Acknowledgment of Abuse, Repeated DHS Involvement, and the Futility of Improvement Periods: Commentary on In re C.F. and I.F.

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re C.F. and I.F., No. 25-5 (Nov. 25, 2025), affirming the termination of a mother’s parental rights and the denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the opinion offers a clear and instructive application of several core principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence:

Improvement periods are not automatic; a parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate.
Failure to acknowledge the existence and impact of abusive conduct renders services ineffective and an improvement period “an exercise in futility.”
Repeated recurrence of the same abuse/neglect issues after extensive services can establish “no reasonable likelihood” of correction, justifying termination.
Appellate courts will not disturb circuit court credibility findings in abuse and neglect cases.

This case centers on a mother (“K.F.”) who, after successfully completing services in a prior abuse and neglect case and regaining custody of her two children (C.F. and I.F.), quickly reverted to the same pattern of domestic violence, substance misuse, and untreated mental health problems. The opinion reinforces the long-standing rule that the child’s welfare and need for stability and safety outweigh a parent’s desire for repeated opportunities where the evidence shows a pattern of non-change.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The 2021 Abuse and Neglect Case

In 2021, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that:

The petitioner mother engaged in domestic violence with the children’s father.
She abused substances.
She suffered from untreated mental health issues.

In that earlier case, both parents were granted and successfully completed post-adjudicatory improvement periods. They participated in services such as:

Drug and alcohol classes
Parenting classes
Marital counseling
Anger management
Mental health counseling

As a result, custody of the children was restored in January 2023, and the 2021 case was dismissed.

B. The 2023 Petition: Re-Emergence of the Same Problems

Less than a year later, in November 2023, DHS filed a new abuse and neglect petition alleging that the parents:

Again exposed the children to serious domestic violence.
Were involved in substance abuse and untreated mental health issues.

The children disclosed disturbing incidents involving their mother:

Threatening to stab the father in the throat with a knife.
Using a car to run over the father’s foot.
Pouring bleach on his clothes.

DHS also reported that household turmoil severely affected the children:

They displayed “severe dysfunctional behaviors.”
They repeatedly fell asleep in school.

C. Adjudication: Mother’s Stipulation

At the April 2024 adjudicatory hearing, the mother stipulated to:

Engaging in domestic violence.
Having mental health issues.

The circuit court accepted the stipulation and adjudicated her as an abusing and/or neglectful parent as to both children.

D. Motion for a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

Following adjudication, the mother sought a post-adjudicatory improvement period. DHS and the guardian ad litem opposed. At the hearing, DHS presented:

Evidence of multiple prior referrals to Child Protective Services for substance abuse and domestic violence.
Evidence of her prior participation in extensive services in the 2021 case.
Her own admission that she stopped taking prescribed medication and resumed illegal drugs right after the 2021 case was dismissed.

DHS also highlighted:

The mother’s attempt after the new petition to restart medication and counseling, only to quit because she felt it was “not working.”
Her newly reported diagnosis of “unspecified personality disorder with borderline and anti-social traits.”
Her stated intent to attend yet another counseling program that she believed might be more effective.
A hostile remark on her psychological evaluation intake form: she wrote that she attended because “CPS is a crock of sh--.”
Her continued minimization of domestic violence, insistence that the children were exaggerating, and continued blaming of the father.

The circuit court found that the mother was unlikely to truly participate in an improvement period and denied her motion.

E. Disposition: Evidence at the Termination Hearing

At the November 2024 dispositional hearing, DHS emphasized:

The similarity between the 2021 and 2023 cases (domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health).
The short time—less than a year—between dismissal of the 2021 case and the new petition.
Her failure to consistently and effectively treat her mental health issues.

The children’s foster parent testified to the children’s trauma symptoms, including:

Recurring nightmares about their mother hitting their father with a car and threatening to slit his throat.
Nightmares involving their mother’s suicidal statements.

