Actual Notice of Citation, Not Mere Knowledge of the Lawsuit, Governs Conscious Indifference Under Craddock After Alternative Service: A Commentary on Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman, No. 24‑0919 (Dec. 5, 2025), is a significant refinement of the State’s longstanding doctrine governing relief from default judgments under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939). The case arises from a default divorce decree entered after alternative service of citation, in the context of a contentious marital separation involving allegations of mistreatment and concerns about child custody.

The central legal issue is whether a defendant who (1) knew a divorce case had been filed but (2) credibly did not know she had been served by alternative service, and (3) promptly answered after learning of the default, satisfied the first element of the Craddock test: that her failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference.

The trial court and the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals both concluded that Jenna Tabakman failed the first Craddock element, emphasizing her knowledge that a divorce suit was pending and that someone was attempting service. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that:

Being aware a lawsuit has been filed is not the same as being aware that citation has been served.
Proper alternative service does not establish that the defendant actually received the citation or had actual notice of it for purposes of evaluating conscious indifference under Craddock.
Where a defendant presents uncontroverted evidence that she never saw the citation effectuated by alternative service, and promptly appears once she learns of the default, the first Craddock element is satisfied.

The Court further held that Jenna satisfied the second and third Craddock elements (meritorious defense and lack of undue delay or injury), ordered the default decree set aside, and remanded for a new trial.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

After 13 years of marriage and one child, Jenna left the marital home to live with her parents, alleging mistreatment by her husband Gary. That same month, Gary filed for divorce and informed Jenna that he had done so. Jenna testified that she:

Was scared and had no money for an attorney;
Expected to be served personally with divorce papers;
Waited for in-person service with her parents, who also expected personal service.

When repeated attempts at personal service failed, Gary obtained an order authorizing alternative service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). The process server then posted the citation, petition, and alternative-service order on the front door of Jenna’s parents’ home. No answer was filed, so Gary moved for default judgment.

At a default hearing, the trial court orally rendered a default divorce. Around the same time—but unaware of the hearing or the alternative service—Jenna sought counsel after Gary allegedly told her he planned to abscond with their child and family dog. Within three weeks of the oral rendition, Jenna’s attorney:

Filed an answer, and
Filed a motion for new trial invoking the Craddock doctrine.

Despite her appearance, the court signed the written Default Final Decree of Divorce a few days after Jenna’s answer and motion were filed. (On appeal, Jenna did not argue that signing the decree after her appearance was itself an abuse of discretion, and the Supreme Court notes that fact in a footnote.)

After an evidentiary hearing on the new-trial motion, the trial court found:

Jenna had set up a meritorious defense; but
She was “consciously indifferent” in failing to answer; and
She had not shown that a new trial would not injure Gary.

The court of appeals affirmed, focusing exclusively on the first Craddock element, and holding that Jenna’s assertion that she was unaware of service and did not take steps to avoid it was insufficient to negate conscious indifference.

Jenna sought review in the Supreme Court, challenging:

The validity of service; and
The denial of a new trial under Craddock.

The Supreme Court:

Upheld the validity of alternative service (finding no reversible error and declining further discussion under Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024)), and
Reversed on the Craddock issue, holding that Jenna satisfied all three elements as a matter of law.

B. Core Holdings

First Craddock Element – Conscious Indifference.
The Court held that Jenna’s explanation—she believed she would be served personally, took no steps to avoid service, never saw the documents posted under alternative service, and promptly appeared upon learning of the default—negated intentional or consciously indifferent conduct.
- Knowledge of the lawsuit is distinct from knowledge that citation has been served.
- A return showing alternative service is not evidence that the defendant actually received the citation or knew it had been served.
- Gary did not “controvert” Jenna’s factual assertions about lack of actual notice.
Second Craddock Element – Meritorious Defense.
Jenna “set up” a meritorious defense by raising a reimbursement / separate-property claim for funds allegedly used from her separate estate for the down payment on the marital home, supported by testimony and documents. At the Craddock stage she need not prove that claim by clear and convincing evidence; she only had to allege facts that, if true, would constitute a defense.
Third Craddock Element – No Undue Delay or Injury.
Jenna met her initial burden by:
- Alleging that a new trial would not cause undue delay or injury;
- Stating she was ready for trial;
- Offering to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default; and
- Recognizing the court’s discretion to award fees related to the motion.
The burden then shifted to Gary to show specific prejudice. His assertions of general financial cost and strain on the child were insufficient because he did not show how a new trial would disadvantage him in presenting the merits.

