Actual Knowledge Means Subjective Awareness: Email Notice and Deadline Extensions Under Texas Rule 306a After Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, No. 24‑0005 (Tex. May 9, 2025), clarifies a deceptively simple but crucial phrase in Texas civil procedure: “actual knowledge” of a judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4). The Court holds that:

“Actual knowledge” means subjective awareness of the judgment, not merely that notice was available or received electronically; and
The mere receipt of an email from the clerk, if it is not read and does not in fact come to the attorney’s awareness, does not constitute “actual knowledge” for purposes of Rule 306a(4).

This clarification has immediate implications for post‑judgment and appellate deadlines whenever a clerk fails to give notice in the manner required by Rule 306a(3). It also resolves a growing line of intermediate appellate decisions that had effectively treated unread emails as conferring “actual knowledge.”

The case arises from a substantial personal-injury judgment—$7.1 million—for an injured employee against a nonsubscribing employer, Red Bluff, LLC. But the Supreme Court does not address the merits of that judgment. Instead, it focuses entirely on whether Red Bluff’s post-judgment motions were timely in light of a notice problem and the lawyer’s claim that he did not read the clerk’s email for over a month.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. The Underlying Suit

Respondent Nicole Tarpley, a certified nursing assistant, sued her employer, Red Bluff, LLC, a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers’ compensation system, for injuries she sustained while working at Red Bluff’s rehabilitation facility. A jury found in Tarpley’s favor on negligence and premises-liability claims, and the trial court rendered a judgment awarding her $7.1 million.

B. The Judgment and the Clerk’s Email

The trial court signed the judgment on February 4, 2022. At that time, former Rule 306a(3) required the trial court clerk to:

“immediately give notice to the parties or their attorneys of record by first-class mail advising that the judgment or order was signed.” (TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(3) (Vernon 1941, amended 2022), emphasis added)

Instead of mailing notice by first-class mail, the clerk sent notice by email to Red Bluff’s lead counsel on February 8, 2022, four days after the judgment was signed. Counsel later swore that:

He did receive the email on February 8 (in the sense that it arrived in his email account); but
He did not see, open, or read the email at that time.

According to counsel’s sworn statement, he first learned of the judgment on March 14, 2022—thirty-eight days after the judgment was signed—when Tarpley’s counsel emailed him a demand for payment.

C. Post‑Judgment Filings and Rule 306a Motion

When counsel learned of the judgment on March 14, he immediately:

Filed a notice of appeal; and
Filed a sworn motion under Rule 306a, asking the trial court to reset post-judgment deadlines to run from March 14 as the date he first acquired notice or actual knowledge.

On April 13, well within 30 days of March 14, he filed:

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); and
A motion for new trial.

The timeliness of those motions—and with them, the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction and the appellate timetable—turned entirely on whether Rule 306a’s extension mechanism applied.

D. Trial Court and Court of Appeals

The trial court denied Red Bluff’s Rule 306a motion, finding that:

Red Bluff’s counsel acquired “actual knowledge” of the judgment on February 8—the date the clerk emailed the notice—
Even though he swore that he did not see or read that email until March 14.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston affirmed. See Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley, 679 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023). It:

First held that the notice of appeal was filed within Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3’s fifteen-day grace period, thus properly invoking the court’s jurisdiction (a point not disputed in the Supreme Court); and
Then agreed with the trial court that Red Bluff’s counsel had “actual knowledge” as of February 8, thereby making later post‑judgment motions untimely.

In effect, the court of appeals treated the receipt of an email from the clerk as equivalent to acquiring “actual knowledge” of the judgment—even if the attorney never actually read the email.

E. Supreme Court Review

The Supreme Court of Texas granted review (without oral argument under Rule 59.1), reversed the court of appeals, and remanded the case to the trial court to consider Red Bluff’s timely post‑judgment motions.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

