Actual Receipt of Citation, Not Mere Knowledge of Suit: The Texas Supreme Court Refines Craddock in Alternative‑Service Default Divorces

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam opinion in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919 (opinion delivered Dec. 5, 2025), is a significant development in Texas default‑judgment jurisprudence, especially in the family‑law context. The Court clarifies how the venerable Craddock test applies when a defendant has been validly served by alternative means but credibly denies ever receiving the citation.

The case arises from a default divorce decree entered after the husband, Gary, obtained alternative service on his wife, Jenna, at her parents’ home. Jenna did not appear at the default hearing. The trial court orally rendered a default divorce, then later signed a written decree even though Jenna, through counsel, had already filed both an answer and a motion for new trial under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm’n Op. 1939).

The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether Jenna satisfied the three‑part Craddock test for setting aside a no‑answer default judgment:

1. Her failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to mistake or accident;
2. She “set up” a meritorious defense; and
3. Granting a new trial would not cause delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

Both the trial court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Jenna failed the first Craddock element, concluding she was consciously indifferent to the suit. The Supreme Court disagreed, reversed, and ordered a new trial.

The opinion does three important things:

• It refines what it means to negate “intentional” or “consciously indifferent” failure to answer when service is by posting under Rule 106(b);
• It underscores the distinction between knowledge that a lawsuit exists and knowledge that a defendant has been served with a citation commanding an answer; and
• It reinforces and operationalizes the strong policy disfavoring default judgments, particularly in family‑law matters involving divorce, property division, and child custody.

Note: This is a scholarly commentary and does not constitute legal advice.

---

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

After a 13‑year marriage and the birth of one child, Jenna left the marital home to live with her parents due to alleged mistreatment by Gary. Shortly thereafter, Gary filed for divorce and told Jenna that he had done so.

Jenna testified that she:

• Was frightened and lacked funds to hire a lawyer;
• Did not know what to do about the lawsuit; and
• Assumed she would be personally handed the divorce papers (personal service).

Her father testified that the family was waiting for someone to personally serve Jenna at his home.

After several failed personal‑service attempts, the trial court authorized alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). A process server then posted the citation, the divorce petition, and the alternative‑service order on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ home, where Jenna was living.

No answer was filed. Gary sought a default judgment. At a hearing—unattended by Jenna—the trial judge orally rendered a default divorce.

Around the same time, Jenna contacted an attorney after Gary allegedly threatened to abscond with their child and the family dog. Within about three weeks, her attorney filed:

• An answer; and
• A motion for new trial under Craddock.

Despite Jenna’s appearance through counsel, the trial court signed the written default decree a few days later. Jenna did not, on appeal, challenge the signing of the decree after her appearance.

B. Procedural History

1. Trial Court
   • Found that Jenna had been properly served by alternative service.
   • Found that Jenna had “set up” a meritorious defense.
   • Nevertheless denied the motion for new trial, holding:
     • She was “consciously indifferent” in failing to answer; and
     • She failed to prove that a new trial would not harm or injure Gary.
2. Court of Appeals (Houston [14th Dist.])
   • Affirmed the denial of a new trial.
   • Analyzed only the first Craddock element.
   • Held that Jenna’s excuses (unawareness of service, belief she would be personally served) did not negate conscious indifference.
   • Relied on evidence that Gary told Jenna about the lawsuit and that a process server had attempted service, concluding the trial court could reject Jenna’s account.
3. Texas Supreme Court
   • Granted review.
   • Rejected Jenna’s challenge to the validity of service, concluding there was no reversible error on that issue and declining to elaborate under Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024).
   • Held that Jenna satisfied all three Craddock elements and was entitled to a new trial.
   • Reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

C. Holding in One Sentence

A defendant validly served by alternative service who credibly explains that she never actually received the posted citation—and promptly appears upon learning of the default—satisfies the first Craddock element, and where she also sets up a meritorious defense and shows no undue injury to the plaintiff, the trial court must grant a new trial.