The Supreme Court therefore granted review, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Default Judgments and the Craddock Doctrine in Context

The Court situates this decision within Texas’s strong disfavor of default judgments, relying heavily on In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. 2024). In Lakeside Resort, the Court emphasized that:

Default judgments are “greatly disfavor[ed]” … consistent with the strong policy preference for adjudicating cases on the merits.

The Court noted structural concerns with defaults:

The absence of the “adversarial clash” that improves accuracy by testing evidence and arguments;
The risk of ex parte communications;
The “inherent unfairness to the missing party”; and
The “threat to judicial integrity” from enforcing potentially erroneous judgments.

In that backdrop, the Court reiterates a powerful formulation from Lakeside Resort:

Any doubts about a default judgment—not just doubts about service—“must be resolved against the party who secured the default.”

The equitable mechanism for attacking such judgments is the three-part Craddock test, which asks:

Was the failure to answer not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but due to mistake or accident?
Has the defendant set up a meritorious defense (a prima facie viable defense on the merits)?
Was the motion for new trial filed in time such that granting it would not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff?

When these elements are satisfied, “a motion for new trial must be granted.” In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114–15 (Tex. 2006).

The Court also underscores the guiding question from Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006):

The overarching question guiding this inquiry is: “Why did the defendant not appear?”

This opinion develops that question in a setting where:

Service was formally valid (including under alternative service rules);
The defendant knew of the lawsuit in a general sense; but
The defendant plausibly did not know that citation had actually been served by alternative means.

B. First Craddock Element: Intent and Conscious Indifference

1. The Legal Standard and Prior Authorities

For the first element, the Court relies on a series of cases refining what “intentional” and “consciously indifferent” mean:

Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co., 913 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1995) – Conscious indifference is more than mere negligence.
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006) – The key idea: conscious indifference means that the defendant “knew it was sued but did not care.”
Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2012) – The “controlling fact” is the absence of intentional failure to answer, not whether the excuse is particularly compelling.
Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2012) – “Some excuse, although not necessarily a good one,” can be enough if it shows the defendant’s failure was not because they did not care.
In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006) – The defendant meets the first element when:
- Her factual assertions, if true, negate intent or conscious indifference; and
- Those assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.

The Court reaffirms this relatively low threshold: the issue is not whether the defendant acted perfectly or prudently, but whether she deliberately failed to answer or utterly did not care.

2. Jenna’s Explanation and the Court’s Acceptance

Jenna’s explanation involved several components:

She believed she would be served personally with divorce papers.
She did not understand that alternative service (posting at the door) could validly be used.
She took no action to avoid service; to the contrary, she and her parents waited for personal service.
She never saw the citation, petition, or alternative-service order posted on the door.
Her father corroborated this, explaining:
- Construction was ongoing at the house;
- The neighborhood security guard customarily notified him of visitors;
- No such notification occurred regarding a process server; and
- Neither he nor the workers saw or delivered any papers from the front door.
Once she learned of the default, she quickly retained counsel and filed an answer and Craddock motion—before the judge signed the written default decree.

Two doctrinal points are critical in the Court’s acceptance of this explanation:

Mistake of law can be an “excuse.”
Citing Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1992), the Court notes that a mistaken belief about the legal requirements for service—even if incorrect—may satisfy the first Craddock element. Jenna’s belief that service had to be personal fits this category.
Loss or non-receipt of suit papers, if credibly explained, can negate conscious indifference.
In cases like Fidelity & Guar. Ins., Milestone Operating, and Sutherland, the Court found sufficient excuses where:
- The defendant did not recall being served;
- Suit papers were misplaced in an office; or
- Papers were left in a stack and forgotten during a busy period.
The Court quotes its earlier observation:
“[P]eople often do not know where or how they lost something—that is precisely why it remains ‘lost.’”
Here, the explanation is even stronger: Jenna’s position is not that she knew of the citation and mislaid it, but that she never received it at all. The Court treats this as at least as compelling an excuse as forgetting about already-received papers.

Taken together, these facts, if true, show that Jenna did not willingly default or ignore the suit; they indicate confusion about service procedures and lack of actual notice of citation.

3. Distinguishing Knowledge of Lawsuit from Knowledge of Citation

The opinion forcefully clarifies a doctrinal distinction that often gets blurred in default cases:

A lawsuit is commenced when a petition is filed. (Tex. R. Civ. P. 22.)
A citation is the document that:
- Is directed to the defendant;
- Tells the defendant they have been sued; and
- Commands the defendant to answer, expressly warning that failure to answer may result in a default judgment. (Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(c).)

