Actual Knowledge and Attempted Obstruction: Commentary on State v. Ford, Supreme Court of North Carolina (2025)

I. Introduction

In State v. Ford, No. 31A24 (Dec. 12, 2025), the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed two important questions in criminal law:

What constitutes common-law felony obstruction of justice when a defendant allegedly destroys or withholds business records sought by police?
What mental state does N.C.G.S. § 14‑360(b) require for felony cruelty to animals—does the State need to prove actual knowledge of the animal’s presence, or is it enough that the defendant “should have known”?

The case arose from a confrontation in Asheville between Scott Everett Ford, owner of Classic Event Rental, and Claude “Alex” McPherson, an unhoused man widely known in the community as the “Cat Man” because he was almost always accompanied by his cat, Thomas, either on his shoulder or in a stroller.

During an altercation near an interstate exit where McPherson regularly panhandled, Ford drove his company’s Ford F‑150 truck off the road and struck McPherson’s stroller, which contained Thomas. The cat survived but was plainly distressed and allegedly traumatized. When police later sought documentation from Classic Event Rental to determine who had been driving the truck, the paper schedule for May 17, 2021—the day of the incident—was missing from the business’s recycling bin, although comparable schedules for the surrounding days were present. Police ultimately found a digital copy of the May 17 schedule on Ford’s phone.

Ford was convicted by a jury of felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals, among other charges not at issue here. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished, divided decision, affirmed. The dissent would have directed dismissal of the obstruction of justice charge. The Supreme Court:

Affirmed both convictions, finding the evidence legally sufficient to go to the jury.
Modified the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the cruelty to animals charge, holding that § 14‑360(b) requires actual knowledge of the animal’s presence and rejecting the “should have known” formulation used by the Court of Appeals majority.

The case is particularly significant because it:

Clarifies that unsuccessful or partially successful attempts to hinder an investigation—such as removing only the paper copy of a document—can still constitute felony common-law obstruction of justice.
Establishes that felony cruelty to animals under § 14‑360(b) requires proof that the defendant actually knew an animal was present, not merely that a reasonable person would have known.
Through a concurrence, re‑emphasizes that the State’s burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage is very low—“more than a scintilla” of evidence, which is synonymous with “substantial evidence.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

Ford was tried in Buncombe County Superior Court and convicted of felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals.
He moved twice to dismiss these charges for insufficient evidence; both motions were denied.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority upheld both convictions and used “knew or should have known” language in its sufficiency analysis on the animal cruelty charge. The dissent argued that the obstruction charge should have been dismissed because Ford’s disposal of the schedule followed his normal business practice and because police obtained the schedule anyway.
Ford appealed as of right to the Supreme Court under former N.C.G.S. § 7A‑30(2) (appeal by right based on a dissent) on the obstruction issue, and the Court granted discretionary review under § 7A‑31 on the animal cruelty mens rea issue.

B. Holdings

Obstruction of Justice
The Court held that the State presented substantial evidence of felony obstruction of justice. The existence of a routine business practice of discarding schedules did not preclude a finding that Ford intentionally removed the May 17 paper schedule to hinder the police investigation. The fact that officers eventually found a digital copy did not defeat the charge; success in obstructing justice is not an element of the offense.
Cruelty to Animals
The Court held that N.C.G.S. § 14‑360(b), read with § 14‑360(c), requires proof that the defendant actually knew an animal was present. The Court explicitly rejected the “should have known” language used by the Court of Appeals majority. However, applying the correct standard, the Court found that the State had introduced sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to infer that Ford actually knew Thomas was in the stroller when he struck it. The conviction therefore stands, and the Court of Appeals’ judgment is “modified and affirmed.”
Concurrence on the Standard for Motions to Dismiss
Justice Berger concurred to emphasize that the State’s burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage is simply to present “more than a scintilla” of evidence—this is synonymous with the term “substantial evidence,” and both describe a very low bar.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence / Motion-to-Dismiss Framework

The Court grounds its standard-of-review analysis in a line of cases defining when a trial judge must deny a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence:

