Actual Knowledge Is Awareness of the Hazard Itself, Not Its Precise Location: Georgia Supreme Court Clarifies “Specific Hazard” and Limits Constructive-Knowledge Principles in Premises Liability

Introduction

In SMG Construction Services, LLC v. Cook, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated a Court of Appeals decision that had reversed summary judgment for a property owner in a construction-site fall case. The Court held that the Court of Appeals conflated the doctrines of actual and constructive knowledge and improperly used constructive-knowledge principles (“open and obvious,” “plain view,” and “camouflage/optical illusion” cases) to create a jury question where the plaintiff admitted he had seen and understood the very hazard that caused his injury—an unguarded second-floor ledge.

The decision clarifies that actual knowledge requires awareness of the hazard itself, not the precise details of its location or configuration. While evidence that conditions obscured a hazard may undermine constructive knowledge (i.e., what a reasonable person should have perceived), such evidence does not erase a plaintiff’s actual knowledge when he has already acknowledged awareness of the specific dangerous condition that proximately caused his injury.

The Court also cautioned against mechanically applying the Robinson v. Kroger “slip-and-fall” framework to all premises cases and reminded courts to analyze the full suite of negligence elements and affirmative defenses actually raised. Because the Court of Appeals stopped after its erroneous knowledge analysis, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for consideration of the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses, including assumption of the risk (particularly the “hired worker” variant) and voluntary negligence.

Case Background

Daniel Cook, an independent contractor installing cabinetry on the second floor of a residence under construction, fell from an unguarded balcony/ledge adjacent to an “open foyer” area. In his deposition, Cook admitted he had observed that the balcony lacked a guardrail and that he “could see where [it] dropped off.” He fell while “shuffling” backward toward that area. He sued SMG Construction Services (the property owner), alleging premises liability and related claims.

The trial court granted summary judgment to SMG, concluding that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care, and that SMG’s knowledge of the hazard was not superior to Cook’s. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that conflicting evidence about lighting, drywall dust, overspray, and color blending created a jury question whether Cook knew the “specific hazard”—which the court framed as the precise proximity of the balcony’s edge to his work area—rather than merely the general condition of an unguarded balcony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that Cook’s own testimony established his actual knowledge of the specific hazard that proximately caused his injury—the unguarded ledge—rendering it improper to invoke constructive-knowledge principles to defeat summary judgment on that element.
The Court explained that a plaintiff’s misperception of the precise point of drop-off or the fine details of a known hazard does not negate his actual knowledge of that hazard.
The Court criticized the Court of Appeals for treating “optical illusion” and similar evidence as undermining actual knowledge; those concepts, the Supreme Court held, bear on constructive knowledge (what a reasonably careful person should have perceived), not on admitted, actual awareness.
The Court also admonished lower courts not to default to the Robinson v. Kroger two-element “slip-and-fall” framework because it does not encompass all elements of premises liability or of affirmative defenses.
Because the Court of Appeals ended its analysis at (mistaken) knowledge, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for the intermediate court to analyze the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses: (1) assumption of the risk (including the “hired worker” exception); and (2) voluntary negligence (a species of contributory negligence).

Detailed Analysis

1) The Court’s Clarification of Actual vs. Constructive Knowledge

The Court drew a bright line between actual and constructive knowledge:

Actual knowledge exists when the plaintiff actually saw or was aware of the hazard. The Court cited Robinson v. Kroger and Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma (U.S. 2020) for the commonsense proposition that “actual” means—well—actual: the person is in fact aware.
Constructive knowledge is what a reasonably careful person would have learned under the circumstances. It asks whether the hazard was in plain view or sufficiently open and obvious such that the invitee should have seen and avoided it with ordinary care.

