Actual Receipt of Citation, Not Mere Knowledge of Suit: The Texas Supreme Court Recalibrates the Craddock Doctrine in Default Divorce Judgments

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919 (Tex. Dec. 5, 2025), is a significant development in Texas default-judgment jurisprudence. Although arising from a default divorce decree, the Court’s analysis is not confined to family law; it materially refines the application of the Craddock test across all civil cases, especially where alternative service is used.

At the center of the dispute is whether a defendant who:

• knows a lawsuit has been filed,
• is validly served via alternative service (here, posting on a door), but
• credibly testifies that she never actually saw or received the citation

can satisfy the first element of the Craddock test and obtain a new trial after a default judgment. The lower courts said no; the Supreme Court emphatically said yes.

The Court holds that:

• Mere knowledge that a lawsuit exists is not the same as knowledge that one has been served with citation.
• Evidence that alternative service was properly carried out does not, by itself, controvert a defendant’s sworn assertion that she never actually received the citation.
• When a defendant promptly appears and moves for a new trial after learning of a default, and provides a plausible explanation for failing to answer, the equitable Craddock doctrine mandates relief.

The decision strengthens Texas’s already robust preference for adjudicating cases on the merits rather than by default, and clarifies how Craddock applies in the increasingly common context of alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b).

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

After thirteen years of marriage and one child, Jenna Tabakman left the marital home, alleging mistreatment by her husband, Gary Tabakman. She moved in with her parents. That same month, Gary filed for divorce and told Jenna that he had filed, so she indisputably knew a divorce lawsuit existed.

Jenna testified that she:

• was scared, had no money for an attorney,
• did not know what to do, and
• assumed she would be personally served with the divorce papers.

Her father confirmed that the family was waiting for in-person service. After multiple unsuccessful attempts at personal service, the trial court authorized alternative service under Rule 106(b), and a process server posted the citation, petition, and alternative-service order on the front door of the parents’ home.

No answer was filed by Jenna, so Gary moved for a default judgment.

B. Default Judgment and Postjudgment Events

At a hearing on Gary’s motion, the trial judge orally rendered a default judgment. Jenna did not appear—it is undisputed she was unaware of that hearing.

Around the same time, Jenna became concerned because Gary allegedly said he planned to leave with their child and the family dog. In response, she contacted a lawyer. Within three weeks:

• her lawyer filed an answer, and
• her lawyer filed a motion for new trial under Craddock.

Despite her appearance and pending motion, the trial court signed the default divorce decree a few days later. Jenna did not challenge that timing as an independent ground for reversal, and the Supreme Court notes that point in a footnote and leaves it untouched.

C. Motion for New Trial and Lower-Court Rulings

At an evidentiary hearing on Jenna’s new-trial motion:

• The trial court found that Jenna had asserted a meritorious defense (element two under Craddock), but
• held that she was consciously indifferent in not answering, and
• concluded that she failed to show a lack of injury or harm to Gary if a new trial were granted (element three).

The court of appeals (Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Houston) affirmed, focusing only on the first Craddock element. It reasoned that Jenna’s explanation—that she was unaware of being served and did nothing to avoid service—was insufficient to negate conscious indifference, particularly because:

• Gary had informed her of the suit, and
• there was evidence she knew someone was trying to serve her.

Because those facts were “controverted,” the court of appeals held the trial court was free to resolve the conflicts against Jenna.

Jenna petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, challenging:

• the denial of a new trial under Craddock, and
• the validity of service.

