Actual Duplication Required: Seventh Circuit Holds Sound Recording Infringement Demands Proof of Sampling, Not Mere Imitation

Introduction

In Eddie Richardson v. Karim Kharbouch, Nos. 24-1119 & 24-2378 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2025), the Seventh Circuit resolved a question of first impression in that court about what a plaintiff must prove to establish infringement of a sound recording under the Copyright Act. The court held that a sound recording copyright protects only the “actual sounds fixed in the recording,” and therefore a plaintiff must present evidence of duplication (e.g., sampling) of those specific recorded sounds, not merely evidence that a defendant’s work sounds like the plaintiff’s work.

The case arose from allegations by Eddie Richardson, a producer who posted his hip-hop instrumental “Hood Pushin Weight” (HPW) online in 2012, that the beat of Karim “French Montana” Kharbouch’s chart-topping song “Ain’t Worried About Nothin” (AWAN) unlawfully copied HPW. Richardson registered a sound recording copyright—not a musical composition copyright—and sued for infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. After two rounds of summary judgment marred by both parties’ violations of the Northern District of Illinois’s Local Rule 56.1, the district court granted summary judgment to Kharbouch, denied his request for attorney’s fees, and awarded costs. Richardson appealed the summary judgment ruling and the district court’s handling of the local rules; Kharbouch cross-appealed the fee denial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed across the board.

The opinion clarifies the evidentiary showing required for sound recording claims under § 114(b), addresses a district court’s discretion to overlook reciprocal violations of local summary-judgment procedures, and reaffirms the fact-intensive application of the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision under Fogerty notwithstanding a strong presumption favoring prevailing defendants.

Summary of the Opinion

• Sound recording infringement standard (new Seventh Circuit rule): A plaintiff with a sound recording copyright must present evidence that the defendant duplicated the actual recorded sounds (e.g., sampled or otherwise recaptured the recording), not merely that the defendant’s work imitates or is similar to the plaintiff’s recording. Evidence of “striking similarity” or the prevalence of sampling in an industry, without more, does not create a triable issue of duplication under § 114(b).
• Application: Richardson offered expert testimony that the two tracks were “shockingly similar” and that sampling is common in hip-hop, but he offered no evidence about AWAN’s production process, no admissions of sampling, and no technical evidence indicating the HPW recording was actually sampled. Summary judgment for Kharbouch was affirmed.
• Local Rule 56.1 discretion: The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to deem either side’s uncontroverted statements admitted where both parties failed to comply with local summary judgment procedures. The court’s even-handed leniency was permissible.
• Attorney’s fees: Although prevailing defendants in copyright cases enjoy a strong presumption in favor of fee awards, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying fees after a case-specific Fogerty analysis. The court reasonably found no frivolousness, improper motivation, or objective unreasonableness, and concluded that compensation/deterrence would not be advanced—particularly given the defense’s lack of diligence in developing the dispositive argument.
• Injunctive relief: Denied as a matter of course because Richardson did not prevail on the merits.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991): Provided the two-part framework for copyright infringement: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of original constituent elements. Ownership was undisputed; the case turned on whether Richardson proved copying of protected elements of the sound recording.
• Design Basics, LLC v. Signature Construction, Inc., 994 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2021) and Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093 (7th Cir. 2017): Clarified how indirect evidence can establish copying—via access and substantial similarity—and that an “uncanny resemblance” case excusing proof of access is exceedingly rare. The Seventh Circuit applied this structure but emphasized that “copying” for sound recordings means duplication of recorded sounds.
• Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1994): Confirmed the evidentiary presumption of validity arising from a certificate of registration—satisfying element one without dispute.
• Statutory provisions—17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114(b): The court drew a sharp line between the expansive rights conferred by § 106 on musical compositions and the narrow, fixation-focused rights for sound recordings under § 114(b), which protect only “actual sounds fixed in the recording.”
• Legislative history—H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976): The report “makes clear” that sound recording protection extends only to the particular recorded sounds and does not forbid imitation of a recorded performance. This history bolstered the statutory reading.
• VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016): Cited for the proposition that a new recording that mimics a copyrighted recording is not infringement absent “actual copying.” Also an example of the type of expert evidence that can show duplication (there, the expert opined on direct copying and modification of the recording).
• Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2020): Emphasized plaintiffs must show sampling of the sound recording rather than similarity in sound—supporting the Seventh Circuit’s alignment with other circuits.
• Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005): Interpreted § 114(b) to leave the world free to imitate or simulate a recorded performance absent an actual copy of the recording, but also famously held that any amount of sampling infringes (the so-called “no de minimis” rule). The Seventh Circuit cited Bridgeport for the imitation point while expressly leaving open the de minimis question.
• Local rule enforcement precedents: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2002); Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166 (7th Cir. 2013); and Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2011), collectively underscore district courts’ broad discretion to enforce or relax local rules so long as not done unevenly.
• Standard of review: Thompson Corrugated Sys., Inc. v. Engico, S.R.L., 111 F.4th 747 (7th Cir. 2024) (de novo review of summary judgment); Poer v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2010) (inferences in favor of nonmovant).
• Injunctive relief: Chathas v. Local 134 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 233 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2000) (no injunction absent success on the merits).
• Attorney’s fees: Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (nonexclusive factors); Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Soc’y of Ill., Inc., 77 F.4th 630 (7th Cir. 2023) (strong presumption favoring prevailing defendants); Timothy B. O’Brien LLC v. Knott, 962 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 2020) (case-specific analysis can overcome presumption).