The Court emphasized that where the record contains “plain, palpable, and undisputed” evidence of a plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the specific hazard that caused the injury, courts must not import constructive-knowledge concepts to create a jury issue on knowledge. That is precisely what the Court of Appeals did here by treating testimony about dust, overspray, lighting, and color blending as defeating actual knowledge. Those conditions may bear on whether someone should have perceived a hazard they did not in fact see. But they cannot erase a plaintiff’s own admission that he did see and appreciate the very hazard that later injured him.

2) The “Specific Hazard” Requirement and Its Scope

The Court reaffirmed that Georgia law requires knowledge of the “specific hazard which precipitate[d] the injury,” not mere awareness that conditions were generally hazardous. But it clarified how “specific” that hazard must be:

The specific hazard is the dangerous condition that proximately caused the injury. In this case, that is the unguarded ledge itself, not the exact inch-by-inch location of its drop-off, or the degree to which the edge “blended” visually with surrounding surfaces.
A plaintiff cannot defeat actual knowledge by redefining the “specific hazard” so narrowly that it requires knowledge of every detail underlying the danger. The Court invoked Landings Association v. Williams (the alligator case) to illustrate that if someone knows alligators inhabit the lagoon, they know the hazard, even if unaware of the size or precise location of a particular alligator.
The Court analogized to cases like Downes v. Oglethorpe University (open body of water) and Saunders v. Industrial Metals & Surplus (miscalculating distance to a known skylight) to reaffirm that the hazard is the dangerous condition per se, not its granular features.

The Court distinguished Lore v. Suwanee Creek HOA and similar cases where the “specific hazard” was qualitatively different than the general condition (e.g., a sinkhole that extended several feet beyond the obvious edge, causing collapse). Here, by contrast, Cook fell from the very open and unguarded ledge he testified he had seen and understood.

3) Misapplication of “Camouflage/Optical Illusion” Cases

The Supreme Court identified the Court of Appeals’ reliance on “camouflage” and “optical illusion” cases (e.g., Strauss v. City of Lilburn; Pinder v. H & H Food Services; Hagadorn v. Prudential) as a category mistake. Those cases concern constructive knowledge: whether an invitee should have seen a hazard they did not actually perceive because, for example, inadequate lighting or blending surfaces concealed it.

Here, Cook did not claim he lacked awareness of the unguarded ledge; he admitted he saw and knew it was open and unrailed. Evidence that conditions made the edge’s precise location less perceptible might matter to other issues (e.g., the voluntariness or reasonableness of Cook’s conduct), but it does not create a jury question on actual knowledge once admitted.

4) The Robinson Framework: Use With Care

The Court offered an important doctrinal reminder: the Robinson v. Kroger two-part framework—(1) defendant’s knowledge; and (2) plaintiff’s lack of knowledge despite ordinary care—was developed for slip/trip-and-fall cases and addresses only a subset of the issues in premises liability:

Robinson’s first prong aligns with breach (defendant’s knowledge of a hazard).
Robinson’s second prong encapsulates two contributory-negligence defenses: voluntary negligence and “casual” negligence (failure to exercise ordinary care).

Accordingly, Robinson does not replace the traditional elements of negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages), nor does it subsume affirmative defenses like assumption of the risk. Courts should analyze the arguments actually raised and the defenses asserted, rather than default to Robinson simply because a case involves a fall.

5) Independent Contractor and the “Hired Worker” Assumption-of-Risk Variant

SMG advanced two affirmative defenses:

Assumption of the risk, including the “hired worker” exception—often applicable on construction sites, where hazards are inherent and evolving.
Voluntary negligence (a species of contributory negligence)—intentional, unreasonable self-exposure to a known hazard.

The Supreme Court recognized that Cook’s independent-contractor status engages the hired-worker doctrine. This doctrine can bar recovery where a worker knowingly encounters an inherent, obvious danger on a construction site while performing work that necessarily implicates that danger. The Court did not decide whether the doctrine applies here; it simply held the Court of Appeals must now analyze these defenses fully in light of Cook’s actual knowledge.

