Acklin v. Eichner: Reaffirming the 30‑Day Appeal Deadline as the Benchmark for Rule 60(b)(1) Legal‑Error Motions and Tightening Post‑Judgment Amendments under Rule 60(b)(6)

Introduction

This Second Circuit summary order, Acklin v. Eichner, arises from litigation brought by hundreds of investors who purchased timeshare interests in a Manhattan building. The plaintiffs asserted federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state-law claims against the developers and related entities associated with the project.

The district court (Judge Gregory H. Woods, S.D.N.Y.) dismissed the RICO claims with prejudice, after having already granted one opportunity to amend, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Crucially, the plaintiffs did not file a timely notice of appeal from that final judgment. Instead, they attempted to revive their case through:

• motions to extend the time to appeal, and
• motions for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

The district court denied both sets of motions. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged only the denial of their Rule 60(b) motions. The Second Circuit (Calabresi, Lynch, Merriam, JJ.) affirmed.

Although issued as a nonprecedential “summary order” under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision is doctrinally important because it:

• reconfirms that, when a Rule 60(b)(1) motion alleges legal error that could have been raised on direct appeal, the “reasonable time” requirement ordinarily means no later than the 30‑day appeal deadline under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A); and
• applies the Supreme Court’s decision in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman to hold that post‑judgment requests to amend a complaint must satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)’s “extraordinary circumstances” standard independently of Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy.

The opinion thus serves as a pointed reminder that Rule 60(b) is not a backdoor substitute for a missed appeal, and that parties who voluntarily forgo or mishandle their appeal rights will rarely find refuge in Rule 60(b)(6).

Summary of the Opinion

After the district court entered judgment dismissing the RICO claims with prejudice and the state-law claims without prejudice on February 26, 2024, the plaintiffs had 30 days—until March 27, 2024—to file a notice of appeal. Instead:

• On March 27, 2024 (the last day), plaintiff Charles Acklin filed:
  • a motion to extend his time to file a notice of appeal, and
  • a bare “notice of motion” for Rule 60(b) relief (without the required supporting memorandum).
• On March 28, 2024 (one day after the deadline), Acklin filed his memorandum in support of Rule 60(b), and the remaining plaintiffs filed their own motions:
  • to extend the time to appeal, and
  • for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).

The district court:

• denied the motions to extend the time to appeal, and
• denied the Rule 60(b) motions.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged only the denial of Rule 60(b) relief. The Second Circuit:

1. Standard of Review. Applied abuse-of-discretion review to the Rule 60(b) rulings, as clarified by the Supreme Court’s decision in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, requiring that the district court:
   • applied the correct legal standard, and
   • offered “substantial justification” for its conclusions.
2. Characterization of the Rule 60(b) motion. Approved the district court’s characterization of:
   • claims of judicial “mistake” (legal error) as governed by Rule 60(b)(1), and
   • the request for leave to amend after judgment as governed by Rule 60(b)(6).
3. Timeliness under Rule 60(b)(1). Held that:
   • Rule 60(c)(1)’s one-year limit for Rule 60(b)(1) is an outer limit, and
   • where the motion alleges a “substantive legal” error that could have been raised on appeal, the “reasonable time” requirement ordinarily does not extend beyond the 30‑day appeal period under FRAP 4(a)(1)(A), citing Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco and Ahmed v. Noem.
   The plaintiffs filed their Rule 60(b)(1) motions after the 30‑day deadline and offered no special circumstances justifying delay. The motions were therefore untimely.
4. Forfeiture. The plaintiffs did not challenge the district court’s timeliness ruling on Rule 60(b)(1) in their opening brief, thereby forfeiting any argument on that issue (citing Hussein v. Maait).
5. Rule 60(b)(6) and post-judgment amendment. As to the request to vacate the judgment so the plaintiffs could amend the complaint again (after discovery), the court held:
   • under BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, post‑judgment amendment requires first establishing entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) by showing “extraordinary circumstances,” and
   • Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard does not by itself justify reopening a final judgment.
   The plaintiffs failed to show extraordinary circumstances, failed to explain their delay beyond the appeal deadline, and failed to identify any new facts or law unavailable earlier. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was properly denied.