The Court quotes Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. Sierra Club, 70 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. 2002), to emphasize the function of citation, and then draws on Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1990):

“Absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.”

Furthermore, in Fidelity & Guar. Ins., the Court noted that actual notice through an unauthorized method of service is equivalent, for these purposes, to never receiving suit papers at all.

The key doctrinal move here is the Court’s explicit recognition that:

Knowing a petition has been filed is not the same as being on notice that one must answer by a specific deadline or face default.
Conscious indifference under Craddock must be assessed in light of whether the defendant had notice of service of citation, not simply awareness of litigation in the abstract.

Thus, although Gary told Jenna he had filed for divorce and discussed a process server and “the citation of service” in general terms, the record did not demonstrate that:

He told her that service had actually been accomplished via posting, or
She had otherwise learned that citation had in fact been served (as opposed to ongoing attempts).

The court of appeals erred, in the Supreme Court’s view, by treating general knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit as functionally equivalent to knowledge that valid service had been completed.

4. The Role of Alternative Service and Evidence of Actual Notice

The opinion draws an important evidentiary line regarding alternative service under Rule 106(b). Alternative service is designed for situations where traditional in-person or certified-mail service is impracticable. When authorized and performed correctly, it:

Establishes valid service for jurisdictional and procedural purposes; but
Does not, standing alone, prove that the defendant actually saw the citation or had actual notice.

The Court cites State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Costley, 868 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1993), for the point that the record of alternative service is:

“no evidence in the record of when defendant received actual notice.”

This is akin to the Court’s treatment of service presumptions under Rule 21a in Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987):

Service by mail creates a presumption of delivery and receipt; but
The presumption “is not evidence” and “vanishes” when the opponent presents evidence of non-receipt.

Similarly, in Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 713 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2025), the Court distinguished actual knowledge from constructive knowledge in the context of notice of judgment under Rule 306a. That distinction is now extended here to the context of alternative service and Craddock.

Applied here:

Alternative service was valid and effective for purposes of the trial court’s jurisdiction and entry of default;
But it provided no direct evidence that Jenna actually saw the documents posted or learned of the service itself;
Jenna’s testimony (corroborated by her father) that she never saw the posted papers was therefore not “controverted” by the mere existence of a return showing alternative service.

5. What Counts as “Controverting” the Defendant’s Excuse?

Under In re R.R., if the defendant’s factual assertions, if true, would negate conscious indifference and those assertions are not controverted, the defendant carries the first Craddock element. The Court is careful about what qualifies as a true “controversion.”

Gary argued that Jenna’s excuse was no more than a “conclusory denial of service” and that the process server’s testimony (and the service return) controverted her statements. The Supreme Court disagreed, drawing a key distinction:

The process server’s return and testimony showed how service was executed (posting on the door) and when it was done.
They did not show that Jenna actually saw the posted documents or learned of their existence.

Accordingly:

Evidence that service was properly executed is not the same as evidence that the defendant had actual notice of the citation for purposes of the conscious-indifference inquiry.
To truly “controvert” Jenna’s excuse, Gary needed evidence that:
- Jenna in fact saw the posted documents; or
- Someone told her specifically that service had been accomplished and explained its implications; or
- She admitted receiving the citation but chose not to answer.

Because the record lacked such evidence, the Court held that Jenna’s excuse was uncontroverted, and therefore sufficient as a matter of law under the first Craddock element.

6. Court of Appeals’ Error

The court of appeals made two related legal missteps:

It collapsed the distinction between awareness of the lawsuit and awareness of service of citation, inferring conscious indifference from Jenna’s conceded knowledge that a divorce proceeding existed.
It treated the execution of alternative service—and the process server’s testimony—as “controverting” Jenna’s account that she never saw the posted documents and did not know service had occurred.

By correcting both, the Supreme Court substantially reorients how lower courts must approach Craddock in alternative-service contexts.

C. Second Craddock Element: Meritorious Defense

1. The “Set Up” Requirement

The Court reiterates the standard from Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009): to satisfy the second element, a defendant need only “set up” a meritorious defense, which means:

Alleging facts which, if true, would constitute a defense in law; and
Supporting those allegations with affidavits or other evidence providing prima facie proof.

Crucially, this is not a trial-level merits determination:

The court does not weigh competing evidence;
The plaintiff’s controverting evidence does not defeat the motion at this stage;
The inquiry is whether there is a legally cognizable defense worth litigating, not whether the defendant will ultimately win.