---

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Comm’n Op. 1939)

Craddock established the foundational three‑part test to set aside a no‑answer default judgment:

1. Failure to answer not intentional or due to conscious indifference, but due to accident or mistake;
2. A meritorious defense “set up” in the motion; and
3. No delay or injury to the plaintiff if a new trial is granted.

This standard has remained the core equitable doctrine for relief from no‑answer defaults in Texas for nearly a century. The present case applies and extends that doctrine in the specific context of alternative service under Rule 106(b).

2. In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024)

Lakeside is cited for the overarching policy tilt against default judgments:

• Default judgments are “greatly disfavored.”
• There is a strong preference for adjudicating cases on the merits through the “adversarial clash.”
• Ex parte default proceedings raise concerns about:
  • Fairness to the absent party;
  • Judicial integrity and independence; and
  • The risk of erroneous judgments backed by state coercive power.
• Any doubts about a default judgment—not just doubts about service—must be resolved against the party that obtained the default.

The Tabakman Court uses Lakeside to frame default relief as an exceptional but strongly favored corrective when a defendant plausibly lacked meaningful notice or opportunity to participate.

3. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006)

R.R. distilled Craddock and emphasized how the first element is tested:

• The defendant meets her burden if her factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct and those assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.
• “Not understanding a citation and then doing nothing following service” is insufficient as an excuse.

In Tabakman, the Court distinguishes R.R.: The problem there was a defendant who received the citation but failed to act; here, Jenna’s claim is that she never received the citation at all, despite valid constructive service.

4. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006)

Fidelity is pivotal for two reasons:

• It sharpens the key question in Craddock analysis: “Why did the defendant not appear?”
• It teaches that if the answer is “Because I didn’t get the suit papers,” the default generally must be set aside—if that claim is supported by a plausible explanation.

The Court also recognized that losing or misplacing suit papers is a common and understandable failure, and that people often cannot identify exactly how or where they were lost. Still, some corroborating explanation from the person likely to have seen them is generally required.

Tabakman extends this logic: If a defendant says I never received the citation posted under alternative service and provides a reasonable, corroborated explanation (e.g., construction workers, security protocols, no notice), that explanation ordinarily negates conscious indifference.

5. Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012)

In Sutherland, the Court held that an excuse such as leaving the citation in a stack of papers on a desk and forgetting about it due to limited office time during the holidays could negate conscious indifference. Crucially, the Court stated:

• Conscious indifference is “more than mere negligence.”
• “Some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” can suffice to show the failure to answer was not because the defendant did not care.

Tabakman invokes this rationale to support Jenna’s account: even if her assumptions about service (that it would be personal) were mistaken, that kind of legal mistake, combined with lack of actual receipt, can defeat a finding of conscious indifference.

6. Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012)

Milestone reinforced that the controlling fact under the first Craddock element is the absence of an intentional failure to answer—not the quality of the excuse. It again approved excuses based on misplacement or loss of suit papers.

Tabakman relies on this to:

• Underscore that the inquiry is not whether Jenna’s actions were perfectly prudent; and
• Affirm that an honest and supported account of non‑receipt (even when service is technically valid) suffices.

7. Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992)

Bank One stands for the proposition that a mistake of law can, in appropriate circumstances, satisfy the first Craddock element. Jenna’s belief that service had to be in person was legally incorrect—alternative service is allowed—yet such a legal mistake can negate conscious indifference when coupled with lack of actual notice.

8. Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995)

Smith clarifies:

• A failure to answer is not “intentional” merely because it is deliberate;
• “Conscious indifference” is more than ordinary negligence.

This threshold protects defendants from losing their day in court merely because they were imperfectly diligent, as opposed to deliberately apathetic.

9. Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990)

Wilson is critical to the Court’s distinction between:

• Knowledge of a pending lawsuit; and
• Receipt of a citation directing the defendant to appear.

Wilson held that absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge that a suit has been filed imposes no legal duty to answer. Tabakman imports this concept directly into the Craddock analysis: being told “I sued you” is not the same as being served with a citation warning of default.