The Second Circuit concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and therefore affirmed the order denying Rule 60(b) relief.

Detailed Analysis

I. Procedural Posture and Context

The underlying dispute centers on alleged misconduct in the sale of timeshare interests. The plaintiffs, as timeshare purchasers, brought:

• federal RICO claims, and
• state-law claims (e.g., likely fraud, contract, consumer protection, though the summary order does not detail them).

The district court:

• dismissed the original RICO complaint but allowed amendment;
• dismissed the amended complaint’s RICO claims with prejudice; and
• declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice (footnote 1), after dismissing all federal claims.

The plaintiffs did not appeal the judgment within 30 days. Instead, they attempted to:

• extend the time for appeal; and
• obtain Rule 60(b) relief as a vehicle either to overturn the judgment or to secure yet another opportunity to amend.

The timing of their filings is critical:

• February 26, 2024: Judgment entered.
• March 27, 2024: 30‑day appeal deadline expires (FRAP 4(a)(1)(A)). On that day:
  • Acklin files: (i) a motion to extend appeal time; and (ii) a notice of motion for Rule 60(b) relief (without supporting memorandum).
• March 28, 2024:
  • Acklin files the memorandum of law supporting his Rule 60(b) motion.
  • The remaining plaintiffs file:
    • their own motion to extend the time to appeal; and
    • their own Rule 60(b) motion (with supporting papers).

The district court denied:

• the requests to extend the appeal deadline, and
• the Rule 60(b) motions.

On appeal, the plaintiffs focused exclusively on the Rule 60(b) denials. The merits of the underlying RICO dismissal were not before the Second Circuit except indirectly, as the alleged “legal errors” that plaintiffs sought to correct via Rule 60(b)(1).

II. Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion in Rule 60(b) Cases

The Second Circuit applied the standard specified in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204 (2025), which it quotes:

“District courts’ Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed ‘only for abuse of discretion.’ … To be upheld, a district court’s decision need only ‘appl[y] the correct legal standard and offe[r] substantial justification’ for its conclusion.”

This standard builds on earlier Supreme Court authority (Browder v. Dep’t of Corrections of Illinois; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.) and has two principal components:

1. Correct legal standard. The district court must identify and apply the correct doctrinal framework: e.g., properly distinguish between Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6); understand the timeliness requirements of Rule 60(c)(1); apply the “extraordinary circumstances” standard under Rule 60(b)(6); and respect the line between direct appeal and collateral relief.
2. Substantial justification. The court’s reasoning must be adequately supported by facts and law, not arbitrary or perfunctory. It does not need to be the only reasonable conclusion; it needs to be a reasonable one.

In Acklin, the Second Circuit holds that both criteria are met:

• the district court correctly classified and analyzed the Rule 60(b) arguments under subsections (1) and (6);
• its application of the “reasonable time” requirement and “extraordinary circumstances” test was faithful to governing authority; and
• it adequately explained why the Rule 60(b) motions were untimely or meritless.

III. Proper Characterization of the Rule 60(b) Motion

A threshold question in any Rule 60(b) case is: which subsection applies? This matters greatly, because:

• each subsection has different substantive standards (e.g., mistake vs. fraud vs. newly discovered evidence vs. “any other reason”), and
• some subsections (60(b)(1)–(3)) are subject to the one‑year outer limit, while others (60(b)(4)–(6)) are not, though all are constrained by the “reasonable time” requirement in Rule 60(c)(1).

The Second Circuit cites its prior decision in Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2023), for the proposition that:

“Proper characterization of [a] Rule 60(b) motion is a threshold issue.”

Here, the plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion was not carefully parsed; they “broadly” invoked both Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6). The district court, however, made a critical distinction:

• To the extent the motion asserted that the district court had made mistakes of law in dismissing the RICO claims, it was governed by Rule 60(b)(1).
• To the extent the plaintiffs sought another chance to amend the complaint after judgment—especially after discovery—this request fell under the “catchall” of Rule 60(b)(6).

The Second Circuit endorsed this characterization as accurate and consistent with its jurisprudence.