A psychologist testified that the trauma manifested as:

C.F. becoming violent toward others and making suicidal and homicidal statements.
I.F. exhibiting significant mood regulation issues.
Both children persistently wetting the bed despite their older age.

The mother testified that she:

Had begun a new mental health treatment program.
Was obtaining a divorce from the father.

However, she continued to:

Minimize the domestic violence, calling it mere “arguing.”
Blame the father for her own conduct.
Deny that the children suffered negative effects from witnessing the conflict.

F. Circuit Court’s Disposition

The circuit court found:

[It did] “not believe the [petitioner] will make any meaningful change; rather, like the first case, [the petitioner] will simply go through the motions and do everything [t]hat is required of [her], without making any actual or meaningful changes or improvements.”

It concluded:

There was no reasonable likelihood that the mother could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future.
She had demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems on her own or with help.
Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare because they had suffered “grievous psychological injuries with physical manifestations” impacting their sleep, schooling, and mental and physical health.

The court terminated her parental rights. The father’s parental rights were also terminated, and the children’s permanency plan is adoption by the current foster placement.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court's Decision

On appeal, the mother challenged:

The denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
The termination of her parental rights.

The Supreme Court of Appeals:

Applied a clearly erroneous standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions, per In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).
Affirmed the denial of the improvement period, holding that she did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, a likelihood of full participation under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B).
Relied heavily on her:
- Failure to acknowledge the problem.
- Minimization of domestic violence.
- Blaming of the father.
- History of abandoning treatment and relapsing after services ended.
Cited In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), and In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004), for the principle that failure to acknowledge the problem renders it untreatable and makes an improvement period futile.
Affirmed termination of parental rights under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d), concluding:
- There was “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future.
- Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.
Relied on In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), and In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), to confirm that parental rights may be terminated without less restrictive alternatives when these findings are made.
Rejected her argument that pending mental health treatment and an intended divorce sufficed to show likely correction, emphasizing the recurrence of the same issues after extensive prior services.
Deferred to the circuit court’s credibility assessments, citing In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), and Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997).

The Supreme Court affirmed the December 9, 2024 order in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Procedural Framework

At the outset, the Court restated the standard of review from syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T.:

Factual findings of the circuit court in abuse and neglect proceedings are reviewed for clear error.
Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

This framework is crucial because much of this case turns on:

Credibility assessments (particularly of the mother).
Fact-intensive conclusions about her capacity to change.

The Court’s deference to the circuit court’s factfinding heavily shapes the outcome, particularly with respect to:

The mother’s sincerity (or lack thereof) in addressing mental health and domestic violence.
The interpretation of her behavior post-2021 case.

B. Denial of the Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

1. Statutory Standard: W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B)

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a parent seeking a post-adjudicatory improvement period must:

Demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence” that they are “likely to fully participate in the improvement period.”

Key implications:

The burden is on the parent, not on DHS or the court.
The standard of proof is relatively high (“clear and convincing,” not just “more likely than not”).
“Likely to fully participate” goes beyond mere verbal assurances; it includes an assessment of the parent’s history, insight, consistency, and behavior.

2. The Acknowledgment Requirement: Timber M. and Charity H.

The Court’s primary doctrinal anchor is the “acknowledgment” rule. Quoting In re Timber M., which in turn quoted In re Charity H., the Court reiterates:

“[F]ailure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, . . . results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.”

Put plainly, if a parent:

Refuses to recognize that their conduct is abusive or harmful, or
Minimizes or blames others instead of accepting responsibility,

then:

Services are unlikely to be effective.
An improvement period is likely to waste time while children remain in limbo.

In this case, the Supreme Court identifies several specific behaviors by the mother that fit squarely into this doctrine:

She minimized the seriousness of the domestic violence, characterizing it as “arguing.”
She accused the children of exaggerating their accounts.
She continually blamed the father for her own actions and anger.
She denied that the children were negatively affected by witnessing the violence, despite contrary professional testimony.

