Actual Concealment, Not Mere Abandonment: The Meaning of “Conceal” in Connecticut’s Evidence Tampering Statute After State v. Bolden

I. Introduction

In State v. Bolden, SC 21063 (officially released December 16, 2025), the Supreme Court of Connecticut issued a significant clarification of the scope of the crime of tampering with physical evidence under General Statutes § 53a‑155(a). The case arose out of a fatal hit-and-run incident in Waterbury, in which the defendant, Christopher Bolden, fled the scene after striking a pedestrian with a BMW SUV and later left the disabled vehicle in a private driveway.

The legal question before the Supreme Court was narrow but important: did the defendant’s act of having an obviously damaged SUV pushed a few feet into a residential driveway, where it remained entirely visible from a busy public street, constitute “concealment” of physical evidence within the meaning of § 53a‑155(a)?

The Court held that it did not. In doing so, it:

• Clarified that “conceal” in § 53a‑155(a) requires the actual hiding or obscuring of the object, not merely abandoning it or making it somewhat “less noticeable.”
• Rejected the Appellate Court’s expansive reading that would have allowed concealment to be inferred solely from the defendant’s circumstances and intentions, despite the object remaining in plain and obvious view.
• Aligned Connecticut’s law more closely with decisions from other Model Penal Code–based jurisdictions that distinguish between attempted concealment and actual concealment.

The Court reversed Bolden’s conviction for tampering with physical evidence and directed the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal on that count, while leaving intact his conviction for evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Incident

On May 1, 2020, Bolden, who did not have a driver’s license, was driving a BMW X3 owned by his girlfriend, Breyanne Talbot, on Baldwin Street in Waterbury. At a four-way intersection near Saint Mary’s Hospital, he struck pedestrian Shaneice Copeland, who was crossing in a crosswalk. The impact caused fatal blunt force injuries.

Bolden did not slow or stop. He:

• Drove onto the Baldwin Street highway overpass and stopped briefly.
• Executed a U-turn and drove back past the crash site, making eye contact with a witness.
• Then continued to flee.

A short time later, the SUV broke down on Meriden Road, several miles away. It came to rest partially blocking the street and the driveway of a house at 727 Meriden Road.

Bolden:

• Knocked on the homeowner’s door, told him he was having “car trouble,” and asked for help moving the car and calling a taxi.
• Did not disclose that he had just struck a pedestrian and did not ask the homeowner to hide the vehicle or contact the police.
• With the homeowner and taxi driver, pushed the SUV a short distance into the driveway, up an incline.

The SUV was left:

• Backed into the driveway with its front end facing Meriden Road.
• In front of multiple other vehicles, closest to the street.
• Partially blocking the sidewalk.
• With obvious frontal damage (grille, fog lamps, dents on hood and bumper, and a piece of the victim’s jacket in the grille).
• Not in a garage, under a tarp, behind other vehicles, behind the house, in bushes, or otherwise obscured.

The next day, police investigating the hit-and-run located the SUV exactly where Bolden had left it, plainly visible from both directions of travel on Meriden Road.

B. Post-incident Conduct

After leaving the SUV, Bolden took the taxi to pick up Talbot at her workplace in Berlin. On the way, he told the taxi driver that his girlfriend would be angry because the car had broken down and she would not understand.

They then:

• Picked up Talbot and went to a hotel where Bolden and Talbot spent the night.
• Bolden told Talbot there had been an “accident” with the SUV in Waterbury but assured her “everything was okay.”
• The next morning, a friend drove them back to Talbot’s home in Waterbury, intending to stop at 727 Meriden Road to check on the SUV.
• Seeing police at the house, they did not stop; instead, they went directly to Talbot’s house.
• Talbot then called police and falsely reported the SUV stolen, by which time she knew Bolden had struck a pedestrian.

Bolden was later arrested and confessed his involvement in the incident.

C. Charges, Trial, and Jury Question

The state charged Bolden with:

1. Evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, § 14‑224(a).
2. Misconduct with a motor vehicle, § 53a‑57(a) (on which the jury ultimately did not convict).
3. Tampering with physical evidence, § 53a‑155(a).

The tampering charge was premised specifically on the allegation that Bolden had “concealed” the SUV as physical evidence.

During deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the trial court:

Does “moving evidence” equate to “concealing evidence” for purposes of § 53a‑155(a)?

