and that the issue is too short-lived to litigate before it ends.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores two practical rules for disability-rights litigation arising from jail conditions: (1) compensatory damages under Title II and § 504 require evidence of an authorized official’s actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, and cannot rest on vicarious responsibility for staff conduct; and (2) prospective injunctive relief claims ordinarily become moot upon release unless the plaintiff can show a concrete likelihood of being subjected to the same conditions again. The opinion thus channels jail-access claims toward robust proof of notice and institutional response (for damages) and highlights the justiciability barriers facing former detainees seeking systemic reform through individual suits.