Acknowledgment of Domestic Violence Is a Prerequisite to Improvement Periods; Ongoing Abuse During Proceedings Supports Immediate Termination

Case: In re J.C.-1 and J.C.-2, No. 24-554 (W. Va. Sept. 10, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Disposition: Affirmed (memorandum decision)

Introduction

This memorandum decision from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirms a circuit court’s denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period and termination of a father’s parental and custodial rights to two children, J.C.-1 and J.C.-2. The decision is a forceful application of long-standing West Virginia principles: a parent seeking an improvement period must acknowledge the abuse or neglect and demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, a likelihood of full participation and correction; where domestic violence (DV) continues unabated during the proceedings and is minimized by the offending parent, a circuit court may deny an improvement period and proceed to termination when necessary for the children’s welfare.

The petitioner father (J.C.-3) had previously been subject to a disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) as to J.C.-1 in a 2019 abuse and neglect matter. In late 2023 and early 2024, a new abuse and neglect proceeding was initiated against the mother, stemming in part from domestic violence in the home involving the father. After the mother’s adjudication, the father moved to modify his prior disposition and reunify with J.C.-1, while the Department of Human Services (DHS) counter-moved to modify his disposition and terminate his parental rights. The circuit court later adjudicated the father as an abusing and neglectful parent based on ongoing domestic violence, denied his request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and terminated his parental and custodial rights to both children. On appeal, the father principally challenged the denial of the improvement period and the termination.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the deferential clear-error standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions (Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T.), the Supreme Court affirmed. It held:

• The circuit court did not err in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Although the father was not incarcerated, attended hearings, admitted to “arguing with and hitting” the mother, and had positive visits with the infant (J.C.-2), he failed to carry his statutory burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was likely to fully participate in an improvement period (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610). The record showed ongoing domestic violence during the case, a DV protective order (DVPO) entered against him in June 2024, and persistent minimization of his conduct—exactly the circumstances in which West Virginia law deems an improvement period futile absent acknowledgment (In re Timber M.; In re Charity H.).
• Termination of parental and custodial rights to both children was proper under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). The father’s minimization, continued domestic violence during the pendency of the case, significant violent criminal history, instability, and the need to provide permanency and reliable caretakers for the children (State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman) supported the circuit court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

The Court emphasized that circuit courts have discretion to deny improvement periods when no improvement is likely (In re Tonjia M.) and that children’s entitlement to permanence and safety outweighs speculative hopes that a parent will change course in the face of ongoing domestic violence.

Factual and Procedural Background

• 2019: The father was a respondent in an abuse and neglect case and was subjected to a disposition under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) as to J.C.-1 (a disposition that typically removes or limits custodial rights while parental rights may remain intact).
• December 2023–January 2024: DHS filed a new petition against the mother. She was adjudicated as an abusing and neglectful parent in January 2024, in part due to domestic violence in the home between her and the father.
• Early 2024: The father moved to modify his prior disposition to reunify with J.C.-1, citing recent release from incarceration and parole; DHS countered with a motion to modify, seeking termination of his parental rights. Forensic interviews of the children reflected disclosures that they witnessed domestic violence between the parents.
• March 2024: J.C.-2 was born; DHS amended the petition to add the infant and the father as parties, alleging domestic violence in the presence of children.
• July 2024 (Adjudication): The father admitted to “arguing with and hitting” the mother but claimed no children were present and professed poor recollection of his domestic-violence history and broader criminal record. The mother testified to repeated violence, threats, property destruction, a black eye, and an incident in which the father punched out her car window, leading to a DVPO in June 2024. The circuit court adjudicated the father as an abusing and neglectful parent based on unabated domestic violence.
• August 2024 (Disposition): Considering both parties’ modification motions and the father’s request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, the circuit court found a significant violent criminal history (including burglary, attempted murder, and gun-related offenses), a pattern of instability and recurring domestic violence, ongoing minimization, and the recent DVPO. It concluded there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, that an improvement period would be futile, and that the children’s welfare necessitated termination. It denied the father’s motions and terminated his parental and custodial rights to both children. The permanency plan is adoption in the current placement.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (Syl. Pt. 1) — Sets the appellate standards of review: factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. This framework constrained the Supreme Court to defer to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and factual findings regarding minimization, ongoing domestic violence, and risk to the children.
• In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) — Establishes that acknowledgment of the abuse or neglect is a necessary predicate to remediation; without it, an improvement period becomes “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.” The Supreme Court applied this principle directly: the father’s partial admissions were undercut by his persistent minimization and contemporaneous acts of domestic violence, defeating any claim that he was likely to fully participate and correct the problem.
• In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002) — Affirms the circuit court’s discretion to deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely. The Court invoked Tonjia M. to underscore that compliance with hearings or isolated positive interactions is not enough; the statutory burden is likelihood of full participation and correction, proven by clear and convincing evidence.
• State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W. Va. 251, 470 S.E.2d 205 (1996) — Emphasizes the imperative of timely permanency and the child’s right to rely on stable caretakers. The Court used Amy M. to support prioritizing permanency over speculative prospects of change where violence and instability persist.
• W. Va. Code § 49-4-610 — Governs improvement periods. The applicant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a likelihood of full participation. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that the father failed to meet this threshold due to minimization and ongoing abuse.
• W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) — Authorizes termination where there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The Court held that the father’s recidivist violence, instability, and failure to acknowledge the problem satisfied this standard.
• Context: W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) — Earlier proceeding (2019) resulted in a § 49-4-604(c)(5) disposition as to J.C.-1. In West Virginia practice, a (c)(5) disposition often limits or terminates custodial rights while parental rights may remain, permitting later modification motions. The present case arose from the father’s attempt to modify that disposition to reunify, and DHS’s motion to modify toward termination.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The Court’s reasoning closely follows the statutory scheme and established case law.