The court, after conferring with counsel, answered:

We cannot give you an answer. That is for you to determine, whether that equates to those things. So, you’ll have to make that decision as a group.

The jury found Bolden guilty of:

• Evasion of responsibility.
• Tampering with physical evidence.

He was sentenced to:

• 15 years’ imprisonment on the evasion count.
• 5 years’ imprisonment on the tampering count, to run concurrently.
• For a total effective sentence of 15 years.

D. Appellate Court Decision

On appeal, Bolden challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the tampering conviction, arguing that the state had not proven:

• That he believed a criminal investigation was pending or about to be instituted; and
• That he had concealed the SUV with the purpose of impairing its availability in that investigation.

The Appellate Court rejected his arguments and affirmed:

• It held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that Bolden believed a criminal investigation was imminent, based on his conduct in leaving the scene and the obvious severity of the damage and injuries.
• On concealment, it reasoned that a rational juror could infer that, given Bolden’s need to “quickly and temporarily abandon the SUV” after likely knowing he had seriously injured a pedestrian, he saw an opportunity to make the SUV “less noticeable” by placing it in a private driveway among multiple vehicles.

The Appellate Court also rejected a claim related to the jury’s question about whether moving equates to concealing, deeming it waived under State v. Kitchens, and found no preserved plain error review basis. That issue was not before the Supreme Court on certification.

E. Issue on Certification

The Supreme Court granted certification on a single, focused issue:

“Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had concealed his motor vehicle for the purpose of impairing its availability in connection with a criminal investigation, as required to support his conviction of tampering with physical evidence under § 53a‑155(a)?”

The Court’s analysis therefore concentrated on the act element of tampering—“concealment”—rather than the mental state elements.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Alexander, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the “concealment” element of § 53a‑155(a). The Court concluded:

• The ordinary meaning of “conceal” is to hide, place out of sight, or prevent disclosure or recognition.
• Even viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the facts showed that the SUV was:
  • Uncovered,
  • Fully visible from the public roadway,
  • Partially blocking the sidewalk,
  • With the damaged front end facing the street.
• Under these circumstances, the SUV was not “concealed in any sense of that term.”

The Court emphasized that:

• Whatever Bolden’s intent or plan may have been, intent alone does not satisfy the statutory requirement; there must be an actual act of concealment of the thing itself.
• Out-of-state cases interpreting similar Model Penal Code–based statutes confirm that:
  • The object of evidence tampering statutes is actual interference with the availability or verity of evidence, not mere abandonment in plain view.
  • Unsuccessful attempts to hide evidence may support an attempt charge but do not fulfill the “concealment” element of a completed tampering offense.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Reversed the portion of the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the tampering conviction.
• Remanded with directions to:
  • Reverse the tampering conviction at the trial court level,
  • Enter a judgment of acquittal on the tampering charge, and
  • Conduct any resentencing the trial court deems appropriate under the aggregate package theory of sentencing.
• Affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment in all other respects (including the evasion conviction).

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and Elements of Tampering

Section 53a‑155(a) provides, in relevant part:

“A person is guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that a criminal investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency or an official proceeding is pending, or about to be instituted, such person: (1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such criminal investigation or official proceeding . . . .”

From this text, the offense has three core components:

1. Belief element: The defendant believes a criminal investigation or official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted.
2. Act element: The defendant “alters, destroys, conceals or removes” a record, document, or thing.
3. Purpose element: The act is committed with the purpose of impairing the evidence’s verity (truthfulness/accuracy) or availability in that investigation or proceeding.

Prior case law in Connecticut had focused largely on the belief and purpose elements; Bolden squarely addresses the act element, and particularly the meaning of “conceals.”

1. Correction of the Incomplete Formulation in State v. Jordan

The Court flagged that its earlier decision in State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354 (2014), had described the act element imprecisely, stating that the state must prove that the defendant “discarded” the evidence at issue. That language was incomplete because the statute expressly includes four possible acts:

• Alters;
• Destroys;
• Conceals; or
• Removes.

By recognizing that Jordan’s formulation omitted acts other than discarding, Bolden implicitly re-centers the statutory text: courts must look to whether one of the four enumerated acts has been proven, and, where “concealment” is the theory, the evidence must support an actual concealment rather than some other, uncharged act.

