ADA Accommodation Claims, Prior Terminations, and No‑Merit Appeals in Delaware Termination of Parental Rights Cases:
A Commentary on Shelby Davis v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court’s December 11, 2025 order in Shelby Davis v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families (“Davis”). The case arises from the Family Court’s termination of the parental rights of Shelby Davis (“Mother”) to her daughter born in June 2024 (“the Child”).

On appeal, Mother’s court‑appointed counsel filed a “no‑merit” brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), Delaware’s analogue to an Anders-type procedure in termination of parental rights (“TPR”) appeals. Mother, acting pro se, submitted additional points, focusing on her asserted learning disability and alleged noncompliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by child welfare authorities, relying on a prior Colorado decision involving her and a different child.

The Court affirmed the TPR and held the motion to withdraw moot. Although the order is procedurally brief, it is legally significant in at least three respects:

1. It reaffirms the two‑step statutory framework and clear‑and‑convincing standard for TPR in Delaware, and the deferential appellate review of Family Court findings.
2. It emphasizes that ADA‑based accommodation claims in child welfare and TPR proceedings must be raised in the trial court and supported by the record; they cannot be successfully introduced for the first time on appeal.
3. It underscores that, where there are prior involuntary terminations of parental rights, those prior TPRs can independently support termination under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7), even if the Family Court focused on a “failure to plan” ground under § 1103(a)(5).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s June 18, 2025 order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

• Statutory grounds. The Family Court correctly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother failed to plan adequately for the Child’s physical needs and emotional development while the Child was in DFS custody for more than six months, satisfying 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). The Supreme Court further noted that the record also clearly supported termination under § 1103(a)(7) based on Mother’s prior involuntary terminations as to two other children.
• Best interests of the child. Applying the 13 Del. C. § 722 factors, the Family Court reasonably concluded that termination was in the Child’s best interests, particularly in light of the Child’s adjustment to foster care, lack of meaningful bond with Mother, and the parents’ mental health, substance abuse, housing, and compliance issues.
• ADA / learning disability claim rejected. Mother argued on appeal that she has a learning disability and that Colorado authorities had been found to have violated the ADA in a prior case involving another child (People in Interest of S.S.). The Delaware Supreme Court held that:
  • Mother did not invoke the ADA in the Family Court proceedings;
  • The record contained no evidence of a learning disability requiring reasonable accommodations; and
  • DFS was statutorily excused from case planning because of the prior TPRs, further undercutting any ADA‑based challenge to the case plan in this matter.
• No‑merit appeal. After independently reviewing the record, the Court agreed with counsel that the appeal was “wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issues” under Rule 26.1(c), and affirmed the Family Court’s judgment. Because the appeal was decided on the merits, counsel’s motion to withdraw was deemed moot.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Removal and Early Proceedings

The Child was born in June 2024. DFS petitioned for emergency custody after Mother tested positive for THC at the Child’s birth, and in light of:

• Mother’s extensive child welfare history in Colorado and Delaware;
• Her mental health issues and history of substance abuse; and
• Her unsuitable housing conditions.

The Family Court granted emergency custody and, as required by 13 Del. C. § 2514 and Family Court Civil Procedure Rules 212–219, conducted the mandated series of review hearings. At the preliminary protective hearing, Mother stipulated that the Child was dependent and that remaining in DFS custody was in the Child’s best interests. The court found probable cause that the Child was at risk of physical, mental, or emotional danger and that DFS had made reasonable efforts to avoid removal.

B. Case Plan and Motion to Be Excused from Case Planning

In July 2024, DFS moved under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7) and (d) to:

• Be excused from providing a reunification case plan; and
• Change the permanency goal to termination of parental rights.

The basis was that Mother and Father had previously had their parental rights involuntarily terminated as to two other children. Notwithstanding this motion, the Family Court initially approved a case plan that required Mother to:

• Maintain safe, adequate housing and financial stability;
• Engage in mental health services;
• Complete parenting classes;
• Obtain domestic violence and substance abuse evaluations and follow recommendations; and
• Resolve pending child welfare issues in Colorado.