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis proceeds in three steps.

1. Clarifying what “copying” means for sound recordings: The court distinguished between the two core copyright elements and focused on the second—copying of protected elements. It emphasized that for a sound recording, Congress limited the scope of protection to the “actual sounds fixed in the recording” (§ 114(b)). In practical terms, that means that imitation of a recording’s musical content—however convincing—is not actionable unless the defendant duplicated the recorded sounds themselves. This textual reading is reinforced by the House Report and a line of cases across circuits.
2. Evidence sufficient to reach a jury on duplication: The court reiterated that copying can be shown through direct or indirect evidence. Direct evidence might include admissions, session files, or production notes revealing sampling. Indirect evidence requires (a) access sufficient to permit an inference of opportunity to duplicate and (b) similarities sufficient to infer that duplication actually occurred. Crucially, the similarities analysis must be targeted to the object of protection: for sound recordings, the question is whether the recorded sounds were recaptured—not whether the musical ideas are alike.
3. Applying the standard to the record: Richardson offered no direct evidence of duplication and no production-related facts—no depositions of the artist or producer (Rico Love), no technical analysis showing identical waveforms or matching samples, no admissions, and no expert opinion that AWAN actually sampled HPW. His expert described “shocking” similarity and industry practice but stopped short of opining that the recording was sampled. On access, the plaintiff relied on having uploaded HPW to the internet, which, under Lexington Homes, is not enough by itself to infer access. On this record, a jury could not reasonably find duplication rather than imitation. Summary judgment for the defendant was therefore appropriate.

Local Rule 56.1 Enforcement

The court affirmed the district court’s discretionary decision not to deem facts admitted despite both sides’ failures to comply with Local Rule 56.1. Seventh Circuit precedent does not entitle litigants to rigid enforcement; what matters is even-handedness. Because the district court declined to penalize both parties and Richardson sought an asymmetric application of the rule (to benefit himself alone), there was no abuse of discretion.

Attorney’s Fees Under § 505 and Fogerty

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the “strong” presumption favoring fee awards to prevailing defendants in copyright actions (Live Face on Web), but reiterated that the decision remains a fact-intensive, case-specific exercise. Here, the district court treated the fee motion as timely despite being one day late, then conducted a full Fogerty analysis:

• Frivolousness: The case was not frivolous. Richardson genuinely believed his beat had been copied and misunderstood the legal distinction between composition and sound recording rights.
• Motivation: No improper motivation was shown.
• Objective unreasonableness: Not objectively unreasonable, especially given that the defense itself did not develop the dispositive § 114(b) argument until prompted by the court.
• Compensation/deterrence: Awarding fees here would not advance compensation or deterrence because it would effectively reward the defense’s lack of diligence and not meaningfully promote meritorious defenses in future cases.

Given the district court’s careful reasoning and proximity to the record, denial of fees was within its discretion, consistent with Timothy B. O’Brien and Fogerty.

