Actual Reliance and Invited Error: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Challenges to Sentences Based on Disputed PSI Facts

Introduction

In United States v. Jacob Elijah Groover, No. 24-13068 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 70-month sentence imposed after a guilty plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Groover argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court allegedly relied on disputed and unproven facts embedded in the presentence investigation report (PSI). He also preserved—without pursuing—constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) that are foreclosed by circuit precedent, and he withdrew a guidelines-calculation challenge after the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in United States v. Rowe.

The core issue before the court was narrow but significant: What must an appellant show to prevail on a substantive reasonableness challenge premised on the sentencing court’s supposed reliance on disputed PSI facts, and how does the invited-error doctrine limit such challenges? The Eleventh Circuit’s answer underscores two complementary principles: (1) a defendant must demonstrate the district court actually relied on disputed, unproven facts in fashioning the sentence; and (2) when defense counsel concedes or invites reliance on particular facts at sentencing, the invited-error doctrine forecloses appellate review.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Groover’s 70-month sentence, concluding it was substantively reasonable under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. The panel held:

The district court did not rely on the disputed narrative in the PSI describing the facts underlying Groover’s 2018 cocaine-trafficking conviction. Rather, the court relied only on the fact of conviction—an undisputed, admitted fact—to infer a pattern of disregard for the law.
Any error related to the district court’s consideration of Groover’s 23 probation violations was invited, because defense counsel acknowledged the violations occurred and argued only that they were not significant. Under the invited-error doctrine, appellate review was precluded.
The record did not support Groover’s claim that the district court mistakenly doubled the count of his prison disciplinary violations (listing the same four violations in two PSI narrative sections). The PSI expressly noted concurrent sentences, and the government clarified at sentencing that Groover had four violations, not eight.
Given that the sentence was at the bottom of the correctly calculated guidelines range and far below the 15-year statutory maximum, and considering the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis emphasizing Groover’s escalating criminal conduct and the need for deterrence, the sentence fell within the range of reasonable outcomes.

The court declined to reach Groover’s preserved constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) in light of binding circuit precedent and rejected his guidelines argument as foreclosed by United States v. Rowe.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007): Established the abuse-of-discretion standard and the requirement to assess substantive reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances. The panel applied Gall’s deferential framework to Groover’s appeal.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254–56 (11th Cir. 2015): Clarifies that a sentence is substantively unreasonable only if the court (1) fails to consider a factor deserving significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper factor, or (3) makes a clear error of judgment in balancing proper factors. Also confirms district courts need not give equal weight to each § 3553(a) factor. The panel cited Rosales-Bruno to frame when substantive reasonableness challenges succeed.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022): Appellate courts do not second-guess the weight a district court assigns to § 3553(a) factors so long as the sentence is reasonable. This supported deference to the district court’s emphasis on deterrence and criminal history.
United States v. Evans, 958 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 2020): A sentencing court may rely on facts admitted by the defendant, undisputed PSI statements, and evidence presented at sentencing. The Eleventh Circuit used Evans to validate reliance on Groover’s admitted prior conviction, as distinct from the disputed narrative details.
United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013): If a defendant disputes a factual basis for sentencing, the government must prove the fact by a preponderance of the evidence with reliable and specific evidence. The court reiterated this burden but found it inapplicable because there was no reliance on disputed facts—and counsel invited any error regarding the probation violations.
United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013): Prohibits sentencing courts from relying on disputed facts not proven by a preponderance. The court distinguished Philidor because here the district court referenced undisputed facts or facts conceded by the defense at sentencing.
United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009): Under the invited-error doctrine, appellate review is barred when the defendant induces or invites the error. The panel applied Brannan to hold that defense counsel’s treatment of the 23 probation violations—conceding their existence while arguing they were not significant—foreclosed appellate review.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): The court will vacate a sentence only if left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing § 3553(a). The panel found no such error.
United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008): While not presumptively reasonable, within-Guidelines sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable. The bottom-of-range sentence supported affirmance.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008): A sentence well below the statutory maximum indicates reasonableness. Groover’s sentence was far below the 15-year maximum.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005): Though not central to the holding, Shepard was referenced in sentencing objections about the kinds of documents permissible to classify prior convictions. The probation office clarified the narrative was background and not used for guidelines calculations, and Groover later abandoned his guidelines challenge after Rowe.
United States v. Rowe, 143 F.4th 1318 (11th Cir. 2025): Held that Florida cocaine trafficking under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b) is categorically a controlled substance offense for guideline purposes. This foreclosed Groover’s guidelines argument and contributed to a correct advisory range of 70–87 months.
United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 892–93 (11th Cir. 2025): Post-Bruen and Rahimi, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Second Amendment. The panel cited Dubois to explain why Groover’s constitutional challenge was foreclosed.
United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2017), abrogated in part on other grounds by Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): Upheld § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause. The panel noted that Groover’s Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed by Longoria.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

No actual reliance on disputed PSI narrative: Groover objected to the PSI’s narrative describing the factual circumstances of his 2018 cocaine-trafficking conviction. The panel examined the sentencing transcript and found the district court did not rely on those disputed narrative facts. Instead, the court referenced only the existence of the trafficking conviction—an admitted fact—and drew reasonable inferences about Groover’s pattern of disregard for the law from his record as a whole. Under Evans, a district court may rely on admitted convictions and undisputed PSI statements without triggering the government’s burden to prove disputed facts.
Invited error regarding probation violations: Groover argued the district court improperly relied on 23 probation violations listed under the trafficking conviction’s PSI narrative. But at sentencing, defense counsel did not dispute that the violations occurred; counsel instead minimized their significance, characterizing them as technical or clustered (e.g., “community control” violations). This concession invited any alleged error. Applying Brannan, the Eleventh Circuit held that invited error forecloses review of the claim that the district court improperly relied on those violations absent government proof.
No double-counting of prison disciplinary violations: Although the PSI mentioned the same four prison disciplinary infractions in the narratives for both the trafficking and criminal mischief convictions, the PSI also made clear that the sentences ran concurrently. At the hearing, the government expressly stated Groover had four disciplinary violations, not eight, and the court referenced them only once while discussing the criminal mischief conviction (a narrative to which Groover had not objected). The record therefore did not support the assertion that the district court mistakenly believed there were eight violations or otherwise double-counted them.