B. Precedents and Comparative Authority

1. Connecticut Cases on § 53a‑155

The Court noted that most of Connecticut’s tampering jurisprudence addressed mental state rather than the act element. Examples include:

• State v. Foreshaw, 214 Conn. 540 (1990) – addressed whether the defendant believed an official proceeding was pending or about to be instituted.
• State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354 (2014) – focused on the belief and purpose elements; provided the now-corrected articulation of the act element.
• State v. Knox, 201 Conn. App. 457 (2020); State v. Mark, 170 Conn. App. 241 (2017); State v. Stephenson, 207 Conn. App. 154 (2021) – Appellate Court decisions dealing with the defendant’s knowledge of impending proceedings and intent to affect evidence.

Only Mark significantly discussed the act of concealment itself. In Mark, the defendant returned to the crime scene, told someone he was going back to destroy the murder weapon (a rock), was seen bending over and picking something up, and later told others he disposed of it. The Appellate Court held this was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the weapon had been actually concealed or removed (i.e., rendered unavailable).

Bolden contrasts sharply with Mark: there, the evidence disappeared; here, the evidence (the SUV) remained plainly visible exactly where the defendant left it.

2. Model Penal Code Influence

Connecticut’s tampering statute is based on § 241.7 of the Model Penal Code. The Court noted this lineage and relied on the persuasive value of decisions from other jurisdictions applying substantially similar statutory language derived from the Code.

3. Out-of-State Cases on “Concealment”

The Court drew heavily on a body of cases from other states interpreting the term “conceal” in evidence tampering statutes:

• Commonwealth v. Henderson, 85 S.W.3d 618 (Ky. 2002) – Held that the “concealment” required for tampering must be distinct from and more than behavior “directly incident to the underlying crime” (there, shoplifting). This prevents automatic conversion of every shoplifting into a tampering offense.
• Harris v. State, 991 A.2d 1135 (Del. 2010); State v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180 (2009); In re Juvenile 2003‑187, 151 N.H. 14 (2004); Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) – These decisions emphasize that the statutory term “conceals” does not encompass mere attempts to hide an object if the attempt fails such that the evidence remains visible and readily recoverable.
• Stahmann, in particular, is central:
  • The defendant threw a bottle of promethazine over a wire fence after a car accident.
  • The bottle landed in plain view, 2–3 feet beyond the fence, easily visible to witnesses and police.
  • The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s intention to conceal but held that intent and concealment are distinct elements. Because the bottle was not actually hidden, the concealment element failed.
• State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121 (Tenn. 2013) – The defendant tossed a shotgun over a short, see-through fence, onto lightly snow-covered ground. Police quickly located the weapon, which retained evidentiary value (including DNA).
  • The Tennessee Supreme Court held there was no concealment: the defendant did not materially impede the investigation or place the weapon out of sight, but merely tried to distance himself personally from it.
  • The court stressed that the evidence must be actually hidden or made significantly harder to discover, not just discarded in a slightly less obvious location.
• People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139 (2011); Commonwealth v. James, 586 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2019); Commonwealth v. Delgado, 544 Pa. 591 (1996) – These cases likewise stand for the proposition that throwing or dropping drugs or paraphernalia in the open, even in view of police, is not “concealment” of the evidence itself.
• State v. Daniels, 397 Mont. 204 (2019) – Cited as an example that concealment can be proven circumstantially, but still requires that the evidence actually be hidden or obscured.

Collectively, these authorities support three key propositions adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court:

1. The tampering statute addresses actual interference with the availability or verity of evidence.
2. Attempted concealment that fails—leaving evidence in plain view—does not satisfy the completed offense, although it might support an attempt charge.
3. Mere abandonment or distancing oneself from evidence, without hiding the evidence itself, is insufficient.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review

The Court reaffirmed the familiar two-part sufficiency of the evidence test:

1. View the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.
2. Determine whether the jury could reasonably have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that all elements of the offense were proven by the cumulative force of the evidence and reasonable inferences.

The Court emphasized:

• Every element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but each individual fact or inference need not be.
• Proof may be circumstantial; the jury may draw reasonable and logical inferences.
• Appellate courts do not test whether there is any hypothesis of innocence; they test whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the guilty verdict.

However, statutory meaning is ultimately a question of law. Once “conceal” is given its proper definition, the sufficiency question became whether any rational jury could find, given these undisputed physical facts, that the SUV was “concealed” in that sense.