2. Jenna’s Meritorious Defense: Reimbursement / Separate-Property Claim

Among other defenses, Jenna asserted a claim seeking reimbursement from the community estate to her separate estate for funds allegedly used as a down payment on the marital home. She supported this with:

Testimony; and
Documentary evidence concerning the source and application of the funds.

Gary argued that Jenna failed to overcome the community-property presumption in Texas Family Code § 3.003, which requires clear and convincing evidence to establish that property acquired during marriage is separate, not community. His position effectively demanded that Jenna prove her separate-property characterization at the new-trial stage.

The Court rejected that approach as applying the wrong standard at the wrong time. It agreed with the trial court’s finding that Jenna had “set up” a meritorious defense:

Even if Jenna may or may not ultimately prove her separate-property claim by clear and convincing evidence at trial;
Her allegations and supporting evidence were enough to show a colorable and legally cognizable property-rights claim justifying a merits trial.

This reinforces that the Craddock inquiry is about ensuring the defendant is not deprived of a genuine opportunity to litigate a potentially valid claim, not about pre-screening that claim for likely success.

3. Significance for Family-Law Defaults

The Court’s analysis resonates with its approach in In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. 2021), which it cites in the context of the third element. In Sandoval, the Court underscored that allowing a separate-property claim to be adjudicated later does not necessarily “upset the underlying divorce, custody, support, or division of the community assets.”

Here, recognizing Jenna’s reimbursement/separate-property claim as a meritorious defense:

Signals that property characterization disputes—especially those invoking constitutional protections of separate property—are particularly weighty;
Reinforces that default decrees are not a favored vehicle for conclusively settling complex property disputes in family cases.

D. Third Craddock Element: No Undue Delay or Injury

1. Burden-Shifting and the Nature of “Injury”

Under Dolgencorp, once the defendant:

Alleges that granting a new trial will not cause injury or undue delay; and
Offers to proceed without delay and to cover reasonable default-related costs;

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show actual injury—not merely inconvenience or financial cost but prejudice in presenting the merits at a new trial. The controlling case cited here is Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994), which held that:

Assertions of general harm and financial hardship are not enough absent a showing of prejudice to the presentation of the merits in a new trial.

2. Jenna’s Showing

Jenna met her initial burden by:

Alleging that a new trial would not cause Gary undue delay or injury;
Stating she was ready for trial;
Agreeing to pay Gary’s reasonable costs incurred in obtaining the default; and
Recognizing that the court could award attorney’s fees related to the new-trial motion.

This was sufficient to shift the burden to Gary.

3. Gary’s Response and Why It Fell Short

Gary argued that:

He had incurred financial expense in managing the community estate and in selling the marital home; and
Disturbing the default decree’s standard-possession order and custody provisions would place strain on the child.

The Court found this insufficient because:

He did not explain how these circumstances would disadvantage him in presenting his case on the merits at a new trial (the touchstone under Evans);
Financial and emotional burdens that naturally accompany further litigation, while real, are precisely the kind of generalized hardship that Evans holds insufficient to defeat a new trial under Craddock;
Sandoval suggests that litigating separate-property issues after a default need not “upset” the core divorce, custody, and support framework, further undermining the claimed prejudice.

Accordingly, the Court held that Jenna satisfied the third element as well.

E. Relationship to Other Doctrines and Procedural Features

1. Distinguishing Service Validity from Craddock Relief

Notably, the Court explicitly upholds the validity of alternative service (finding no reversible error) but then grants equitable relief from the default. This highlights a crucial conceptual separation:

Service validity is a legal/jurisdictional question: was service accomplished in compliance with the Rules?
Craddock relief is an equitable question: given what actually happened, is it fair to enforce the default judgment?

Even where service is technically valid—and therefore the judgment is not void—equitable principles can still require a new trial if the defendant’s failure to answer was not intentional or consciously indifferent and the other elements are met.

2. Rule 320 “Good Cause” and the Special Nature of Defaults

The Court, echoing Lakeside Resort, notes in a footnote that even when Craddock is not strictly satisfied, trial courts retain broad discretion to grant new trials for “good cause” under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320. Default judgments “differ from every other kind in a fundamental way,” justifying a more generous view of motions to set them aside.

While the Court does not rely on Rule 320 discretion here—because it holds that Craddock is satisfied as a matter of law—the reminder reinforces the systemic preference against defaults.