Taken together, these behaviors demonstrate not mere denial, but a profound lack of insight into how her conduct traumatized the children. For the Court, this failure of acknowledgment makes meaningful change unlikely and an improvement period futile.

3. Prior Services and Relapse: Evidence of Futility

The Court also grounds its analysis in the mother’s history. Critical facts include:

In the 2021 case, she had extensive services (mental health counseling, anger management, substance abuse treatment, marital counseling, etc.).
She successfully completed that improvement period, resulting in reunification.
Immediately after the case was dismissed in January 2023:
- She stopped taking prescribed mental health medication.
- She ceased counseling.
- She resumed abusing illegal drugs.
- The domestic violence resumed and escalated.

Thus, her apparent compliance during the 2021 case was, in the circuit court’s view, “going through the motions” without genuine internalized change. The Supreme Court accepts that finding and uses it to support denial of yet another improvement period.

Her hostile remark—“CPS is a crock of sh--”—on the psychological evaluation intake form materially supports the conclusion that she was not sincerely engaged in the process.

4. Discretion to Refuse Improvement Periods: Tonjia M.

The Court cites In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002), noting:

“The circuit court has the discretion to refuse to grant an improvement period when no improvement is likely.”

This emphasizes that:

Improvement periods are not entitlements.
Circuit courts may deny an improvement period up front if the evidence shows that it is unlikely to produce meaningful change.

Given the mother’s relapse pattern and lack of insight, the Supreme Court held the denial was a permissible exercise of that discretion.

C. Termination of Parental Rights

1. Statutory Framework: W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)

Termination of parental rights is authorized under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) when:

There is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future,” and
Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

Subsection (d) defines “no reasonable likelihood” to mean that:

“[T]he abusing adult . . . [has] demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on [their] own or with help.”

The statutory language explicitly contemplates future prospects: the question is not merely whether the parent has failed in the past, but whether, considering that history, they show an adequate capacity to change in the near future—even with help.

2. Application: Recurrence After Extensive Services

The Supreme Court underscores the following:

The mother received a “plethora of services” during the 2021 case.
The same core problems—domestic violence, substance abuse, untreated mental health issues—reappeared within about a year, and in some respects escalated.
The children’s trauma symptoms were significant, persistent, and corroborated by psychological testimony.

The Court accepts the circuit court’s conclusion that:

Her pattern of relapse and minimization shows an “inadequate capacity” to correct the problems.
Her assurances of future treatment and a planned divorce lack credibility in light of this history.

3. Credibility and Appellate Deference: In re D.S. and Michael D.C.

The mother argued that:

She had re-engaged in mental health treatment.
She intended to divorce the father, thereby removing the main source of domestic conflict.

The circuit court was unpersuaded, and the Supreme Court declined to disturb that assessment. It cites:

In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), confirming that appellate courts review under deferential standards and do not re-weigh credibility.
Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997), reiterating that the trier of fact is uniquely positioned to assess witness credibility and appellate courts will not “second guess” such determinations.

For practitioners, this underscores a critical appellate reality: once the circuit court finds a parent’s promises of change to be unconvincing, it is very difficult to reverse that finding on appeal.

4. Necessity for the Children’s Welfare: Trauma and Psychological Harm

The evidence of the children’s harm was powerful:

Recurrent nightmares of graphic violence and suicidal ideation involving their mother.
Externalizing behaviors (violence toward others, homicidal and suicidal statements by C.F.).
Internalizing or regulatory problems (mood regulation issues for I.F.).
Persistent bedwetting, a physical manifestation of psychological distress.

The circuit court found that the children had suffered “grievous psychological injuries with physical manifestations,” and that this harmed their schooling, sleep, and overall well-being. The Supreme Court accepted these findings as more than sufficient to establish that:

Continued parental rights would be detrimental.
Termination was “necessary for the welfare of the child” under § 49-4-604(c)(6).