2. Defining “Conceal” by Its Ordinary Meaning

Because the statute does not define “conceal,” the Court resorted to:

• General Statutes § 1‑1(a) (words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language).
• Standard dictionaries, which define “conceal” as:
  • “To prevent disclosure or recognition of”; or
  • “To place out of sight”; or
  • “To hide; withdraw or remove from observation; cover or keep from sight.”

The Court acknowledged that something can be simultaneously visible and still fairly described as hidden if, for example, it is camouflaged, partially obscured, or visible only with extraordinary effort. But the key inquiry is whether, in a realistic, everyday sense, the object has been placed out of sight or hidden from recognition.

3. Application to the Facts: Why the SUV Was Not Concealed

Applying this definition, the Court made several crucial observations:

• The SUV was:
  • Uncovered.
  • Parked at the front of the driveway, in front of other vehicles.
  • Closest to the street and partially blocking the sidewalk.
  • Facing the roadway, with its damaged front end plainly exposed.
• Police officers, in the course of their investigation, found the vehicle the next day right where it had been left, readily visible from the road.
• Nothing about the location—no garage, tarp, other vehicles positioned in front of it, foliage, or backyard placement—suggested an attempt to place it “out of sight” in the dictionary sense.

Given these facts, the Court concluded:

“[A]n SUV, sitting uncovered at the end of a driveway with its damaged front end facing a public roadway, is not concealed in any sense of the term.”

Even accepting the Appellate Court’s view that the jury could infer Bolden’s intent to “make the SUV less noticeable,” that is not the legal test. The Court emphasized the distinction:

• Intent to conceal is a mental state element.
• Concealment is a separate act element—something must actually be hidden or placed out of sight.

On these facts, at most the defendant abandoned the vehicle in a private driveway and distanced himself from it. That might support other criminal charges (e.g., evasion of responsibility), but it does not transform the visible vehicle into “concealed” evidence.

4. Distinguishing “Hiding the Evidence” from “Hiding One’s Connection to the Evidence”

The Court invoked Hawkins and related cases to draw a critical conceptual line:

• Where a defendant leaves evidence in a place where it is “quite likely to be discovered,” he may be trying to conceal his own possession or connection to the evidence, but he is not concealing the evidence itself.
• Evidence tampering statutes are aimed at the latter—interfering with the object’s role as evidence—rather than every act of distancing or abandonment.

In Bolden, the SUV remained:

• Available for inspection, seizure, and forensic examination.
• In a location that did not materially impede investigation.

Bolden may have hoped that leaving it on private property would delay or deflect law enforcement attention, but he did not do anything that would hide the SUV or significantly reduce the likelihood of its discovery.

5. Attempt vs. Completed Offense and the “Theory of the Case” Limitation

The state, on appeal, hinted at broader theories:

• That Bolden’s conduct might at least amount to an attempt to conceal under § 53a‑49 (criminal attempt); or
• That other act elements of § 53a‑155(a)—such as “removal”—might apply (he removed the SUV from the crash scene).

The Supreme Court declined to rely on those theories for two reasons:

1. The statutory text – The completed offense requires actual alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal with the requisite mental state. A failed attempt to conceal is not the same as successful concealment.
2. The theory-of-the-case doctrine – The state charged and tried the case solely on a theory of “concealment” of the SUV at 727 Meriden Road. Bolden defended on that theory.
   • Under the theory-of-the-case doctrine (see State v. King, 321 Conn. 135 (2016)), an appellate court may not uphold a conviction on a materially different legal theory that was never presented to the jury.
   • Because the state did not pursue an attempt theory, or a “removal” theory, those grounds could not be used to salvage the conviction.

This reinforces that prosecutors must be careful, at the charging and trial stages, to select the correct statutory theory (e.g., attempt, removal, destruction) that matches the facts they can prove.

6. Mental State Elements Not Reached

The Appellate Court had found sufficient evidence that Bolden:

• Believed a criminal investigation was about to begin; and
• Acted with the purpose to impair the SUV’s availability in that investigation.

The Supreme Court expressly declined to address those mental state arguments. Once it found that there was no evidence of the act of concealment, it was unnecessary to decide:

• Whether Bolden believed an investigation was imminent when he abandoned the SUV; or
• Whether he had the specific purpose to impair the SUV’s availability as evidence.