10. Tex. Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002)

The Court uses Sierra Club to explain what a citation is:

• A document directed to the defendant, telling them they have been sued; and
• Commanding them to appear and answer under penalty of default.

Tabakman relies on this to stress that service of the citation, not just awareness of a case filing, triggers the defendant’s duty to engage with the lawsuit.

11. Alternative‑Service and Notice Cases

• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) – permits alternative service methods (such as posting) when standard personal or mail service fails.
• State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993)
  • Alternative service is designed for circumstances where proof of actual notice is impractical.
  • Proof that alternative service was executed is evidence of how and when service occurred, but is “no evidence in the record of when defendant received actual notice.”
• Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987)
  • Rule 21a service by mail creates a presumption of receipt, but that presumption is not “evidence” and vanishes when opposing evidence of non‑receipt is offered.
• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025)
  • Distinguishes “actual” from “constructive” knowledge for purposes of notice of a judgment under Rule 306a.

These authorities collectively support the Court’s conclusion that proof of valid alternative service does not automatically establish that the defendant received or knew of the citation—and thus does not, by itself, controvert a defendant’s sworn denial of receipt.

12. Meritorious-Defense and Injury Cases

• Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009)
  • To “set up” a meritorious defense, the defendant need only allege facts that in law constitute a defense and support them with prima facie evidence—not prove the defense by a preponderance.
  • Once the defendant meets her burden on injury/delay by allegations and reasonable offers (e.g., payment of default‑related costs), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show injury.
• Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994)
  • “Injury” under Craddock means prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present the merits at a new trial, not mere financial hardship or inconvenience.
• In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021)
  • Allowed litigation of a separate‑property claim without disturbing the underlying divorce, custody, support, and community‑property aspects.
  • Used in Tabakman to show that allowing a new trial on property issues does not necessarily injure the opposing spouse in a way cognizable under Craddock.
• In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2022)
  • Confirms that Craddock applies in family‑law and divorce contexts to set aside default decrees.

13. Procedural and Jurisprudential Management

• Rule 22, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure – a lawsuit is “commenced” by filing a petition, but that filing does not itself impose a duty on the defendant to appear.
• Rule 99(c) – prescribes the content of the citation, including the warning that “a default judgment may be taken against you” if you fail to answer.
• Rule 320 – allows new trials “for good cause” beyond Craddock; the Court notes that even if Craddock is not satisfied, trial courts hold broad discretion to grant a new trial in default cases.
• Rule 59.1, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure – permits disposition of a petition for review without oral argument when the Court deems it appropriate.
• Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024) – recognizes that the Court may, as “stewards of scarce judicial resources,” decide not to write at length on issues that do not warrant further development in the state’s jurisprudence (here, Jenna’s technical service‑validity challenge).

14. Texas Family Code and Separate-Property Presumption

The Court briefly addresses:

• Texas Family Code § 3.003 – presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

Gary relied on this provision to argue Jenna had not overcome the community presumption. The Court responds by pointing out that such a merits dispute is not resolved at the Craddock stage; it is enough that Jenna “set up” a reimbursement claim supported by prima facie evidence.

---

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The First Craddock Element: Why Did Jenna Not Appear?

The Court’s analysis begins from the central question articulated in Fidelity & Guaranty: why did the defendant not appear?

Jenna’s explanation, supported by her own and her father’s testimony, was:

• She believed she would be personally served and was waiting for that event.
• She did not take any steps to avoid service.
• She was unaware of any attempts by a process server to personally contact her, knock on the door, or leave documents with family or neighborhood security.
• She never saw the citation posted under alternative service and no one brought it to her.
• Her father confirmed that:
  • A security guard at their community typically notifies him of visitors;
  • The guard never reported any process server;
  • There was construction at the house, but the crew did not give him any documents; and
  • He never saw any papers posted on the door.
• Upon learning that a default judgment had been rendered, she promptly retained counsel, and an answer was filed before the judge signed the written default decree.