C. Review / Permanency Hearing

At a November 19, 2024 review and permanency hearing, the evidence showed:

• Of twelve visits scheduled between August 20 and November, Mother failed to confirm or attend three; she cut short one thirty‑minute visit after thirteen minutes.
• A DFS home assessment in June revealed animal feces, black mold on the walls, and exposed electrical wiring in the mobile home; Father later refused access in August.
• Mother was seeing a therapist but remained unemployed; substance abuse and domestic violence issues were unaddressed.

In light of these facts and the prior TPR history, the Family Court granted DFS’s motion to be excused from case planning and changed the goal to termination of parental rights.

D. TPR Petition and Post‑Permanency Hearing

On January 17, 2025, DFS filed a TPR petition asserting two statutory grounds:

• Failure to plan for the Child’s physical needs and emotional development under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5); and
• Prior involuntary terminations as to another child under § 1103(a)(7).

At a February 3, 2025 post‑permanency hearing, a Delaware State Police officer testified that he visited the home after Father reported that Mother had made suicidal threats. During that incident:

• Mother was uncooperative, arrested for resisting arrest, and transported to a hospital after an apparent seizure;
• She left the hospital after about 24 hours; and
• The home was “full of garbage and very dirty.”

Of six scheduled visits since November 26, Mother failed to confirm or attend two and was late for another. She had occasional work at a restaurant and was appealing a denial of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), while continuing therapy.

E. The TPR Hearing

At the May 19, 2025 TPR hearing, the Family Court:

• Took judicial notice of:
  • Prior orders in this case;
  • Its earlier termination of Mother’s rights to a child born in 2022 (Davis v. DSCYF, affirmed on appeal); and
  • A Colorado district court order terminating her rights to a child born in 2019 (People in Interest of M.S.).
• Heard testimony from:
  • Maternal grandmother, concerning how four of Mother’s other children came into her custody;
  • Father, about the family’s housing plans and prior child welfare involvement;
  • Mother, regarding her marijuana use for a seizure disorder, multiple mental health diagnoses, current therapy and medications, home repairs, and intermittent substance abuse treatment;
  • The DFS permanency worker, about the unchanged condition of the home, lack of documentation on services, and Mother’s resistance to certain evaluations;
  • One of the Child’s foster parents, who described the Child’s progress and bond in foster care; and
  • The Child’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), who supported TPR and adoption by the foster parents.

The permanency worker testified there was no observed bonding between Mother and the Child, while the Child had bonded with her foster parents, who were willing to adopt. Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a written decision terminating Mother’s parental rights.

F. The Appeal and Mother’s ADA Argument

On appeal, Mother’s appointed counsel filed a Rule 26.1(c) no‑merit brief and motion to withdraw, stating that, after a conscientious review of the record and law, there were no non‑frivolous appellate issues. DFS and the Child’s attorney responded, urging affirmance.

Mother, in her own written submission, argued that she had been treated unfairly because she has a learning disability. She referenced a Colorado Court of Appeals decision, People in Interest of S.S., 2023 WL 12058523 (Colo. App. Mar. 30, 2023), in which the termination of her rights to a different child (born in 2020) was reversed because the child welfare agency had not made reasonable accommodations for her learning disability in devising her treatment plan, in violation of the ADA.

The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this reliance for multiple reasons, discussed below.

IV. Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and Standards of Review

1. Two‑step TPR framework

The Court reiterates the well‑established two‑step framework for terminating parental rights in Delaware, grounded in 13 Del. C. § 1103 and § 722, and drawn from Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533 (Del. 2000), and Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724 (Del. 2008):

1. Statutory basis. The Family Court must first determine whether one or more statutory grounds for termination under § 1103(a) have been established by “clear and convincing” evidence.
2. Best interests. If a statutory ground is established, the court must then determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests under § 722, again using the clear‑and‑convincing standard.

Both steps are essential; the presence of a statutory ground alone does not compel termination. There must also be a best‑interests determination.

