Acquitted Conduct After U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c): Still Usable Under § 3553(a) and § 1B1.4; “Significant” Collateral Consequences for the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Must Be Concrete and Non‑Speculative

Acquitted Conduct After U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c): Still Usable Under § 3553(a) and § 1B1.4; “Significant” Collateral Consequences for the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Must Be Concrete and Non‑Speculative

I. Introduction

In United States v. Christopher Texidor (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2026), the Third Circuit addressed a set of post-trial and sentencing disputes arising from two consolidated matters: (1) a jury conviction for marijuana-trafficking and related firearm offenses tied to a large, multi-person organization using USPS shipments and violence to protect its operation; and (2) a guilty plea to one count of wire fraud arising from a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan scheme committed while the defendant was on pretrial release.

On appeal, Christopher Texidor challenged: (a) the district court’s refusal to strike cocaine-related references from the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) after his acquittal on a cocaine conspiracy count, arguing the new U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (effective Nov. 1, 2024) barred consideration of acquitted conduct; (b) a four-level organizer/leader enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); (c) the substantive reasonableness of the 292-month aggregate sentence on the drug/firearm case; and (d) the substantive reasonableness of the concurrent 240-month sentence for wire fraud.

The decision is significant for two clarifications: first, it is the Third Circuit’s first-impression interpretation of how § 1B1.3(c) interacts with § 1B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 3661; second, it refines the Third Circuit’s concurrent-sentence doctrine analysis by defining when collateral consequences are sufficiently “significant” to warrant review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Acquitted conduct / PSR references: The court held that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) limits acquitted conduct only for Guidelines-range calculation (“relevant conduct”), and does not bar consideration of acquitted conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when selecting a sentence within/outside the range. The panel also found no record indication that the district court actually relied on cocaine conduct in imposing sentence.
  • Leadership enhancement: The four-level U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) enhancement was affirmed; the district court’s organizer/leader findings were not clearly erroneous.
  • Substantive reasonableness (drug/firearm): A bottom-of-the-range 292-month aggregate term was substantively reasonable given the scale (nearly 3,000 kg), duration, use of violence and firearms, and PPP fraud while on release. The court rejected the argument that potential marijuana rescheduling rendered the sentence unreasonable.
  • Wire-fraud sentence review: The court declined to review the 240-month concurrent wire-fraud sentence under the concurrent sentence doctrine, concluding the asserted “marijuana reform” collateral consequences were speculative. It clarified that to defeat the doctrine, collateral consequences must be concrete and non-speculative.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and sentencing framework

  • United States v. Seibert: Cited for de novo review of Guidelines interpretation. The panel used this to frame that the meaning of the Guidelines’ provisions is a legal question.
  • United States v. Tupone: Cited for the tripartite review structure (interpretation de novo; application abuse of discretion; factual findings clear error).
  • United States v. Thung Van Huynh: Important because it treats the organizer/leader inquiry as a “predominantly fact-driven test,” supporting clear-error review of the enhancement’s application.
  • United States v. Tomko: Supplies the Third Circuit’s substantive-reasonableness standard—affirm unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence.” This is the lens through which the panel upheld the 292-month term.

2. Acquitted conduct at sentencing: § 1B1.3(c) vs. § 1B1.4 and § 3661

  • United States v. Watts: The Supreme Court’s key authority that acquitted conduct may be considered at sentencing if proven by a preponderance, anchored in 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and the Guidelines’ broad information rule. Although the opinion acknowledges the new § 1B1.3(c), it relies on Watts to show the historical baseline and to reinforce the continuing vitality of § 3661 and § 1B1.4 outside “relevant conduct” calculations.
  • United States v. Ciavarella: Third Circuit precedent applying Watts. Its inclusion underscores that Third Circuit law long permitted consideration of acquitted conduct (with a preponderance finding) and sets the stage for the question: what changes after § 1B1.3(c)?
  • United States v. Ware: The only circuit authority the panel identified as directly touching the post-§ 1B1.3(c) question. The Third Circuit found Ware persuasive and aligned its holding with the Eighth Circuit’s footnote: § 1B1.3(c) does not bar considering acquitted conduct under § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Omoruyi: Used to justify applying the Guidelines language in effect at the time of sentencing, relevant because § 1B1.3(c) was new and § 1B1.4 had been amended after sentencing.