IV. Rule 60(b)(1): Timeliness, “Reasonable Time,” and the Appeal Deadline

A. Text of Rule 60(c)(1) and the “extreme limit” concept

Rule 60(c)(1) provides:

“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”

The plaintiffs argued that their motions were timely simply because they were filed within one year of the judgment. The Second Circuit rejected that reading as contrary to the rule’s “plain language,” emphasizing that:

• “Reasonable time” is a separate and independent requirement that applies to all Rule 60(b) motions, and
• the one‑year limit for (b)(1)–(3) is an additional, stricter cap—not an entitlement to wait up to a year in all circumstances.

The court reinforced this point by citing Wright & Miller’s leading treatise:

“The one-year period represents an extreme limit, and the motion may be rejected as untimely if not made within a ‘reasonable time’ even though the one-year period has not expired.”

B. Legal error and the 30‑day appeal period

The central doctrinal move is the court’s reaffirmation of the rule that, for Rule 60(b)(1) motions alleging substantive legal error—the kind of error that could have been raised on direct appeal—the “reasonable time” ordinarily does not extend beyond the appeal period.

The court relies on:

• Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1977): holding that where a Rule 60(b)(1) motion alleges legal mistakes, the motion must ordinarily be brought within the time for filing an appeal (30 days under FRAP 4(a)(1)(A)).
• Ahmed v. Noem, No. 24‑1260, 2025 WL 428424, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2025): reiterating that “our caselaw is clear that a motion to correct the district court’s mistake pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) must be brought within the time to appeal the judgment.”

The opinion explains that the plaintiffs’ claim—that the district court wrongly dismissed their RICO counts—is a classic, “garden variety” assertion of legal error, fully amenable to direct appellate review. Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to serve as an alternative late-stage mechanism for such routine challenges.

Accordingly, the “reasonable time” to bring a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for legal error in this context is presumptively:

• 30 days from judgment, i.e., the same period during which an ordinary notice of appeal could have been filed under FRAP 4(a)(1)(A).

C. Addressing the plaintiffs’ policy argument

The plaintiffs argued that tying Rule 60(b)(1) timeliness to the 30‑day appeal period would “force” parties to file unnecessary appeals whenever they believed the district court might be persuaded to correct its own errors under Rule 60(b)(1).

The Second Circuit rejected that concern as misplaced. It clarified that:

• Parties are not required to file both an appeal and a Rule 60(b) motion; rather,
• they must simply file any Rule 60(b)(1) motion within the 30‑day window. A timely 60(b)(1) motion is fully compatible with allowing the district court to correct its own errors, so long as litigants act within the same timeframe that would preserve their appellate rights.

In a critical footnote, the court further underscored that:

“[I]f the motion is filed within 28 days, the motion will automatically extend the time to appeal.” (Citing FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) and Rule 59(e).)

This means that:

• A Rule 60(b) motion filed within 28 days of judgment often functions like a post‑judgment motion under Rule 59(e) for tolling purposes; it suspends the time to appeal until the motion is decided.
• This procedural design actually reduces the risk of duplicative filings, because a promptly filed Rule 60(b)(1) motion both:
  • gives the district court a first opportunity to correct alleged errors, and
  • preserves the right to appeal later if the district court denies relief.

What the rules do not permit is waiting beyond the appeal period and then using Rule 60(b)(1) as a belated substitute for a timely appeal.

D. Application: Untimely Rule 60(b)(1) motions

Applying these standards, the Second Circuit concluded:

• The plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(1) motions, alleging legal error in the dismissal of the RICO claims, were untimely because they were not effectively filed within the 30‑day appeal period.
• Acklin’s bare notice of motion filed on day 30 did not qualify as a proper motion under the Southern District of New York’s local rules, which require a memorandum of law to accompany motions. The court cites Colluci v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 531 F. App’x 118, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2013), upholding denial of a motion as untimely where the local rules were not followed.
• The substantive memoranda and the group filings by the other plaintiffs came on March 28, 2024—after the 30‑day deadline.

The plaintiffs also failed to identify any special circumstances—such as lack of notice, incapacity, or external obstacles—that might justify a departure from the usual rule tying “reasonable time” to the appeal period. Their contentions were indistinguishable from those ordinarily raised on appeal.

The district court was therefore correct to deem the Rule 60(b)(1) motions untimely.