On the service issue, the Supreme Court, citing Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. 2024), expressly declined to address it in detail, concluding no reversible error and that further discussion would not benefit the state’s jurisprudence.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court:

1. Reaffirms that default judgments are strongly disfavored in Texas because they raise serious fairness and accuracy concerns.
2. Clarifies the first Craddock element in the context of alternative service:
   • Mere knowledge of a lawsuit does not equate to knowledge of having been served.
   • A defendant’s credible statement that she did not receive the citation—even where alternative service was validly executed—can negate conscious indifference.
   • Proof that alternative service was properly carried out is not evidence of actual receipt and does not necessarily controvert the defendant’s excuse.
3. Holds that Jenna satisfied all three Craddock elements:
   • Her failure to answer was not intentional or the product of conscious indifference.
   • She “set up” a meritorious defense (a reimbursement claim regarding separate funds used for the marital home’s down payment).
   • Her motion was timely, and she showed that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injury to Gary.
4. Reverses the court of appeals and remands for a new trial in the trial court.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Default-Judgment Backdrop: Strong Disfavor and Policy of Merits-Based Adjudication

The Court anchors its analysis in its recent decision In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024), which:

• describes default judgments as “greatly disfavored,”
• emphasizes the system’s preference for decisions on the merits, and
• highlights the systemic risks of ex parte proceedings and erroneous judgments.

Key policy points reiterated here include:

• The adversarial system works best when both sides appear and test each other’s evidence and arguments.
• Ex parte default proceedings raise concerns about fairness and judicial legitimacy.
• Nevertheless, courts cannot allow defendants to frustrate judicial authority merely by refusing to participate; default judgments are tolerated but not favored.
• “Any doubts” about a default judgment—“not just doubts about service”—must be resolved against the party who obtained the default.

This framing colors the Court’s generous construction of Craddock in Jenna’s favor.

B. The Craddock Test and Its Evolution

Under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939), a defendant seeking to set aside a default judgment must show:

1. The failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to accident or mistake;
2. The defendant has a meritorious defense; and
3. The motion is filed at such a time that granting a new trial will not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.

The Court reiterates earlier pronouncements that when these three elements are met, the trial court must grant a new trial. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006).

The Court also notes, consistent with Lakeside and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320, that even if Craddock is not met, trial courts still retain broad discretion to grant a new trial for “good cause,” because default judgments “differ from every other kind in a fundamental way.”

C. First Craddock Element: Intentional or Consciously Indifferent Failure to Answer

1. The Legal Standard and Prior Precedent

The Court restates settled principles:

• A failure to answer is not “intentional” merely because it was deliberate.
• Conscious indifference is more than negligence. As articulated in Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006), it means the defendant knew it was sued and simply did not care.
• The “controlling fact” is the absence of an intentional failure to answer, not the quality of the excuse. Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012).
• Therefore, “some excuse, although not necessarily a good one, will suffice” to negate conscious indifference. Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Tex. 2012).

The evidentiary rule remains:

• If the defendant’s factual assertions, if true, negate intent or conscious indifference, and
• those assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff,

then the defendant satisfies the first Craddock element as a matter of law. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 115.

The Court applies these principles in a novel way to the context of alternative service.

2. Jenna’s Excuse and Why It Is Legally Sufficient

Jenna’s explanation included several components:

• She believed—incorrectly—that she would be served in person.
• She did not take steps to avoid service and was unaware of any attempt by a process server to personally serve her.
• She never saw the citation that had been posted on the front door of her parents’ home under the alternative-service order.
• When she learned of the default, she swiftly hired counsel and filed an answer before the written default decree was signed.

The Court holds that, if true, these facts:

• negate intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer; and
• fit comfortably within the line of cases where the Court has found excuses such as “I don’t recall being served” or “I misplaced the suit papers” sufficient to satisfy Craddock’s first prong. See:
  • Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012);
  • Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012);
  • Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006).

The Court also emphasizes that a mistake of law—here, assuming service must be personal—can satisfy the first Craddock element. Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992).

Her father’s testimony provides the type of corroboration the Court described in Drewery in the context of “lost” citations—namely:

• there was construction at the house at the time of posting,
• the neighborhood security guard never reported any visitors such as process servers,
• the construction crew did not hand him any papers taken from the door, and
• he never saw the posted citation.

This corroboration helps show why Jenna might never have actually received or seen the citation, even if it was lawfully posted.