2. Appellate review

Citing Wilson v. Division of Family Services, 988 A.2d 435 (Del. 2010), the Court recites its familiar standards:

• Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo (the appellate court substitutes its judgment for the trial court on questions of law).
• Factual findings are reviewed only to ensure they are supported by the record and are not “clearly wrong.”
• If the trial judge correctly applied the law, the Supreme Court’s review is limited to whether there was an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the decision was one that no reasonable judge could have reached on the evidence.

This deferential standard is especially consequential in TPR cases, where the Family Court’s live assessment of credibility, parent‑child interactions, and service participation figures prominently.

3. Rule 26.1(c) no‑merit appeals

The Court also operates within the framework of Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), applicable when an attorney for a parent in a TPR appeal concludes that the appeal lacks any arguably meritorious issues. Under the rule:

• Counsel must file a “no‑merit” brief and a motion to withdraw, certifying a conscientious review of the record and pertinent law.
• Counsel must provide the parent with a copy and advise that the parent may file pro se points.
• The Court must then independently review the record and determine whether the appeal is wholly without merit or whether counsel has overlooked any arguable issues.

In Davis, the Court expressly found that Mother’s appeal was “wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issues,” thereby both affirming the TPR and implicitly endorsing counsel’s Rule 26.1(c) submission.

B. Statutory Grounds: Failure to Plan and Prior Terminations

1. Failure to plan – § 1103(a)(5)

The Family Court relied primarily on 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5), which authorizes TPR when:

“The parent… has failed to plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or mental and emotional health and development, and one or more of the following conditions are met…”

One such condition, applicable here, is that the child has been in DFS custody for more than six months. The Supreme Court recounts specific facts supporting the failure‑to‑plan finding:

• The Child had never lived with Mother; from birth she was in DFS custody and placed in foster care.
• Mother lacked financial resources and safe, adequate housing; the home remained unsanitary and unsafe (animal feces, mold, exposed wiring, significant clutter) well into the case.
• Mother’s visitation was inconsistent: she missed multiple visits, ended one early, and was late to others, undermining both bonding and demonstration of parenting ability.
• Mental health and substance abuse issues, although partially addressed (therapy, medications, some treatment), were not sufficiently or consistently addressed to reassure the court about long‑term stability and safety.

These cumulative facts, in the Court’s view, clearly supported the Family Court’s conclusion that Mother had “failed to plan” within the meaning of § 1103(a)(5).

2. Prior involuntary terminations – § 1103(a)(7)

The TPR petition also invoked § 1103(a)(7), which authorizes termination when parental rights as to another child have been involuntarily terminated. The Supreme Court notes:

• Mother’s rights to a child born in 2019 were terminated by a Colorado court in People in Interest of M.S. (Colo. D. Ct. Oct. 11, 2021).
• The Delaware Supreme Court previously affirmed the termination of Mother’s rights to a child born in 2022 in Davis v. DSCYF/DFS, 338 A.3d 1291, 2025 WL 315097 (Del. Jan. 28, 2025).
• Although one Colorado TPR (People in Interest of S.S.) was reversed on ADA grounds, the two TPRs invoked here (M.S. and the Delaware 2022 child) remain valid and enforceable.

The Supreme Court emphasizes that, even though the Family Court relied on § 1103(a)(5), “there was also clear and convincing evidence to support termination… under § 1103(a)(7).” This is important doctrinally: an appellate court may affirm on an alternative statutory ground that is clearly supported by the record, even if the trial court did not explicitly rest its decision on that ground, so long as the parent had notice of the ground (here, by virtue of the petition).

3. Excuse from case planning – § 1103(d)

Section 1103(d) allows the Family Court to excuse DFS from providing reunification case planning when certain aggravated circumstances are present, including prior involuntary terminations for siblings. Here, once DFS’s motion was granted at the permanency stage, the agency’s obligation to engage in extensive reunification efforts and tailored case planning was significantly curtailed.

This statutory framework is crucial to the Court’s later rejection of Mother’s ADA argument: if DFS is lawfully excused from case planning, there is less room to argue that DFS failed to provide reasonable ADA accommodations in the design or implementation of a case plan.