The Court also flagged that the conditions Cook identified (dust, overspray, lighting, color blending) may still be relevant on remand—not to knowledge, but to whether Cook intentionally and unreasonably exposed himself to the hazard, or whether his conduct was otherwise negligent, as well as to whether SMG’s knowledge was “superior” in the sense relevant to warning/protection duties.

Precedents Cited and How They Informed the Decision

Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997). Provided the classic two-prong slip-and-fall framework and defined voluntary and “casual” negligence. The Supreme Court emphasized Robinson’s limited scope, warning against mechanical application to non-slip/trip scenarios and reminding that Robinson does not capture all negligence elements or all affirmative defenses.
Johnson St. Props., LLC v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51 (2017). Reiterated that a plaintiff’s knowledge must concern the “specific hazard” that precipitated the injury. The majority read Clure as requiring knowledge of the dangerous condition that causes injury (here, the unguarded ledge), not every detail (exact proximity or timing). The dissent argued Clure supports a narrower focus on particulars (e.g., precise timing/location), creating a jury question. The majority rejected that extension.
Landings Ass’n v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397 (2012). Held that awareness of alligators on the property sufficed to establish knowledge of the hazard, even if the victim did not know the size or precise location of the alligator that caused the injury. The Court used Landings to reject over-narrow definitions of the “specific hazard,” reasoning that an alligator (like an open ledge) presents a unitary hazard.
American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (2009). Confirmed that plaintiffs bear the burden to show the proprietor’s knowledge and clarified Robinson’s role as a “refined” test in premises cases premised on slip-and-fall. Cited in articulating standards for negligence elements and defenses.
Givens v. Coral Hospitality-GA, LLC, 317 Ga. 282 (2023) (Pinson, J., concurring). Explained that Robinson’s elements neither fully capture the breach inquiry nor encompass all negligence elements; and underscored that a proprietor who exercises ordinary care yet lacks knowledge of a hazard has not breached duty. The majority used this to re-center the analysis on core negligence and defenses.
Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 (2010). Stated the summary-judgment standards—defendants can prevail by negating an essential element, showing lack of evidence on an essential element, or establishing an affirmative defense. Applied here to stress that knowledge is only one element of SMG’s defenses.
Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480 (2019); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). Standard premises-liability duty: ordinary care to keep premises and approaches safe; liability turns on proprietor’s superior knowledge of danger. The Court used this backdrop to maintain focus on comparative knowledge but with proper doctrinal fit.
Ga. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023) (n.7). Confirmed that the plaintiff’s knowledge is relevant to the ultimate question of liability, particularly via affirmative defenses like assumption of risk and contributory negligence.
Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805 (1999). Articulated assumption-of-the-risk elements, including plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the danger—reinforcing the Court’s insistence on actual, not constructive, knowledge for that defense.
Sinyard v. Georgia Power Co., 363 Ga. App. 195 (2022); Holland v. Durham Coal & Coke Co., 131 Ga. 715 (1908); Elsberry v. Ivey, 209 Ga. App. 620 (1993). These cases ground the “hired worker” exception and the notion that construction sites are inherently changing, with risks often assumed by those hired to work amidst them. Their relevance will be central on remand.
Downes v. Oglethorpe University, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 250 (2017); Saunders v. Industrial Metals & Surplus, Inc., 285 Ga. App. 415 (2007); contrast Lore v. Suwanee Creek HOA, 305 Ga. App. 165 (2010). Downes and Saunders support the majority’s “unitary hazard” view; Lore shows the outer boundary where the “specific hazard” differs qualitatively from the general condition.
Myers v. Harris, 257 Ga. App. 286 (2002); Strauss; Pinder; Simon v. Murphy, 350 Ga. App. 291 (2019); Hagadorn, 267 Ga. App. 143 (2004). The Court of Appeals’ reliance on these constructive-knowledge/“camouflage” cases was misplaced because Cook admitted actual knowledge of the hazard.
Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U.S. 178 (2020). The Court used Sulyma’s clean definition of “actual knowledge” to discipline terminology: “actual” means “in fact aware,” not “should have known.”