5. No Requirement of Less Restrictive Alternatives: Kristin Y. and R.J.M.

The Court relies on syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y. (quoting syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M.), holding that:

Termination of parental rights may occur “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

In other words:

The circuit court is not obligated to try guardianship, custody with relatives, or additional short-term services if the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” standard is met and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

Given:

The repeated nature of the abuse/neglect.
The prior failed improvement period.
The severe psychological impact on the children.

the Supreme Court concludes that skipping less restrictive alternatives and moving directly to termination was fully consistent with West Virginia law.

D. The Central Role of Insight, Accountability, and Attitude

One of the most important thematic strands in this decision is the significance of a parent’s insight and attitude in abuse and neglect cases. The Court is not simply evaluating “checkbox compliance” (attendance at classes, signing up for counseling, etc.); it is assessing:

Does the parent genuinely understand what they did wrong?
Do they grasp the impact on the children?
Are they motivated to change for the children’s sake, or only to end DHS involvement?

Evidence that the mother:

Dismissed CPS as a “crock of sh--.”
Minimized violence to “arguing.”
Blamed the father, and claimed the children exaggerated.
Only re-engaged in treatment after a new petition was filed.

collectively undercut any claim that she was truly prepared to do the deep, sustained work needed to change.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion uses established precedents in a largely reinforcing, rather than novel, manner:

In re Cecil T. – Standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals (clear error for facts; de novo for law).
In re Timber M. & In re Charity H. – Articulate the “acknowledgment rule”: failure to acknowledge abuse makes services futile and can justify denial of improvement periods.
In re Tonjia M. – Confirms circuit court discretion to deny an improvement period where no likely improvement is shown.
In re D.S. & Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C. – Reinforce strong appellate deference to circuit court credibility determinations.
In re Kristin Y. & In re R.J.M. – Support termination without less restrictive alternatives once “no reasonable likelihood” and necessity for the child’s welfare are found.

In re C.F. and I.F. thus does not redefine doctrine but applies and strengthens an existing line of cases concerning:

The centrality of genuine acknowledgment of problems.
The limited tolerance for repeated cycles of reunification and relapse.
The primacy of the child’s well-being and need for permanency.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Abuse and Neglect Petition

A formal legal filing by DHS asking a court to intervene because children are alleged to be abused (physically, emotionally, sexually) or neglected (lacking proper care, supervision, or a safe environment).

2. Adjudicatory vs. Dispositional Hearings

Adjudicatory hearing: The court decides whether the child is actually abused or neglected. It focuses on whether the allegations are true.
Dispositional hearing: After a finding of abuse or neglect, the court decides what to do next: return the child with conditions, grant an improvement period, place the child with someone else, or terminate parental rights.

3. Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

A structured period after adjudication during which:

The parent is given access to services (counseling, treatment, classes, etc.).
The goal is to correct the problems that led to the abuse/neglect finding.
The parent must show willingness and ability to participate meaningfully.

It is not automatic. The parent must prove they are likely to fully participate, and the court may deny it when it appears futile or contrary to the children’s interests.

4. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

An intermediate standard of proof:

Higher than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not).
Lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases).
Means that the evidence must be highly and substantially more likely to be true than not, and the factfinder must have a firm belief or conviction in its truth.

5. “No Reasonable Likelihood that Conditions Can Be Substantially Corrected”

As defined by W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), this means:

The parent has shown an inadequate capacity to fix the problems, even with help.
It looks unlikely that they will correct the situation in the near future.

Courts consider:

Past participation in services.
The parent’s insight and attitude.
Whether problems reappear after cases close.

6. Termination of Parental Rights

A permanent severing of the legal relationship between parent and child:

The parent loses all legal rights and responsibilities for the child.
The child becomes eligible for adoption.

Termination is considered a drastic remedy and is used when:

There is no reasonable likelihood the parent can correct the conditions in the near future, and
Termination is necessary for the child’s health, safety, and well-being.