E. Forfeiture of the timeliness challenge

The Second Circuit adds another, independent ground for affirmance: forfeiture. The court notes that:

• The plaintiffs did not contest the district court’s timeliness ruling on the Rule 60(b)(1) motions in their opening brief on appeal.
• Issues not raised in the opening brief are generally forfeited, per Hussein v. Maait, 129 F.4th 99, 123 (2d Cir. 2025).

Even if there had been arguable merit to their timeliness argument (there was not), the plaintiffs lost the opportunity to pursue it by failing to brief it.

V. Rule 60(b)(6): Post‑Judgment Amendment and “Extraordinary Circumstances”

A. Rule 60(b)(6) as a “catchall” and its high threshold

Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a final judgment for:

“any other reason that justifies relief.”

By its terms, Rule 60(b)(6) applies only to situations not covered by subsections (1)–(5). It is traditionally reserved for “extraordinary circumstances” that make it inequitable to enforce a judgment—not for routine litigation missteps or strategic errors.

The Second Circuit emphasizes the Supreme Court’s guidance in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman:

• A party seeking to reopen a case and replead after judgment must first satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) “on its own” by showing “extraordinary circumstances.”
• Rule 15(a)(2)’s liberal standard for granting leave to amend (“freely give leave when justice so requires”) does not override the finality of judgments once Rule 60(b) becomes relevant.
• Courts should “emphasize the importance of a Rule 60(b)(6) movant’s faultlessness” and refuse to relieve parties from the consequences of their “free, calculated, [and] deliberate choices,” quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950).

B. Plaintiffs’ request: another amendment after discovery

In Acklin, the plaintiffs requested:

• vacatur of the judgment, and
• leave to amend the complaint yet again, this time after conducting discovery.

This is a particularly ambitious request: the plaintiffs had already been granted one opportunity to amend; their RICO claims had been dismissed with prejudice; they missed the appeal deadline; and now they sought to both reopen the case and obtain discovery-based amendments.

They tried to ground this in the “liberal allowance of amendments” under Rule 15(a)(2), arguing that fairness required another opportunity to plead their claims more fully. But the Second Circuit, invoking BLOM Bank, makes clear that:

• Rule 15(a)(2) is a pre‑judgment standard: it governs whether to allow amendments while a case is still active.
• After final judgment, the bar is much higher: the party must first reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), which in turn requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances.

C. Lack of “extraordinary circumstances” and responsibility for delay

The Second Circuit agrees with the district court that the plaintiffs failed completely to show “extraordinary circumstances.” Specifically:

• They did not explain why they waited until after the appeal deadline to seek vacatur and amendment.
• They did not identify any new facts or legal developments that were previously unavailable at the time of judgment.
• They essentially sought to relitigate the same theories, just with more time and discovery, after having chosen not to file a timely appeal.

Under BLOM Bank and Ackermann, this is exactly the sort of “free, calculated, deliberate choice” that Rule 60(b)(6) does not exist to undo. The equities cut sharply against the plaintiffs:

• They were represented by counsel.
• They had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the sufficiency of their complaint, including one amendment.
• They had notice of the judgment and the time to appeal.
• They simply failed to utilize ordinary appellate procedures in a timely way.

Since the plaintiffs could not show extraordinary circumstances or faultlessness, the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and the Second Circuit affirmed.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204 (2025)

The Supreme Court’s decision in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman is the doctrinal backbone of Acklin. The Second Circuit relies on it for three propositions:

1. Standard of review. Rule 60(b) decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. They will be upheld if the district court:
   • applies the correct legal standard, and
   • offers substantial justification for its conclusions.
2. Post‑judgment amendment requires Rule 60(b)(6) satisfaction first. A party seeking to reopen a case and replead must first satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) on its own terms—i.e., show “extraordinary circumstances.”
3. Faultlessness and deliberate choices. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is equitable and focuses on the movant’s faultlessness; courts do not relieve parties from the consequences of deliberate litigation choices, as confirmed by Ackermann v. United States.

2. Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1977)

Vesco supplies the foundational Second Circuit rule that when a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is aimed at correcting “mistakes of a substantive legal nature” that could have been raised on appeal, the “reasonable time” for filing such a motion will ordinarily not exceed the time allowed to file an appeal (30 days).