The Court holds that, if true, these facts:

• Negate an “intentional” decision not to answer;
• Negate “conscious indifference” (i.e., a knowing choice not to care); and
• Show at most a legally mistaken, but non‑willful, approach to the lawsuit.

Two key doctrinal moves support this conclusion:

1. Legal Mistake as Acceptable Excuse.
   Relying on Bank One, the Court accepts that Jenna’s belief that she had to be served in person—even though wrong as a matter of law—can be an excuse sufficient to defeat conscious indifference when paired with a genuine lack of actual notice.
2. Non‑receipt of Citation as Excuse, Even After Valid Alternative Service.
   Analogizing to lost suit papers (Fidelity, Sutherland, Milestone), the Court reasons that:
   • Defendants often do not know exactly how they failed to receive posted citations, just as they may not know how they lost papers.
   • A credible, fact‑specific explanation, corroborated by someone likely to have seen the papers, passes the Craddock threshold.
   • Especially in alternative‑service contexts, there is an inherent risk that the defendant may never actually see the posting, even if service is technically valid.

From this, the Court concludes Jenna’s reason is “some excuse,” which, under Sutherland and Milestone, need not be a “good excuse” so long as it shows she did not simply disregard the lawsuit.

2. Distinguishing Knowledge of Suit from Knowledge of Citation

The court of appeals placed heavy weight on evidence that:

• Gary informed Jenna of the divorce filing;
• She knew “someone was attempting to serve” her; and
• There were conversations about a process server and the citation.

The Supreme Court criticizes this reasoning as conflating two different things:

• Awareness that a lawsuit has been filed; and
• Awareness that a citation has been served, triggering a duty to answer under penalty of default.

Drawing on Rules 22 and 99(c), Sierra Club, and Wilson, the Court holds:

• Filing a petition commences a lawsuit, but does not, by itself, impose an obligation on the defendant to respond.
• Only service, waiver, or formal citation gives rise to a legal duty to answer.
• Actual notice via non‑authorized methods is treated as if the defendant was never served.

Thus, Jenna’s knowledge that Gary had “filed for divorce” and talked generally about a process server does not negate her contention that she never received the citation or knew that it had been validly served by posting.

3. The Role of Alternative Service in Controverting a Craddock Excuse

Gary argued that his evidence of properly executed alternative service controverted Jenna’s explanation of non‑receipt. The Court rejects that argument as a misunderstanding of what alternative service proves.

• Alternative service under Rule 106(b) is designed for circumstances where proof of actual notice is impractical.
• Proof that a citation was posted at a certain place and time establishes that service was carried out as ordered—but not that the defendant in fact saw or received it.
• As Costley holds, such proof is “no evidence” of when the defendant achieved actual notice.
• Presumptions of receipt (e.g., under Rule 21a) are not evidence and disappear upon a credible denial of receipt (Cliff).

Here, the process server admitted that she never saw Jenna, and there was no evidence that Jenna, or anyone who dealt with her, ever handled or delivered the posted citation to her. Jenna’s detailed, sworn account—plus her father’s corroboration—stood uncontroverted on the only point that matters under Craddock: why she did not appear.

4. The Second Craddock Element: Setting Up a Meritorious Defense

The Court then turns to the second element, which the court of appeals had not reached but the trial court had found satisfied.

Under Dolgencorp, a defendant “sets up” a meritorious defense if she:

1. Alleges facts that, if true, would constitute a legal defense; and
2. Supports those facts with affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof.

Jenna asserted, among other defenses, a reimbursement claim from the community estate to her separate estate based on funds allegedly used as a down payment on the marital residence. She supported this with testimonial and documentary evidence.

Gary countered that Jenna failed to overcome the community‑property presumption of Family Code § 3.003 by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court holds that:

• This argument goes to the ultimate merits of the reimbursement and characterization dispute; and
• At the Craddock stage, Jenna need only show a plausible, evidence‑supported defense—not prove it conclusively.

The Court therefore agrees with the trial court that Jenna successfully set up at least one meritorious defense.