With those points resolved, the panel reviewed the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis. The court emphasized the seriousness of the instant offense, Groover’s escalating criminal conduct (including a serious drug-trafficking conviction), repeated supervision violations, recent recidivism soon after release, and the need for both specific and general deterrence. Given the totality of the circumstances, the bottom-of-Guidelines sentence—well below the statutory maximum—fell within the range of reasonable choices contemplated by Gall, Rosales-Bruno, Irey, Hunt, and Gonzalez.

Impact

The opinion, though unpublished, carries several practical implications for federal sentencing practice in the Eleventh Circuit:

Actual reliance requirement: Appellants challenging substantive reasonableness based on alleged reliance on disputed PSI facts must identify record evidence that the district court actually relied on those disputed details. Merely pointing to objected-to PSI narratives is insufficient if the court anchored its analysis in admitted facts (e.g., existence of prior convictions) or undisputed history.
Invited error limits preservation strategies: Defense counsel should avoid conceding the existence of PSI facts they intend to challenge on appeal. Arguing that a fact is “not significant” rather than denying it occurred may be treated as an invitation to rely on it, precluding appellate review under Brannan.
PSI drafting and reading: Repetition of the same disciplinary history across narratives for multiple prior convictions, by itself, does not show the sentencing court double-counted. Clear notation of concurrent sentences and explicit counts by the government at sentencing will mitigate the risk of confusion.
Weighting § 3553(a) factors: The decision reaffirms substantial sentencing discretion: district courts may give heightened weight to criminal history and deterrence interests when the record shows escalating conduct and quick recidivism after release.
Guidelines and Florida drug offenses: Rowe’s holding that Florida cocaine trafficking under § 893.135(1)(b) is a controlled substance offense will continue to drive higher advisory ranges in firearms cases involving such priors (e.g., under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1), narrowing grounds for guidelines challenges in the Eleventh Circuit.
Constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1): Post-Bruen and Rahimi, Dubois and Longoria continue to foreclose Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Eleventh Circuit, at least absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive vs. procedural reasonableness: Procedural errors involve mistakes like miscalculating the Guidelines or relying on clearly erroneous facts. Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is reasonable given the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. Groover’s appeal focused on substantive reasonableness.
Presentence Investigation Report (PSI): A detailed report prepared by probation officers that summarizes the offense, the defendant’s criminal history, personal background, and other relevant information for sentencing. Parties may object to factual statements in the PSI. If disputed, the government must prove those facts by a preponderance of the evidence before the court may rely on them.
Shepard documents: When a court classifies prior convictions for certain legal purposes (e.g., ACCA, Guidelines enhancements), it is limited to specific sources—charging documents, plea agreements, plea colloquies, jury instructions, verdict forms, and comparable judicial records. Groover initially raised a Shepard-adjacent classification issue, but Rowe foreclosed it.
Preponderance of the evidence: The standard for proving disputed facts at sentencing—more likely than not. If a fact is disputed, the government bears this burden with reliable and specific evidence before the court may rely on the fact.
Invited error: If a party induces or invites a particular ruling or reliance by the court (e.g., conceding the existence of a fact), that party generally cannot challenge the ruling on appeal.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors: The statute instructs courts to consider, among other things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the need for deterrence, public protection, just punishment, and the advisory Guidelines range.
Within-Guidelines and statutory maximum indicators: Although not dispositive, a sentence at the bottom of a correctly calculated advisory range and well below the statutory maximum is commonly viewed as an indicator of reasonableness.

Additional Practical Guidance for Sentencing Advocacy

When disputing PSI facts, expressly ask the court to make a finding or to state on the record that it will not consider the disputed narrative absent proof.
Avoid characterizing disputed facts as “not significant.” If you intend to preserve a challenge, maintain the dispute and request an evidentiary hearing or proffer.
Ask the government to clarify counts and dates for disciplinary or probation violations where the PSI references them in multiple places to prevent any perception of double-counting.
If the court indicates it would impose the same sentence even under a lower Guidelines range, build a record addressing § 3553(a) mitigation themes independent of Guidelines calculations.

Conclusion

United States v. Groover sharpens the Eleventh Circuit’s guidance on substantive reasonableness challenges premised on alleged reliance on disputed PSI facts. The decision teaches that the appellant must demonstrate actual reliance on the disputed facts, not merely their presence in the PSI. It further underscores that concessions at sentencing can trigger the invited-error doctrine, foreclosing later review. The court’s emphasis on admitted convictions, undisputed supervision and disciplinary history, and the traditional indicators of reasonableness (bottom-of-Guidelines, well below the statutory maximum) collectively sustained the sentence. In the broader landscape, Groover reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s deference to district courts’ § 3553(a) balancing—especially where the record shows escalating conduct and rapid recidivism—while also reminding practitioners that precise objections and careful preservation are essential in sentencing litigation.