State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95 (1980) – Sets out the two-part test: the court must decide if there is substantial evidence of (1) each element of the offense and (2) the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator.
State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268 (2001) – Defines “substantial evidence” as evidence that is “relevant and adequate to convince a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion.”
State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176 (1983) – Clarifies that evidence creating only “suspicion or conjecture” is insufficient; then a motion to dismiss must be allowed.
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373 (2000) and State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537 (1992) – Require the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, granting it every reasonable inference; this applies equally to circumstantial evidence.
State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96 (2009) – Emphasizes that contradictions in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State at this stage.
State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141 (2002) – Holds that if the State’s evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt, the case must go to the jury even if an equally reasonable inference of innocence exists.
State v. Chekanow, 370 N.C. 488 (2018) and State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717 (2016) – Confirm that whether the evidence is sufficient is a question of law reviewed de novo.

Together, these precedents justify the Court’s de novo review of the trial court’s denial of Ford’s motions to dismiss, and they require the Court to treat all conflicts in the evidence as resolved in favor of the State.

2. Common-Law Obstruction of Justice

The obstruction analysis rests primarily on longstanding North Carolina authority defining the scope of common-law obstruction:

In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635 (1983) – A judicial discipline case that defines common-law obstruction as:
“any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders public or legal justice.”
Kivett emphasized that even an attempt to interfere with justice—for example, trying to prevent a grand jury from convening—can support an obstruction charge, whether or not the attempt succeeds.
State v. Bradsher, 382 N.C. 656 (2022) – Recently reaffirmed Kivett’s broad definition and explains that common-law obstruction becomes a felony when committed “with deceit and intent to defraud” under N.C.G.S. § 14‑3(b).
State v. Ditenhafer, 373 N.C. 116 (2019) – Cited for the proposition that common-law obstruction is converted to felony status by § 14‑3(b), but not central to the specific facts here.
State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752 (1923) – Characterizes obstruction as direct or indirect opposition or resistance to an officer’s lawful duties, reinforcing that active interference with an investigation can qualify.
Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75 (1984) – A civil case in which the Court recognized that deliberate destruction or concealment of records to thwart an adverse party’s investigation would amount to common-law obstruction. The Court here relies on Henry to recognize that destroying documents sought by law enforcement can indeed be obstruction—even if other copies later surface.
State v. Eastman, 113 N.C. App. 347 (1994) – A Court of Appeals decision that had language suggesting obstruction involves acts done to “impair the verity or availability” of evidence. Ford relied on this phrase to argue that because the digital schedule was found and used at trial, there was no impairment and hence no obstruction. The Supreme Court essentially limits this reading and harmonizes Eastman with Kivett and Henry by reaffirming that success is not required.

The Court uses these cases to confirm that:

Destroying or making unavailable documents targeted by an investigation can be obstruction of justice.
There is no requirement that the defendant’s effort fully or permanently prevent the evidence from being obtained.

3. Mental State and “Knowledge” in the Cruelty to Animals Statute

The key statutory interpretation issue is the meaning of “intentionally” and “knowingly” in N.C.G.S. § 14‑360(c). The Court draws on:

State v. Sexton, 357 N.C. 235 (2003) – Clarifies that malice and intent are typically proven circumstantially: juries infer state of mind from conduct and surrounding circumstances. This supports the Court’s use of indirect evidence (community reputation, prior interactions, eyewitness testimony) to infer Ford’s actual knowledge.
State v. Hightower, 187 N.C. 300 (1924) – Provides a canonical definition:
“[W]hen it is said a person has knowledge of a given condition, it is meant that his relation to it, his association with it, his control over it, and his direction of it are such as to give him actual information concerning it.”
The Court uses this definition to hold that “knowingly” in § 14‑360(c) entails actual knowledge, and therefore the crime does not rest on mere constructive knowledge or what a person “should have known.”

4. Concurrence: Clarifying “Substantial Evidence” vs. “More Than a Scintilla”

Justice Berger’s concurrence cites a series of decisions equating “substantial evidence” with “more than a scintilla of evidence”:

State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342 (1958) – Longstanding case stating that if there is “more than a scintilla” of competent evidence supporting the allegations, the case must go to the jury.
State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67 (1993) – Emphasizes that the State is entitled to every reasonable inference at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591 (2002) – Uses the “substantial evidence” terminology.
State v. Beck, 385 N.C. 435 (2023) – Explicitly states that “substantial evidence” means “more than a scintilla of evidence,” quoting Powell.
State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797 (2024) and State v. Dover, 381 N.C. 535 (2022) – Reaffirm that the two phrases are “in reality the same,” quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62 (1982).