3. Oral Rendition Versus Signed Judgment

The timeline is unusual:

The trial court orally rendered default judgment at a hearing Jenna did not attend.
Later, but before the written decree was signed, Jenna appeared and filed an answer and motion for new trial.
The trial court nonetheless signed the default decree afterward.

The court of appeals noted that Jenna did not argue that signing the default decree after her appearance was itself an abuse of discretion, and the Supreme Court acknowledges this but does not address it. The opinion thus leaves intact, but does not develop, separate lines of authority concerning:

When a defendant’s appearance after oral rendition but before signing may affect the validity or propriety of default relief; and
Whether such timing issues can independently support motions for new trial or appeals.

4. Appellate Economy and Selective Issue Discussion

The Court cites Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital, 703 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. 2024), to justify declining extended discussion of the service-validity challenge, even though the issue was briefed. This reinforces a recent trend:

The Court sees itself as a steward of limited judicial resources;
It may affirm or reject issues without full opinion if no reversible error exists and further discussion would not materially advance Texas jurisprudence.

Here, the Court evidently judged that:

The more important doctrinal contribution lay in clarifying the Craddock analysis for alternative-service defaults; and
Service-validity doctrine was adequately settled for this context.

F. Clarified and Emerging Legal Principles

The opinion crystallizes several important rules and refinements:

Actual notice of citation, not mere knowledge of the lawsuit, governs conscious-indifference analysis under Craddock.
A defendant who knows a petition has been filed but credibly lacks actual notice that citation has been served, and who reasonably believes service has not yet occurred, may still satisfy the first Craddock element.
Alternative service does not itself prove actual notice for Craddock purposes.
A return showing posting or other substituted service is evidence of how and when service was attempted; it is not evidence that the defendant actually saw or received the citation.
To “controvert” a non-receipt excuse, plaintiffs must show actual notice or purposeful disregard.
Plaintiffs cannot defeat a Craddock motion simply by showing technically valid service; they must marshal evidence that the defendant in fact had actual notice and nevertheless did not care to respond.
The threshold for a meritorious defense remains low.
At the new-trial stage, defendants need only raise a prima facie defense supported by some evidence. In family-law contexts, reimbursement and separate-property claims readily qualify.
Injury under the third element requires prejudice to litigating the merits, not general hardship.
Financial costs, emotional strain, and disruption that naturally follow further litigation are insufficient to defeat a new trial absent specific prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to present the case.
Doubts about defaults must be resolved against the party who secured them.
The Court again stresses that default judgments are merely tolerated and that the system’s preference is always to decide cases on their merits when reasonably possible.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. The Craddock Test in Plain Terms

In everyday language, the Craddock test asks:

Why didn’t you show up? Was it really an accident or mistake, or did you know and just not care?
Do you have a real argument? If we give you another chance, do you have some potentially valid defense or claim that could change the outcome?
Will a new trial unfairly hurt the other side? Will it make it significantly harder for them to present their case (for example, key witnesses are now unavailable), or will it just be some extra time and money?

If the answers are: (1) it was a genuine mistake, not indifference; (2) yes, you have a real defense; and (3) no, a new trial won’t unfairly handicap the other side, then the court must grant a new trial and set aside the default judgment.

B. “Conscious Indifference” Versus Negligence

Negligence = carelessness, mistakes, misunderstandings, or disorganization.
Conscious indifference = knowing you’ve been sued and simply not caring enough to do anything at all.

Texas law allows a new trial for defendants who were negligent, confused, or mistaken—but not for those who were deliberately indifferent to the lawsuit.

C. Alternative Service

Normally, a process server hands you court papers in person or sends them by certain authorized mail. When that proves impracticable, a court can order alternative service under Rule 106(b)—for example:

Posting the citation and petition on the defendant’s door;
Leaving papers with someone else at the residence; or
Other methods expressly authorized by the court’s order.

Alternative service is legally valid. But someone may still never actually see those papers—e.g., they blow away; a contractor removes them; a family member throws them away. That possibility is why the Court treats actual notice as distinct from proof that alternative service was executed.

D. Oral Rendition vs. Signed Judgment

Oral rendition = the judge announces the decision in open court (e.g., “I grant the default and order a divorce on these terms”).
Signed judgment = the written order or decree the judge signs afterward, which is the formal, enforceable judgment.

Appeal deadlines and some other procedural rights typically run from the signed judgment, but the rights implicated by appearance, default, and new-trial motions can intersect with both stages. This case concerns relief from the signed default decree, though Jenna appeared before that decree was signed.

