Introduction

In Enzo C. v. State, DFCS, OCS, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), concluding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made “active efforts” despite the father’s pretrial incarceration and a criminal no-contact order with his child. Although issued as a memorandum decision and therefore nonprecedential under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d), the opinion provides important guidance on how ICWA’s heightened “active efforts” requirement functions when rehabilitative services and visitation are severely constrained by criminal proceedings and jail conditions.

The case arose after the child’s mother, Sarah, was killed and the father, Enzo, was arrested and detained pretrial for her alleged murder. OCS placed the child, Archer, with a maternal relative and pursued case planning and tribal engagement, while navigating the realities of a no-contact order and sparse programming at the pretrial facility. On appeal, Enzo challenged only the superior court’s “active efforts” finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that OCS’s tailored mix of case planning, consistent communication, kinship placement, and sustained tribal-identification efforts satisfied ICWA in these constrained circumstances.

• Parties: Appellant father (Enzo C.); Appellee State of Alaska, DFCS/OCS; Guardian ad Litem for the child.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court (Memorandum Opinion & Judgment, Oct. 8, 2025).
• Core Issue on Appeal: Whether OCS made “active efforts” under ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court upheld the superior court’s finding—by clear and convincing evidence—that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, as ICWA requires, notwithstanding the father’s incarceration and a no-contact order barring contact with the child while in jail. The Court emphasized:

• OCS developed and updated case plans tailored to both immediate constraints and future conditions if the father were released.
• OCS maintained ongoing communication with Enzo, provided him with photos and updates about his child, and met with him multiple times (including with counsel) to discuss plans and limitations.
• OCS diligently pursued family placement—ultimately placing the child with a maternal cousin—and also evaluated paternal relatives, arranged family contact with the father’s sister, and investigated maternal grandmother placement.
• OCS engaged in sustained tribal-identification efforts, including outreach to multiple tribes, family-tree development, lineage documentation, and preparing enrollment paperwork for both the father and child.
• Where services were unavailable in the pretrial setting, OCS was not required to do the impossible; the father’s participation in a jail-based parenting class counted toward “active efforts” in light of statewide responsibilities (State efforts can include Department of Corrections facilitation).

The Court reaffirmed that incarceration does not excuse ICWA’s active-efforts obligation, but it significantly shapes the scope of what is feasible. Considering the totality of OCS’s conduct, the Court held the efforts here were active and adequate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Anton K. v. Department of Family & Community Services, OCS, 554 P.3d 456 (Alaska 2024).

  The Court relied heavily on Anton K., which addressed active efforts when a parent is incarcerated for violence against the other parent. Anton K. held that:

  • Active efforts must be evaluated case-by-case and in their entirety.
  • Even if visitation facilitation and program referrals are imperfect or partially passive due to incarceration limits, substantial efforts toward relative placement and supporting reunification objectives can satisfy ICWA.
  • OCS’s affirmative steps—especially family placement—carry significant weight when incarceration curtails services and contact.

  The present decision adopts Anton K.’s framework: three guideposts for incarcerated-parent cases—affirmative assistance with the case plan, assistance with any available in-custody services, and vigorous relative placement efforts—collectively support an active efforts finding.

• Doe v. State, DHSS, OCS, 272 P.3d 1014 (Alaska 2012); A.A. v. State, DFYS, 982 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1999); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part on other grounds by In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).

  These cases establish that ICWA has no incarceration exception; incarceration “significantly affects” the scope of required efforts but does not eliminate the duty. The Court applied that principle here: pretrial detention and a no-contact order narrowed what OCS could do, but OCS still had to (and did) act affirmatively within those constraints.

• Dale H. v. State, DHSS, 235 P.3d 203 (Alaska 2010); 25 C.F.R. § 23.2.

  Dale H. and the federal regulation emphasize that active efforts are tailored and case-specific. The Court invoked this tailor-made approach to credit OCS’s bespoke planning in a pretrial, no-contact environment.

• Walker E. v. DHSS, OCS, 480 P.3d 598 (Alaska 2021).

  Tribal contact can itself be part of active efforts. The Court favorably cited OCS’s sustained tribal-identification and enrollment support for Enzo and Archer as a meaningful component of the active-efforts calculus.

• Ronald H. v. DHSS, OCS, 490 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2021).

  Initial delays do not automatically negate active efforts. The Court used this to reject Enzo’s argument that scheduling delays and initial deferral of some referrals rendered efforts per se insufficient.

• O’Brien v. Delaplain, 556 P.3d 1170 (Alaska 2024).

  Active efforts need not be perfect; they must be reasonable and tailored under ICWA’s heightened standard. The Court cited this to explain that OCS’s imperfect but persistent approach sufficed.

• T.F. v. State, DHSS, 26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).

  ICWA’s “active efforts” obligation is borne by the State, not just OCS; efforts by other state agencies (e.g., Department of Corrections) can count. That doctrinal point undergirded the Court’s recognition that Enzo’s DOC-facilitated parenting class contributed to the State’s overall effort.

• Native Village of Kwinhagak v. State, DHSS, OCS, 542 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2024).

  Cited for the Court’s independent legal judgment standard: when translating facts into the ICWA standard, the Court adopts the rule most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a two-layered review. It reviewed the superior court’s factual findings for clear error and the legal sufficiency of those facts under ICWA de novo. With that framing, it reasoned as follows:

• No blanket exception for incarceration, but incarceration affects scope.