The concurrence is essentially an exhortation to practitioners and courts: do not treat “substantial evidence” as a demanding standard; it is designed to be a that heavily favors letting the jury decide.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Obstruction of Justice: Document Disposal and the Lack of a “Success” Requirement

(a) Ford’s Arguments

Ford challenged the obstruction conviction on two main grounds:

Routine Business Practice: The schedules at Classic Event Rental, he argued, were routinely discarded in the normal course of business. Because there is no law requiring him to retain them, throwing away the May 17 schedule could not logically be obstruction; it was, at most, routine conduct.
No Actual Impairment: He pointed out that law enforcement ultimately obtained the May 17 schedule from his phone. Relying on language from Eastman, he argued that obstruction requires an act that impairs the “verity or availability” of evidence. Since the evidence was available and used at trial, there was no obstruction.

(b) The Court’s Response: Routine Practice Is Not a Safe Harbor

The Court rejected the argument that a regular practice of discarding documents automatically negates obstruction. The key point is that even against the backdrop of a regular practice, the question is whether in this particular case the disposal was used as a tool to impede justice.

The Court pointed to circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer :

When police asked for documentation of who was driving the truck on May 17, Ford falsely said the company did not keep such records and claimed he had “no clue” who drove the truck, saying they “throw keys and tell them to go.”
When officers returned with a search warrant, Ford led them to the warehouse recycling bin where the paper schedules were kept.
Officers found schedules for the 15th, 16th, and “the 18th on”—“every single day consecutively except for May 17th.”
Ford had worked the “podium” on May 17, giving him direct access to the schedule.
Eyewitness testimony and later investigation established that Ford himself had been the driver who struck the stroller, giving him a personal motive to hinder the investigation.

From these facts, the Court reasoned that a jury could permissibly draw two steps of inference:

Someone intentionally removed the May 17 schedule from the recycling bin, because its absence cannot be explained merely by the ordinary business practice (other days’ schedules from that same time period were present).
Ford, as the driver and as the person with access and motive, was the one who removed it with the purpose of impeding the investigation.

Under the deferential standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that is enough to require submission of the case to the jury.

(c) The Court’s Response: Success Is Not an Element of Obstruction

On the “no actual impairment” argument, the Court squarely rejected the idea that obstruction requires the defendant’s efforts to succeed in keeping evidence unavailable.

Relying on Kivett and Henry, the Court emphasized:

In Kivett, the judge’s effort to secure an order preventing a grand jury from convening was never successful—yet it “would support a charge of common law obstruction of justice.”
Henry recognizes that destroying records to subvert an investigation is obstruction, without suggesting that the State must prove the concealment was perfectly effective.

Thus, the Court distills the rule:

“[T]he success of a defendant’s obstruction efforts is not an element of the offense.”

The key inquiry is whether the defendant acted with the purpose of preventing, obstructing, impeding, or hindering public or legal justice—not whether the attempt ultimately failed. Making the paper schedule unavailable—even if a digital copy still existed—sufficed to support the offense.

2. Felony Cruelty to Animals: Actual Knowledge Under N.C.G.S. § 14‑360(b)

(a) Statutory Structure and Text

N.C.G.S. § 14‑360(b) makes it a felony to:

“maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or kill ... any animal.”

Section 14‑360(c) defines:

“Maliciously” as “an act committed intentionally and with malice or bad motive.”
“Intentionally” as “committed knowingly and without justifiable excuse.”

Thus, for felony cruelty, the State must show:

The defendant committed one of the prohibited acts (e.g., cruelly beating or killing an animal);
The act was done “maliciously”—i.e., intentionally, with bad motive; and
“Intentionally” means the defendant acted “knowingly” and without justifiable excuse.

The dispute in Ford is over the meaning of “knowingly”: Does it require actual awareness that an animal is present, or can the State rely on what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position should have known?