3. Leadership enhancement: meaning of “organizer” and “leader”

  • United States v. Adair: Central definitional precedent. The panel adopted Adair’s “ordinary meanings” approach: an organizer “generates a coherent functional structure,” and a leader has “high-level directive power or influence.” The Texidor panel then assessed facts (recruitment, direction, operational base, coordination, violent intimidation efforts) against these definitions.
  • United States v. Belletiere: The defendant’s main comparator. The panel distinguished Belletiere as involving mere suppliers/customers and “unrelated drug sales,” whereas Texidor involved recruitment, coordinated logistics, use of premises, and members reporting back to him—features consistent with an organized enterprise under Adair.

4. Concurrent sentence doctrine and collateral consequences

  • United States v. McKie: Cited for the basic mechanics—courts may decline to decide issues on counts that will not change overall time served when a longer concurrent sentence will survive.
  • Duka v. United States: Supplies the doctrine’s resource-conservation rationale and frames collateral consequences as the key limitation.
  • Ray v. United States and United States v. Ross: Used to explain why the doctrine is generally unavailable on direct review of convictions (especially where special assessments make sentences not “truly concurrent”). The panel distinguished Texidor’s situation because he challenged only sentence length on a concurrent count.
  • Kassir v. United States, United States v. Bradley, and United States v. Harris: Cited to show that appellate courts still apply the doctrine on direct appeal where only the length of a concurrent sentence is challenged.
  • United States v. Lampley: The Third Circuit’s “significant risk of greater adverse collateral consequences” articulation, which Texidor presented as a barrier to applying the doctrine.
  • Ruiz v. United States, United States v. Sherifi, United States v. Case: 24-3315 Document: 40 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Charles, and Eason v. United States: The panel used these to add content to “significant risk,” clarifying it must be concrete and non-speculative, and that speculative consequences do not bar use of the doctrine.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The new rule on § 1B1.3(c): a “range-calculation only” limitation

The court’s first-impression holding is textual and structural:

  • Text: U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) states that “relevant conduct does not include” acquitted conduct for purposes of determining the Guidelines range, with a limited exception. The panel read this as a targeted restriction on what counts as “relevant conduct,” not a global evidentiary prohibition at sentencing.
  • Structure: The Guidelines separately contain U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, which (implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3661) broadly authorizes consideration of background, character, and conduct when choosing a sentence within/outside the range. The panel reasoned that because § 1B1.3(c) does not, by its terms, constrain § 1B1.4 or § 3661, acquitted conduct remains potentially usable at the § 3553(a) stage.
  • Harmony with Supreme Court baseline: The panel treated United States v. Watts as still describing the governing statutory principle under § 3661, and read the new guideline as narrowing acquitted conduct only in the “relevant conduct” computation step.

Crucially, after announcing the legal rule, the panel affirmed on an additional, practical ground: the record did not show the district court actually relied on cocaine conduct to determine the Guidelines range (it said it did not), nor did it reference cocaine conduct when weighing § 3553(a) factors or pronouncing sentence.

2. Organizer/leader enhancement applied to a “coherent functional structure”

Applying United States v. Adair and reviewing for clear error per United States v. Thung Van Huynh, the panel emphasized facts demonstrating both organization and leadership:

  • Recruitment of family/friends to receive packages and coordination of their receipt;
  • Provision of business and residence as operational bases and concealment venues;
  • Regular coordination of pickups/drop-offs and communications about parcels, debts, and payments;
  • Organization of GPS tracking to address missing parcels;
  • Coordination of violent intimidation and evidence that perpetrators reported back and used resources tied to Texidor (vehicle left at his home, then hidden by him).

The panel rejected the defendant’s reliance on United States v. Belletiere, characterizing Texidor’s network as an organized enterprise rather than a set of arm’s-length buyer-seller transactions.

3. Substantive reasonableness: rescheduling speculation vs. violence and scale

Under United States v. Tomko, the panel credited the district court’s explanation: the “astonishing” drug quantity, lengthy duration, violence and firearms, and the separate PPP fraud while on release. The proposed rescheduling of marijuana did not make reliance on current law unreasonable, and the court underscored that the sentence was driven not merely by marijuana classification but by multiple offense characteristics (leadership, weapon, threats/violence, drug premises).