5. The Third Craddock Element: No Undue Delay or Injury

For the third element, Jenna alleged that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injury to Gary. She further offered to:

• Proceed promptly (representing readiness for trial); and
• Pay Gary’s reasonable costs in securing the default judgment.

Under Dolgencorp, such allegations and offers meet the defendant’s initial burden and shift the burden to the plaintiff to show specific injury.

Gary attempted to show injury by:

• Pointing to financial costs related to:
  • Managing the community estate; and
  • Selling the marital home; and
• Expressing concern that undoing the standard‑possession and custody provisions would cause strain on the child.

Invoking Evans, the Court reiterates that:

• “Injury” under Craddock means prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present the merits of the case at a new trial.
• General costs, inconvenience, or hardship—without a showing that they impair the plaintiff’s presentation of the case—do not satisfy this standard.

Gary did not explain how the claimed harms would disadvantage him in litigating the merits. Moreover, the Court notes that, under In re Marriage of Sandoval, allowing a spouse to litigate a separate‑property or reimbursement claim in a subsequent proceeding does not undermine the stability of the underlying divorce, custody, or support rulings.

By analogy, allowing Jenna to contest property characterization and related issues in a new trial—rather than through a narrow post‑judgment mechanism—does not inherently injure Gary in the sense relevant to Craddock.

Accordingly, the Court concludes Jenna satisfied the third element as well.

---

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarification of Craddock in Alternative-Service Settings

The most important doctrinal contribution of Tabakman is its clear statement that:

• Evidence of proper alternative service is not evidence that the defendant actually received the citation; and
• A defendant’s credible, supported denial of actual receipt can satisfy the first Craddock element, even when service is indisputably valid and the defendant knew a lawsuit had been filed.

This holding will be especially influential in cases involving:

• Service by posting or other substitute means;
• Transitory or unstable living situations (e.g., domestic‑violence context, temporary housing); and
• High‑conflict family disputes where one party may have greater access to information or counsel.

2. Reinforcement of the Policy Against Default Judgments

Tabakman, following Lakeside, powerfully restates Texas’s policy:

• Courts should strongly prefer merits‑based adjudication over defaults;
• Ex parte default judgments carry serious fairness and legitimacy concerns; and
• Any doubt regarding a default—not just about service—must be resolved against the party who secured it.

In practical terms, this opinion will make trial courts more cautious about denying new‑trial motions where:

• The defendant offers a plausible, supported explanation for non‑appearance;
• The defendant acts quickly once aware of the default; and
• There is any serious issue regarding actual notice, even if constructive notice requirements are satisfied.

3. Implications for Family Law Practice

In the divorce context, the opinion has several specific implications:

• Default divorces are especially disfavored.
  Given the profound and lasting consequences of divorce judgments (status, property rights, custody, support), courts will likely be even more inclined to grant new trials when a default divorce is obtained on alternative service and the absent spouse credibly asserts non‑receipt.
• Property characterization defenses will more readily support Craddock relief.
  A spouse’s claim that certain funds or assets are separate property, or that the community owes reimbursement, will usually suffice as a “meritorious defense” where supported by basic documentation or testimony.
• Child‑custody default orders are vulnerable when the absent parent shows lack of actual notice.
  Courts may be particularly sensitive to ensuring that both parents have a genuine opportunity to be heard before finalizing custody and possession orders.

4. Litigation Strategy and Burden-Shifting

For plaintiffs seeking to uphold a default judgment:

• It will not be enough to show that service complied with Rule 106(b);
• They should be prepared to present specific evidence that:
  • The defendant actually saw or received the citation (e.g., admissions, conduct indicating awareness, witnesses who handed over documents); or
  • The defendant’s excuse is implausible or internally inconsistent.

For defendants seeking relief:

• They should provide detailed, corroborated affidavits explaining:
  • Where they were living;
  • Household routines (who checks the door, mail, etc.);
  • Any construction, repair, or third‑party activity that could account for non‑receipt; and
  • Their efforts (or lack of efforts) regarding anticipated service.
• Prompt action upon learning of the default—especially filing an answer before the decree is signed—strongly supports a finding of no conscious indifference.