(b) The Court’s Interpretation: “Knowingly” Means Actual Knowledge

The Court treats “knowingly” as a technical term with a settled meaning in North Carolina criminal law. Citing Hightower, it holds that:

“Knowledge” refers to the person’s actual information about a condition, based on their relationship or association with it.
Accordingly, “knowingly” in § 14‑360(c) imports actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or negligence.

The Court therefore concludes:

“[T]he Court of Appeals erred in using the phrase ‘should have known’ because, under N.C.G.S. § 14‑360(b), the State needed to present substantial evidence that Mr. Ford had actual knowledge that Thomas was in the stroller at the time of the incident.”

This is the central new doctrinal piece: felony cruelty to animals under § 14‑360(b) requires proof of actual knowledge of the animal’s presence.

(c) Application: Why the Evidence Supported Actual Knowledge

Although the Court corrects the legal standard, it holds that this error does not warrant reversal at the motion-to-dismiss stage because the State’s evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, supports a reasonable inference of actual knowledge.

Key evidentiary points include:

Ford had owned and operated Classic Event Rental in Asheville for approximately twenty-one years.
McPherson was a well-known local figure, nicknamed “Cat Man”; Thomas the cat was “a very popular character” always with him, either on his shoulder or in the stroller.
Ford admitted at trial that McPherson “mess[ed] with [him] every time [he went] through” the intersection, implying long-standing, repeated interactions and animosity.
On the day in question, Madison Stewart and Joseph Schlenk, both familiar with McPherson and Thomas, saw Ford drive off the road and “go straight for” the stroller.
Ford’s passenger, Kelby Manos, initially not paying attention, testified that when he looked up he saw “the kitty kitty” and that Ford “hit a cat stroller.” If the cat was clearly visible from the passenger seat, a jury could infer Ford saw it from the driver’s seat.
Schlenk described Ford’s demeanor as “really upset, mad, grimacing” as he drove toward the stroller, supporting an inference of targeted, malicious action rather than an inadvertent collision.

Ford insisted he did not know Thomas was in the stroller and claimed he was not aware of McPherson’s “Cat Man” identity. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the State’s favor. The question is not whether the jury must find knowledge, but whether it reasonably could.

The Court held that, taken together, the evidence supports a chain of reasonable inferences:

Ford knew McPherson and had an adversarial history with him at that specific intersection.
Given Thomas’s constant presence with McPherson and community notoriety, Ford likely knew of Thomas as well.
On the day of the incident, Ford could visibly see the stroller and, inferably, the cat inside, as evidenced by Manos’s observation from the same vehicle.
Ford drove “straight for the baby carriage” out of anger, intending to strike it, and did so knowing Thomas was in it.

These inferences, grounded in circumstantial evidence, suffice to meet the low “more than a scintilla” / “substantial evidence” standard. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied even under the corrected actual-knowledge standard.

(d) Rejection of the “Should Have Known” Mischaracterization

Ford argued that the State, and the Court of Appeals, effectively relied on information known to others—such as Thomas’s fame in the community—to argue that Ford should have known about the cat, which would sound in negligence rather than knowledge.

The Supreme Court responds by emphasizing that the State’s proof went beyond abstract “community knowledge”:

Evidence that Thomas was “always” with McPherson;
Ford’s own admission of regular, contentious interactions with McPherson at that very intersection;
Direct eyewitness testimony that the cat was visible and that Ford drove directly at the stroller.

Viewed together, these facts support an inference of , not just an argument that Ford should have seen what a reasonable person might have noticed. The Court thus makes clear that while proof of knowledge can rely on circumstantial evidence and shared context, the legal standard itself remains actual knowledge.

3. Concurrence: The Low Threshold for Surviving a Motion to Dismiss

Justice Berger’s concurring opinion is not essential to the resolution of Ford’s case but has practical importance. He notes that there has been some confusion regarding the phrase “substantial evidence.” Some might understand it as implying a robust quantity or quality of evidence.

By collecting recent decisions, the concurrence reaffirms:

“Substantial evidence means ‘more than a scintilla of evidence.’ ... Even though these two phrases are synonymous, the ‘more than a scintilla of evidence’ standard is probably the more accurate framing given the low bar.”

In other words:

The State need not present a strong or overwhelming case to avoid dismissal.
If there is more than a minimal amount of evidence on each element, from which a jury could reasonably infer guilt, the case must be submitted to the jury.
Trial judges are not permitted to weigh credibility or resolve close factual questions at the motion-to-dismiss stage; those are reserved for the jury.