C. Best Interests Analysis Under § 722

After finding statutory grounds for termination, the Family Court evaluated the child‑centric “best interests” factors under 13 Del. C. § 722. The Supreme Court describes the Family Court’s weighing:

• Factor 1 – Parents’ wishes: Mother wished to retain her parental rights; this factor weighed against termination.
• Factor 2 – Child’s wishes: Neutral—due to the Child’s infancy and inability to express meaningful wishes.
• Factor 3 – Relationship with parents and relatives: Weighed in favor of TPR. The Child had never lived with Mother, minimal bonding was observed, and the Child was closely bonded with foster parents.
• Factor 4 – Adjustment to home, school, community: Weighed in favor of TPR. The Child was well‑adjusted to the foster home and that home was ready to provide permanence through adoption.
• Factor 5 – Mental and physical health of all individuals involved: Weighed in favor of TPR, given Mother’s mental health, substance abuse, and seizure issues, coupled with inconsistent follow‑through with treatment and environmental hazards in the home.
• Factor 6 – Parents’ past and present compliance with parental responsibilities: Weighed in favor of TPR, based on prior TPRs, unresolved issues from those cases, and present non‑compliance with visitation, housing, and services.
• Factor 7 – Evidence of domestic violence: Neutral—no determinative evidence.
• Factor 8 – Criminal history: Neutral—although there were incidents (e.g., resisting arrest), they were not the central focus of the court’s decision.

Balancing these factors, the Family Court found that the factors favoring termination (3, 4, 5, 6) outweighed Mother’s wishes (factor 1) and the neutral factors. The Supreme Court found this weighing well‑supported by the record and not an abuse of discretion.

D. The ADA / Learning Disability Argument

1. Mother’s reliance on People in Interest of S.S.

Mother contended she had been treated unfairly because of a learning disability and pointed to People in Interest of S.S., 2023 WL 12058523 (Colo. App. Mar. 30, 2023), where a Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the termination of her rights to a child born in 2020 and remanded for a treatment plan that reasonably accommodated her learning disability under the ADA.

In S.S., as summarized by the Delaware Supreme Court, the Colorado court held that the child welfare agency failed to show that it had made reasonable accommodations for Mother’s learning disability in devising her treatment plan, warranting reversal of the TPR. Mother attempted to transplant that reasoning into this Delaware case.

2. The Supreme Court’s rejection and its rationale

The Court rejected the ADA‑based challenge on two principal grounds:

1. Procedural default: ADA not raised below.
   The Court noted that “Mother did not invoke the ADA below.” Delaware follows a well‑settled preservation rule: issues not fairly presented to the trial court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal. The ADA argument could not be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, especially where it would require factual development (e.g., the nature and extent of any learning disability, DFS’s knowledge of it, particular accommodations requested or refused).
2. Absence of supporting evidence in the record.
   The Court further stated that “the record is devoid of evidence that she had a learning disability requiring DFS to make reasonable accommodations in preparing her case plan.” Without record evidence of:
   • A qualifying disability;
   • DFS’s knowledge of that disability; and
   • Any failure to make reasonable accommodations;
   an ADA argument could not be sustained.

Additionally, the Court highlighted that “DFS was excused from case planning because Mother’s parental rights to two other children were previously terminated.” This statutory excusal under § 1103(d) substantially undercuts any claim that DFS had an affirmative duty to craft or modify a detailed reunification plan, ADA or otherwise, in this case. In practical terms, even if an ADA duty could arise in the context of reunification services, here the statutory framework had already allowed the State to pursue TPR without reunification efforts because of the prior TPR history.

3. Doctrinal implications for Delaware

While the Court does not articulate a broad, explicit ADA doctrine applicable to all Delaware TPR cases, this order conveys several important principles:

• Preservation is essential. Parents who believe their disabilities require accommodations in child welfare proceedings must raise ADA‑related concerns in the Family Court and build a record—through testimony, documentation, expert evaluations, or requests for specific accommodations.
• Record‑based adjudication. The Supreme Court will not assume the existence of a disability or of ADA violations based on out‑of‑state rulings in other children’s cases absent corroborating evidence in the current record.
• Interaction with “aggravated circumstances” statutes. Where the statutory scheme—here, § 1103(d)—allows the State to be excused from case planning because of prior TPRs, ADA‑based arguments focused on case‑plan design or reunification efforts face additional hurdles.