Notice defect under Rule 306a(3).
At the time of this judgment, Rule 306a(3) required notice “by first-class mail.” The clerk failed to comply by using email instead. Therefore, Red Bluff satisfied the first prong of Rule 306a(4) by showing it did not “receive notice of the judgment as required” by the rule.
“Actual knowledge” means subjective awareness.
The Court construed “actual knowledge” in Rule 306a(4) to require that the party or its attorney in fact be aware of the judgment. Mere accessibility of information or the mere arrival of an email does not constitute “actual knowledge.”
Receipt of an unread email is not actual knowledge.
Because Red Bluff’s counsel swore that he did not see or read the clerk’s email until March 14, and Tarpley produced no evidence to the contrary, the Court held that he did not acquire “actual knowledge” of the judgment on February 8.
Distinguishing actual from constructive knowledge.
The Court acknowledged that counsel should have read his email, and may have had constructive knowledge, but Rule 306a(4) explicitly requires actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or “should have known.”
Deadline extension and jurisdiction preserved.
Because:
- The clerk did not send notice “by first-class mail” as required; and
- Counsel did not actually learn of the judgment until March 14 and proved that fact by sworn evidence;
the Court concluded that Red Bluff was entitled to the Rule 306a extension. Its post‑judgment motions were thus timely, and the trial court had plenary jurisdiction to consider them.
Prior intermediate decisions misread Rule 306a.
The Court expressly disapproved of intermediate appellate decisions, including Rendon v. Swanson and Park v. Aboudail, to the extent they held that the mere receipt of an email from the clerk created “actual knowledge” even when the email was never read.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Rule 306a and the Post‑Judgment Deadline Framework

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(a) sets the basic rule: a party must file any motion for new trial or similar post‑judgment motion within 30 days after the judgment is signed.

Rule 306a modifies this timetable in limited circumstances. Under Rule 306a(4):

If, within twenty days after the judgment is signed, a party or its attorney neither:

receives the clerk’s notice required by Rule 306a(3), nor

acquires “actual knowledge” of the judgment,

then the deadlines (for post‑judgment motions, notice of appeal, etc.) begin on the date the party either receives the proper notice or acquires actual knowledge, whichever comes first, up to a 90‑day cap.

Key structural point: both conditions—no proper notice and no actual knowledge within 20 days—must be satisfied before Rule 306a(4)’s extension triggers.

Rule 306a(5) adds a procedural requirement: to invoke Rule 306a(4), the party must prove, by sworn motion and evidence, the date it first received proper notice or acquired actual knowledge.

1. The First Prong: “Notice as Required” Under Former Rule 306a(3)

At the time of this judgment (February 2022), Rule 306a(3) required the clerk to give notice:

“by first-class mail.”

This is crucial. The Supreme Court accepts as undisputed that:

The clerk did send an email on February 8; but
The clerk did not send notice by first-class mail at all.

Therefore, Red Bluff “did not receive notice of the judgment as the then-applicable version of Rule 306a(3) required.” The Court treats this as straightforward: compliance is measured against the specified method—first‑class mail. Email did not qualify.

The Court notes that Rule 306a has since been amended twice. The current version of Rule 306a(3) requires the clerk to:

“immediately send the judgment or order to the parties as provided in Rule 21(f)(10),”

and Rule 21(f)(10) generally requires electronic service through the state’s e‑filing system (with limited exceptions, e.g., sealed orders or unrepresented parties). The parties agree that these amendments do not apply retroactively to this case, and the Supreme Court applies the pre‑amendment “first-class mail” requirement.

2. The Second Prong: “Actual Knowledge” Under Rule 306a(4)

Having found a clear defect in notice, the Court turns to whether Red Bluff’s counsel acquired “actual knowledge” of the judgment within the first 20 days after February 4. If he did, the extension would be defeated despite the notice defect.

The lower courts held that he did—on February 8—simply because the clerk’s email arrived in his inbox. The Supreme Court rejects this, focusing on the textual and ordinary meaning of “actual knowledge.”

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Textual-Interpretation Framework: EBS Solutions, Inc. v. Hegar

The Court reiterates its standard approach to interpreting procedural rules: give words their “plain and ordinary meaning” absent a contrary definition. It cites EBS Solutions, Inc. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Tex. 2020), a tax case, for that textualist principle. This frames the rest of the analysis: “actual knowledge” will be read according to its ordinary, not judicially expanded, meaning.

2. U.S. Supreme Court on “Actual Knowledge”: Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma

The Court relies heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, 589 U.S. 178 (2020). There, construing a federal limitations provision that referred to “actual knowledge” of a breach, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

To have “actual knowledge,” one must be aware of the information; and
Mere availability of information (e.g., documents posted online) is insufficient if the plaintiff never actually read or otherwise became aware of it.

The Texas Supreme Court quotes Sulyma for the proposition that:

“To have ‘actual knowledge’ of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.”
(emphasis added)

The Court further quotes Sulyma’s key clarification:

“[I]f a person is not aware of a fact, he does not have ‘actual knowledge’ of that fact however close at hand the fact might be.”