Legal Reasoning

Framing the hazard. The Court anchored the “specific hazard” as the dangerous condition that proximately caused injury. Because Cook conceded he knew the balcony was open and unguarded and could see where it dropped off, he had actual knowledge of the specific hazard.
Rejecting detail-based redefinition. The Court rejected efforts to recast “specific hazard” into ever finer details (exact proximity, edge demarcation, visual blending), analogizing to Landings: a plaintiff who knows a lagoon has alligators cannot defeat knowledge by claiming ignorance of one alligator’s size or hiding spot.
Policing the actual/constructive boundary. “Camouflage/optical illusion” cases are about what a reasonable person should have perceived when the plaintiff did not actually perceive a hazard. They cannot create a triable issue on actual knowledge where the plaintiff testifies to having seen and appreciated the hazard.
Robinson cautions. The Robinson test is not a universal solvent; it neither replaces negligence elements nor resolves affirmative defenses. Courts must evaluate the specific defenses asserted—in this case, assumption of risk (including the hired-worker variant) and voluntary negligence—and all their elements.
Procedural course correction. Because the Court of Appeals halted after mischaracterizing knowledge, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for consideration of the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses, expressly declining to opine on their ultimate merit.

Impact and Likely Consequences

For Premises Liability Doctrine in Georgia

Sharper knowledge taxonomy. This decision reaffirms a clear doctrinal boundary: once a plaintiff admits they saw and understood the hazard that caused their injury, “camouflage” evidence will not resurrect a knowledge dispute. Expect more summary-judgment successes for defendants on the knowledge element of assumption-of-risk and voluntary-negligence defenses where plaintiffs concede actual awareness.
Cabining the “specific hazard” doctrine. Plaintiffs cannot define hazards so narrowly that knowledge requires awareness of every precise detail (location, timing, degree). Courts will treat hazards like open ledges, bodies of water, and similar perils as “unitary” dangers for knowledge purposes.
Reduced overreliance on Robinson. Trial and appellate courts are reminded to analyze all negligence elements and affirmative defenses actually raised rather than default to Robinson’s two-prong proxy.

For Construction-Site Litigation and Independent Contractors

Hired worker assumption-of-risk defense. The opinion elevates the salience of the hired-worker variant of assumption of risk when the plaintiff is an independent contractor on an active site. On remand, expect focus on whether the unguarded balcony was an inherent, obvious site risk and whether Cook knowingly and voluntarily encountered it in performing his work.
Deposition dynamics. Plaintiff admissions that they observed and appreciated a hazard can be case-dispositive on knowledge. Counsel will likely coach witnesses more carefully on differentiating general awareness from particular features, though this opinion narrows the room to do so.
Safety practices and documentation. Owners and GCs should continue documenting safety meetings, sign-offs, and site conditions. While this decision helps defeat knowledge disputes, it also signals that other elements of defenses (voluntariness, reasonableness, superior knowledge) remain fact-intensive.

For Summary Judgment Strategy

Defendants. Lead with plaintiff admissions establishing actual knowledge; distinguish constructive-knowledge cases; frame the hazard at the right level of generality. Then carry through all elements of affirmative defenses—voluntariness for assumption of risk, intentional exposure for voluntary negligence, and lack of superior knowledge.
Plaintiffs. Avoid categorical admissions of actual awareness; where unavoidable, pivot to disputing voluntariness and reasonableness and to any evidence suggesting the owner’s superior knowledge or failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping premises safe.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual knowledge. You actually knew about the danger—you saw it or were otherwise aware of it.
Constructive knowledge. Even if you didn’t actually know, you should have known if you were being reasonably careful because it was in plain view or obvious.
Specific hazard. The particular dangerous condition that actually caused the injury (e.g., the unguarded ledge), not every granular detail (e.g., the exact point of drop-off).
Assumption of the risk. A defense where the plaintiff knew about the risk, appreciated it, and voluntarily chose to face it. The “hired worker” variant often applies on construction sites where risks are inherent to the job.
Voluntary negligence. A form of contributory negligence: intentionally and unreasonably exposing oneself to a known danger.
“Casual” negligence (ordinary-care failure). Failing to use ordinary care to discover and avoid a hazard.
Plain, palpable, and undisputed. The high threshold for deciding negligence or knowledge issues on summary judgment; evidence must be so one-sided that reasonable jurors could not disagree.