Impact and Implications

• Doctrinal alignment and clarity: The Seventh Circuit now expressly aligns with the dominant reading of § 114(b) in other circuits: sound recording claims require proof of duplication of recorded sounds. This ruling brings needed clarity within the Seventh Circuit, especially for music litigation in Chicago and other regional hubs.
• Open question preserved: The panel deliberately left unresolved the inter-circuit debate on de minimis sampling—i.e., whether any copying of recorded sounds is actionable (Bridgeport’s “no de minimis” rule) or whether the copying must be substantial (VMG Salsoul). Future Seventh Circuit cases will need to address this if/when evidence of actual sampling is presented.
• Evidentiary recalibration for plaintiffs: Plaintiffs asserting sound recording infringement should anticipate the need for production-focused evidence:
  • Admissions from artists/producers/engineers
  • Session files, stems, or DAW project data
  • Sample-library provenance and licensing records
  • Technical expert analysis indicating waveform or spectral identity
  Generalized “sounds the same” testimony or appeals to industry practice will rarely survive summary judgment without linking to duplication.
• Registration strategy for creators: The decision exposes a significant practical trap for beatmakers and producers who only register sound recordings of their tracks. If the alleged copying is of the underlying composition (melody, rhythm, harmony, structure), a composition registration would be the appropriate vehicle. Absent that, plaintiffs with only a sound recording registration will need to prove sampling or other duplication of the actual fixed sounds.
• Access on the internet is not enough: Plaintiffs cannot rely solely on the fact that a track was posted online to establish access, particularly for the more demanding inference required for duplication. This has implications for creators who publish on open platforms.
• Defense playbook: Defendants can defeat claims by:
  • Documenting independent creation and production workflows
  • Producing project files to show no imported samples of plaintiff’s recording
  • Demonstrating lawful use of stock or licensed samples unrelated to the plaintiff’s recording
• Fees jurisprudence tempered by diligence: While prevailing defendants can expect a strong presumption in favor of fees, this case signals that litigants should still timely and fully develop dispositive defenses. Courts may withhold fees where defense victories are attributable to the court’s sua sponte intervention more than to counsel’s diligence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sound recording vs. musical composition:
  • Musical composition = the song as written (melody, harmony, lyrics). Rights include reproduction, derivative works, public performance, and display (17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5)).
  • Sound recording = the fixation of a particular performance in a recording. Protection is narrow: it covers the “actual sounds fixed in the recording” and only certain performance rights (notably, digital audio transmissions) (17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114).
• Duplication vs. imitation:
  • Duplication means recapturing the same recorded sounds—e.g., digital sampling or copying audio from the original recording.
  • Imitation means recreating a similar-sounding performance using new, independently fixed sounds. Imitation can be lawful for sound recording claims, even if it is very convincing.
• Sampling: The practice of taking a portion of a sound recording and reusing it in a new work. Under this decision, proving sampling (or other forms of duplication) is essential for sound recording infringement.
• Access and substantial similarity (indirect evidence): To infer copying without direct proof, plaintiffs generally must show (1) the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to access the work and (2) the works are sufficiently similar to infer copying. Here, the similarity must point to duplication of recorded sounds, not just compositional likeness.
• Local Rule 56.1 (N.D. Ill.): Governs how parties present and respond to statements of material fact at summary judgment. Non-compliance can lead courts to deem facts admitted—but district courts have discretion to relax or enforce the rule, especially when violations are mutual.
• Fogerty factors for fees: Courts weigh frivolousness, motivation, objective reasonableness, and compensation/deterrence in deciding whether to award fees under § 505. A strong presumption favors prevailing defendants, but it is rebuttable through a case-specific analysis.

Conclusion

Richardson v. Kharbouch establishes a clear, precedential rule in the Seventh Circuit: for sound recording infringement, plaintiffs must present evidence of actual duplication of the recorded sounds—typically via proof of sampling or other recapture of the fixed audio. Mere similarity in the way two tracks sound, or evidence of widespread industry sampling, does not suffice. The opinion aligns the Seventh Circuit with other circuits’ fixation-focused approach to § 114(b), while leaving for another day the de minimis sampling question.

Procedurally, the decision reinforces district courts’ discretion in managing local rule compliance, particularly where both parties transgress. On fees, the court underscores that even a strong presumption in favor of prevailing defendants yields to a thoughtful, fact-bound Fogerty analysis—especially where the defense’s own lack of diligence tempers the case for compensation and deterrence.

For creators, the case is a cautionary tale about registration strategy and evidentiary burdens: if the grievance is musical imitation, register the composition; if the claim is sampling, be prepared to prove duplication through production records and technical analysis. For defendants, robust documentation of independent creation and early, careful development of dispositive defenses remain best practices. Overall, the decision meaningfully clarifies the contours of sound recording protection and will shape music-related copyright litigation in the Seventh Circuit going forward.