The decision thus stands as a cautionary example for parents with disabilities in Delaware: ADA‑based arguments must be timely asserted, factually supported, and framed in the context of Delaware’s specific statutory provisions governing reunification efforts and case planning.

E. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Wilson v. Division of Family Services (2010)

Wilson is cited for the standard of review in TPR appeals. It establishes that:

• Legal rulings are reviewed de novo;
• Factual findings are reviewed for clear error; and
• If the law is correctly applied, the remaining review is for abuse of discretion.

Davis faithfully applies this framework: the Supreme Court closely examines the statutory interpretation and then defers to the Family Court’s factual findings where supported by the record.

2. Shepherd v. Clemens (2000)

Shepherd is cited for the two‑step TPR process: establishing a statutory basis under § 1103(a), then separately assessing the child’s best interests under § 722, both by clear and convincing evidence. Davis reaffirms that the Family Court must explicitly traverse both steps and that the Supreme Court will review each in turn.

3. Powell v. DSCYF (2008)

Powell is referenced for the proposition that both the statutory ground and the best‑interests requirement must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. This high evidentiary standard reflects the constitutional dimension of parental rights, as recognized in cases such as Santosky v. Kramer (U.S. Supreme Court), though Santosky is not cited in this order.

4. People in Interest of S.S. (Colo. App. 2023)

Although an out‑of‑state decision, S.S. is invoked by Mother herself. The Delaware Supreme Court treats it descriptively rather than as binding or persuasive authority, using it only to explain the nature of Mother’s ADA argument. The Court’s decision to distinguish rather than apply S.S. underscores its adherence to Delaware’s preservation rules and its focus on the record developed in the Delaware proceedings.

5. Mother’s prior TPR precedents

• Davis v. DSCYF/DFS, 338 A.3d 1291, 2025 WL 315097 (Del. Jan. 28, 2025).
  The Delaware Supreme Court previously affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights to a child born in 2022. That prior affirmance is part of the evidentiary and statutory landscape justifying use of § 1103(a)(7) here.
• People in Interest of M.S., Case No. 19JV624 (Colo. D. Ct. Oct. 11, 2021).
  A Colorado district court order terminating Mother’s parental rights to a child born in 2019. Unlike S.S., this order was not reversed. Its existence provides another qualifying prior involuntary termination for purposes of § 1103(a)(7).

F. Impact and Prospective Significance

1. For parents with disabilities in Delaware child welfare cases

Davis sends a clear, practical message:

• Parents who believe they are entitled to ADA accommodations (for learning disabilities or other impairments) must affirmatively raise those issues in the Family Court, ideally at the earliest stage.
• They should ensure that their disabilities, functional limitations, and requested accommodations are documented through evaluations, testimony, or other evidence.
• Reliance on favorable decisions from other jurisdictions involving different children will not substitute for a developed record in the current case.

Failure to do so, as in Davis, will likely bar ADA‑based challenges on appeal, even where parent‑counsel later seek to analogize to cases like S.S..

2. For DFS and Family Court judges

The decision reinforces several operational points:

• Use of § 1103(a)(7) and § 1103(d). When there are prior valid involuntary terminations, DFS is authorized to seek excusal from case planning and to pursue TPR earlier in the child’s life, consistent with the policy favoring timely permanency for children.
• Record making. Family Court findings about housing conditions, service participation, visitation, and child adjustment—all central in Davis—must be thoroughly documented, as they are the foundation for appellate review.
• ADA awareness. While Davis does not hold that ADA obligations are irrelevant, it implicitly encourages courts and agencies to address disability issues explicitly when raised, both to protect parents’ rights and to create a clear record for review.

3. For appellate practice in TPR cases

Davis also illustrates how Rule 26.1(c) functions in practice:

• Counsel must do more than file a conclusory motion; a “conscientious review” and a substantive no‑merit brief are required.
• The Supreme Court will still independently scour the record, including any pro se submissions by the parent, to ensure there are no arguably appealable issues.
• Where the Court finds the appeal wholly without merit, it will affirm and may declare the withdrawal motion moot, as in this case.