The Dissent

Justice McMillian, joined by Chief Justice Peterson and Justice Ellington, would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. The dissent reads Clure to support a narrower “specific hazard” concept, insisting that jurors could find Cook lacked actual knowledge of the precise proximity of the edge (given dust, poor lighting, and color blending), and thus that SMG may have had superior knowledge. The dissent also distinguished Landings as involving wild animals equally known to the owner and victim, whereas here, SMG (as owner/builder) may have had superior knowledge of the balcony’s edge in relation to Cook’s work area.

In short, the dissent would send the case to a jury on whether Cook’s knowledge equaled SMG’s and on whether Cook exercised ordinary care, leaving all defenses and negligence issues for trial rather than summary resolution.

What Remains on Remand

The Court of Appeals must now decide whether SMG carried its summary-judgment burden on the remaining elements of its affirmative defenses in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that Cook had actual knowledge of the unguarded ledge:

Assumption of the risk (including hired worker). Did Cook appreciate the risk of falling from the known open ledge and voluntarily choose to encounter that risk in the way he worked? Was the hazard inherent and obvious in the construction site context, and does any evidence negate voluntariness (e.g., lack of reasonable alternatives)?
Voluntary negligence. Did Cook intentionally and unreasonably expose himself to the known hazard (e.g., by backing toward it while focused on an air hose)? Or are there fact disputes about the reasonableness of his actions under the conditions?
Superior knowledge. Even given Cook’s actual knowledge, are there disputed facts about SMG’s superior knowledge of site-specific risks that could sustain a duty to warn or protect? The Supreme Court left open that site conditions might remain relevant to these issues.

Key Takeaways

A plaintiff’s admitted awareness of the hazardous condition that causes injury establishes actual knowledge; “optical illusion” evidence does not undo that admission.
The “specific hazard” is the dangerous condition that proximately causes injury, not every precise detail about its location or configuration.
Constructive-knowledge principles (plain view/open and obvious) do not apply to negate actual knowledge.
Do not mechanically apply Robinson v. Kroger in all premises cases; courts must analyze the elements of negligence and the affirmative defenses actually raised.
For construction sites, the hired-worker assumption-of-risk doctrine may be decisive where the worker knowingly encounters inherent, obvious site hazards.

Conclusion

SMG Construction Services, LLC v. Cook clarifies a recurring fault line in Georgia premises-liability law: actual knowledge versus constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court holds that once a plaintiff admits awareness of the hazard that caused the harm, courts may not resuscitate the knowledge element by invoking constructive-knowledge and camouflage cases. The opinion also curbs overuse of Robinson’s slip-and-fall framework, refocusing courts on the full negligence analysis and on affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk and voluntary negligence.

The practical impact is significant. Defendants will more often secure summary judgment on knowledge where plaintiffs concede actual awareness, particularly in construction settings. Plaintiffs, in turn, will need to concentrate on contesting voluntariness, reasonableness, and superior knowledge rather than redefining hazards at a hyper-granular level. On remand, the Court of Appeals must complete the analysis the Supreme Court says was left undone—addressing all elements of SMG’s defenses in light of the clarified standard. Regardless of the ultimate outcome for these parties, the doctrinal guidance will shape Georgia premises-liability litigation well beyond construction sites.