3. Critical Distinction: Knowledge of Lawsuit vs Knowledge of Service

The Court criticizes the court of appeals for failing to distinguish between:

• Knowledge that a lawsuit has been filed (which Jenna clearly had), and
• Knowledge that one has been properly served with citation commanding a response.

This distinction is anchored in two key precedents:

• Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002):
  • Explains that a “citation” is a procedural device directed at the defendant, informing them of:
    • the existence of the suit,
    • the need to answer, and
    • the risk of default judgment.
• Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990):
  • Holds that “[a]bsent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.”

The Court further cites Drewery for the proposition that:

Receiving suit papers or actual notice through a procedure not authorized for service is treated the same as never receiving them.

In other words, service, not mere awareness of litigation, is what triggers the legal obligation to respond. Thus, a defendant can know a suit exists but still lack actual notice of proper service; in that scenario, failing to answer is not automatically “conscious indifference.”

4. The Role of Alternative Service and Why Proper Execution Does Not Equal Actual Notice

Gary argued that Jenna’s explanation was “controverted” because:

• the trial court had authorized alternative service, and
• the process server’s return showed she posted the documents on the door as ordered.

The Court rejects that position, clarifying the limited evidentiary role of alternative service orders:

• Rule 106(b) allows alternative service (e.g., posting on a door) when personal service is impracticable.
• Proof that the process server complied with the method ordered is proof of:
  • how
  • and when
  service was executed.
• But that proof is “no evidence in the record of when [the] defendant received actual notice.” See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. 1993).

The Court analogizes to:

• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025), distinguishing actual from constructive knowledge for purposes of Rule 306a (notice of judgment); and
• Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987), where the presumption of receipt under Rule 21a is not “evidence” and disappears when opposing evidence is introduced.

Here:

• The process server never saw Jenna.
• There is no record evidence that Jenna was ever told about the posting or that she otherwise encountered the papers.
• Gary’s generalized statements about talking to Jenna regarding “a process server” and “the citation of service” do not pinpoint timing or show he told her that citation had actually been served via posting.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Gary did not truly controvert Jenna’s factual assertions regarding her lack of actual notice of service. As a result, her excuse satisfies the first Craddock element as a matter of law.

5. Relationship to Prior “Didn’t Get the Suit Papers” Cases

The Court explicitly situates this case within its existing line of decisions where excuses such as “I lost the papers” or “I forgot to respond” have been accepted under Craddock:

• Sutherland (citation left in a stack of papers on a desk and forgotten during a holiday period with bad weather).
• Milestone Operating (similar lost-or-misplaced papers scenarios).
• Drewery (defendant did not receive or could not later locate the citation).

The Court concludes that the rationale of those cases applies “with greater force” here, where:

• service is accomplished by posting in a location subject to outside interference (e.g., construction workers, weather, passersby), and
• the defendant credibly claims never to have actually received the citation.

Thus, this opinion extends the “didn’t get the suit papers” logic expressly to the context of alternative service.

D. Second Craddock Element: Setting Up a Meritorious Defense

1. Legal Standard

Under Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009), a defendant satisfies the second element by:

• alleging facts which, if true, would constitute a defense in law, and
• supporting those allegations with affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof.

Crucially:

• The defendant need only “set up” a defense, not conclusively prove it.
• Courts do not weigh or resolve conflicting evidence on this element; controverting evidence is ignored at this stage.

2. Jenna’s Meritorious Defense

Among other defenses, Jenna asserted a reimbursement claim relating to:

• funds she alleged were her separate property,
• used as the down payment on the parties’ marital home,
• for which she sought reimbursement to her separate estate from the community estate.

She offered both testimonial and documentary support.

Gary responded that she failed to rebut the statutory community-property presumption by clear and convincing evidence, as required by Texas Family Code § 3.003. The Court notes that Gary may ultimately prevail on this argument at trial but emphasizes that:

• That contention goes to the merits, not to whether Jenna has “set up” a defense.
• At the Craddock stage, it is enough that Jenna alleges a legally cognizable separate-property or reimbursement claim, supported by prima facie evidence.