E. Meritorious Defense and Reimbursement in Community Property

Community property = generally, property acquired during the marriage, presumed to belong to both spouses.
Separate property = property owned before marriage, or acquired during marriage by gift, inheritance, or personal-injury damages (with exceptions). The Texas Constitution protects separate property from being taken to satisfy community debts or divided as if it were community.
Reimbursement claim = when one estate (separate or community) uses its funds to benefit the other estate, the paying estate can ask to be compensated (“reimbursed”) when the marriage ends.

At the new-trial stage, a spouse need not prove a reimbursement or separate-property claim conclusively; she must show that such a claim is colorable and supported by some documentation or testimony.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Defendants Facing Default After Alternative Service

Defendants who learn of a default after alternative service can invoke Craddock even when service was formally valid, if they:
- Did not actually see or receive the citation;
- Can credibly explain why (construction, mail issues, family circumstances, etc.); and
- Act promptly to file an answer and motion for new trial.
Defendants should:
- Document circumstances surrounding their living arrangements and any security or mail-handling practices;
- Obtain affidavits from family members, neighbors, or building staff who would likely have seen posted papers;
- Be explicit about:
  - When they first learned about the lawsuit;
  - When they first learned about service and/or the default;
  - What they did in response and how quickly.

B. For Plaintiffs Seeking Default Judgments

Plaintiffs relying on alternative service should anticipate that:
- Courts will scrutinize Craddock motions carefully, especially in family-law cases;
- Proof of valid service alone will not defeat an otherwise credible excuse of non-receipt.
To protect a default judgment, plaintiffs should:
- Develop evidence—such as texts, emails, or admissions—showing the defendant actually knew the citation had been served and understood the consequences;
- Consider using multiple communication channels (while respecting ethical and procedural limits) to ensure actual notice; and
- Prepare to show specific prejudice to trying the case again, not just expense or delay.

C. For Family Law Judges

The opinion cautions against over-reliance on default decrees, especially where property characterization, custody, and support rights are at stake.
Trial courts should:
- Separate the validity of service from the fairness inquiry under Craddock;
- Recognize that knowledge of the lawsuit is not enough to infer conscious indifference absent proof of notice of citation;
- Give substantial weight to prompt post-default appearances and colorable meritorious defenses.

D. Process Servers and Alternative-Service Orders

Process servers should meticulously document how and where alternative service was carried out, but they should also understand that:
- Their returns prove execution of service, not actual notice;
- Courts may credit credible non-receipt explanations even when alternative service was properly executed.
Lawyers drafting motions for alternative service should:
- Propose methods genuinely likely to give actual notice (e.g., email or social media, where appropriate and authorized);
- Recognize that methods with a higher risk of non-receipt (like door posting in high-traffic or construction areas) may invite later Craddock challenges.

E. Systemic and Policy-Level Effects

The opinion deepens Texas’s commitment to deciding cases on the merits by:
- Clarifying that equitable relief is available even when service is technically proper;
- Setting a realistic, defendant-friendly standard for the first Craddock element in alternative-service settings.
It also reinforces the Court’s concern for:
- Judicial legitimacy and avoidance of erroneous, coercively enforced judgments;
- Fair process for absent parties, especially in family-law disputes where the consequences of default (on property and children) are long-lasting.

VI. Conclusion

Jenna Tabakman v. Gary Tabakman represents a meaningful refinement of Texas default-judgment jurisprudence under Craddock, particularly where alternative service is involved. The Supreme Court of Texas holds that:

Conscious indifference cannot be inferred from mere knowledge that a lawsuit exists; what matters is whether the defendant had actual notice of citation and disregarded it.
Alternative service, though legally valid, does not itself prove that the defendant saw the citation or knew service was complete; it therefore cannot, by itself, controvert a credible non-receipt explanation.
Defendants need only “set up” a prima facie meritorious defense and show that a new trial will not unduly prejudice the plaintiff’s ability to present the case on the merits.

In reaffirming that “any doubts” about default judgments must be resolved against the party who obtained them, the Court underscores that defaults are at best a necessary evil, tolerated but not favored. When a defendant like Jenna, who plausibly never received the citation, promptly appears, raises a substantive property claim, and demonstrates that a new trial will not unfairly injure the plaintiff, equity and Texas precedent mandate setting the default aside.

This opinion will guide trial and appellate courts in future default cases—especially those involving alternative service and family-law disputes—ensuring that the preference for decisions on the merits remains central in Texas civil procedure.