• Improvement period denial: The statutory question under § 49-4-610 is not whether a parent is physically available, attends hearings, or has isolated positive visits, but whether the parent has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, a likely full participation that will correct the underlying conditions. Acknowledgment of the abuse is an indispensable first step. Here, the father’s partial admission (to arguing with and hitting the mother) was counterbalanced by his claims that children were never present, his professed inability to recall prior domestic-violence incidents and criminal history, and, most critically, evidence that he continued to commit acts of domestic violence during the case—culminating in a DVPO one month before adjudication. Given Timber M./Charity H., an improvement period would be futile without genuine acknowledgment and cessation. Tonjia M. vested discretion in the circuit court to deny the improvement period; the record provided ample support to exercise that discretion.
• Termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6): The circuit court found no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare. The Supreme Court identified several pillars supporting this finding: (1) ongoing domestic violence during the proceedings; (2) minimization and credibility concerns; (3) a significant violent criminal history and instability (including substantial adult life spent incarcerated); (4) a pattern of moving in and out of the mother’s home precipitated by domestic-violence incidents; and (5) the entry of a DVPO close in time to adjudication. Layered upon the statutory standard is the jurisprudential imperative of permanency from Amy M.: children are entitled to safety and reliable caretakers. Given these findings, termination was a legally sound and necessary disposition.
• Standard of review: By invoking Cecil T., the Court signaled deference to the circuit court’s fact-finding and credibility determinations, especially regarding the father’s minimization, the weight of the mother’s testimony, the forensic interviews, and the significance of the DVPO. The legal conclusions—namely, that these facts meet the thresholds of § 49-4-610 and § 49-4-604(c)(6)—were reviewed de novo and found correct.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Domestic violence cases: The decision reinforces that ongoing domestic violence during a case, coupled with minimization or denial, is fundamentally incompatible with granting an improvement period. Parents must show concrete acknowledgment and immediate behavioral change; a protective order contemporaneous with the proceedings is potent evidence to the contrary.
• Proof required for improvement periods: Attendance and isolated positive visits do not satisfy § 49-4-610. Courts will look for clear indicators of acknowledgment and capacity to fully participate—e.g., credible acceptance of responsibility, tangible engagement in appropriate interventions, demonstrable cessation of violence, and protective measures for children.
• Custodial history and modification motions: Where a parent has previously been subject to a (c)(5) disposition limiting custodial rights, attempting to modify back toward reunification will require a robust evidentiary showing of changed circumstances. Conversely, DHS may seek to modify toward termination when new evidence (such as renewed domestic violence) arises.
• Permanency emphasis: The Court’s reliance on Amy M. underscores that children’s rights to stability and reliable caregivers can eclipse parental claims to incremental remedial opportunities when the underlying harm persists.
• Use of corroborative evidence: Forensic interviews, recent DVPOs, and consistency between witness testimony and documentary/criminal records will continue to weigh heavily in adjudication and disposition, particularly where a parent contests the presence of children during incidents or minimizes intent and impact.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication decides whether abuse or neglect occurred and who is responsible. Disposition determines what happens next (e.g., placement, services, improvement period, termination).
• Improvement period (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610): A time-limited opportunity for a parent to correct the conditions of abuse/neglect. It is not automatic; the parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence they will fully participate and correct the problems. Acknowledgment of the problem is essential.
• “Clear and convincing” evidence: A high level of proof requiring that the claim be highly probable or reasonably certain—more than a preponderance of the evidence, less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
• “No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)): A finding that, based on the parent’s current behavior, history, and response to services, meaningful change is not reasonably expected soon enough to meet the child’s needs for safety and permanence.
• Parental rights vs. custodial rights: Parental rights include the legal relationship and residual rights (e.g., consent to adoption, some decision-making). Custodial rights concern physical care and control. West Virginia law permits courts, in some circumstances, to limit or terminate custodial rights without completely terminating parental rights, or to terminate both.
• Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO): A civil court order intended to prevent further domestic violence, often granted upon evidence of recent abuse or credible threats. Its issuance during an abuse/neglect case strongly indicates ongoing risk.
• Memorandum decision: A shorter appellate disposition used where oral argument is unnecessary and existing law clearly resolves the issues. It remains citable authority under the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Conclusion

In re J.C.-1 and J.C.-2 reaffirms core principles of West Virginia abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence: parents are not entitled to improvement periods as a matter of right; they must show, by clear and convincing evidence, a genuine likelihood of full participation and correction, which begins with forthright acknowledgment of the problem. When domestic violence persists during the very proceedings intended to address it—especially when accompanied by minimization and a recent DVPO—circuit courts act within their discretion to deny an improvement period and, where warranted, to terminate parental and custodial rights to secure permanence and safety for children.

The decision offers a clear, practical message for future cases: continued domestic violence is incompatible with reunification goals unless the parent promptly accepts responsibility, verifiably changes behavior, and demonstrates stability. In the absence of that showing, the statutory mandate to protect children and provide permanency prevails.