The Supreme Court agrees with the trial court’s earlier finding that Jenna met the second element. Gary’s attempt to import the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard into the Craddock inquiry is rejected as imposing too high a burden at this stage.

E. Third Craddock Element: Delay or Injury to the Plaintiff

1. Legal Standard

Under Dolgencorp and Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994):

• The defendant initially must allege that granting a new trial will not cause delay or injury, often accompanied by an offer to go to trial promptly and to pay costs.
• Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate actual injury.
• “Injury” must mean prejudice to the plaintiff in presenting the merits at the new trial; generalized financial hardship or the inconvenience of relitigating is insufficient.

2. Jenna’s Showing and Gary’s Response

Jenna:

• alleged that a new trial would not unduly delay or injure Gary,
• represented she was ready for trial,
• offered to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default judgment, and
• acknowledged the trial court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees related to the new-trial motion.

This satisfied her initial burden. The burden then shifted to Gary, who contended:

• he had incurred legal fees to manage the community estate and to sell the marital home, and
• undoing the custody and possession provisions in the divorce decree would “put a lot of strain” on their child.

The Court holds this showing inadequate because:

• Gary did not explain how those harms would impair his ability to present the merits of his case at a new trial.
• Under Evans, generalized claims of financial cost or emotional strain do not suffice.

The Court also notes that In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021), supports Jenna’s position. In Sandoval, the Court recognized that allowing a party to litigate a separate-property claim in a new trial would:

not upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.

Though Tabakman does not limit the new trial solely to property issues, Sandoval underscores that opening the door to litigating separate-property rights is not inherently injurious to the other spouse in the Craddock sense.

Accordingly, Jenna also satisfies the third Craddock element.

V. Precedents Cited and How They Shape the Decision

A. Foundational Cases on Defaults and New Trials

• Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939):
  • Establishes the three-part test for setting aside a default judgment.
  • Remains the linchpin of Texas default-judgment relief.
• In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006):
  • Clarifies that once the three Craddock elements are satisfied, the trial court must grant a new trial.
  • Explains that the first element is met as a matter of law when the defendant’s uncontroverted factual assertions negate intent or conscious indifference.
• In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024):
  • Pronounces default judgments “greatly disfavored.”
  • Insists that all doubts about a default—beyond just service issues—should be resolved against the party who obtained it.
  • Frames default relief as essential to judicial integrity.
  • Relied upon in Tabakman to justify a generous reading of Craddock.

B. Conscious Indifference and “Some Excuse” Cases

• Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006):
  • Defines conscious indifference as knowing you’ve been sued and not caring.
  • Holds that “I didn’t get the suit papers” is generally enough to satisfy Craddock if supported by some explanation.
  • Provides the analogy the Court uses for alternative service in Tabakman.
• Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995):
  • Confirms that conscious indifference requires more than negligence.
• Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012) and Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012):
  • Accept explanations involving misplaced or forgotten citations as sufficient excuses where supported by contextual evidence.
  • Used in Tabakman to support extending similar leniency to non-receipt caused by alternative service.
• Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992):
  • Holds that a mistake of law can be a valid excuse under Craddock.
  • Supports treating Jenna’s misunderstanding about the need for personal service as an acceptable excuse.

C. Service, Citation, and Notice Cases

• Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002):
  • Explains what a “citation” is and its notice function to defendants.
  • Used to distinguish awareness of a suit from notice of a duty to answer.
• Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990):
  • Holds that mere knowledge of a pending suit does not impose a duty to act absent proper service or waiver.
  • Central to the Court’s criticism of the court of appeals’ approach.
• State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993):
  • States that a return showing alternative service has occurred is not evidence of when the defendant received actual notice.
  • Directly supports the Court’s rejection of Gary’s purported “controverting” evidence.
• Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987):
  • Rules that presumptions of receipt under Rule 21a vanish once contrary evidence is introduced; they are not actual evidence.
  • Supports the Court's insistence that process-server proof of posting does not trump testimony of non-receipt.
• Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025):
  • Distinguishes constructive knowledge from actual knowledge in the Rule 306a context.
  • Analogized here to underscore that constructive notice from valid service does not necessarily equate to actual notice for Craddock purposes.