3. Ahmed v. Noem, No. 24‑1260, 2025 WL 428424 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2025)

Cited as a recent reiteration of the Vesco principle, Ahmed expressly states that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to correct the district court’s mistake “must be brought within the time to appeal the judgment.”

4. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950)

Ackermann is the classic Supreme Court authority cautioning that Rule 60(b) does not exist to relieve parties from “free, calculated, deliberate choices.” It underlines the importance of finality and litigant responsibility. BLOM Bank relies on Ackermann, and Acklin in turn applies that principle to reject the plaintiffs’ efforts to undo their missed appeal.

5. Browder v. Dep’t of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (1978)

Browder reinforces the limited, exception-based nature of Rule 60(b) and supports the abuse-of-discretion standard of review for Rule 60(b) rulings. It is quoted via BLOM Bank.

6. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)

Cooter & Gell supports the “correct legal standard and substantial justification” test for reviewing discretionary procedural decisions. It underpins the deferential posture appellate courts take toward district courts in the Rule 60(b) context.

7. Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2023)

Mandala is cited to underscore that correctly characterizing the Rule 60(b) ground (e.g., (1) vs. (6)) is a “threshold issue.” Mischaracterization can lead to misapplication of time limits and substantive standards.

8. Treatise: Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2866 (3d ed. 2025)

The court quotes this respected treatise to clarify that the one‑year limit for Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) is an “extreme limit,” not a guaranteed window, and that courts may deem a motion untimely if not filed within a “reasonable time,” even if the year has not expired.

9. Hussein v. Maait, 129 F.4th 99 (2d Cir. 2025)

Hussein is cited for the rule that arguments not raised in the opening brief on appeal are generally forfeited. The Second Circuit uses this doctrine to hold that even if the plaintiffs’ timeliness arguments had potential merit, they were abandoned by not being briefed.

10. Colluci v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 531 F. App’x 118 (2d Cir. 2013)

Colluci supports the proposition that compliance with local rules—such as the requirement to submit a memorandum of law with a motion—is essential to treat a filing as a proper “motion.” Acklin’s last-minute bare notice of motion did not suffice to render the Rule 60(b) motion timely.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For litigants and counsel: timing is everything

Acklin sends an unmistakable message: do not treat the one-year outer limit in Rule 60(c)(1) as a safe harbor for Rule 60(b)(1) motions alleging legal error.

For such motions:

• The “reasonable time” will almost always mean no later than the 30‑day appeal deadline.
• Delays beyond that period require compelling justification (e.g., lack of notice), which was absent here.

Practically, counsel should:

• Assume that any Rule 60(b)(1) motion challenging alleged legal errors must be prepared and filed within 30 days.
• Consider filing within 28 days where possible, to take advantage of FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), which suspends the appeal deadline while the motion is pending.
• Never rely on “placeholder” filings that violate local rules; they may not preserve timeliness.

B. Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal

Acklin reinforces a longstanding principle: Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy, not a routine second chance. It is especially not a substitute for:

• a timely appeal, or
• a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.

Litigants who:

• make conscious decisions not to appeal;
• gamble on post‑judgment strategies; or
• simply mismanage deadlines

will rarely be able to use Rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6) to escape the consequences of those choices.

C. Post‑judgment amendment is strictly cabined

The decision, read with BLOM Bank, tightens the doctrinal screws on parties who wish to:

• vacate an adverse judgment, and
• replead (especially after taking discovery).

Going forward, such parties must accept that:

• Rule 15(a)(2)’s liberal standard is not the operative test once judgment is final.
• They must first clear the high bar of Rule 60(b)(6) by showing:
  • extraordinary circumstances, and
  • their own near-total faultlessness in creating the situation that led to judgment.

This reinforces the imperative to plead one’s best case pre‑judgment and to use ordinary appellate review rather than hoping for expansive post‑judgment leniency.

D. Summary orders as persuasive guidance

Although the Second Circuit’s opinion is a “summary order” and expressly “does not have precedential effect” under Local Rule 32.1.1, it:

• may be cited (with appropriate notation) under FRAP 32.1; and
• offers a clear, practical roadmap for how the court will apply:
  • BLOM Bank in post‑judgment amendment contexts, and
  • the “reasonable time” requirement of Rule 60(b)(1) in relation to the 30‑day appeal period.