5. The Court’s Approach to Judicial Economy and Issue Selection

By expressly declining to elaborate on Jenna’s challenge to the validity of service, the Court signals an ongoing willingness to:

• Assume, without extended discussion, that service was valid where no reversible error is shown; and
• Direct its jurisprudential efforts toward more consequential issues (here, the scope of Craddock in alternative‑service contexts).

This approach both conserves judicial resources and encourages lower courts and practitioners to concentrate on substantive, systemic issues rather than purely technical or fact‑bound disputes that do not alter the outcome.

---

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Default Judgment
  A judgment entered when a defendant fails to respond or appear. In a “no‑answer” default, the defendant never files an answer after being served.
• Craddock Test
  A three‑part equitable standard used to decide whether to set aside a no‑answer default judgment:
  1. The failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to mistake or accident;
  2. The defendant has a plausible defense supported by basic evidence; and
  3. Granting a new trial will not unfairly delay or harm the plaintiff’s ability to present the case.
• Conscious Indifference
  More than simple negligence; it means the defendant knew about the suit and knew an answer was required but “did not care” to respond.
• Citation
  The formal court document served on a defendant, telling them they have been sued and ordering them to appear and answer, warning that a default judgment may be entered if they do not.
• Alternative Service (Rule 106(b))
  When personal or mail service cannot be accomplished despite diligent efforts, the court may authorize alternative methods, such as:
  • Leaving the citation with someone who appears to be over a certain age at the defendant’s usual place of abode; or
  • Posting the citation on the front door of the defendant’s usual place of abode.
  Such service is legally valid even if the defendant never actually sees the citation.
• Actual vs. Constructive Notice
  
  • Actual notice – the person truly knows of the lawsuit or judgment (e.g., they read the papers).
  • Constructive notice – the law treats the person as if they knew, because service was completed in a valid way, even if they did not literally read the documents.
  Tabakman explains that valid constructive service does not necessarily imply actual notice for purposes of excusing a default under Craddock.
• Meritorious Defense
  A defense that, if proven at trial, could change the outcome—e.g., that certain property is separate rather than community. The defendant need only show a plausible basis and some supporting evidence, not prove the defense fully at the new‑trial stage.
• Reimbursement Claim in Divorce
  A claim that one estate (e.g., a spouse’s separate property) should be reimbursed because its funds were used to benefit another estate (e.g., the community) without proper compensation. For example, using separate funds for a down payment on a marital home.
• Community-Property Presumption (Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003)
  All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property. To prove otherwise, a spouse must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the property is separate (e.g., acquired before marriage, by gift, or by inheritance).
• Injury Under Craddock
  In this context, “injury” means real prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present the merits at a new trial—not just extra cost, delay, or emotional strain.

---

V. Conclusion

Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman solidifies and refines Texas law on setting aside default judgments in cases involving alternative service. The Supreme Court’s central messages are:

• Default judgments remain “greatly disfavored,” especially in high‑stakes matters like divorce and custody;
• Valid alternative service does not automatically equate to actual notice; a defendant’s supported denial of receiving the citation can satisfy the first Craddock element;
• Mere knowledge that a suit was filed does not impose a duty to answer and does not defeat a Craddock excuse rooted in non‑receipt of citation;
• To “set up” a meritorious defense, a defendant need not win the dispute at the new‑trial stage; plausible, supported claims—such as reimbursement for separate‑property contributions—are enough; and
• “Injury” under Craddock means prejudice to merits presentation, not simply cost or disruption, and is not shown by generic financial or emotional harms.

By reversing the denial of a new trial and remanding for full litigation on the merits, the Court reaffirms a robust commitment to procedural fairness and adversarial truth‑seeking. Tabakman will guide trial courts, lawyers, and litigants in future default cases—particularly where alternative service intersects with contested issues of actual notice, family relationships, and fundamental property and custody rights.