This language mirrors the fact pattern here: the email with notice was “close at hand” in counsel’s inbox, but under Sulyma, that does not create actual knowledge unless the contents are actually known.

3. Subjective Awareness: U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.

The Court also references United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739 (2023), in which the U.S. Supreme Court again emphasized that “actual knowledge” refers to whether a person is aware of information, not whether the information was available or accessible.

4. Definitions from Legal Lexicography

The Court reinforces its plain-meaning analysis with standard legal lexicography:

Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011):
Defines “knowledge” as actual “awareness of a fact or condition,” and contrasts it with “notice.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024):
Distinguishes “actual knowledge” (“knowledge that one in fact has”) from “constructive knowledge” (“knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have” and that is therefore attributed to a person).

5. Texas Cases on Actual vs. Constructive Knowledge

The Court situates its Rule 306a holding within a broader Texas jurisprudence that consistently distinguishes actual from constructive knowledge:

City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2008)
In premises-liability law, actual knowledge requires that the defendant had knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time of the accident, as opposed to being on constructive notice of it.
State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1974)
Again emphasizes that for certain liability or duty determinations, actual knowledge—not constructive knowledge—is required.
LDF Construction, Inc. v. Texas Friends of Chabad Lubavitch, Inc., 459 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)
Discussing Rule 306a, the court noted that the timetable does not begin on the date a party should have acquired knowledge; it begins only when the party actually does acquire knowledge.

6. Intermediate Cases Disapproved: Rendon and Park

The Court calls out, by name, two key intermediate appellate decisions:

Rendon v. Swanson, No. 11‑19‑00260‑CV, 2021 WL 3672622 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 19, 2021, no pet.)
Held that counsel acquired actual knowledge when he received the clerk’s email notice, even though he never read it.
Park v. Aboudail, No. 02‑20‑00260‑CV, 2021 WL 1421442 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 15, 2021, no pet.)
Similarly concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove lack of actual knowledge when he timely received but failed to read the emailed notice of judgment.

The Supreme Court states bluntly that these holdings “misconstrue the rule” because they conflate “notice” with “actual knowledge” and treat receipt of an email as the functional equivalent of knowledge.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Notice and Actual Knowledge Are Alternative Conditions

Rule 306a(4) states that all relevant periods begin on the date the party:

“received the notice required by [Rule 306a(3)] or acquired actual knowledge.” (emphasis added)

The Court reads this “or” as marking two distinct, alternative sufficient conditions:

The clerk’s compliant notice under Rule 306a(3), or
The party’s “actual knowledge” of the judgment, regardless of notice method.

If a clerk properly gives notice in the required manner, the date of that notice starts the clock. If not, the clock will still start if the party actually learns of the judgment by some other means within the 90‑day outer limit. If neither occurs within the first 20 days, Rule 306a(4) allows a reset once the party first receives proper notice or actual knowledge.

2. Why Email Receipt Alone Is Not “Actual Knowledge”

Applying the above principles, the Court reasons:

Red Bluff did not receive the notice “as required” since the clerk used email rather than first-class mail.
Thus, the only way to defeat a Rule 306a extension is if Red Bluff acquired “actual knowledge” within 20 days of February 4.
Under the ordinary, dictionary‑supported, and precedent‑backed meaning, “actual knowledge” requires that the attorney actually be aware of the judgment—i.e., he must subjectively know that the judgment exists and has been signed.
The mere fact that an email has “arrived” in counsel’s inbox—unread—does not show actual awareness, only that information is available and could be discovered with reasonable diligence. That is classical constructive knowledge, not actual knowledge.

The Court underscores the distinction:

“Perhaps he should have [read the email]. Perhaps he had constructive knowledge of the judgment.”
But “Rule 306a(4) requires actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge.”

In other words, the rule cannot be judicially rewritten to impose a “should have known” standard when it explicitly demands “actual” knowledge.

3. The Evidentiary Basis: Sworn Proof and No Contradiction

Rule 306a(5) requires a sworn motion and proof of the date of notice or knowledge. Red Bluff’s counsel:

Admitted that he received the clerk’s email on February 8 in the sense that it entered his email system; but
Swore that he did not see, read, or otherwise become aware of it until March 14, when opposing counsel separately informed him of the judgment.

The Court notes that:

This sworn statement is evidence of subjective lack of awareness; and
Tarpley offered no contrary evidence (e.g., that counsel opened or discussed the email, forwarded it, or otherwise acted as if he knew of the judgment before March 14).