As such, Acklin is likely to be a useful persuasive authority in future Second Circuit briefing on Rule 60(b) issues, even if it is not formally binding.

E. Minimal impact on substantive RICO law

Finally, the decision has virtually no effect on substantive RICO jurisprudence. The Second Circuit does not reach or discuss:

• the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ RICO allegations;
• the standards for RICO “enterprise,” “pattern,” or “racketeering activity”; or
• how RICO applies in the timeshare-investment context.

The entire appeal turns on civil procedure—specifically, the appropriate use of Rule 60(b) and appellate deadlines. The RICO claims remain dismissed, and the plaintiffs’ failure to pursue a timely appeal means those rulings stand unreviewed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is Rule 60(b)?

Rule 60(b) allows a federal district court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order in limited situations. The rule lists six grounds:

1. Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
2. Newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered in time for a new trial motion under Rule 59(b).
3. Fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.
4. Void judgment (e.g., for lack of jurisdiction).
5. Satisfied, released, or discharged judgment, or a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer equitable for the judgment to have prospective application.
6. Any other reason that justifies relief (the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6)).

All Rule 60(b) motions must be filed within a “reasonable time.” For grounds (1)–(3), they must also be filed no later than one year after judgment. Relief is discretionary and considered exceptional, not routine.

2. Rule 59(e), Rule 60(b), and the appeal clock

There are two main post‑judgment mechanisms for seeking reconsideration in the district court:

• Rule 59(e): motion to alter or amend the judgment, filed within 28 days of entry.
• Rule 60(b): motion for relief from judgment, subject to “reasonable time” and (for some grounds) a one‑year cap.

Key point:

• If a party files a qualifying Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 motion within 28 days, FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) suspends the time to appeal until the motion is decided. This allows the district court first crack at correcting errors, without forcing simultaneous appeal.
• If a party waits beyond 28 days—and especially beyond the 30‑day appeal deadline—they risk losing both their direct appeal and any realistic shot at Rule 60(b)(1) relief for legal errors.

3. “Extraordinary circumstances” and “faultlessness” under Rule 60(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6)’s “any other reason” provision cannot be invoked for routine or foreseeable problems. Courts require:

• Extraordinary circumstances: Something outside the normal run of litigation—severe illness, gross attorney abandonment, dramatic change in law, or other highly unusual conditions that render strict enforcement of the judgment manifestly unjust.
• Faultlessness: The movant must show that they are largely blameless for the situation leading to judgment—for example, they lacked notice or were prevented by forces beyond their control from properly litigating or appealing.

In contrast, a party who:

• made strategic choices (even if unwise),
• missed deadlines, or
• simply disagrees with the court’s analysis

will generally not qualify for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

4. “Abuse of discretion” explained

“Abuse of discretion” is a deferential standard of review. An appellate court will not overturn a district court’s decision unless it:

• applied the wrong legal rule, or
• applied the right rule in an irrational or clearly unreasonable way.

It is not enough that the appellate court might have decided the issue differently. The question is whether the lower court’s decision was within the range of reasonable choices, given the facts and applicable law.

Conclusion

Acklin v. Eichner is, on its face, a procedural skirmish arising from a complex timeshare-investment dispute. But its significance lies in its clear, disciplined application of Rule 60(b) doctrine in the shadow of a missed appeal.

The Second Circuit:

• reaffirms that the “reasonable time” for bringing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion alleging legal error will almost always be bounded by the 30‑day appeal deadline;
• confirms that the one‑year limit in Rule 60(c)(1) is an outer ceiling, not a license to delay; and
• integrates the Supreme Court’s decision in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman to hold that post‑judgment amendment demands satisfaction of Rule 60(b)(6)’s “extraordinary circumstances” test, independent of Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy.

By insisting on timely action, careful motion practice, and respect for the finality of judgments, the court underscores a core structural principle of civil litigation: decisions must, at some point, become final. Rule 60(b) remains an important safety valve for truly exceptional cases, but it cannot rescue parties from their own deliberate or negligent failure to pursue ordinary appellate remedies.