D. Meritorious-Defense and Injury Cases

• Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009):
  • Clarifies that to “set up” a meritorious defense, a defendant need only present prima facie evidence.
  • Confirms that after the defendant alleges no injury and willingness to proceed promptly, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show injury.
• Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994):
  • Rejects general claims of harm and financial hardship as sufficient to show “injury” under Craddock.
  • Requires prejudice to the ability to present the merits of the case.
• In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021):
  • Recognizes that litigating a separate-property claim in a subsequent proceeding need not disturb the underlying divorce, custody, and support orders.
  • Cited in Tabakman to show that allowing property claims to be heard does not inherently injure the other spouse.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Default Judgment?

A default judgment occurs when:

• a defendant does not answer or appear within the time required by law, and
• the plaintiff asks the court to decide the case in the defendant’s absence.

The court may then:

• accept the plaintiff’s evidence (or allegations if unliquidated damages are properly proved), and
• enter judgment without the defendant’s participation.

B. What Is the Craddock Test?

Texas uses the Craddock test to decide whether to set aside a default judgment and give the defendant a new trial. The defendant must show:

1. No conscious indifference: The failure to answer was accidental or due to mistake, not intentional disregard.
2. Meritorious defense: The defendant has a real, legally valid defense worth hearing.
3. No undue delay or injury: Granting a new trial will not unfairly prejudice the plaintiff.

If all three are proven, the court must grant a new trial.

C. What Is “Alternative Service”?

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b), if a process server cannot personally serve a defendant despite due diligence, the court can authorize alternative methods, such as:

• leaving the papers with someone over 16 at the defendant’s usual place of abode, or
• posting the citation and petition on the front door of that abode.

This allows the case to move forward even when personal service is difficult, but it increases the risk that the defendant will not actually see the papers—precisely the concern animating Tabakman.

D. Knowledge of Lawsuit vs Knowledge of Service (Citation)

• Knowledge of lawsuit: You have heard or been told that someone has filed a lawsuit against you.
• Knowledge of service: You have received a citation—official notice from the court commanding you to respond by a certain date and warning of default if you do not.

According to the Supreme Court, only the latter triggers a duty to act. Simply knowing a suit exists is not enough.

E. “Meritorious Defense” vs Winning the Case

To satisfy the second Craddock element, a defendant:

• does not have to prove they will win,
• only must show a prima facie case—facts that, if true, would provide a valid defense at trial.

Conflicting evidence from the plaintiff is irrelevant at this stage.

F. “Undue Delay or Injury”

Under the third Craddock element, the focus is not:

• whether the plaintiff will lose the benefit of a favorable judgment, or
• whether relitigating will be inconvenient or costly in a general sense.

Rather, the question is:

• Will the plaintiff be unfairly handicapped in presenting their case at the new trial?

Examples of real injury might include:

• critical evidence has been irretrievably lost because of the delay, or
• key witnesses are now unavailable.

Absent such prejudice, the presumption favors letting the case be tried on the merits.

G. Community Property, Separate Property, and Reimbursement

• Texas presumes that property acquired during marriage is community property. See Texas Family Code § 3.003.
• A spouse claiming an asset is separate property (e.g., property owned before marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance) must prove that status by clear and convincing evidence.
• If separate property is used to benefit the community estate (e.g., using inherited funds to make a down payment on a marital home), the contributing spouse may have a reimbursement claim from the community to the separate estate.

In Tabakman, Jenna’s reimbursement claim was sufficient to be a “meritorious defense” even though its ultimate success remains to be decided at trial.