Given that uncontroverted proof, the Supreme Court concludes, as a matter of law, that counsel did not acquire actual knowledge until March 14. The admitted fact that the email arrived on February 8 is “relevant in judging whether he gained knowledge,” but legal significance attaches only if and when he “in fact [became] aware of that information.”

Since actual awareness occurred outside the first 20 days and proper notice never occurred at all, Red Bluff satisfies both preconditions for a Rule 306a(4) extension.

4. Consequences for Deadlines and Jurisdiction

Because Rule 306a(4) and (5) were successfully invoked:

The 30‑day deadline for post‑judgment motions began on March 14, the date of actual knowledge.
Red Bluff’s April 13 motions for JNOV and new trial were therefore timely.
The trial court retained plenary jurisdiction—its full power to change or vacate its judgment—at least through the period triggered by these timely motions.

Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction due to untimeliness. The Supreme Court remands so that the trial court can reach the merits of those motions.

D. Impact and Implications

1. Clarifying a Statewide Rule: “Actual Knowledge” Is Subjective

The most important doctrinal contribution of Red Bluff is the explicit statewide clarification that:

For Rule 306a(4), “actual knowledge” requires subjective awareness of the judgment; and
Mere receipt of an email (or other electronic communication) that the lawyer never actually reads does not itself establish actual knowledge.

This rejects the contrary implication in Rendon and Park and resolves a developing tension in the courts of appeals. Practitioners can no longer assume that intermediate cases equating email receipt with knowledge will control; the Supreme Court’s interpretation governs.

2. How the 2022 Amendments to Rule 306a Affect This Holding

Under today’s Rule 306a(3) (post‑amendment), the clerk must send the judgment via the electronic filing system (Rule 21(f)(10)) for represented parties, not by first-class mail. That change affects the first prong of Rule 306a(4)—whether the party “received the notice required by (3)”:

If the clerk properly e‑serves the judgment via the e‑filing system, then the party has received “notice as required”, even if counsel does not open the email.
In that scenario, Rule 306a(4) is never triggered, and the 30‑day clock runs from the date of judgment, regardless of actual awareness.

By contrast, Red Bluff addresses a situation where:

The clerk did not comply with the method required by Rule 306a(3); and
Thus, the first prong (proper notice) was not satisfied at all.

In modern practice, the practical scope of Red Bluff is therefore:

Most significant where clerks fail to send notice in compliance with Rule 306a(3) (e.g., no e‑file notice, mis‑served judgment, or technical errors); and
Critical for determining whether an alternative form of communication (like an email, letter, or phone call) that actually informs counsel of the judgment nonetheless started the deadlines under the “actual knowledge” prong.

Even under the amended rule, the definition of “actual knowledge” remains the same: subjective awareness. So in any case where the clerk’s formal notice fails, or where a party claims late discovery of a judgment, Red Bluff governs the “actual knowledge” inquiry.

3. Practice Implications for Lawyers

On one level, the decision might appear to reward inattentive email practices. The Court is aware of that tension; it notes that counsel “perhaps should have” read the email. But it refuses to convert that professional expectation into a different legal standard than the rule’s text.

For practitioners, the implications are nuanced:

Duty of diligence remains.
The decision does not diminish lawyers’ ethical and professional obligations to monitor their cases, check email, and track dockets. A lawyer who fails to do so risks malpractice, sanctions, or client-relations problems even if the procedural rule grants relief.
Relief depends on evidence.
Red Bluff was decided on uncontroverted sworn proof that the email was never read. In closer cases, trial courts can weigh conflicting affidavits, email logs, or circumstantial evidence (e.g., a lawyer’s conduct inconsistent with claimed ignorance).
No presumption from mere email receipt.
There is no longer any basis for a presumption that the arrival of an email alone—without proof of it being read—creates “actual knowledge” under Rule 306a.
Strategic use of Rule 306a.
When notice by the clerk fails, parties should promptly assess whether Rule 306a(4) relief is available and gather sworn evidence of when the judgment was truly discovered.

4. Institutional and Systemic Impact

Institutionally, the decision:

Reinforces the importance of clerks complying with Rule 306a(3). Courts cannot paper over non‑compliance by treating alternative communications as de facto notice unless they constitute actual knowledge.
Fits within a broader trend of the Supreme Court’s textualist approach to procedural rules, favoring the rule’s plain language over judicially created diligence standards.
Ensures that litigants are not deprived of appellate review or post‑judgment relief solely because information was technically available but never actually brought to their attention.

