Active Ecological Management within Conservation Deeds: The Second Circuit’s New Framework in Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Romero

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has delivered a precedent-setting opinion clarifying how courts should interpret restrictive covenants that convey land “to be maintained in its natural state” while simultaneously mandating that it be “operated as a preserve for the maintenance of wildlife.” At the centre of Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Romero lies the fate of the Sunken Forest Preserve—one of only two maritime holly forests in the United States—donated during the 1950s and 1960s to the federal government but subject to stringent conservation conditions and an automatic possibility of reverter. When the National Park Service (NPS) adopted a 2016 “White-Tailed Deer Management Plan” featuring large exclusion fencing and lethal as well as non-lethal deer reduction, the donor-organisation filed a Quiet Title Act suit, alleging that the plan violated deed restrictions and triggered reversion of title.

The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, but—critically—on an alternative ground: even if the suit were timely, the 2016 Plan simply does not breach the deed language when that language is read under New York’s strict-construction rules for reversionary interests. The decision substantially reshapes the legal landscape for conservation easements, reversionary interests, and agency land-management powers.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The 2016 Deer & Vegetation Management Plan (Plan) does not violate the 1955/1966 deed restrictions; therefore, title has not reverted to Wildlife Preserves, Inc. The Second Circuit affirms the district court’s result, but on different reasoning, without reaching statute-of-limitations issues.
• Key determinations:
  • Under New York law, restrictions creating possibilities of reverter are strictly construed against the grantor and cannot be extended “beyond the fair import of the language.”
  • The phrase “maintained in [its] natural state and operated as a preserve for the maintenance of wildlife” reasonably encompasses active ecological management, including fencing and selective culling, where such actions aim to preserve the ecosystem’s long-term integrity.
  • Prohibitions on “hunting, trapping, fishing or any other activities that might adversely affect the environment or the animal population” bar recreational or commercial take, but do not bar scientifically-driven, targeted removals that benefit the overall fauna and flora.
  • Because the Plan aligns with the “true spirit and purpose” of the deeds, no reversion is triggered.
• Separate opinions:
  • Judge Park concurred in the result but insisted the case was not constitutionally ripe.
  • Judge Pérez concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that lethal deer removal does “adversely affect fauna,” and that summary judgment for the government was therefore improper.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and their Influence

• Duryea v. City of New York, 62 N.Y. 592 (1875) – Foundation for the rule that deed restrictions with possibilities of reverter must be strictly construed against the grantor.
• Single v. Whitmore, 307 N.Y. 575 (1954) & Lipton v. Bruce, 1 N.Y.2d 631 (1956) – Confirm that in cases of ambiguity, courts should adopt the construction limiting, rather than extending, restrictive covenants.
• Rose v. Hawley, 141 N.Y. 366 (1894) – Establishes that only material, not technical, breaches trigger reversion.
• O & W Lines, Inc. v. St. John, 20 N.Y.2d 17 (1967) – Reaffirms strict construction and disfavour of forfeiture in property law.
• Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) – Cited on ripeness; demonstrates when agency plans can be attacked pre-implementation (used by majority to find ripeness).
• Friends of Animals v. Romero, 948 F.3d 579 (2d Cir. 2020) – Earlier NEPA litigation upholding the same deer-management plan’s environmental review, reinforcing that the plan is final agency action.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Parsing of the Deeds
   The panel divided the operative sentence into two independent duties—(a) maintain in natural state, and (b) operate as wildlife preserve—both informed by the subsequent purpose clause. The court then asked whether fencing and culling are incompatible with either duty. It concluded they further, rather than hinder, both objectives.
2. Strict Construction against the Grantor
   Because Wildlife Preserves drafted the restriction and seeks forfeiture, any plausible state-preserving reading must be adopted in favour of the government. Under this canon, the court accepted that “hunting” and “trapping” target recreational or commercial killing, whereas controlled “sharpshooting” in aid of ecological balance falls outside the ban.
3. Material vs. Technical Breach
   Even if vegetation is removed during fence construction, that is a small, temporary impact designed to achieve a larger ecological good; therefore, it is at most a technical deviation insufficient to cause reversion.
4. Reconciliation of Deed Language
   The majority rejected the dissent’s “leave nature alone” reading as contrary to the deeds’ explicit management language and to New York’s policy favouring free alienability of land.
5. Avoidance of Statute-of-Limitations Question
   Having found no breach, the court declined to decide whether the claim was time-barred, invoking the principle that courts may affirm on any ground supported by the record.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

This opinion will reverberate well beyond Fire Island:

• Conservation Easements & Donations: Donors often include restrictive covenants expecting perpetual “hands-off” conservation. Wildlife Preserves signals that courts may deem active management—fencing, selective culls, even prescribed burns—consistent with “natural state” language when aimed at ecosystem health.
• Government & NGO Land Managers: Federal and state agencies now wield clearer authority to implement science-based management on deed-restricted lands without fear of automatic forfeiture, provided actions demonstrably protect long-term ecological integrity.
• Quiet Title Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs can no longer rely solely on literalist readings; they must show that agency actions undermine, rather than advance, conservation purposes. Conversely, defendants can raise Wildlife Preserves to argue that “active” preservation is within the covenant’s scope.
• Drafting Lessons: Future conservation deeds may specify whether active interventions (e.g., culling, chemical treatments, re-introductions) are permitted, to avoid the uncertainty spotlighted by this case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Quiet Title Act (QTA): A federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 2409a) that gives private parties a mechanism to adjudicate disputes over land title when the United States claims an interest. It includes a strict 12-year limitations period.
• Possibility of Reverter: A future interest retained by the grantor; title automatically “snaps back” if specified conditions are breached.
• Strict Construction: A canon that interprets forfeiture clauses narrowly; ambiguity is resolved against enforcing forfeiture.
• Ripeness: A constitutional and prudential doctrine requiring that legal issues be sufficiently concrete. The majority held the dispute ripe because the Plan was finalized and implementation imminent.
• Invasive vs. Native Species Management: Conservation theory increasingly recognises that allowing unchecked growth of native but over-abundant species (e.g., deer without predators) can devastate plant diversity; active control is thus part of “preservation.”

5. Conclusion

Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Romero charts a pragmatic middle path between passive and active conservation philosophies. By holding that controlled culling and fencing designed to protect a rare maritime holly forest do not violate a “natural state” covenant, the Second Circuit clarifies that modern ecological management is compatible with mid-20th-century deed language—provided the intervention aims to conserve the very values the covenant sought to safeguard. Going forward, land trusts, environmental donors, and governmental stewards alike must draft and interpret restrictions in light of this precedent: conservation covenants are not preservationist straitjackets; rather, they permit—and sometimes demand—scientifically-grounded action to secure ecological integrity for generations to come.