4. Concurrent sentence doctrine: “significant risk” requires concreteness

The court exercised discretion not to review the wire-fraud sentence because success would not reduce time served given the longer 292-month concurrent term. It then refined the collateral-consequences limitation:

  • The Third Circuit reiterated that the doctrine should not be used where there is a “significant risk” of adverse collateral consequences (United States v. Lampley), but acknowledged prior Third Circuit cases had not clearly defined that threshold.
  • Adopting sister-circuit gloss, the court held the risk must be “concrete” and “non-speculative” (citing Ruiz v. United States), and that speculative future changes do not suffice (citing Eason v. United States, United States v. Sherifi, United States v. Case: 24-3315 Document: 40 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Charles).

The panel found Texidor’s asserted collateral consequences speculative because (i) the Guidelines already treat marijuana and unspecified Schedule III substances the same through “Converted Drug Weight,” and (ii) even if future amendments occurred, the availability of retroactive relief (e.g., via 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)) was uncertain.

C. Impact

1. Acquitted conduct: a narrower reform than some defendants may assume

The decision establishes in the Third Circuit that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) is a Guidelines-calculation reform, not a comprehensive bar on sentencing courts’ consideration of acquitted conduct at the § 3553(a) stage. Practically:

  • Guidelines range: Acquitted conduct generally cannot increase the calculated range via “relevant conduct” (subject to the guideline’s “instant offense” carveout).
  • Ultimate sentence selection: Acquitted conduct may still be considered when selecting a sentence within the range or deciding variances, consistent with § 3661 and § 1B1.4, absent another legal prohibition.

This creates a two-stage reality: even if the range is “clean” of acquitted conduct, the same facts may still influence the final sentence as part of the broader conduct assessment—subject to evidentiary reliability and the district court’s discretionary weighting.

2. Leadership enhancement: enterprise-management facts matter more than resale control

By distinguishing United States v. Belletiere and applying United States v. Adair, the panel signals that leadership can be established by logistics coordination, recruitment, use of premises, and directive influence—especially where participants report back—without needing proof of control over downstream resale networks.

3. Concurrent sentence doctrine: a more defendant-specific, evidence-based inquiry

The clarification that “significant risk” means concrete and non-speculative will likely increase the doctrine’s use in sentencing-only challenges to shorter concurrent counts. Defendants seeking review despite a longer concurrent sentence will need to identify realistic collateral consequences (e.g., specific guideline/recidivist effects, supervised release implications, restitution/financial penalties uniquely tied to the challenged count, or clearly applicable retroactivity pathways), not merely potential legal reforms.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Acquitted conduct”: Conduct the defendant was charged with but found not guilty of. Historically, federal sentencing courts could still consider it if proven by a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not), per United States v. Watts.
  • “Relevant conduct” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): A Guidelines concept defining what behavior counts in computing the advisory range. The new § 1B1.3(c) removes acquitted conduct from this range-calculation bucket (with a limited exception).
  • U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 3661: Broad rules allowing courts to consider almost any reliable information about the defendant when choosing the sentence, even if that information did not affect the Guidelines range.
  • § 3553(a) factors: The statutory criteria judges must consider in sentencing (seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, history/characteristics, etc.). This is where the court said acquitted conduct may still be weighed.
  • Organizer/leader enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)): A four-level increase if the defendant organized or led a criminal activity involving five or more participants (or “otherwise extensive”). Leadership can be shown through recruitment, coordination, directing others, and building an operational structure.
  • Concurrent sentence doctrine: An appellate efficiency doctrine allowing courts to skip reviewing a challenged count if a longer concurrent sentence will keep the total time served unchanged—unless ignoring the issue would cause concrete adverse collateral consequences.
  • “Converted Drug Weight”: A Guidelines method for equating different drugs to a common measure to set offense levels. The panel noted marijuana and unspecified Schedule III substances are already treated similarly under the conversion approach, undercutting the claim that rescheduling would likely lower Texidor’s Guidelines range.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Christopher Texidor delivers two doctrinal clarifications with immediate sentencing and appellate consequences in the Third Circuit. First, it holds that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) restricts acquitted conduct only in calculating the advisory Guidelines range and does not bar its consideration under § 3553(a) via 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. Second, it sharpens the concurrent sentence doctrine by requiring that collateral consequences be concrete and non-speculative to justify appellate review of a shorter concurrent sentence. Together, these holdings preserve broad sentencing discretion at the § 3553(a) stage while narrowing acquitted conduct’s role in range computation and expanding the circumstances in which appellate courts may conserve resources by declining review of non-outcome-determinative concurrent sentences.

Case Details

Year: 2026
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

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