This clarification dovetails with the majority opinion’s readiness to treat circumstantial evidence as sufficient to infer both intent to obstruct and actual knowledge of the animal’s presence.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. On Obstruction of Justice and Business Records

State v. Ford has notable implications for how businesses and individuals handle records once they become aware—or should reasonably suspect—that law enforcement is investigating:

No Safe Harbor in “Regular Practice”: A routine document-destruction or recycling policy does not immunize conduct from obstruction charges when, in a particular case, a document relevant to an investigation is missing while similar documents are present. If the surrounding circumstances suggest that the destruction or removal was selective and tied to impending or ongoing law enforcement scrutiny, obstruction can be established.
Paper vs. Digital Copies: Making a physical copy unavailable can still amount to obstruction even if a digital copy exists and is ultimately discovered. Defendants cannot rely on the existence of other copies to argue that there was no obstruction; the focus is on the attempt and its intent, not the overall success in hiding all copies.
Litigation Hold / Preservation Duties (Practically, if not Statutorily): While Ford does not impose a new statutory retention duty on businesses, it functionally underscores the risk of continuing to discard materials in the “ordinary course” once one is on notice of law enforcement interest. Counsel advising clients must treat knowledge of a potential criminal investigation as a trigger for suspension of routine destruction practices to avoid exposure to obstruction charges.

2. On Felony Cruelty to Animals Prosecutions

The decision provides the most explicit high‑court articulation to date that felony cruelty to animals under § 14‑360(b) requires of the animal’s presence. The implications include:

Higher Mens Rea Requirement than “Should Have Known”: Prosecutors cannot secure felony cruelty convictions simply by showing that a reasonable person would have known or noticed the animal. Evidence of recklessness or negligence is not enough to meet the “knowingly” requirement of § 14‑360(c).
Circumstantial Proof Still Sufficient: At the same time, the Court’s acceptance of circumstantial evidence to show knowledge means that prosecutors are not limited to direct admissions or eyewitness testimony of the defendant’s mental state. Patterns of behavior, relationships, prior interactions, and visibility from the defendant’s vantage point can all support an inference of actual knowledge.
Potential Influence on Jury Instructions: Although the case before the Court did not involve a direct challenge to jury instructions on mens rea, Ford’s reasoning strongly suggests that trial courts should avoid “should have known” language in instructing juries on felony cruelty to animals and instead use terms like “knew” or “was aware that.”
Line-Drawing Between Felony and Lesser Forms of Animal Cruelty: Because § 14‑360 has both misdemeanor and felony components (with the felony requiring “malicious” conduct), the clarification of “knowingly” sharpens the line between:
- Conduct that is negligent or reckless toward animals (potentially covered by other provisions), and
- Conduct that is intentionally and knowingly directed at animals with bad motive (felony under § 14‑360(b)).

3. On Sufficiency Review and Defense Strategy

The majority opinion, coupled with Justice Berger’s concurrence, reinforces North Carolina’s extremely deferential standard toward the State at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Practically, this means:

Most Close Cases Will Go to the Jury: As long as the State can present more than a minimal amount of evidence supporting each element—even if the defense presents strong contrary evidence—the trial judge generally must allow the case to go forward.
Circumstantial Evidence Can Carry the Day: Defendants cannot expect dismissal merely because the State’s case rests on inference rather than direct proof. Ford illustrates how a series of circumstantial facts—the missing paper schedule, the presence of other schedules, the defendant’s misleading statements, and his role as the driver—can make a prima facie case of obstruction.
Appellate Review Remains Limited: Given the low threshold and the rule that all conflicts in the evidence are resolved for the State, reversals for insufficient evidence on appeal will be rare unless the State fails entirely to address an element or relies solely on speculation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Common-Law” Obstruction of Justice

A common-law offense is a crime that originally developed through judicial decisions rather than through a specific statute. In North Carolina, obstruction of justice existed at common law long before being mentioned in statutes.

When the Court defines obstruction as “any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders public or legal justice,” it is describing this judge‑made offense. Section 14‑3(b) does not create obstruction; instead, it classifies obstruction as a felony when committed “with deceit and intent to defraud.”