VII. Practical Impact and Future Implications

A. For Defendants and Their Counsel

• Lower threshold to set aside defaults after alternative service:
  • Defendants who did not actually see posted or substituted service can more readily claim they lacked notice, even if service was technically valid.
  • Sworn statements of non-receipt, supported by reasonable contextual explanations, will often satisfy the first Craddock element.
• Importance of prompt action:
  • Jenna’s prompt filing of an answer and Craddock motion—within three weeks of learning of the default and before the decree was signed—was crucial.
  • Defendants should act immediately upon discovering any judgment entered without their participation.
• Detailed factual affidavits are critical:
  • Defendants should provide specific, corroborated accounts of why they did not receive or respond to suit papers (construction, mail issues, family or household circumstances, etc.).
  • Affidavits from family members, neighbors, or others in a position to observe service attempts can be decisive.

B. For Plaintiffs, Particularly in Family Law

• Alternative service is not a guaranteed “safe harbor” for finality:
  • Even if service by posting or other alternative means is properly authorized and executed, a default may still be vulnerable under Craddock.
• Strategic implications:
  • Plaintiffs should anticipate that a default obtained via alternative service may be harder to preserve on appeal.
  • Where practical, personal service or other methods more likely to provide actual notice may better protect judgments from collateral attack.
• Injury arguments must be specific and substantive:
  • General assertions of emotional strain, increased attorney’s fees, or disruption of status quo custody arrangements are unlikely to defeat Craddock relief without proof of concrete prejudice to the merits.

C. For Trial Courts

• Heightened sensitivity to default judgments:
  • Tabakman, combined with Lakeside and Red Bluff, reinforces that default judgments must be approached with skepticism.
  • Any serious doubt about notice or actual receipt of citation should usually be resolved in favor of a new trial.
• Fact-finding constraints when evidence is uncontroverted:
  • Where a defendant’s affidavit is not meaningfully controverted, trial courts may not simply disbelieve it to deny Craddock relief.
  • The Supreme Court will treat uncontroverted affidavits that negate conscious indifference as satisfying the first element as a matter of law.
• Balancing finality with fairness:
  • While final judgments are important, Tabakman confirms that the balance in Texas decisively favors allowing cases to be tried on their merits when reasonably possible.

D. Systemic and Doctrinal Significance

Doctrinally, Tabakman:

• Clarifies and narrows the circumstances in which a defendant’s knowledge of a lawsuit will be equated with conscious indifference.
• Formally extends the “lost papers / non-receipt” line of Craddock cases to situations where:
• • service is technically valid under alternative methods, yet
  • the defendant provides a plausible explanation for never having actually seen the papers.
• Reemphasizes the low bar for the meritorious-defense element and underscores that plaintiffs cannot defeat it by pointing to conflicting evidence.
• Reinforces that the injury inquiry focuses on prejudice to the merits, not general burdens of relitigation.

Practically, this decision will likely:

• Increase the granting of new trials in default cases—especially family-law defaults—where service was by posting or other alternative means.
• Encourage more careful records and findings at service hearings, recognizing the postjudgment scrutiny that may follow.

VIII. Conclusion

Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman is a significant reaffirmation and refinement of Texas’s Craddock doctrine. The key holding is that:

• Actual receipt of citation—not mere knowledge that a lawsuit exists, and not merely proof that alternative service was executed—is central to the conscious-indifference analysis.

By holding that Jenna’s uncontroverted explanation of non-receipt, corroborated by her father and followed by prompt action, satisfies the first Craddock element, the Supreme Court:

• pushes back against a rigid, form-over-substance approach to defaults,
• protects litigants from the hazards of alternative service that never actually reaches them, and
• fortifies the state’s strong policy preference for resolving cases on the merits.

The Court’s treatment of the second and third elements likewise underscores:

• the modest threshold required to “set up” a meritorious defense, and
• the demanding nature of the plaintiff’s burden to show true “injury” from a new trial.

Taken together with In re Lakeside Resort JV, Red Bluff, and In re Marriage of Sandoval, Tabakman confirms that default judgments in Texas are, in the Court’s own terms, merely tolerated and will be carefully scrutinized. Where a defendant can plausibly say, “I never actually got the citation,” and moves quickly once she learns of the default, Texas law now more clearly entitles her to a second chance.