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Reinforcement, Not Revolution, in West Virginia Child Welfare Law

In re C.F. and I.F. largely reinforces established principles rather than creating new law. Its value lies in how clearly and concretely it applies those principles in a recurring fact pattern:

A parent previously successful in an improvement period.
Rapid relapse into the same harmful behavior after the case closes.
Renewed DHS involvement and severe child trauma.

Practitioners and trial courts can look to this case as a strong example of:

When a second (or repeated) improvement period may properly be denied.
How to evaluate a parent who “goes through the motions” but does not internalize change.

B. Emphasis on Genuine Insight and Responsibility

The decision sends a clear message:

Compliance alone is not enough. Simply attending classes or checking boxes is insufficient if, afterward, the same behaviors resurface.
Insight matters. Parents must understand and acknowledge:
- The nature of their abusive or neglectful conduct.
- The harm caused to the children.
- Their personal responsibility for that harm.
Denial and minimization are red flags. Where a parent consistently downplays violence or blames others, courts may reasonably find that improvement periods would be futile.

C. Child-Centered Focus and Permanency

The opinion embodies the modern, child-centered approach in abuse and neglect proceedings:

Children are not required to endure repeated cycles of removal and reunification while a parent experiments with treatment.
Severe psychological harm—manifested as nightmares, behavioral issues, and regression—is taken seriously and weighs heavily in favor of termination where the parent shows no real progress.

The decision underscores that the “best interests” and welfare of the child can—and often will—outweigh a parent’s pleas for another chance when those pleas are not backed by credible evidence of true change.

D. Guidance for Counsel and Parents

For attorneys and parents in similar cases, In re C.F. and I.F. offers several lessons:

Document genuine progress. Evidence should demonstrate not just attendance at services, but behavioral change and insight.
Address minimization head-on. Counsel should work with clients to confront and articulate the harm caused, showing the court they understand and accept responsibility.
Take prior cases seriously. A prior improvement period is not a “reset button”; relapse into the same patterns after reunification is powerful evidence against future improvement.
Caution with hostile statements. Written or recorded hostile statements about DHS, mental health providers, or the process can severely undermine claims of willingness to participate.

E. The Role of Mental Health and Domestic Violence

The case reflects the complex intersection of:

Mental health diagnoses (here, an unspecified personality disorder with borderline and antisocial traits).
Substance abuse.
Domestic violence dynamics.

The Court does not treat mental health or substance abuse, in themselves, as automatic grounds for termination. Rather, it focuses on:

The mother’s refusal or inability to consistently engage in treatment.
The recurrence of dangerous behavior despite services.
The severe and demonstrable impact on the children.

This underscores an important nuance: West Virginia law expects parents with such issues to take sustained, responsible steps to manage them. Where they do not—and children are harmed—termination may be appropriate.

VII. Conclusion

In re C.F. and I.F. is a clear, fact-driven affirmation of core principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect law. It holds that:

A parent seeking an improvement period must, by clear and convincing evidence, demonstrate likely full participation—and this includes genuine acknowledgment of the problem.
When a parent fails to acknowledge the seriousness of domestic violence, minimizes its effects, blames others, and reverts to harmful behavior after extensive services, courts may reasonably find an improvement period futile.
Repeated recurrence of the same abuse/neglect conditions, especially after a prior improvement period and reunification, can show “no reasonable likelihood” of correction, and can justify termination of parental rights without less restrictive alternatives.
Children’s severe psychological injuries, particularly where supported by expert testimony, strongly support a finding that termination is necessary for their welfare.
Appellate courts will defer to circuit courts’ credibility determinations and will not re-weigh the parent’s assurances of future change on a cold record.

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re C.F. and I.F. provides a robust illustration of how West Virginia courts balance parental rights, the need for meaningful change, and the paramount interest of children in safety and permanence. It emphasizes that the law does not require children to wait indefinitely for a parent to develop the insight and commitment that were lacking in this case.