This preserves the balance between parents’ rights to counsel in TPR appeals and the judicial interest in filtering out meritless challenges that would delay permanency for children.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal terms and concepts in the opinion can be confusing. The following brief explanations may assist non‑specialist readers.

1. “Clear and convincing evidence”

This is an intermediate standard of proof, higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (criminal standard). It requires evidence that produces a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations. In TPR cases, both the existence of a statutory ground and the child’s best interests must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

2. “Failure to plan” under § 1103(a)(5)

“Failure to plan” does not solely refer to having no written plan. It broadly covers a parent’s failure to take realistic, timely steps to provide:

• Safe and stable housing;
• Financial support;
• Appropriate parenting and supervision;
• Attention to the child’s emotional and developmental needs; and
• Compliance with necessary services (mental health, substance abuse, etc.).

Sporadic efforts or partial compliance that do not materially improve the parent’s ability to care safely for the child may still constitute “failure to plan.”

3. “Reasonable efforts” and excusal from case planning

Child welfare agencies generally must make “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal and to reunify families. However, statutes like 13 Del. C. § 1103(d) allow courts to excuse the agency from such efforts when certain aggravated circumstances exist, such as prior involuntary TPRs for siblings. Once excused, the agency may focus on permanency for the child (often adoption) rather than continued reunification work.

4. Prior involuntary TPRs as grounds for new termination

Under § 1103(a)(7), a parent’s prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child can itself be a ground to terminate rights to a new child. The idea is that repeated, serious parenting failures—especially those leading to TPR—are highly predictive and justify a more expedited path to permanency for subsequent children.

5. “Best interests of the child” factors

Section 722 lists multiple non‑exclusive factors a court may consider, including:

• Parents’ and child’s wishes;
• Child’s relationships with parents, siblings, and others;
• Child’s adjustment to home, school, community;
• Mental and physical health of all involved;
• Past and present compliance with parental responsibilities;
• Evidence of domestic violence; and
• Criminal histories.

No single factor is decisive; the court balances them to determine what outcome best promotes the child’s safety, stability, and long‑term welfare.

6. Rule 26.1(c) no‑merit briefs

When appointed counsel in a TPR appeal concludes that there are no non‑frivolous appellate issues:

• They file a no‑merit brief explaining why; and
• They request permission to withdraw as counsel.

The Court then independently reviews the case and any pro se arguments. If it finds the appeal wholly meritless, it affirms and may allow counsel to withdraw (or, as in Davis, deem the withdrawal motion moot after ruling).

VI. Conclusion

The Delaware Supreme Court’s order in Shelby Davis v. DSCYF is a concise but meaningful reaffirmation of several key principles in Delaware termination of parental rights law.

Substantively, it confirms that longstanding statutory grounds—particularly “failure to plan” and prior involuntary terminations—remain potent bases for TPR where supported by clear and convincing evidence and where the best‑interests factors point decisively in favor of permanency through adoption. The case underscores the importance of consistent visitation, stable and safe housing, and meaningful engagement in mental health and substance abuse services.

Procedurally, Davis reinforces two critical points:

• ADA‑based accommodation claims in the child welfare context must be raised in the Family Court and supported by evidence; they cannot be successfully raised for the first time on appeal based solely on out‑of‑state decisions involving different children.
• Rule 26.1(c) no‑merit procedures, when conscientiously followed by counsel, allow the Supreme Court to ensure parents’ rights to meaningful appellate review while quickly resolving appeals that lack any arguable merit, thereby advancing the goal of timely permanency for children.

In the broader legal context, Davis illustrates the continuing tension between respect for the fundamental rights of parents and the pressing need to secure safe, stable, and permanent homes for very young children. The decision tilts that balance toward permanency where repeated prior terminations, persistent instability, and unaddressed mental health and substance abuse problems create a compelling case that reunification is not in a child’s best interests—while reminding practitioners that disability‑based rights must be asserted early and clearly to have any chance of influencing that outcome.