Accordingly, Bolden leaves the Appellate Court’s mental state discussion undisturbed but not affirmatively endorsed as Supreme Court precedent.

7. Resentencing and the Aggregate Package Theory

Although the tampering conviction carried a five-year concurrent sentence, its reversal did not change Bolden’s total effective sentence of fifteen years (driven by the evasion conviction).

Nonetheless, the Court invoked the “aggregate package theory” of sentencing (see State v. Johnson, 316 Conn. 34 (2015)), under which:

• A sentencing court often views the combined sentence across multiple counts as a single “package” designed to achieve an overall penal objective.
• When one part of that package (such as a conviction on a particular count) is later invalidated, the sentencing court should generally be free to reconsider the entire sentence to ensure it still reflects the original intent, so long as constitutional limits (e.g., no vindictive resentencing) are respected.

The Supreme Court therefore left any resentencing to the trial court’s discretion, even though the formal reduction in counts did not, on its own, lower the aggregate term of incarceration.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Narrowing the Reach of § 53a‑155(a) in “Abandonment” Scenarios

Bolden significantly constrains the use of § 53a‑155(a) in common “discard or abandon” fact patterns, such as:

• Throwing drugs or weapons while being chased by police.
• Leaving contraband in a public place and walking away.
• Parking a vehicle involved in a crime in an open, visible place but failing to report its location.

In such situations, tampering with physical evidence will be much harder to prove unless:

• The defendant’s conduct actually hides the object (e.g., placing it under garbage, in dense bushes, in a concealed compartment); or
• The defendant destroys, alters, or fully removes it from availability (e.g., throwing it in a river or permanent destruction).

Evidence that an item was left in plain view and readily recovered will now be a strong defense against a concealment-based tampering charge, even if:

• The defendant indisputably intended to separate himself from the evidence; or
• He lied about its whereabouts.

2. Charging Strategy for Prosecutors

Prosecutors in Connecticut will need to adjust strategies in light of Bolden:

• Careful selection of act theory:
  • If the facts show a failed attempt to hide evidence, consideration should be given to charging attempted tampering under § 53a‑49, rather than—or in addition to—the completed offense.
  • Where evidence is moved but not hidden, “removal” might be a more accurate statutory theory than “concealment,” provided the removal materially affects availability as evidence.
• Articulation in jury instructions:
  • Trial courts should carefully define “conceal” consistent with Bolden, emphasizing that the object must be actually placed out of sight or hidden from ordinary observation.
  • The jury should be instructed that intent to conceal, without actual concealment, is insufficient for the completed offense.
• Alternative charges:
  • Where evidence is abandoned but still plainly visible, prosecutors may focus on the underlying substantive crimes (e.g., hit-and-run, illegal possession of contraband) and on any false statements or interference with police, rather than stretching § 53a‑155(a).

3. Defense Strategy

Defense counsel can leverage Bolden to:

• Argue that mere abandonment or relocation of evidence, without actual hiding or obscuring, does not meet the statutory definition of “concealment.”
• Highlight evidence showing:
  • That the object remained in an open and obvious location.
  • That law enforcement quickly and easily located and seized it.
  • That its evidentiary value was unimpaired (no destruction or alteration).
• Challenge jury instructions that conflate “moving” with “concealing,” using the problematic jury question in Bolden as a cautionary example.

4. Doctrinal Clarification: Textual Constraint and Overcriminalization

At a broader level, Bolden reflects a reluctance to convert routine conduct surrounding crimes (e.g., driving away from a crash, discarding contraband) into additional felonies unless the statutory elements are clearly satisfied. This serves:

• To guard against overbroad application of tampering statutes based more on moral blameworthiness than on statutory text.
• To maintain a principled distinction between:
  • Core offenses (e.g., hit-and-run, drug possession, illegal firearm use), and
  • The separate, more serious step of actively attacking the integrity or availability of evidence that the justice system needs.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Tampering with Physical Evidence” (§ 53a‑155)

In plain terms, you commit tampering with physical evidence when:

• You know or strongly believe that the police or courts are about to look into a crime (or already are); and
• You do something to evidence—like hiding it, destroying it, changing it, or moving it out of reach—
• for the specific purpose of making it harder or impossible for investigators or a court to use that evidence.

It is not enough that you run away from the crime scene or lie about your involvement; there must be an actual act involving the evidence itself that impairs its usefulness as evidence.

