Accrual-Point and Jurisdictional Deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2467
– Commentary on In Re Enforcement of Philippine Forfeiture Judgment, 24-185(L) (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

On 18 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a richly-reasoned opinion that clarifies several unsettled questions surrounding the federal mechanism for enforcing foreign criminal-forfeiture judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 2467. At centre stage were $40 million in assets traceable to the late President-dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos, originally deposited in 1972 in a Merrill Lynch account set up through the shell company Arelma S.A.

Two groups sought to derail the Republic of the Philippines’ effort, led by the U.S. Department of Justice, to repatriate the assets:

• A certified class of 9,539 Filipinos who had obtained a US$2 billion federal judgment for human-rights abuses.
• Jeana Roxas (and the Golden Budha Corporation) asserting rights flowing from treasure allegedly stolen by Marcos.

The Court affirmed in full the Southern District of New York’s rulings, rejected every affirmative defence, and dismissed Roxas for lack of Article III standing—thereby clearing the final hurdle to remittance of the funds to Manila.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Statute-of-Limitations Holding – The relevant “claim” under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is the federal enforcement action itself, and it accrues when the foreign state formally requests enforcement and the Attorney General certifies that request. Thus, the five-year clock started no earlier than January 2015 and the 2016 filing was timely.
• Rule 41 Two-Dismissal Rule Inapplicable – Prior suits the Philippines voluntarily dismissed in the 1980s did not bar the present action because the § 2467 proceeding is a new, distinct claim.
• Subject-Matter-Jurisdiction Defence – Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction is measured under Philippine law; the intervenors produced no contrary evidence.
• Notice Defence – Only persons holding an interest at the time of the foreign judgment are owed notice; the class’s interest evaporated when the Supreme Court decided Pimentel (2008) prior to the 2009 forfeiture order.
• Fraud Defence – § 2467(d)(1)(E) embraces only “fraud on the court” analogous to Rule 60(d)(3); the class showed no such fraud.
• Scope of Enforcement – A bank account qualifies as “property” under § 2467(a)(2)(B); the entire account (not merely the 1983 balance) is forfeitable.
• Standing – Roxas failed to trace the Yamashita treasure proceeds to the Arelma Assets even under a relaxed tracing standard; hence no Article III injury.
• Intervention – Golden Budha Corporation properly denied intervention; its interests duplicated Roxas’s and it likewise lacked standing.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008) – Critical to the notice analysis; the Court treated the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Hawaii interpleader action as eliminating the class’s property interest.
• Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013) – Distinguished; although Gabelli pegged § 2462 accrual to the date of the underlying violation for punitive SEC suits, the Second Circuit held that § 2467 actions cannot accrue until a final foreign judgment and DOJ certification exist.
• Multiple circuit decisions on administrative-penalty enforcement (e.g., FERC v. Vitol, 9th Cir. 2023) – Cited for the prevalent view that enforcement-only suits accrue after antecedent agency action, reinforcing the Court’s approach to § 2467.
• Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013) – The presumption against extraterritoriality helped justify using Philippine (not U.S.) jurisdictional doctrines.
• Federal Rule 60 “fraud on the court” jurisprudence (Mazzei 2023) – Provided the template for interpreting § 2467(d)(1)(E).

3.2 Legal Reasoning Breakdown

1. Defining the “Claim” for § 2462
   The panel parsed the word “claim” contextually:
   • In limitations statutes a claim accrues only once the plaintiff possesses a “complete and present cause of action.”
   • Because the United States cannot file under § 2467 until (i) the foreign judgment is final and (ii) DOJ determines enforcement serves the “interest of justice,” earlier misconduct is irrelevant.
2. Due-Process Notice Defence
   Section 2467(d)(1)(D) is retroactive: did the foreign sovereign deprive an interested party of the chance to defend? The Court ruled that interest must exist on the foreign judgment’s date; earlier or later interests do not trigger the defence.
3. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Measured by Foreign Law
   Applying U.S. in-rem concepts to overseas tribunals would “undermine § 2467’s purpose as a discretionary tool of international comity.” Thus Philippine law controlled.
4. Fraud Standard
   Congress’s phrase “obtained by fraud” is read narrowly: only egregious deceit that “defiles the court” voids enforcement, not ordinary evidentiary disputes.
5. Property vs. Money Judgments
   Bank accounts are forfeitable “property”; citing Rule 32.2 and federal forfeiture practice, the Court dismissed the argument that a sum-certain is required.
6. Standing & Constructive Trust
   Even under relaxed New-York tracing rules, conjectural testimony could not link the Yamashita treasure to the Arelma deposit; hence no “facially colourable” interest.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

The ruling is the Second Circuit’s first comprehensive construction of § 2467 and will serve as persuasive authority nationwide.

• Time-Bar Clarity – Foreign states and DOJ now have a predictable five-year window beginning with the certified request, not the underlying criminal conduct.
• Forum-Law Deference – Respondents must attack a foreign court’s jurisdiction using that court’s own doctrines—raising the evidentiary bar for collateral challenges.
• Trimmed Defences – By aligning fraud with Rule 60(d)(3) and restricting the notice defence to contemporaneous interest-holders, the Court narrows the avenues for delay tactics.
• Property Definition – Treating fluid financial assets as “property” ensures that entire accounts (including appreciation) are swept into forfeiture, enlarging the potential recovery for victim-states.
• Standing Demands Tracing, Even if Relaxed – Future intervenors must supply non-speculative tracing evidence, discouraging speculative opportunistic claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• 28 U.S.C. § 2467 – A statute that lets DOJ, upon request of a treaty partner, ask a U.S. court to enforce that country’s final criminal-forfeiture judgment as though it were domestic.
• § 2462 Five-Year Limitation – General federal catch-all time bar for enforcing penalties or forfeitures. The question here was when that five-year countdown starts.
• Rule 41 Two-Dismissal Rule – If a plaintiff twice voluntarily dismisses the same claim, the second dismissal counts “with prejudice.” It did not apply because the § 2467 enforcement action is a brand-new claim.
• Notice Defence in § 2467 – A judgment will not be enforced if the foreign nation failed to give adequate notice to people who already had a legal stake in the property when the foreign court acted.
• Constructive Trust – An equitable device through which a court treats a wrong-doer as a trustee holding property for the true owner; requires tracing the victim’s property into the offender’s hands.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s opinion in In Re Enforcement of Philippine Forfeiture Judgment supplies much-needed doctrinal structure to 28 U.S.C. § 2467. The Court firmly anchored the statute-of-limitations trigger to DOJ certification, insisted that foreign legal standards govern foreign-court jurisdiction, and pruned the statutory affirmative defences to a manageable scope.

For states seeking to repatriate kleptocratic assets, the decision streamlines the path through U.S. courts; for human-rights victims and other competing creditors, it signals that speculative or belated claims will face steep hurdles. Above all, the case underscores § 2467’s hybrid character: a tool of foreign-policy discretion wielded by the Executive, implemented through federal forfeiture practice, and now bounded by clear judicial guideposts.