Yet the decision does not open the door to unlimited second chances. Rule 306a(4) still imposes:

A 20‑day window for the absence of both notice and actual knowledge;
A 90‑day outer limit for resetting deadlines; and
A requirement of sworn proof as to when knowledge was acquired.

Those structural safeguards temper any concern that litigants will routinely evade deadlines through after‑the‑fact disclaimers of knowledge.

5. Relationship to Other “Actual Knowledge” Contexts

While the holding is formally tethered to Rule 306a, its reasoning reinforces Texas law more broadly on “actual knowledge”:

In premises liability (Corsicana), governmental liability, and similar areas, courts already require subjective awareness when the statute or doctrine speaks of “actual knowledge.”
Red Bluff bolsters those interpretations by anchoring them in ordinary language and high‑court precedent like Sulyma and Schutte.
It also signals that where a statute or rule uses the phrase “actual knowledge,” Texas courts will generally resist attempts to transform it into a “knew or should have known” or purely objective standard absent explicit textual support.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several procedural and doctrinal terms in the opinion may be opaque to non‑specialists. The following clarifications may help.

1. “Post‑Judgment Motions”

These are motions filed after the trial court signs a final judgment, typically within 30 days, such as:

Motion for new trial;
Motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment; or
Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

Filing such motions on time can extend the trial court’s power to change its judgment and can also affect the deadlines for filing an appeal.

2. “Plenary Jurisdiction”

“Plenary jurisdiction” is the trial court’s full authority over its judgment. During this period, the court can:

Set aside the judgment;
Grant a new trial; or
Modify or reform the judgment.

Once plenary jurisdiction expires—usually 30 days after judgment unless extended by timely post‑judgment motions—the trial court generally loses power to alter the judgment.

3. “Actual Knowledge” vs. “Constructive Knowledge”

Actual knowledge:
The person actually knows the fact; they are subjectively aware of it.
Constructive knowledge:
The person should have known the fact if they had exercised reasonable care, even if they did not in fact know it.

Rule 306a(4) explicitly requires actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge. This was the crux of the dispute in Red Bluff.

4. “Nonsubscriber” Employer

In Texas, employers may choose not to purchase workers’ compensation insurance; these are called “nonsubscribers.” Employees of nonsubscribers can sue their employers in tort for work‑related injuries, and the employer loses certain common‑law defenses (e.g., contributory negligence) as a tradeoff for opting out of the workers’ compensation system.

5. “Per Curiam” Opinion

A “per curiam” opinion is an unsigned opinion issued in the name of the Court rather than a particular justice. It often signals either unanimity or that the Court views the legal issue as relatively straightforward, not requiring a lengthy authored opinion.

6. Rule 26.3 “Grace Period” for Appeals

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 allows a party to file a notice of appeal up to 15 days late if it also files a motion for extension of time and shows a reasonable explanation. The court of appeals held, and the Supreme Court accepted without dispute, that Red Bluff’s notice of appeal fell within this grace period, preserving appellate jurisdiction.

VI. Conclusion: The Significance of Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley

Red Bluff, LLC v. Tarpley establishes a clear and important procedural principle in Texas civil practice:

For purposes of Rule 306a(4), “actual knowledge” of a judgment means the party or its attorney must in fact be subjectively aware that the judgment has been signed. The mere receipt of an unread email from the clerk does not, by itself, constitute actual knowledge.

From this principle flow several key consequences:

Where a clerk fails to provide notice in the manner required by Rule 306a(3), litigants may obtain relief under Rule 306a(4) if they can prove that they lacked both such notice and actual knowledge within the first 20 days.
Intermediate appellate decisions that equated email receipt with actual knowledge are effectively overruled to that extent.
Texas courts reaffirm the sharp doctrinal line between actual and constructive knowledge, and they reject any quiet erosion of that line in the name of docket control or lawyer diligence.

The decision does not excuse lawyers from the duty to monitor their cases; failures in that respect may have other serious consequences. But it does ensure that litigants are not stripped of post‑judgment and appellate rights solely because of information that sat, unread, in an inbox, especially when the clerk did not comply with the rules governing notice.

In the broader legal landscape, Red Bluff reinforces a consistent theme in Texas and federal jurisprudence: where legal rights turn on “actual knowledge,” courts will demand actual awareness and will resist substituting a “should have known” standard unless the text expressly says so. That approach promotes clarity, respects the separation of the judiciary’s interpretive role from rule‑making functions, and guards against forfeitures of substantial rights based on mere technical availability of information.