2. “Conceal” vs. “Abandon”

• Conceal – To hide something, put it out of sight, or make it so people will not notice or recognize it as what it is. For example:
  • Putting a bloody knife under floorboards.
  • Stashing drugs in a hidden compartment in a car.
  • Burying a gun in the woods.
• Abandon – To leave something behind and walk away from it, without necessarily hiding it. For example:
  • Dropping a gun in the middle of the street while fleeing.
  • Leaving a damaged car in a driveway, visible from the road.

Under Bolden, abandonment—without more—is not “concealment” for purposes of evidence tampering, even if you abandon the item to distance yourself from it.

3. Intent vs. Act Elements

• Intent (mental state) – What the defendant meant to do, hoped to accomplish, or believed. In tampering, that includes:
  • Believing an investigation is underway or imminent; and
  • Acting for the purpose of affecting the evidence’s use in that investigation.
• Act (actus reus) – What the defendant actually did in the real world (e.g., hid, destroyed, altered, or removed an object).

In Bolden, the Court stressed that:

• Even if Bolden intended to hide the SUV or to distance himself from it, the evidence showed he did not actually hide it.
• You cannot be guilty of the completed crime of “concealing” evidence unless the object is actually concealed.

4. Theory-of-the-Case Doctrine

This doctrine holds that, on appeal, the state cannot save a conviction by switching to a different legal theory that:

• Was not charged in the information; and
• Was not presented to or decided by the jury at trial.

In Bolden:

• The state charged and argued that Bolden “concealed” the SUV at 727 Meriden Road.
• It did not charge or try the case under alternative theories like:
  • “Removal” of the SUV from the crash scene as the act of tampering; or
  • Attempted concealment under the attempt statute.
• Therefore, the Supreme Court could not affirm the conviction based on those uncharged and untried theories.

5. Aggregate Package Theory of Sentencing

When a court sentences a defendant on multiple counts at once, it often thinks in terms of an overall package—a total period of incarceration and supervision that it deems just in light of all offenses, rather than mechanically assigning independent sentences to each count in isolation.

If one of those convictions is later vacated:

• The appellate court can allow the trial court to revisit the “package” to ensure the resulting sentence still makes sense.
• The trial court may:
  • Leave the remaining sentences as-is; or
  • Adjust them, within legal limits, to reconstitute a proportionate total sentence.

In Bolden, although the total effective sentence was still 15 years even without the tampering count, the Supreme Court left open the possibility of resentencing under this principle.

VI. Conclusion

State v. Bolden is a pivotal Connecticut decision on the scope of tampering with physical evidence under § 53a‑155(a), and particularly on the meaning of “conceal.” The Court’s holding may be distilled into the following core propositions:

1. “Conceal” requires actual hiding.
   • An object is concealed when it is placed out of sight or otherwise hidden from ordinary observation, not merely when its possessor has walked away from it.
2. Intent is not enough.
   • Even clear evidence that a defendant wanted to conceal evidence will not support a conviction for the completed offense if the attempt fails and the item remains visible and readily discoverable.
3. Abandonment ≠ concealment.
   • Leaving evidence in an open and visible place, even to distance oneself from it, does not meet the “concealment” element of § 53a‑155(a).
4. Statutory precision and theory consistency matter.
   • Prosecutors must align their charging theories (conceal, remove, alter, destroy, or attempt) with the facts they can prove.
   • Appellate courts cannot uphold convictions on fundamentally different theories from those tried to the jury.
5. The decision harmonizes Connecticut law with Model Penal Code–based case law elsewhere.
   • Bolden joins a substantial body of authority that limits tampering convictions to situations where evidence is actually hidden, destroyed, altered, or removed from meaningful availability, rather than merely abandoned in plain sight.

In practical terms, Bolden protects against overbroad application of the tampering statute to every impulsive attempt by a suspect to disassociate from incriminating objects. It reinforces a principled boundary between:

• The underlying offense (here, a grave hit-and-run); and
• The distinct, and separately punishable, wrong of actively undermining the justice system’s access to evidence.

Going forward, Connecticut courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel will need to apply Bolden’s clear requirement of actual concealment whenever § 53a‑155(a) is invoked on a concealment theory. The case thus stands as a leading precedent on the meaning of “conceal” in Connecticut criminal law and an important check on the expansion of tampering with evidence beyond its textual limits.