  ICWA demands active efforts even when a parent is incarcerated; however, incarceration—and here, a pretrial detention with a no-contact order—constrains feasible services and contact. The Court weighed the realities of the pretrial facility’s limited programming and the bail-imposed prohibition on parent-child contact.

• Active steps beyond paper planning.

  OCS did more than draft a plan: it met with Enzo (first alone when counsel scheduling failed; later with counsel), updated and tailored case plans to present and future contingencies, sent photos and developmental updates, and inquired into available jail services. Case plans included immediate steps (stay in touch with OCS; address the no-contact order) and future steps (arrange visitation when conditions allow).

• Relative placement heavily weighted when services/visitation are inaccessible.

  Echoing Anton K., the Court gave “substantial weight” to OCS’s persistent kinship-placement efforts. OCS vetted multiple relatives on both sides, placed the child with a maternal cousin (Jasper), arranged paternal-family contact (with Enzo’s sister), and investigated the maternal grandmother—all of which promoted stability and family ties when direct reunification services were unrealistic in the near term.

• Tribal engagement as part of active efforts.

  Even though the child lacked initial formal tribal affiliation, OCS undertook proactive tribal-outreach and enrollment measures (family-tree work, lineage verification through paternal great-great-grandparents, enrollment paperwork for both father and child, and tribal participation in proceedings). The Court counted this work toward active efforts.

• Initial delay and service limits did not defeat active efforts.

  The Court rejected the notion that delay until April 2024 for certain referrals or that OCS’s failure to arrange unavailable services rendered efforts inadequate. Where the record showed the absence of relevant programs in the pretrial jail—and where the State nonetheless facilitated some participation (DOC’s parenting class)—OCS’s efforts remained active and appropriately tailored. Active efforts need not be flawless.

• What the Court did not decide.

  The Court expressly declined to address whether an allegation that one parent killed the other might alter ICWA obligations. Because OCS met the active-efforts standard here, the Court did not reach that question.

Impact and Likely Reach

Although a memorandum decision, this opinion offers practical guidance with broad implications for ICWA practice in Alaska:

• Pretrial incarceration and no-contact orders sharpen the tailoring inquiry.

  When visitation and programming are sharply limited by criminal-process factors, courts will scrutinize whether OCS did what it could: maintain communication, tailor case plans to immediate constraints and future contingencies, inquire about in-custody services, and aggressively pursue kinship placement and tribal involvement.

• Relative placement and tribal engagement can “carry” the active-efforts analysis.

  Where traditional reunification services are not feasible, courts may place “substantial weight” on effective family placement and culturally meaningful tribal efforts—especially where family is supportive of the child’s connections on both sides.

• Delays may be excused if justified and if OCS persists.

  Scheduling difficulties (e.g., coordinating with criminal defense counsel), cautious adherence to ethical boundaries, and changing counsel will not necessarily undercut an otherwise active effort—particularly where OCS later meets with counsel, continues outreach, and documents its steps.

• Statewide responsibility means DOC programs count.

  A parent’s participation in correctional programs can satisfy part of the State’s active-efforts duty even if OCS did not orchestrate the enrollment—underscoring the importance of cross-agency coordination and recordkeeping.

• Unresolved edge question.

  The Court left open whether alleged parental homicide alters ICWA obligations. Practitioners should not assume a categorical exception exists; OCS should continue making active efforts unless and until the law clearly says otherwise.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• ICWA “active efforts” vs. “reasonable efforts.”

  Under Alaska law, terminating parental rights generally requires “reasonable efforts” to prevent family breakup. ICWA raises that bar to “active efforts” for Indian children: OCS must take affirmative, hands-on steps to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent family breakup, proven by clear and convincing evidence. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(B).

• Case-by-case tailoring.

  There’s no checklist. Federal regulations require that efforts be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2. Incarceration and court-ordered no-contact limitations narrow feasible options but do not eliminate the State’s duty to act.

• Standard of review.

  Whether OCS made active efforts is a mixed question. The appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, then independently decides whether those facts meet ICWA’s legal standard (drawing on precedent, reason, and policy).

• Kinship placement.

  Placing a child with relatives (on either side of the family) is especially important when direct services to the parent are not available. Courts weigh kinship placement heavily in the active-efforts analysis under ICWA.

• Tribal engagement.

  OCS must make meaningful efforts to identify a child’s tribal affiliation, notify and involve the tribe, and support enrollment when appropriate. These steps can count as “active efforts.”

• Statewide efforts concept.

  ICWA’s duty is on the State, not only OCS. If another state agency (like the Department of Corrections) provides relevant programming to the parent, those efforts may satisfy part of the State’s “active efforts” obligation.

Conclusion

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed termination after concluding that OCS met ICWA’s active-efforts requirement in a highly constrained context: the father’s pretrial incarceration, a no-contact order barring contact with the child, and limited jail programming. The Court credited OCS’s tailored case planning, ongoing communication, diligent kinship-placement work across both sides of the family, and sustained tribal-identification and enrollment efforts. It rejected arguments that initial delays and the unavailability of certain services negate active efforts, emphasizing that active efforts need not be perfect and must be assessed in light of real-world constraints.

While nonprecedential, the opinion reinforces and synthesizes key principles from Anton K. and related cases: incarceration does not excuse ICWA duties; relative placement and tribal engagement can be decisive when services and visitation are limited; and the State’s cross-agency programming can contribute to active efforts. For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of robust documentation, early and persistent tribal outreach, active kinship searches, and candid case planning that anticipates both the constraints of pretrial detention and the steps that become possible upon release.