2. “Substantial Evidence” vs. “More Than a Scintilla”

“Scintilla” means a very small amount.
“More than a scintilla of evidence” means there is at least a minimal amount of evidence that tends to show a fact is true.
“Substantial evidence”, as used in North Carolina criminal law, is defined to mean exactly that: more than a scintilla of evidence that would permit a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the judge does not decide:

Whether the State’s evidence is persuasive;
Whether the defense has a stronger explanation;
Which witnesses are more credible.

The judge asks only: “Is there any reasonable way a juror could infer each required element from the State’s evidence?” If yes, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

3. Actual Knowledge vs. “Should Have Known” (Constructive Knowledge)

Actual knowledge means the person is truly aware of a fact. They have seen it, been told it, or are otherwise personally informed about it.
“Should have known” describes a standard of reasonable care. It means that a reasonable person in the same situation would have discovered the fact with ordinary attention.
Constructive knowledge is a legal fiction: the law treats a person as if they knew a fact because it was so obvious or easily discoverable, even if they claim ignorance.

In Ford, the Supreme Court holds that the word “knowingly” in § 14‑360(c) refers to actual knowledge, not merely constructive knowledge. However, the State can prove actual knowledge through circumstantial evidence (e.g., repeated exposure to the animal, visible presence, community notoriety).

4. Circumstantial Evidence and Inferences

Direct evidence directly proves a fact (e.g., “I saw the defendant run the red light”).
Circumstantial evidence proves a fact indirectly, by providing related facts from which you can infer the main fact (e.g., skid marks, a crumpled car, and a traffic camera time stamp that suggest the car ran the light).

In criminal law, circumstantial evidence is not inherently weaker than direct evidence. Juries are allowed to infer:

Intent from actions;
Knowledge from repeated exposure and visual opportunities;
Purpose to obstruct from selective destruction of evidence and false statements.

Ford is a classic circumstantial-evidence case. No one testified that Ford said, “I know the cat is in the stroller” or “I am destroying this schedule to obstruct the police.” Instead, his mental state was inferred from a pattern of facts.

V. Conclusion

State v. Ford is an important clarification of North Carolina criminal law in three respects:

Attempted or Partial Obstruction Is Enough – The Court confirms that common-law obstruction of justice does not require the defendant’s efforts to succeed. Selectively removing a paper schedule while leaving others in place—and then denying its existence to police—can constitute felony obstruction even if a digital copy is later retrieved.
Felony Animal Cruelty Requires Actual Knowledge – By interpreting “knowingly” in § 14‑360(c) to require actual knowledge of an animal’s presence, the Court rejects a negligence-style “should have known” standard for felony cruelty to animals. However, it reaffirms that this knowledge can be proven circumstantially, as in Ford’s case, where longstanding interactions with “Cat Man,” community notoriety, and the visibility of Thomas in the stroller supported an inference of awareness.
The Sufficiency Threshold Remains Low – Both the majority opinion and the concurrence underscore that the State’s burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage is modest: “substantial evidence” means only “more than a scintilla” of evidence, with all reasonable inferences drawn in the State’s favor. This reinforces that close factual disputes and questions of credibility are for the jury, not the judge on a motion to dismiss.

Taken together, these principles ensure that:

Efforts to hide or selectively destroy records related to ongoing investigations can be prosecuted as obstruction, regardless of whether law enforcement ultimately recovers alternative copies.
Felony animal cruelty prosecutions proceed under a clear, mens rea-based standard that protects defendants from liability based purely on negligence, while still allowing robust use of circumstantial evidence to prove actual knowledge.
North Carolina courts maintain a consistent, deferential approach to sufficiency of the evidence, leaving fact-intensive questions about intent and knowledge where they belong—with the jury.

For practitioners, State v. Ford is a key reference point when litigating:

Obstruction charges based on document handling and business practices;
The mental state required for serious animal cruelty offenses;
Motions to dismiss in any case where the State’s proof is largely circumstantial but nontrivial.

The case illustrates the Court’s commitment to textual clarity in criminal statutes, continuity with longstanding common-law principles, and a firm allocation of factual determinations to the jury.

Actual Knowledge and Attempted Obstruction: A Commentary on State v. Ford (N.C. 2025)